linux-stable.git/mm/usercopy.c, branch v5.18

Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)

2022-03-22T23:11:53+00:00

Merge updates from Andrew Morton:

 - A few misc subsystems: kthread, scripts, ntfs, ocfs2, block, and vfs

 - Most the MM patches which precede the patches in Willy's tree: kasan,
   pagecache, gup, swap, shmem, memcg, selftests, pagemap, mremap,
   sparsemem, vmalloc, pagealloc, memory-failure, mlock, hugetlb,
   userfaultfd, vmscan, compaction, mempolicy, oom-kill, migration, thp,
   cma, autonuma, psi, ksm, page-poison, madvise, memory-hotplug, rmap,
   zswap, uaccess, ioremap, highmem, cleanups, kfence, hmm, and damon.

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton : (227 commits)
  mm/damon/sysfs: remove repeat container_of() in damon_sysfs_kdamond_release()
  Docs/ABI/testing: add DAMON sysfs interface ABI document
  Docs/admin-guide/mm/damon/usage: document DAMON sysfs interface
  selftests/damon: add a test for DAMON sysfs interface
  mm/damon/sysfs: support DAMOS stats
  mm/damon/sysfs: support DAMOS watermarks
  mm/damon/sysfs: support schemes prioritization
  mm/damon/sysfs: support DAMOS quotas
  mm/damon/sysfs: support DAMON-based Operation Schemes
  mm/damon/sysfs: support the physical address space monitoring
  mm/damon/sysfs: link DAMON for virtual address spaces monitoring
  mm/damon: implement a minimal stub for sysfs-based DAMON interface
  mm/damon/core: add number of each enum type values
  mm/damon/core: allow non-exclusive DAMON start/stop
  Docs/damon: update outdated term 'regions update interval'
  Docs/vm/damon/design: update DAMON-Idle Page Tracking interference handling
  Docs/vm/damon: call low level monitoring primitives the operations
  mm/damon: remove unnecessary CONFIG_DAMON option
  mm/damon/paddr,vaddr: remove damon_{p,v}a_{target_valid,set_operations}()
  mm/damon/dbgfs-test: fix is_target_id() change
  ...

mm/usercopy: return 1 from hardened_usercopy __setup() handler

2022-03-22T22:57:11+00:00

__setup() handlers should return 1 if the command line option is handled
and 0 if not (or maybe never return 0; it just pollutes init's
environment).  This prevents:

  Unknown kernel command line parameters \
  "BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc5 hardened_usercopy=off", will be \
  passed to user space.

  Run /sbin/init as init process
   with arguments:
     /sbin/init
   with environment:
     HOME=/
     TERM=linux
     BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc5
     hardened_usercopy=off
or
     hardened_usercopy=on
but when "hardened_usercopy=foo" is used, there is no Unknown kernel
command line parameter.

Return 1 to indicate that the boot option has been handled.
Print a warning if strtobool() returns an error on the option string,
but do not mark this as in unknown command line option and do not cause
init's environment to be polluted with this string.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220222034249.14795-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Link: lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru
Fixes: b5cb15d9372ab ("usercopy: Allow boot cmdline disabling of hardening")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap 
Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov 
Acked-by: Chris von Recklinghausen 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: remove usercopy_warn()

2022-03-22T22:57:11+00:00

Users of usercopy_warn() were removed by commit 53944f171a89 ("mm:
remove HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK")

Remove it.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/5f26643fc70b05f8455b60b99c30c17d635fa640.1644231910.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy 
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin 
Reviewed-by: Stephen Kitt 
Reviewed-by: Muchun Song 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

usercopy: Check valid lifetime via stack depth

2022-02-26T02:20:11+00:00

One of the things that CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY sanity-checks is whether
an object that is about to be copied to/from userspace is overlapping
the stack at all. If it is, it performs a number of inexpensive
bounds checks. One of the finer-grained checks is whether an object
crosses stack frames within the stack region. Doing this on x86 with
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER was cheap/easy. Doing it with ORC was deemed too
heavy, and was left out (a while ago), leaving the courser whole-stack
check.

The LKDTM tests USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_TO and USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_FROM
try to exercise these cross-frame cases to validate the defense is
working. They have been failing ever since ORC was added (which was
expected). While Muhammad was investigating various LKDTM failures[1],
he asked me for additional details on them, and I realized that when
exact stack frame boundary checking is not available (i.e. everything
except x86 with FRAME_POINTER), it could check if a stack object is at
least "current depth valid", in the sense that any object within the
stack region but not between start-of-stack and current_stack_pointer
should be considered unavailable (i.e. its lifetime is from a call no
longer present on the stack).

Introduce ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER to track which architectures
have actually implemented the common global register alias.

Additionally report usercopy bounds checking failures with an offset
from current_stack_pointer, which may assist with diagnosing failures.

The LKDTM USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_TO and USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_FROM tests
(once slightly adjusted in a separate patch) pass again with this fixed.

[1] https://github.com/kernelci/kernelci-project/issues/84

Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Reported-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum 
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
---
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220216201449.2087956-1-keescook@chromium.org
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220224060342.1855457-1-keescook@chromium.org
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220225173345.3358109-1-keescook@chromium.org
v4: - improve commit log (akpm)

mm: Convert check_heap_object() to use struct slab

2022-01-06T11:25:51+00:00

Ensure that we're not seeing a tail page inside __check_heap_object() by
converting to a slab instead of a page.  Take the opportunity to mark
the slab as const since we're not modifying it.  Also move the
declaration of __check_heap_object() to mm/slab.h so it's not available
to the wider kernel.

[ vbabka@suse.cz: in check_heap_object() only convert to struct slab for
  actual PageSlab pages; use folio as intermediate step instead of page ]

Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) 
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka 
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin

mm/usercopy.c: delete duplicated word

2020-08-12T17:57:58+00:00

Drop the repeated word "the".

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton 
Reviewed-by: Zi Yan 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200801173822.14973-13-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

usercopy: Avoid HIGHMEM pfn warning

2019-09-17T22:20:17+00:00

When running on a system with >512MB RAM with a 32-bit kernel built with:

	CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y
	CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y
	CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y

all execve()s will fail due to argv copying into kmap()ed pages, and on
usercopy checking the calls ultimately of virt_to_page() will be looking
for "bad" kmap (highmem) pointers due to CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y:

 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 kernel BUG at ../arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:83!
 invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
 CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc8 #6
 Hardware name: Dell Inc. Inspiron 1318/0C236D, BIOS A04 01/15/2009
 EIP: __phys_addr+0xaf/0x100
 ...
 Call Trace:
  __check_object_size+0xaf/0x3c0
  ? __might_sleep+0x80/0xa0
  copy_strings+0x1c2/0x370
  copy_strings_kernel+0x2b/0x40
  __do_execve_file+0x4ca/0x810
  ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x1c7/0x370
  do_execve+0x1b/0x20
  ...

The check is from arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:

	VIRTUAL_BUG_ON((phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT) > max_low_pfn);

Due to the kmap() in fs/exec.c:

		kaddr = kmap(kmapped_page);
	...
	if (copy_from_user(kaddr+offset, str, bytes_to_copy)) ...

Now we can fetch the correct page to avoid the pfn check. In both cases,
hardened usercopy will need to walk the page-span checker (if enabled)
to do sanity checking.

Reported-by: Randy Dunlap 
Tested-by: Randy Dunlap 
Fixes: f5509cc18daa ("mm: Hardened usercopy")
Cc: Matthew Wilcox 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/201909171056.7F2FFD17@keescook

mm/usercopy: use memory range to be accessed for wraparound check

2019-08-13T23:06:52+00:00

Currently, when checking to see if accessing n bytes starting at address
"ptr" will cause a wraparound in the memory addresses, the check in
check_bogus_address() adds an extra byte, which is incorrect, as the
range of addresses that will be accessed is [ptr, ptr + (n - 1)].

This can lead to incorrectly detecting a wraparound in the memory
address, when trying to read 4 KB from memory that is mapped to the the
last possible page in the virtual address space, when in fact, accessing
that range of memory would not cause a wraparound to occur.

Use the memory range that will actually be accessed when considering if
accessing a certain amount of bytes will cause the memory address to
wrap around.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1564509253-23287-1-git-send-email-isaacm@codeaurora.org
Fixes: f5509cc18daa ("mm: Hardened usercopy")
Signed-off-by: Prasad Sodagudi 
Signed-off-by: Isaac J. Manjarres 
Co-developed-by: Prasad Sodagudi 
Reviewed-by: William Kucharski 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Trilok Soni 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 500

2019-06-19T15:09:55+00:00

Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
  published by the free software foundation

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
  published by the free software foundation #

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt 
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart 
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal 
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm/usercopy.c: no check page span for stack objects

2019-01-09T01:15:11+00:00

It is easy to trigger this with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN=y,

  usercopy: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages (offset 0, size 23)!
  kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!

For example,

print_worker_info
char name[WQ_NAME_LEN] = { };
char desc[WORKER_DESC_LEN] = { };
  probe_kernel_read(name, wq->name, sizeof(name) - 1);
  probe_kernel_read(desc, worker->desc, sizeof(desc) - 1);
    __copy_from_user_inatomic
      check_object_size
        check_heap_object
          check_page_span

This is because on-stack variables could cross PAGE_SIZE boundary, and
failed this check,

if (likely(((unsigned long)ptr & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK) ==
	   ((unsigned long)end & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK)))

ptr = FFFF889007D7EFF8
end = FFFF889007D7F00E

Hence, fix it by checking if it is a stack object first.

[keescook@chromium.org: improve comments after reorder]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190103165151.GA32845@beast
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181231030254.99441-1-cai@lca.pw
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai 
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds