<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/mm, branch v3.18.3</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>mm: Don't count the stack guard page towards RLIMIT_STACK</title>
<updated>2015-01-16T14:59:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-11T19:33:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f2f5d44bb48707fa2ea231bc554c9f6ccfb1a883'/>
<id>f2f5d44bb48707fa2ea231bc554c9f6ccfb1a883</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 690eac53daff34169a4d74fc7bfbd388c4896abb upstream.

Commit fee7e49d4514 ("mm: propagate error from stack expansion even for
guard page") made sure that we return the error properly for stack
growth conditions.  It also theorized that counting the guard page
towards the stack limit might break something, but also said "Let's see
if anybody notices".

Somebody did notice.  Apparently android-x86 sets the stack limit very
close to the limit indeed, and including the guard page in the rlimit
check causes the android 'zygote' process problems.

So this adds the (fairly trivial) code to make the stack rlimit check be
against the actual real stack size, rather than the size of the vma that
includes the guard page.

Reported-and-tested-by: Chih-Wei Huang &lt;cwhuang@android-x86.org&gt;
Cc: Jay Foad &lt;jay.foad@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 690eac53daff34169a4d74fc7bfbd388c4896abb upstream.

Commit fee7e49d4514 ("mm: propagate error from stack expansion even for
guard page") made sure that we return the error properly for stack
growth conditions.  It also theorized that counting the guard page
towards the stack limit might break something, but also said "Let's see
if anybody notices".

Somebody did notice.  Apparently android-x86 sets the stack limit very
close to the limit indeed, and including the guard page in the rlimit
check causes the android 'zygote' process problems.

So this adds the (fairly trivial) code to make the stack rlimit check be
against the actual real stack size, rather than the size of the vma that
includes the guard page.

Reported-and-tested-by: Chih-Wei Huang &lt;cwhuang@android-x86.org&gt;
Cc: Jay Foad &lt;jay.foad@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: propagate error from stack expansion even for guard page</title>
<updated>2015-01-16T14:59:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-06T21:00:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c03aed64c4fc9e39e8727920971d889dac14b002'/>
<id>c03aed64c4fc9e39e8727920971d889dac14b002</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fee7e49d45149fba60156f5b59014f764d3e3728 upstream.

Jay Foad reports that the address sanitizer test (asan) sometimes gets
confused by a stack pointer that ends up being outside the stack vma
that is reported by /proc/maps.

This happens due to an interaction between RLIMIT_STACK and the guard
page: when we do the guard page check, we ignore the potential error
from the stack expansion, which effectively results in a missing guard
page, since the expected stack expansion won't have been done.

And since /proc/maps explicitly ignores the guard page (commit
d7824370e263: "mm: fix up some user-visible effects of the stack guard
page"), the stack pointer ends up being outside the reported stack area.

This is the minimal patch: it just propagates the error.  It also
effectively makes the guard page part of the stack limit, which in turn
measn that the actual real stack is one page less than the stack limit.

Let's see if anybody notices.  We could teach acct_stack_growth() to
allow an extra page for a grow-up/grow-down stack in the rlimit test,
but I don't want to add more complexity if it isn't needed.

Reported-and-tested-by: Jay Foad &lt;jay.foad@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit fee7e49d45149fba60156f5b59014f764d3e3728 upstream.

Jay Foad reports that the address sanitizer test (asan) sometimes gets
confused by a stack pointer that ends up being outside the stack vma
that is reported by /proc/maps.

This happens due to an interaction between RLIMIT_STACK and the guard
page: when we do the guard page check, we ignore the potential error
from the stack expansion, which effectively results in a missing guard
page, since the expected stack expansion won't have been done.

And since /proc/maps explicitly ignores the guard page (commit
d7824370e263: "mm: fix up some user-visible effects of the stack guard
page"), the stack pointer ends up being outside the reported stack area.

This is the minimal patch: it just propagates the error.  It also
effectively makes the guard page part of the stack limit, which in turn
measn that the actual real stack is one page less than the stack limit.

Let's see if anybody notices.  We could teach acct_stack_growth() to
allow an extra page for a grow-up/grow-down stack in the rlimit test,
but I don't want to add more complexity if it isn't needed.

Reported-and-tested-by: Jay Foad &lt;jay.foad@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm, vmscan: prevent kswapd livelock due to pfmemalloc-throttled process being killed</title>
<updated>2015-01-16T14:59:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlastimil Babka</name>
<email>vbabka@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-08T22:32:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=53bcf5c328d8d89d7357d9d8bdd58ad9fb06a377'/>
<id>53bcf5c328d8d89d7357d9d8bdd58ad9fb06a377</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9e5e3661727eaf960d3480213f8e87c8d67b6956 upstream.

Charles Shirron and Paul Cassella from Cray Inc have reported kswapd
stuck in a busy loop with nothing left to balance, but
kswapd_try_to_sleep() failing to sleep.  Their analysis found the cause
to be a combination of several factors:

1. A process is waiting in throttle_direct_reclaim() on pgdat-&gt;pfmemalloc_wait

2. The process has been killed (by OOM in this case), but has not yet been
   scheduled to remove itself from the waitqueue and die.

3. kswapd checks for throttled processes in prepare_kswapd_sleep():

        if (waitqueue_active(&amp;pgdat-&gt;pfmemalloc_wait)) {
                wake_up(&amp;pgdat-&gt;pfmemalloc_wait);
		return false; // kswapd will not go to sleep
	}

   However, for a process that was already killed, wake_up() does not remove
   the process from the waitqueue, since try_to_wake_up() checks its state
   first and returns false when the process is no longer waiting.

4. kswapd is running on the same CPU as the only CPU that the process is
   allowed to run on (through cpus_allowed, or possibly single-cpu system).

5. CONFIG_PREEMPT_NONE=y kernel is used. If there's nothing to balance, kswapd
   encounters no voluntary preemption points and repeatedly fails
   prepare_kswapd_sleep(), blocking the process from running and removing
   itself from the waitqueue, which would let kswapd sleep.

So, the source of the problem is that we prevent kswapd from going to
sleep until there are processes waiting on the pfmemalloc_wait queue,
and a process waiting on a queue is guaranteed to be removed from the
queue only when it gets scheduled.  This was done to make sure that no
process is left sleeping on pfmemalloc_wait when kswapd itself goes to
sleep.

However, it isn't necessary to postpone kswapd sleep until the
pfmemalloc_wait queue actually empties.  To prevent processes from being
left sleeping, it's actually enough to guarantee that all processes
waiting on pfmemalloc_wait queue have been woken up by the time we put
kswapd to sleep.

This patch therefore fixes this issue by substituting 'wake_up' with
'wake_up_all' and removing 'return false' in the code snippet from
prepare_kswapd_sleep() above.  Note that if any process puts itself in
the queue after this waitqueue_active() check, or after the wake up
itself, it means that the process will also wake up kswapd - and since
we are under prepare_to_wait(), the wake up won't be missed.  Also we
update the comment prepare_kswapd_sleep() to hopefully more clearly
describe the races it is preventing.

Fixes: 5515061d22f0 ("mm: throttle direct reclaimers if PF_MEMALLOC reserves are low and swap is backed by network storage")
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov &lt;vdavydov@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9e5e3661727eaf960d3480213f8e87c8d67b6956 upstream.

Charles Shirron and Paul Cassella from Cray Inc have reported kswapd
stuck in a busy loop with nothing left to balance, but
kswapd_try_to_sleep() failing to sleep.  Their analysis found the cause
to be a combination of several factors:

1. A process is waiting in throttle_direct_reclaim() on pgdat-&gt;pfmemalloc_wait

2. The process has been killed (by OOM in this case), but has not yet been
   scheduled to remove itself from the waitqueue and die.

3. kswapd checks for throttled processes in prepare_kswapd_sleep():

        if (waitqueue_active(&amp;pgdat-&gt;pfmemalloc_wait)) {
                wake_up(&amp;pgdat-&gt;pfmemalloc_wait);
		return false; // kswapd will not go to sleep
	}

   However, for a process that was already killed, wake_up() does not remove
   the process from the waitqueue, since try_to_wake_up() checks its state
   first and returns false when the process is no longer waiting.

4. kswapd is running on the same CPU as the only CPU that the process is
   allowed to run on (through cpus_allowed, or possibly single-cpu system).

5. CONFIG_PREEMPT_NONE=y kernel is used. If there's nothing to balance, kswapd
   encounters no voluntary preemption points and repeatedly fails
   prepare_kswapd_sleep(), blocking the process from running and removing
   itself from the waitqueue, which would let kswapd sleep.

So, the source of the problem is that we prevent kswapd from going to
sleep until there are processes waiting on the pfmemalloc_wait queue,
and a process waiting on a queue is guaranteed to be removed from the
queue only when it gets scheduled.  This was done to make sure that no
process is left sleeping on pfmemalloc_wait when kswapd itself goes to
sleep.

However, it isn't necessary to postpone kswapd sleep until the
pfmemalloc_wait queue actually empties.  To prevent processes from being
left sleeping, it's actually enough to guarantee that all processes
waiting on pfmemalloc_wait queue have been woken up by the time we put
kswapd to sleep.

This patch therefore fixes this issue by substituting 'wake_up' with
'wake_up_all' and removing 'return false' in the code snippet from
prepare_kswapd_sleep() above.  Note that if any process puts itself in
the queue after this waitqueue_active() check, or after the wake up
itself, it means that the process will also wake up kswapd - and since
we are under prepare_to_wait(), the wake up won't be missed.  Also we
update the comment prepare_kswapd_sleep() to hopefully more clearly
describe the races it is preventing.

Fixes: 5515061d22f0 ("mm: throttle direct reclaimers if PF_MEMALLOC reserves are low and swap is backed by network storage")
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov &lt;vdavydov@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: protect set_page_dirty() from ongoing truncation</title>
<updated>2015-01-16T14:59:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Weiner</name>
<email>hannes@cmpxchg.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-08T22:32:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a78e877e9a689d8195b2e62d68030c36fd8e7f34'/>
<id>a78e877e9a689d8195b2e62d68030c36fd8e7f34</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2d6d7f98284648c5ed113fe22a132148950b140f upstream.

Tejun, while reviewing the code, spotted the following race condition
between the dirtying and truncation of a page:

__set_page_dirty_nobuffers()       __delete_from_page_cache()
  if (TestSetPageDirty(page))
                                     page-&gt;mapping = NULL
				     if (PageDirty())
				       dec_zone_page_state(page, NR_FILE_DIRTY);
				       dec_bdi_stat(mapping-&gt;backing_dev_info, BDI_RECLAIMABLE);
    if (page-&gt;mapping)
      account_page_dirtied(page)
        __inc_zone_page_state(page, NR_FILE_DIRTY);
	__inc_bdi_stat(mapping-&gt;backing_dev_info, BDI_RECLAIMABLE);

which results in an imbalance of NR_FILE_DIRTY and BDI_RECLAIMABLE.

Dirtiers usually lock out truncation, either by holding the page lock
directly, or in case of zap_pte_range(), by pinning the mapcount with
the page table lock held.  The notable exception to this rule, though,
is do_wp_page(), for which this race exists.  However, do_wp_page()
already waits for a locked page to unlock before setting the dirty bit,
in order to prevent a race where clear_page_dirty() misses the page bit
in the presence of dirty ptes.  Upgrade that wait to a fully locked
set_page_dirty() to also cover the situation explained above.

Afterwards, the code in set_page_dirty() dealing with a truncation race
is no longer needed.  Remove it.

Reported-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2d6d7f98284648c5ed113fe22a132148950b140f upstream.

Tejun, while reviewing the code, spotted the following race condition
between the dirtying and truncation of a page:

__set_page_dirty_nobuffers()       __delete_from_page_cache()
  if (TestSetPageDirty(page))
                                     page-&gt;mapping = NULL
				     if (PageDirty())
				       dec_zone_page_state(page, NR_FILE_DIRTY);
				       dec_bdi_stat(mapping-&gt;backing_dev_info, BDI_RECLAIMABLE);
    if (page-&gt;mapping)
      account_page_dirtied(page)
        __inc_zone_page_state(page, NR_FILE_DIRTY);
	__inc_bdi_stat(mapping-&gt;backing_dev_info, BDI_RECLAIMABLE);

which results in an imbalance of NR_FILE_DIRTY and BDI_RECLAIMABLE.

Dirtiers usually lock out truncation, either by holding the page lock
directly, or in case of zap_pte_range(), by pinning the mapcount with
the page table lock held.  The notable exception to this rule, though,
is do_wp_page(), for which this race exists.  However, do_wp_page()
already waits for a locked page to unlock before setting the dirty bit,
in order to prevent a race where clear_page_dirty() misses the page bit
in the presence of dirty ptes.  Upgrade that wait to a fully locked
set_page_dirty() to also cover the situation explained above.

Afterwards, the code in set_page_dirty() dealing with a truncation race
is no longer needed.  Remove it.

Reported-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/CMA: fix boot regression due to physical address of high_memory</title>
<updated>2015-01-08T18:30:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joonsoo Kim</name>
<email>iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-10T23:41:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2f4f9b92b2582f8c1706686cdbbe07d28530f8cc'/>
<id>2f4f9b92b2582f8c1706686cdbbe07d28530f8cc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6b101e2a3ce4d2a0312087598bd1ab4a1db2ac40 upstream.

high_memory isn't direct mapped memory so retrieving it's physical address
isn't appropriate.  But, it would be useful to check physical address of
highmem boundary so it's justfiable to get physical address from it.  In
x86, there is a validation check if CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL and it triggers
following boot failure reported by Ingo.

  ...
  BUG: Int 6: CR2 00f06f53
  ...
  Call Trace:
    dump_stack+0x41/0x52
    early_idt_handler+0x6b/0x6b
    cma_declare_contiguous+0x33/0x212
    dma_contiguous_reserve_area+0x31/0x4e
    dma_contiguous_reserve+0x11d/0x125
    setup_arch+0x7b5/0xb63
    start_kernel+0xb8/0x3e6
    i386_start_kernel+0x79/0x7d

To fix boot regression, this patch implements workaround to avoid
validation check in x86 when retrieving physical address of high_memory.
__pa_nodebug() used by this patch is implemented only in x86 so there is
no choice but to use dirty #ifdef.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment]
Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Reported-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Marek Szyprowski &lt;m.szyprowski@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;rmk@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6b101e2a3ce4d2a0312087598bd1ab4a1db2ac40 upstream.

high_memory isn't direct mapped memory so retrieving it's physical address
isn't appropriate.  But, it would be useful to check physical address of
highmem boundary so it's justfiable to get physical address from it.  In
x86, there is a validation check if CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL and it triggers
following boot failure reported by Ingo.

  ...
  BUG: Int 6: CR2 00f06f53
  ...
  Call Trace:
    dump_stack+0x41/0x52
    early_idt_handler+0x6b/0x6b
    cma_declare_contiguous+0x33/0x212
    dma_contiguous_reserve_area+0x31/0x4e
    dma_contiguous_reserve+0x11d/0x125
    setup_arch+0x7b5/0xb63
    start_kernel+0xb8/0x3e6
    i386_start_kernel+0x79/0x7d

To fix boot regression, this patch implements workaround to avoid
validation check in x86 when retrieving physical address of high_memory.
__pa_nodebug() used by this patch is implemented only in x86 so there is
no choice but to use dirty #ifdef.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment]
Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Reported-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Marek Szyprowski &lt;m.szyprowski@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;rmk@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>slab: fix nodeid bounds check for non-contiguous node IDs</title>
<updated>2014-12-03T17:36:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Mackerras</name>
<email>paulus@samba.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-02T23:59:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7c3fbbdd04a681a1992ad6a3d7a36a63ff668753'/>
<id>7c3fbbdd04a681a1992ad6a3d7a36a63ff668753</id>
<content type='text'>
The bounds check for nodeid in ____cache_alloc_node gives false
positives on machines where the node IDs are not contiguous, leading to
a panic at boot time.  For example, on a POWER8 machine the node IDs are
typically 0, 1, 16 and 17.  This means that num_online_nodes() returns
4, so when ____cache_alloc_node is called with nodeid = 16 the VM_BUG_ON
triggers, like this:

  kernel BUG at /home/paulus/kernel/kvm/mm/slab.c:3079!
  Call Trace:
    .____cache_alloc_node+0x5c/0x270 (unreliable)
    .kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0xdc/0x360
    .init_list+0x3c/0x128
    .kmem_cache_init+0x1dc/0x258
    .start_kernel+0x2a0/0x568
    start_here_common+0x20/0xa8

To fix this, we instead compare the nodeid with MAX_NUMNODES, and
additionally make sure it isn't negative (since nodeid is an int).  The
check is there mainly to protect the array dereference in the get_node()
call in the next line, and the array being dereferenced is of size
MAX_NUMNODES.  If the nodeid is in range but invalid (for example if the
node is off-line), the BUG_ON in the next line will catch that.

Fixes: 14e50c6a9bc2 ("mm: slab: Verify the nodeid passed to ____cache_alloc_node")
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Yasuaki Ishimatsu &lt;isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The bounds check for nodeid in ____cache_alloc_node gives false
positives on machines where the node IDs are not contiguous, leading to
a panic at boot time.  For example, on a POWER8 machine the node IDs are
typically 0, 1, 16 and 17.  This means that num_online_nodes() returns
4, so when ____cache_alloc_node is called with nodeid = 16 the VM_BUG_ON
triggers, like this:

  kernel BUG at /home/paulus/kernel/kvm/mm/slab.c:3079!
  Call Trace:
    .____cache_alloc_node+0x5c/0x270 (unreliable)
    .kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0xdc/0x360
    .init_list+0x3c/0x128
    .kmem_cache_init+0x1dc/0x258
    .start_kernel+0x2a0/0x568
    start_here_common+0x20/0xa8

To fix this, we instead compare the nodeid with MAX_NUMNODES, and
additionally make sure it isn't negative (since nodeid is an int).  The
check is there mainly to protect the array dereference in the get_node()
call in the next line, and the array being dereferenced is of size
MAX_NUMNODES.  If the nodeid is in range but invalid (for example if the
node is off-line), the BUG_ON in the next line will catch that.

Fixes: 14e50c6a9bc2 ("mm: slab: Verify the nodeid passed to ____cache_alloc_node")
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Yasuaki Ishimatsu &lt;isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pekka Enberg &lt;penberg@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Joonsoo Kim &lt;iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: fix anon_vma_clone() error treatment</title>
<updated>2014-12-03T17:36:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Forrest</name>
<email>dan.forrest@ssec.wisc.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-02T23:59:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c4ea95d7cd08d9ffd7fa75e6c5e0332d596dd11e'/>
<id>c4ea95d7cd08d9ffd7fa75e6c5e0332d596dd11e</id>
<content type='text'>
Andrew Morton noticed that the error return from anon_vma_clone() was
being dropped and replaced with -ENOMEM (which is not itself a bug
because the only error return value from anon_vma_clone() is -ENOMEM).

I did an audit of callers of anon_vma_clone() and discovered an actual
bug where the error return was being lost.  In __split_vma(), between
Linux 3.11 and 3.12 the code was changed so the err variable is used
before the call to anon_vma_clone() and the default initial value of
-ENOMEM is overwritten.  So a failure of anon_vma_clone() will return
success since err at this point is now zero.

Below is a patch which fixes this bug and also propagates the error
return value from anon_vma_clone() in all cases.

Fixes: ef0855d334e1 ("mm: mempolicy: turn vma_set_policy() into vma_dup_policy()")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Forrest &lt;dan.forrest@ssec.wisc.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;koct9i@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Tim Hartrick &lt;tim@edgecast.com&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: Michel Lespinasse &lt;walken@google.com&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[3.12+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Andrew Morton noticed that the error return from anon_vma_clone() was
being dropped and replaced with -ENOMEM (which is not itself a bug
because the only error return value from anon_vma_clone() is -ENOMEM).

I did an audit of callers of anon_vma_clone() and discovered an actual
bug where the error return was being lost.  In __split_vma(), between
Linux 3.11 and 3.12 the code was changed so the err variable is used
before the call to anon_vma_clone() and the default initial value of
-ENOMEM is overwritten.  So a failure of anon_vma_clone() will return
success since err at this point is now zero.

Below is a patch which fixes this bug and also propagates the error
return value from anon_vma_clone() in all cases.

Fixes: ef0855d334e1 ("mm: mempolicy: turn vma_set_policy() into vma_dup_policy()")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Forrest &lt;dan.forrest@ssec.wisc.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;koct9i@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Tim Hartrick &lt;tim@edgecast.com&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: Michel Lespinasse &lt;walken@google.com&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[3.12+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: fix swapoff hang after page migration and fork</title>
<updated>2014-12-03T17:36:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hugh Dickins</name>
<email>hughd@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-02T23:59:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2022b4d18a491a578218ce7a4eca8666db895a73'/>
<id>2022b4d18a491a578218ce7a4eca8666db895a73</id>
<content type='text'>
I've been seeing swapoff hangs in recent testing: it's cycling around
trying unsuccessfully to find an mm for some remaining pages of swap.

I have been exercising swap and page migration more heavily recently,
and now notice a long-standing error in copy_one_pte(): it's trying to
add dst_mm to swapoff's mmlist when it finds a swap entry, but is doing
so even when it's a migration entry or an hwpoison entry.

Which wouldn't matter much, except it adds dst_mm next to src_mm,
assuming src_mm is already on the mmlist: which may not be so.  Then if
pages are later swapped out from dst_mm, swapoff won't be able to find
where to replace them.

There's already a !non_swap_entry() test for stats: move that up before
the swap_duplicate() and the addition to mmlist.

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kelley Nielsen &lt;kelleynnn@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[2.6.18+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
I've been seeing swapoff hangs in recent testing: it's cycling around
trying unsuccessfully to find an mm for some remaining pages of swap.

I have been exercising swap and page migration more heavily recently,
and now notice a long-standing error in copy_one_pte(): it's trying to
add dst_mm to swapoff's mmlist when it finds a swap entry, but is doing
so even when it's a migration entry or an hwpoison entry.

Which wouldn't matter much, except it adds dst_mm next to src_mm,
assuming src_mm is already on the mmlist: which may not be so.  Then if
pages are later swapped out from dst_mm, swapoff won't be able to find
where to replace them.

There's already a !non_swap_entry() test for stats: move that up before
the swap_duplicate() and the addition to mmlist.

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kelley Nielsen &lt;kelleynnn@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[2.6.18+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm/vmpressure.c: fix race in vmpressure_work_fn()</title>
<updated>2014-12-03T01:32:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrew Morton</name>
<email>akpm@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-02T23:59:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=91b57191cfd152c02ded0745250167d0263084f8'/>
<id>91b57191cfd152c02ded0745250167d0263084f8</id>
<content type='text'>
In some android devices, there will be a "divide by zero" exception.
vmpr-&gt;scanned could be zero before spin_lock(&amp;vmpr-&gt;sr_lock).

Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=88051

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: neaten]
Reported-by: ji_ang &lt;ji_ang@163.com&gt;
Cc: Anton Vorontsov &lt;anton.vorontsov@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In some android devices, there will be a "divide by zero" exception.
vmpr-&gt;scanned could be zero before spin_lock(&amp;vmpr-&gt;sr_lock).

Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=88051

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: neaten]
Reported-by: ji_ang &lt;ji_ang@163.com&gt;
Cc: Anton Vorontsov &lt;anton.vorontsov@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: frontswap: invalidate expired data on a dup-store failure</title>
<updated>2014-12-03T01:32:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Weijie Yang</name>
<email>weijie.yang@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-02T23:59:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fb993fa1a2f669215fa03a09eed7848f2663e336'/>
<id>fb993fa1a2f669215fa03a09eed7848f2663e336</id>
<content type='text'>
If a frontswap dup-store failed, it should invalidate the expired page
in the backend, or it could trigger some data corruption issue.
Such as:
 1. use zswap as the frontswap backend with writeback feature
 2. store a swap page(version_1) to entry A, success
 3. dup-store a newer page(version_2) to the same entry A, fail
 4. use __swap_writepage() write version_2 page to swapfile, success
 5. zswap do shrink, writeback version_1 page to swapfile
 6. version_2 page is overwrited by version_1, data corrupt.

This patch fixes this issue by invalidating expired data immediately
when meet a dup-store failure.

Signed-off-by: Weijie Yang &lt;weijie.yang@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Seth Jennings &lt;sjennings@variantweb.net&gt;
Cc: Dan Streetman &lt;ddstreet@ieee.org&gt;
Cc: Minchan Kim &lt;minchan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Bob Liu &lt;bob.liu@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
If a frontswap dup-store failed, it should invalidate the expired page
in the backend, or it could trigger some data corruption issue.
Such as:
 1. use zswap as the frontswap backend with writeback feature
 2. store a swap page(version_1) to entry A, success
 3. dup-store a newer page(version_2) to the same entry A, fail
 4. use __swap_writepage() write version_2 page to swapfile, success
 5. zswap do shrink, writeback version_1 page to swapfile
 6. version_2 page is overwrited by version_1, data corrupt.

This patch fixes this issue by invalidating expired data immediately
when meet a dup-store failure.

Signed-off-by: Weijie Yang &lt;weijie.yang@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Seth Jennings &lt;sjennings@variantweb.net&gt;
Cc: Dan Streetman &lt;ddstreet@ieee.org&gt;
Cc: Minchan Kim &lt;minchan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Bob Liu &lt;bob.liu@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
