linux-stable.git/mm/memory.c, branch linux-2.6.35.y

mm/futex: fix futex writes on archs with SW tracking of

2011-08-01T20:55:00+00:00

[ upstream commit 2efaca927f5cd7ecd0f1554b8f9b6a9a2c329c03 ]
 dirty & young

I haven't reproduced it myself but the fail scenario is that on such
machines (notably ARM and some embedded powerpc), if you manage to hit
that futex path on a writable page whose dirty bit has gone from the PTE,
you'll livelock inside the kernel from what I can tell.

It will go in a loop of trying the atomic access, failing, trying gup to
"fix it up", getting succcess from gup, go back to the atomic access,
failing again because dirty wasn't fixed etc...

So I think you essentially hang in the kernel.

The scenario is probably rare'ish because affected architecture are
embedded and tend to not swap much (if at all) so we probably rarely hit
the case where dirty is missing or young is missing, but I think Shan has
a piece of SW that can reliably reproduce it using a shared writable
mapping & fork or something like that.

On archs who use SW tracking of dirty & young, a page without dirty is
effectively mapped read-only and a page without young unaccessible in the
PTE.

Additionally, some architectures might lazily flush the TLB when relaxing
write protection (by doing only a local flush), and expect a fault to
invalidate the stale entry if it's still present on another processor.

The futex code assumes that if the "in_atomic()" access -EFAULT's, it can
"fix it up" by causing get_user_pages() which would then be equivalent to
taking the fault.

However that isn't the case.  get_user_pages() will not call
handle_mm_fault() in the case where the PTE seems to have the right
permissions, regardless of the dirty and young state.  It will eventually
update those bits ...  in the struct page, but not in the PTE.

Additionally, it will not handle the lazy TLB flushing that can be
required by some architectures in the fault case.

Basically, gup is the wrong interface for the job.  The patch provides a
more appropriate one which boils down to just calling handle_mm_fault()
since what we are trying to do is simulate a real page fault.

The futex code currently attempts to write to user memory within a
pagefault disabled section, and if that fails, tries to fix it up using
get_user_pages().

This doesn't work on archs where the dirty and young bits are maintained
by software, since they will gate access permission in the TLB, and will
not be updated by gup().

In addition, there's an expectation on some archs that a spurious write
fault triggers a local TLB flush, and that is missing from the picture as
well.

I decided that adding those "features" to gup() would be too much for this
already too complex function, and instead added a new simpler
fixup_user_fault() which is essentially a wrapper around handle_mm_fault()
which the futex code can call.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix some nits Darren saw, fiddle comment layout]
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt 
Reported-by: Shan Hai 
Tested-by: Shan Hai 
Cc: David Laight 
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Darren Hart 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen

mm: prevent concurrent unmap_mapping_range() on the same inode

2011-08-01T20:54:59+00:00

commit 2aa15890f3c191326678f1bd68af61ec6b8753ec upstream.

Michael Leun reported that running parallel opens on a fuse filesystem
can trigger a "kernel BUG at mm/truncate.c:475"

Gurudas Pai reported the same bug on NFS.

The reason is, unmap_mapping_range() is not prepared for more than
one concurrent invocation per inode.  For example:

  thread1: going through a big range, stops in the middle of a vma and
     stores the restart address in vm_truncate_count.

  thread2: comes in with a small (e.g. single page) unmap request on
     the same vma, somewhere before restart_address, finds that the
     vma was already unmapped up to the restart address and happily
     returns without doing anything.

Another scenario would be two big unmap requests, both having to
restart the unmapping and each one setting vm_truncate_count to its
own value.  This could go on forever without any of them being able to
finish.

Truncate and hole punching already serialize with i_mutex.  Other
callers of unmap_mapping_range() do not, and it's difficult to get
i_mutex protection for all callers.  In particular ->d_revalidate(),
which calls invalidate_inode_pages2_range() in fuse, may be called
with or without i_mutex.

This patch adds a new mutex to 'struct address_space' to prevent
running multiple concurrent unmap_mapping_range() on the same mapping.

[ We'll hopefully get rid of all this with the upcoming mm
  preemptibility series by Peter Zijlstra, the "mm: Remove i_mmap_mutex
  lockbreak" patch in particular.  But that is for 2.6.39 ]

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi 
Reported-by: Michael Leun 
Reported-by: Gurudas Pai 
Tested-by: Gurudas Pai 
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen

guard page for stacks that grow upwards

2010-09-27T00:18:41+00:00

commit 8ca3eb08097f6839b2206e2242db4179aee3cfb3 upstream.

pa-risc and ia64 have stacks that grow upwards. Check that
they do not run into other mappings. By making VM_GROWSUP
0x0 on architectures that do not ever use it, we can avoid
some unpleasant #ifdefs in check_stack_guard_page().

Signed-off-by: Tony Luck 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: dann frazier 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: further fix swapin race condition

2010-09-27T00:18:19+00:00

commit 31c4a3d3a0f84a5847665f8aa0552d188389f791 upstream.

Commit 4969c1192d15 ("mm: fix swapin race condition") is now agreed to
be incomplete.  There's a race, not very much less likely than the
original race envisaged, in which it is further necessary to check that
the swapcache page's swap has not changed.

Here's the reasoning: cast in terms of reuse_swap_page(), but probably
could be reformulated to rely on try_to_free_swap() instead, or on
swapoff+swapon.

A, faults into do_swap_page(): does page1 = lookup_swap_cache(swap1) and
comes through the lock_page(page1).

B, a racing thread of the same process, faults on the same address: does
page1 = lookup_swap_cache(swap1) and now waits in lock_page(page1), but
for whatever reason is unlucky not to get the lock any time soon.

A carries on through do_swap_page(), a write fault, but cannot reuse the
swap page1 (another reference to swap1).  Unlocks the page1 (but B
doesn't get it yet), does COW in do_wp_page(), page2 now in that pte.

C, perhaps the parent of A+B, comes in and write faults the same swap
page1 into its mm, reuse_swap_page() succeeds this time, swap1 is freed.

kswapd comes in after some time (B still unlucky) and swaps out some
pages from A+B and C: it allocates the original swap1 to page2 in A+B,
and some other swap2 to the original page1 now in C.  But does not
immediately free page1 (actually it couldn't: B holds a reference),
leaving it in swap cache for now.

B at last gets the lock on page1, hooray! Is PageSwapCache(page1)? Yes.
Is pte_same(*page_table, orig_pte)? Yes, because page2 has now been
given the swap1 which page1 used to have.  So B proceeds to insert page1
into A+B's page_table, though its content now belongs to C, quite
different from what A wrote there.

B ought to have checked that page1's swap was still swap1.

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins 
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: fix swapin race condition

2010-09-27T00:18:19+00:00

commit 4969c1192d15afa3389e7ae3302096ff684ba655 upstream.

The pte_same check is reliable only if the swap entry remains pinned (by
the page lock on swapcache).  We've also to ensure the swapcache isn't
removed before we take the lock as try_to_free_swap won't care about the
page pin.

One of the possible impacts of this patch is that a KSM-shared page can
point to the anon_vma of another process, which could exit before the page
is freed.

This can leave a page with a pointer to a recycled anon_vma object, or
worse, a pointer to something that is no longer an anon_vma.

[Backport to 2.6.35.5 (anon_vma instead of anon_vma->root in ksm.h) by Hugh]

[riel@redhat.com: changelog help]
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli 
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins 
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: make stack guard page logic use vm_prev pointer

2010-08-26T23:45:56+00:00

commit 0e8e50e20c837eeec8323bba7dcd25fe5479194c upstream.

Like the mlock() change previously, this makes the stack guard check
code use vma->vm_prev to see what the mapping below the current stack
is, rather than have to look it up with find_vma().

Also, accept an abutting stack segment, since that happens naturally if
you split the stack with mlock or mprotect.

Tested-by: Ian Campbell 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: fix page table unmap for stack guard page properly

2010-08-20T18:55:38+00:00

commit 11ac552477e32835cb6970bf0a70c210807f5673 upstream.

We do in fact need to unmap the page table _before_ doing the whole
stack guard page logic, because if it is needed (mainly 32-bit x86 with
PAE and CONFIG_HIGHPTE, but other architectures may use it too) then it
will do a kmap_atomic/kunmap_atomic.

And those kmaps will create an atomic region that we cannot do
allocations in.  However, the whole stack expand code will need to do
anon_vma_prepare() and vma_lock_anon_vma() and they cannot do that in an
atomic region.

Now, a better model might actually be to do the anon_vma_prepare() when
_creating_ a VM_GROWSDOWN segment, and not have to worry about any of
this at page fault time.  But in the meantime, this is the
straightforward fix for the issue.

See https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=16588 for details.

Reported-by: Wylda 
Reported-by: Sedat Dilek 
Reported-by: Mike Pagano 
Reported-by: François Valenduc 
Tested-by: Ed Tomlinson 
Cc: Pekka Enberg 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: fix missing page table unmap for stack guard page failure case

2010-08-13T20:31:09+00:00

commit 5528f9132cf65d4d892bcbc5684c61e7822b21e9 upstream.

.. which didn't show up in my tests because it's a no-op on x86-64 and
most other architectures.  But we enter the function with the last-level
page table mapped, and should unmap it at exit.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: keep a guard page below a grow-down stack segment

2010-08-13T20:31:09+00:00

commit 320b2b8de12698082609ebbc1a17165727f4c893 upstream.

This is a rather minimally invasive patch to solve the problem of the
user stack growing into a memory mapped area below it.  Whenever we fill
the first page of the stack segment, expand the segment down by one
page.

Now, admittedly some odd application might _want_ the stack to grow down
into the preceding memory mapping, and so we may at some point need to
make this a process tunable (some people might also want to have more
than a single page of guarding), but let's try the minimal approach
first.

Tested with trivial application that maps a single page just below the
stack, and then starts recursing.  Without this, we will get a SIGSEGV
_after_ the stack has smashed the mapping.  With this patch, we'll get a
nice SIGBUS just as the stack touches the page just above the mapping.

Requested-by: Keith Packard 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: fix ia64 crash when gcore reads gate area

2010-07-31T01:56:09+00:00

Debian's ia64 autobuilders have been seeing kernel freeze or reboot
when running the gdb testsuite (Debian bug 588574): dannf bisected to
2.6.32 62eede62dafb4a6633eae7ffbeb34c60dba5e7b1 "mm: ZERO_PAGE without
PTE_SPECIAL"; and reproduced it with gdb's gcore on a simple target.

I'd missed updating the gate_vma handling in __get_user_pages(): that
happens to use vm_normal_page() (nowadays failing on the zero page),
yet reported success even when it failed to get a page - boom when
access_process_vm() tried to copy that to its intermediate buffer.

Fix this, resisting cleanups: in particular, leave it for now reporting
success when not asked to get any pages - very probably safe to change,
but let's not risk it without testing exposure.

Why did ia64 crash with 16kB pages, but succeed with 64kB pages?
Because setup_gate() pads each 64kB of its gate area with zero pages.

Reported-by: Andreas Barth 
Bisected-by: dann frazier 
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins 
Tested-by: dann frazier 
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds