linux-stable.git/mm/mempool.c, branch v4.7

mm: mempool: kasan: don't poot mempool objects in quarantine

2016-06-25T00:23:52+00:00

Currently we may put reserved by mempool elements into quarantine via
kasan_kfree().  This is totally wrong since quarantine may really free
these objects.  So when mempool will try to use such element,
use-after-free will happen.  Or mempool may decide that it no longer
need that element and double-free it.

So don't put object into quarantine in kasan_kfree(), just poison it.
Rename kasan_kfree() to kasan_poison_kfree() to respect that.

Also, we shouldn't use kasan_slab_alloc()/kasan_krealloc() in
kasan_unpoison_element() because those functions may update allocation
stacktrace.  This would be wrong for the most of the remove_element call
sites.

(The only call site where we may want to update alloc stacktrace is
 in mempool_alloc(). Kmemleak solves this by calling
 kmemleak_update_trace(), so we could make something like that too.
 But this is out of scope of this patch).

Fixes: 55834c59098d ("mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/575977C3.1010905@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin 
Reported-by: Kuthonuzo Luruo 
Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko 
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov 
Cc: Kostya Serebryany 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation

2016-05-21T00:58:30+00:00

Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue.  The objects are
returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free
errors.

When the object is freed, its state changes from KASAN_STATE_ALLOC to
KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE.  The object is poisoned and put into quarantine
instead of being returned to the allocator, therefore every subsequent
access to that object triggers a KASAN error, and the error handler is
able to say where the object has been allocated and deallocated.

When it's time for the object to leave quarantine, its state becomes
KASAN_STATE_FREE and it's returned to the allocator.  From now on the
allocator may reuse it for another allocation.  Before that happens,
it's still possible to detect a use-after free on that object (it
retains the allocation/deallocation stacks).

When the allocator reuses this object, the shadow is unpoisoned and old
allocation/deallocation stacks are wiped.  Therefore a use of this
object, even an incorrect one, won't trigger ASan warning.

Without the quarantine, it's not guaranteed that the objects aren't
reused immediately, that's why the probability of catching a
use-after-free is lower than with quarantine in place.

Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue.  The objects are
returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free
errors.

Freed objects are first added to per-cpu quarantine queues.  When a
cache is destroyed or memory shrinking is requested, the objects are
moved into the global quarantine queue.  Whenever a kmalloc call allows
memory reclaiming, the oldest objects are popped out of the global queue
until the total size of objects in quarantine is less than 3/4 of the
maximum quarantine size (which is a fraction of installed physical
memory).

As long as an object remains in the quarantine, KASAN is able to report
accesses to it, so the chance of reporting a use-after-free is
increased.  Once the object leaves quarantine, the allocator may reuse
it, in which case the object is unpoisoned and KASAN can't detect
incorrect accesses to it.

Right now quarantine support is only enabled in SLAB allocator.
Unification of KASAN features in SLAB and SLUB will be done later.

This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: quarantine" patch originally
prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov.  A number of improvements have been
suggested by Andrey Ryabinin.

[glider@google.com: v9]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462987130-144092-1-git-send-email-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko 
Cc: Christoph Lameter 
Cc: Pekka Enberg 
Cc: David Rientjes 
Cc: Joonsoo Kim 
Cc: Andrey Konovalov 
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov 
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin 
Cc: Steven Rostedt 
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany 
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm, kasan: add GFP flags to KASAN API

2016-03-25T23:37:42+00:00

Add GFP flags to KASAN hooks for future patches to use.

This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: unified support for SLUB and SLAB
allocators" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko 
Cc: Christoph Lameter 
Cc: Pekka Enberg 
Cc: David Rientjes 
Cc: Joonsoo Kim 
Cc: Andrey Konovalov 
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov 
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin 
Cc: Steven Rostedt 
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany 
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm, mempool: only set __GFP_NOMEMALLOC if there are free elements

2016-03-17T22:09:34+00:00

If an oom killed thread calls mempool_alloc(), it is possible that it'll
loop forever if there are no elements on the freelist since
__GFP_NOMEMALLOC prevents it from accessing needed memory reserves in
oom conditions.

Only set __GFP_NOMEMALLOC if there are elements on the freelist.  If
there are no free elements, allow allocations without the bit set so
that memory reserves can be accessed if needed.

Additionally, using mempool_alloc() with __GFP_NOMEMALLOC is not
supported since the implementation can loop forever without accessing
memory reserves when needed.

Signed-off-by: David Rientjes 
Cc: Greg Thelen 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Tetsuo Handa 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm/mempool: avoid KASAN marking mempool poison checks as use-after-free

2016-03-12T00:17:47+00:00

When removing an element from the mempool, mark it as unpoisoned in KASAN
before verifying its contents for SLUB/SLAB debugging.  Otherwise KASAN
will flag the reads checking the element use-after-free writes as
use-after-free reads.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Dawson 
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm, page_alloc: distinguish between being unable to sleep, unwilling to sleep and avoiding waking kswapd

2015-11-07T01:50:42+00:00

__GFP_WAIT has been used to identify atomic context in callers that hold
spinlocks or are in interrupts.  They are expected to be high priority and
have access one of two watermarks lower than "min" which can be referred
to as the "atomic reserve".  __GFP_HIGH users get access to the first
lower watermark and can be called the "high priority reserve".

Over time, callers had a requirement to not block when fallback options
were available.  Some have abused __GFP_WAIT leading to a situation where
an optimisitic allocation with a fallback option can access atomic
reserves.

This patch uses __GFP_ATOMIC to identify callers that are truely atomic,
cannot sleep and have no alternative.  High priority users continue to use
__GFP_HIGH.  __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM identifies callers that can sleep and
are willing to enter direct reclaim.  __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM to identify
callers that want to wake kswapd for background reclaim.  __GFP_WAIT is
redefined as a caller that is willing to enter direct reclaim and wake
kswapd for background reclaim.

This patch then converts a number of sites

o __GFP_ATOMIC is used by callers that are high priority and have memory
  pools for those requests. GFP_ATOMIC uses this flag.

o Callers that have a limited mempool to guarantee forward progress clear
  __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM but keep __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM. bio allocations fall
  into this category where kswapd will still be woken but atomic reserves
  are not used as there is a one-entry mempool to guarantee progress.

o Callers that are checking if they are non-blocking should use the
  helper gfpflags_allow_blocking() where possible. This is because
  checking for __GFP_WAIT as was done historically now can trigger false
  positives. Some exceptions like dm-crypt.c exist where the code intent
  is clearer if __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM is used instead of the helper due to
  flag manipulations.

o Callers that built their own GFP flags instead of starting with GFP_KERNEL
  and friends now also need to specify __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM.

The first key hazard to watch out for is callers that removed __GFP_WAIT
and was depending on access to atomic reserves for inconspicuous reasons.
In some cases it may be appropriate for them to use __GFP_HIGH.

The second key hazard is callers that assembled their own combination of
GFP flags instead of starting with something like GFP_KERNEL.  They may
now wish to specify __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM.  It's almost certainly harmless
if it's missed in most cases as other activity will wake kswapd.

Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman 
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner 
Cc: Christoph Lameter 
Cc: David Rientjes 
Cc: Vitaly Wool 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm/mempool: allow NULL `pool' pointer in mempool_destroy()

2015-09-08T22:35:28+00:00

mempool_destroy() does not tolerate a NULL mempool_t pointer argument and
performs a NULL-pointer dereference.  This requires additional attention
and effort from developers/reviewers and forces all mempool_destroy()
callers to do a NULL check

    if (pool)
        mempool_destroy(pool);

Or, otherwise, be invalid mempool_destroy() users.

Tweak mempool_destroy() and NULL-check the pointer there.

Proposed by Andrew Morton.

Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/6/8/583
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky 
Acked-by: David Rientjes 
Cc: Julia Lawall 
Cc: Joe Perches 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm/mempool.c: kasan: poison mempool elements

2015-04-15T23:35:20+00:00

Mempools keep allocated objects in reserved for situations when ordinary
allocation may not be possible to satisfy.  These objects shouldn't be
accessed before they leave the pool.

This patch poison elements when get into the pool and unpoison when they
leave it.  This will let KASan to detect use-after-free of mempool's
elements.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin 
Tested-by: David Rientjes 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov 
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov 
Cc: Alexander Potapenko 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm, mempool: poison elements backed by slab allocator

2015-04-15T23:35:18+00:00

Mempools keep elements in a reserved pool for contexts in which allocation
may not be possible.  When an element is allocated from the reserved pool,
its memory contents is the same as when it was added to the reserved pool.

Because of this, elements lack any free poisoning to detect use-after-free
errors.

This patch adds free poisoning for elements backed by the slab allocator.
This is possible because the mempool layer knows the object size of each
element.

When an element is added to the reserved pool, it is poisoned with
POISON_FREE.  When it is removed from the reserved pool, the contents are
checked for POISON_FREE.  If there is a mismatch, a warning is emitted to
the kernel log.

This is only effective for configs with CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB or
CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG_ON.

[fabio.estevam@freescale.com: use '%zu' for printing 'size_t' variable]
[arnd@arndb.de: add missing include]
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes 
Cc: Dave Kleikamp 
Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Cc: Sebastian Ott 
Cc: Mikulas Patocka 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam 
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm, mempool: disallow mempools based on slab caches with constructors

2015-04-15T23:35:18+00:00

All occurrences of mempools based on slab caches with object constructors
have been removed from the tree, so disallow creating them.

We can only dereference mem->ctor in mm/mempool.c without including
mm/slab.h in include/linux/mempool.h.  So simply note the restriction,
just like the comment restricting usage of __GFP_ZERO, and warn on kernels
with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM() if such a mempool is allocated from.

We don't want to incur this check on every element allocation, so use
VM_BUG_ON().

Signed-off-by: David Rientjes 
Cc: Dave Kleikamp 
Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Cc: Sebastian Ott 
Cc: Mikulas Patocka 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds