linux-stable.git/mm/util.c, branch linux-4.7.y

mm: make vm_mmap killable

2016-05-24T00:04:14+00:00

All the callers of vm_mmap seem to check for the failure already and
bail out in one way or another on the error which means that we can
change it to use killable version of vm_mmap_pgoff and return -EINTR if
the current task gets killed while waiting for mmap_sem.  This also
means that vm_mmap_pgoff can be killable by default and drop the
additional parameter.

This will help in the OOM conditions when the oom victim might be stuck
waiting for the mmap_sem for write which in turn can block oom_reaper
which relies on the mmap_sem for read to make a forward progress and
reclaim the address space of the victim.

Please note that load_elf_binary is ignoring vm_mmap error for
current->personality & MMAP_PAGE_ZERO case but that shouldn't be a
problem because the address is not used anywhere and we never return to
the userspace if we got killed.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko 
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka 
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" 
Cc: Mel Gorman 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Johannes Weiner 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: make mmap_sem for write waits killable for mm syscalls

2016-05-24T00:04:14+00:00

This is a follow up work for oom_reaper [1].  As the async OOM killing
depends on oom_sem for read we would really appreciate if a holder for
write didn't stood in the way.  This patchset is changing many of
down_write calls to be killable to help those cases when the writer is
blocked and waiting for readers to release the lock and so help
__oom_reap_task to process the oom victim.

Most of the patches are really trivial because the lock is help from a
shallow syscall paths where we can return EINTR trivially and allow the
current task to die (note that EINTR will never get to the userspace as
the task has fatal signal pending).  Others seem to be easy as well as
the callers are already handling fatal errors and bail and return to
userspace which should be sufficient to handle the failure gracefully.
I am not familiar with all those code paths so a deeper review is really
appreciated.

As this work is touching more areas which are not directly connected I
have tried to keep the CC list as small as possible and people who I
believed would be familiar are CCed only to the specific patches (all
should have received the cover though).

This patchset is based on linux-next and it depends on
down_write_killable for rw_semaphores which got merged into tip
locking/rwsem branch and it is merged into this next tree.  I guess it
would be easiest to route these patches via mmotm because of the
dependency on the tip tree but if respective maintainers prefer other
way I have no objections.

I haven't covered all the mmap_write(mm->mmap_sem) instances here

  $ git grep "down_write(.*\)" next/master | wc -l
  98
  $ git grep "down_write(.*\)" | wc -l
  62

I have tried to cover those which should be relatively easy to review in
this series because this alone should be a nice improvement.  Other
places can be changed on top.

[0] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1456752417-9626-1-git-send-email-mhocko@kernel.org
[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1452094975-551-1-git-send-email-mhocko@kernel.org
[2] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1456750705-7141-1-git-send-email-mhocko@kernel.org

This patch (of 18):

This is the first step in making mmap_sem write waiters killable.  It
focuses on the trivial ones which are taking the lock early after
entering the syscall and they are not changing state before.

Therefore it is very easy to change them to use down_write_killable and
immediately return with -EINTR.  This will allow the waiter to pass away
without blocking the mmap_sem which might be required to make a forward
progress.  E.g.  the oom reaper will need the lock for reading to
dismantle the OOM victim address space.

The only tricky function in this patch is vm_mmap_pgoff which has many
call sites via vm_mmap.  To reduce the risk keep vm_mmap with the
original non-killable semantic for now.

vm_munmap callers do not bother checking the return value so open code
it into the munmap syscall path for now for simplicity.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko 
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka 
Cc: Mel Gorman 
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" 
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov 
Cc: Hugh Dickins 
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli 
Cc: David Rientjes 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Johannes Weiner 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: uninline page_mapped()

2016-05-20T02:12:14+00:00

It's huge.  Uninlining it saves 206 bytes per callsite.  Shaves 4924
bytes from the x86_64 allmodconfig vmlinux.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Cc: Steve Capper 
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Merge branch 'mm-pkeys-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2016-03-21T02:08:56+00:00

Pull x86 protection key support from Ingo Molnar:
 "This tree adds support for a new memory protection hardware feature
  that is available in upcoming Intel CPUs: 'protection keys' (pkeys).

  There's a background article at LWN.net:

      https://lwn.net/Articles/643797/

  The gist is that protection keys allow the encoding of
  user-controllable permission masks in the pte.  So instead of having a
  fixed protection mask in the pte (which needs a system call to change
  and works on a per page basis), the user can map a (handful of)
  protection mask variants and can change the masks runtime relatively
  cheaply, without having to change every single page in the affected
  virtual memory range.

  This allows the dynamic switching of the protection bits of large
  amounts of virtual memory, via user-space instructions.  It also
  allows more precise control of MMU permission bits: for example the
  executable bit is separate from the read bit (see more about that
  below).

  This tree adds the MM infrastructure and low level x86 glue needed for
  that, plus it adds a high level API to make use of protection keys -
  if a user-space application calls:

        mmap(..., PROT_EXEC);

  or

        mprotect(ptr, sz, PROT_EXEC);

  (note PROT_EXEC-only, without PROT_READ/WRITE), the kernel will notice
  this special case, and will set a special protection key on this
  memory range.  It also sets the appropriate bits in the Protection
  Keys User Rights (PKRU) register so that the memory becomes unreadable
  and unwritable.

  So using protection keys the kernel is able to implement 'true'
  PROT_EXEC on x86 CPUs: without protection keys PROT_EXEC implies
  PROT_READ as well.  Unreadable executable mappings have security
  advantages: they cannot be read via information leaks to figure out
  ASLR details, nor can they be scanned for ROP gadgets - and they
  cannot be used by exploits for data purposes either.

  We know about no user-space code that relies on pure PROT_EXEC
  mappings today, but binary loaders could start making use of this new
  feature to map binaries and libraries in a more secure fashion.

  There is other pending pkeys work that offers more high level system
  call APIs to manage protection keys - but those are not part of this
  pull request.

  Right now there's a Kconfig that controls this feature
  (CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) that is default enabled
  (like most x86 CPU feature enablement code that has no runtime
  overhead), but it's not user-configurable at the moment.  If there's
  any serious problem with this then we can make it configurable and/or
  flip the default"

* 'mm-pkeys-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (38 commits)
  x86/mm/pkeys: Fix mismerge of protection keys CPUID bits
  mm/pkeys: Fix siginfo ABI breakage caused by new u64 field
  x86/mm/pkeys: Fix access_error() denial of writes to write-only VMA
  mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add execute-only protection keys support
  x86/mm/pkeys: Create an x86 arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() for VMA flags
  x86/mm/pkeys: Allow kernel to modify user pkey rights register
  x86/fpu: Allow setting of XSAVE state
  x86/mm: Factor out LDT init from context init
  mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add arch_validate_pkey()
  mm/core, arch, powerpc: Pass a protection key in to calc_vm_flag_bits()
  x86/mm/pkeys: Actually enable Memory Protection Keys in the CPU
  x86/mm/pkeys: Add Kconfig prompt to existing config option
  x86/mm/pkeys: Dump pkey from VMA in /proc/pid/smaps
  x86/mm/pkeys: Dump PKRU with other kernel registers
  mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Differentiate instruction fetches
  x86/mm/pkeys: Optimize fault handling in access_error()
  mm/core: Do not enforce PKEY permissions on remote mm access
  um, pkeys: Add UML arch_*_access_permitted() methods
  mm/gup, x86/mm/pkeys: Check VMAs and PTEs for protection keys
  x86/mm/gup: Simplify get_user_pages() PTE bit handling
  ...

mm: deduplicate memory overcommitment code

2016-03-17T22:09:34+00:00

Currently we have two copies of the same code which implements memory
overcommitment logic.  Let's move it into mm/util.c and hence avoid
duplication.  No functional changes here.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm/gup: Overload get_user_pages() functions

2016-02-16T09:11:12+00:00

The concept here was a suggestion from Ingo.  The implementation
horrors are all mine.

This allows get_user_pages(), get_user_pages_unlocked(), and
get_user_pages_locked() to be called with or without the
leading tsk/mm arguments.  We will give a compile-time warning
about the old style being __deprecated and we will also
WARN_ON() if the non-remote version is used for a remote-style
access.

Doing this, folks will get nice warnings and will not break the
build.  This should be nice for -next and will hopefully let
developers fix up their own code instead of maintainers needing
to do it at merge time.

The way we do this is hideous.  It uses the __VA_ARGS__ macro
functionality to call different functions based on the number
of arguments passed to the macro.

There's an additional hack to ensure that our EXPORT_SYMBOL()
of the deprecated symbols doesn't trigger a warning.

We should be able to remove this mess as soon as -rc1 hits in
the release after this is merged.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Alexander Kuleshov 
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Dan Williams 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Dominik Dingel 
Cc: Geliang Tang 
Cc: Jan Kara 
Cc: Johannes Weiner 
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov 
Cc: Leon Romanovsky 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Masahiro Yamada 
Cc: Mateusz Guzik 
Cc: Maxime Coquelin 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Paul Gortmaker 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Vladimir Davydov 
Cc: Vlastimil Babka 
Cc: Xie XiuQi 
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210155.73222EE1@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

proc: revert /proc//maps [stack:TID] annotation

2016-02-03T16:28:43+00:00

Commit b76437579d13 ("procfs: mark thread stack correctly in
proc//maps") added [stack:TID] annotation to /proc//maps.

Finding the task of a stack VMA requires walking the entire thread list,
turning this into quadratic behavior: a thousand threads means a
thousand stacks, so the rendering of /proc//maps needs to look at a
million combinations.

The cost is not in proportion to the usefulness as described in the
patch.

Drop the [stack:TID] annotation to make /proc//maps (and
/proc//numa_maps) usable again for higher thread counts.

The [stack] annotation inside /proc//task//maps is retained, as
identifying the stack VMA there is an O(1) operation.

Siddesh said:
 "The end users needed a way to identify thread stacks programmatically and
  there wasn't a way to do that.  I'm afraid I no longer remember (or have
  access to the resources that would aid my memory since I changed
  employers) the details of their requirement.  However, I did do this on my
  own time because I thought it was an interesting project for me and nobody
  really gave any feedback then as to its utility, so as far as I am
  concerned you could roll back the main thread maps information since the
  information is available in the thread-specific files"

Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner 
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" 
Cc: Siddhesh Poyarekar 
Cc: Shaohua Li 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc read mm's {arg,env}_{start,end} with mmap semaphore taken.

2016-01-21T01:09:18+00:00

Only functions doing more than one read are modified.  Consumeres
happened to deal with possibly changing data, but it does not seem like
a good thing to rely on.

Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik 
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov 
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan 
Cc: Jarod Wilson 
Cc: Jan Stancek 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Anshuman Khandual 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: prepare page_referenced() and page_idle to new THP refcounting

2016-01-16T01:56:32+00:00

Both page_referenced() and page_idle_clear_pte_refs_one() assume that
THP can only be mapped with PMD, so there's no reason to look on PTEs
for PageTransHuge() pages.  That's no true anymore: THP can be mapped
with PTEs too.

The patch removes PageTransHuge() test from the functions and opencode
page table check.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Cc: Vladimir Davydov 
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli 
Cc: Hugh Dickins 
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi 
Cc: Sasha Levin 
Cc: Minchan Kim 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: sanitize page->mapping for tail pages

2016-01-16T01:56:32+00:00

We don't define meaning of page->mapping for tail pages.  Currently it's
always NULL, which can be inconsistent with head page and potentially
lead to problems.

Let's poison the pointer to catch all illigal uses.

page_rmapping(), page_mapping() and page_anon_vma() are changed to look
on head page.

The only illegal use I've caught so far is __GPF_COMP pages from sound
subsystem, mapped with PTEs.  do_shared_fault() is changed to use
page_rmapping() instead of direct access to fault_page->mapping.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov 
Reviewed-by: Jérôme Glisse 
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli 
Cc: Hugh Dickins 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Mel Gorman 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Vlastimil Babka 
Cc: Christoph Lameter 
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi 
Cc: Steve Capper 
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" 
Cc: Johannes Weiner 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Jerome Marchand 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds