<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/lib, branch v6.6.140</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>lib: test_hmm: evict device pages on file close to avoid use-after-free</title>
<updated>2026-05-17T15:13:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alistair Popple</name>
<email>apopple@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-28T18:19:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bf477abd448c76bb8ea51c9b4f63a3a17c4b6239'/>
<id>bf477abd448c76bb8ea51c9b4f63a3a17c4b6239</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 744dd97752ef1076a8d8672bb0d8aa2c7abc1144 ]

Patch series "Minor hmm_test fixes and cleanups".

Two bugfixes a cleanup for the HMM kernel selftests.  These were mostly
reported by Zenghui Yu with special thanks to Lorenzo for analysing and
pointing out the problems.

This patch (of 3):

When dmirror_fops_release() is called it frees the dmirror struct but
doesn't migrate device private pages back to system memory first.  This
leaves those pages with a dangling zone_device_data pointer to the freed
dmirror.

If a subsequent fault occurs on those pages (eg.  during coredump) the
dmirror_devmem_fault() callback dereferences the stale pointer causing a
kernel panic.  This was reported [1] when running mm/ksft_hmm.sh on arm64,
where a test failure triggered SIGABRT and the resulting coredump walked
the VMAs faulting in the stale device private pages.

Fix this by calling dmirror_device_evict_chunk() for each devmem chunk in
dmirror_fops_release() to migrate all device private pages back to system
memory before freeing the dmirror struct.  The function is moved earlier
in the file to avoid a forward declaration.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260331063445.3551404-1-apopple@nvidia.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260331063445.3551404-2-apopple@nvidia.com
Fixes: b2ef9f5a5cb3 ("mm/hmm/test: add selftest driver for HMM")
Signed-off-by: Alistair Popple &lt;apopple@nvidia.com&gt;
Reported-by: Zenghui Yu &lt;zenghui.yu@linux.dev&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/8bd0396a-8997-4d2e-a13f-5aac033083d7@linux.dev/
Reviewed-by: Balbir Singh &lt;balbirs@nvidia.com&gt;
Tested-by: Zenghui Yu &lt;zenghui.yu@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@ziepe.ca&gt;
Cc: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leon@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Liam Howlett &lt;liam.howlett@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes (Oracle) &lt;ljs@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan &lt;surenb@google.com&gt;
Cc: Zenghui Yu &lt;zenghui.yu@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: Matthew Brost &lt;matthew.brost@intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[ kept the existing simpler `dmirror_device_evict_chunk()` body instead of the upstream compound-folio version ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 744dd97752ef1076a8d8672bb0d8aa2c7abc1144 ]

Patch series "Minor hmm_test fixes and cleanups".

Two bugfixes a cleanup for the HMM kernel selftests.  These were mostly
reported by Zenghui Yu with special thanks to Lorenzo for analysing and
pointing out the problems.

This patch (of 3):

When dmirror_fops_release() is called it frees the dmirror struct but
doesn't migrate device private pages back to system memory first.  This
leaves those pages with a dangling zone_device_data pointer to the freed
dmirror.

If a subsequent fault occurs on those pages (eg.  during coredump) the
dmirror_devmem_fault() callback dereferences the stale pointer causing a
kernel panic.  This was reported [1] when running mm/ksft_hmm.sh on arm64,
where a test failure triggered SIGABRT and the resulting coredump walked
the VMAs faulting in the stale device private pages.

Fix this by calling dmirror_device_evict_chunk() for each devmem chunk in
dmirror_fops_release() to migrate all device private pages back to system
memory before freeing the dmirror struct.  The function is moved earlier
in the file to avoid a forward declaration.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260331063445.3551404-1-apopple@nvidia.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260331063445.3551404-2-apopple@nvidia.com
Fixes: b2ef9f5a5cb3 ("mm/hmm/test: add selftest driver for HMM")
Signed-off-by: Alistair Popple &lt;apopple@nvidia.com&gt;
Reported-by: Zenghui Yu &lt;zenghui.yu@linux.dev&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/8bd0396a-8997-4d2e-a13f-5aac033083d7@linux.dev/
Reviewed-by: Balbir Singh &lt;balbirs@nvidia.com&gt;
Tested-by: Zenghui Yu &lt;zenghui.yu@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@ziepe.ca&gt;
Cc: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leon@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Liam Howlett &lt;liam.howlett@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes (Oracle) &lt;ljs@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan &lt;surenb@google.com&gt;
Cc: Zenghui Yu &lt;zenghui.yu@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: Matthew Brost &lt;matthew.brost@intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[ kept the existing simpler `dmirror_device_evict_chunk()` body instead of the upstream compound-folio version ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/scatterlist: fix temp buffer in extract_user_to_sg()</title>
<updated>2026-05-17T15:13:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian A. Ehrhardt</name>
<email>lk@c--e.de</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-26T21:49:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=470822125b622cd692fb5956fd2d9b4e4ef8e63e'/>
<id>470822125b622cd692fb5956fd2d9b4e4ef8e63e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 118cf3f55975352ac357fb194405031458186819 upstream.

Instead of allocating a temporary buffer for extracted user pages
extract_user_to_sg() uses the end of the to be filled scatterlist as a
temporary buffer.

Fix the calculation of the start address if the scatterlist already
contains elements.  The unused space starts at sgtable-&gt;sgl +
sgtable-&gt;nents not directly at sgtable-&gt;nents and the temporary buffer is
placed at the end of this unused space.

A subsequent commit will add kunit test cases that demonstrate that the
patch is necessary.

Pointed out by sashiko.dev on a previous iteration of this series.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260326214905.818170-3-lk@c--e.de
Fixes: 018584697533 ("netfs: Add a function to extract an iterator into a scatterlist")
Signed-off-by: Christian A. Ehrhardt &lt;lk@c--e.de&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David Gow &lt;davidgow@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[v6.5+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 118cf3f55975352ac357fb194405031458186819 upstream.

Instead of allocating a temporary buffer for extracted user pages
extract_user_to_sg() uses the end of the to be filled scatterlist as a
temporary buffer.

Fix the calculation of the start address if the scatterlist already
contains elements.  The unused space starts at sgtable-&gt;sgl +
sgtable-&gt;nents not directly at sgtable-&gt;nents and the temporary buffer is
placed at the end of this unused space.

A subsequent commit will add kunit test cases that demonstrate that the
patch is necessary.

Pointed out by sashiko.dev on a previous iteration of this series.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260326214905.818170-3-lk@c--e.de
Fixes: 018584697533 ("netfs: Add a function to extract an iterator into a scatterlist")
Signed-off-by: Christian A. Ehrhardt &lt;lk@c--e.de&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David Gow &lt;davidgow@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[v6.5+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/scatterlist: fix length calculations in extract_kvec_to_sg</title>
<updated>2026-05-17T15:13:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian A. Ehrhardt</name>
<email>lk@c--e.de</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-26T21:49:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3f17500e86d730c76db638bb3ae52f9b5e496c76'/>
<id>3f17500e86d730c76db638bb3ae52f9b5e496c76</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 07b7d66e65d9cfe6b9c2c34aa22cfcaac37a5c45 upstream.

Patch series "Fix bugs in extract_iter_to_sg()", v3.

Fix bugs in the kvec and user variants of extract_iter_to_sg.  This series
is growing due to useful remarks made by sashiko.dev.

The main bugs are:
- The length for an sglist entry when extracting from
  a kvec can exceed the number of bytes in the page. This
  is obviously not intended.
- When extracting a user buffer the sglist is temporarily
  used as a scratch buffer for extracted page pointers.
  If the sglist already contains some elements this scratch
  buffer could overlap with existing entries in the sglist.

The series adds test cases to the kunit_iov_iter test that demonstrate all
of these bugs.  Additionally, there is a memory leak fix for the test
itself.

The bugs were orignally introduced into kernel v6.3 where the function
lived in fs/netfs/iterator.c.  It was later moved to lib/scatterlist.c in
v6.5.  Thus the actual fix is only marked for backports to v6.5+.


This patch (of 5):

When extracting from a kvec to a scatterlist, do not cross page
boundaries.  The required length was already calculated but not used as
intended.

Adjust the copied length if the loop runs out of sglist entries without
extracting everything.

While there, return immediately from extract_iter_to_sg if there are no
sglist entries at all.

A subsequent commit will add kunit test cases that demonstrate that the
patch is necessary.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260326214905.818170-1-lk@c--e.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260326214905.818170-2-lk@c--e.de
Fixes: 018584697533 ("netfs: Add a function to extract an iterator into a scatterlist")
Signed-off-by: Christian A. Ehrhardt &lt;lk@c--e.de&gt;
Cc: David Gow &lt;davidgow@google.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[v6.5+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 07b7d66e65d9cfe6b9c2c34aa22cfcaac37a5c45 upstream.

Patch series "Fix bugs in extract_iter_to_sg()", v3.

Fix bugs in the kvec and user variants of extract_iter_to_sg.  This series
is growing due to useful remarks made by sashiko.dev.

The main bugs are:
- The length for an sglist entry when extracting from
  a kvec can exceed the number of bytes in the page. This
  is obviously not intended.
- When extracting a user buffer the sglist is temporarily
  used as a scratch buffer for extracted page pointers.
  If the sglist already contains some elements this scratch
  buffer could overlap with existing entries in the sglist.

The series adds test cases to the kunit_iov_iter test that demonstrate all
of these bugs.  Additionally, there is a memory leak fix for the test
itself.

The bugs were orignally introduced into kernel v6.3 where the function
lived in fs/netfs/iterator.c.  It was later moved to lib/scatterlist.c in
v6.5.  Thus the actual fix is only marked for backports to v6.5+.


This patch (of 5):

When extracting from a kvec to a scatterlist, do not cross page
boundaries.  The required length was already calculated but not used as
intended.

Adjust the copied length if the loop runs out of sglist entries without
extracting everything.

While there, return immediately from extract_iter_to_sg if there are no
sglist entries at all.

A subsequent commit will add kunit test cases that demonstrate that the
patch is necessary.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260326214905.818170-1-lk@c--e.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260326214905.818170-2-lk@c--e.de
Fixes: 018584697533 ("netfs: Add a function to extract an iterator into a scatterlist")
Signed-off-by: Christian A. Ehrhardt &lt;lk@c--e.de&gt;
Cc: David Gow &lt;davidgow@google.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[v6.5+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/crypto: mpi: Fix integer underflow in mpi_read_raw_from_sgl()</title>
<updated>2026-05-17T15:13:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lukas Wunner</name>
<email>lukas@wunner.de</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-12T14:19:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2aa77a18dc7f2670497fe3ee5acbeda0b57659e5'/>
<id>2aa77a18dc7f2670497fe3ee5acbeda0b57659e5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8c2f1288250a90a4b5cabed5d888d7e3aeed4035 upstream.

Yiming reports an integer underflow in mpi_read_raw_from_sgl() when
subtracting "lzeros" from the unsigned "nbytes".

For this to happen, the scatterlist "sgl" needs to occupy more bytes
than the "nbytes" parameter and the first "nbytes + 1" bytes of the
scatterlist must be zero.  Under these conditions, the while loop
iterating over the scatterlist will count more zeroes than "nbytes",
subtract the number of zeroes from "nbytes" and cause the underflow.

When commit 2d4d1eea540b ("lib/mpi: Add mpi sgl helpers") originally
introduced the bug, it couldn't be triggered because all callers of
mpi_read_raw_from_sgl() passed a scatterlist whose length was equal to
"nbytes".

However since commit 63ba4d67594a ("KEYS: asymmetric: Use new crypto
interface without scatterlists"), the underflow can now actually be
triggered.  When invoking a KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT system call with a
larger "out_len" than "in_len" and filling the "in" buffer with zeroes,
crypto_akcipher_sync_prep() will create an all-zero scatterlist used for
both the "src" and "dst" member of struct akcipher_request and thereby
fulfil the conditions to trigger the bug:

  sys_keyctl()
    keyctl_pkey_e_d_s()
      asymmetric_key_eds_op()
        software_key_eds_op()
          crypto_akcipher_sync_encrypt()
            crypto_akcipher_sync_prep()
              crypto_akcipher_encrypt()
                rsa_enc()
                  mpi_read_raw_from_sgl()

To the user this will be visible as a DoS as the kernel spins forever,
causing soft lockup splats as a side effect.

Fix it.

Reported-by: Yiming Qian &lt;yimingqian591@gmail.com&gt; # off-list
Fixes: 2d4d1eea540b ("lib/mpi: Add mpi sgl helpers")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner &lt;lukas@wunner.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reviewed-by: Ignat Korchagin &lt;ignat@linux.win&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/59eca92ff4f87e2081777f1423a0efaaadcfdb39.1776003111.git.lukas@wunner.de
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8c2f1288250a90a4b5cabed5d888d7e3aeed4035 upstream.

Yiming reports an integer underflow in mpi_read_raw_from_sgl() when
subtracting "lzeros" from the unsigned "nbytes".

For this to happen, the scatterlist "sgl" needs to occupy more bytes
than the "nbytes" parameter and the first "nbytes + 1" bytes of the
scatterlist must be zero.  Under these conditions, the while loop
iterating over the scatterlist will count more zeroes than "nbytes",
subtract the number of zeroes from "nbytes" and cause the underflow.

When commit 2d4d1eea540b ("lib/mpi: Add mpi sgl helpers") originally
introduced the bug, it couldn't be triggered because all callers of
mpi_read_raw_from_sgl() passed a scatterlist whose length was equal to
"nbytes".

However since commit 63ba4d67594a ("KEYS: asymmetric: Use new crypto
interface without scatterlists"), the underflow can now actually be
triggered.  When invoking a KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT system call with a
larger "out_len" than "in_len" and filling the "in" buffer with zeroes,
crypto_akcipher_sync_prep() will create an all-zero scatterlist used for
both the "src" and "dst" member of struct akcipher_request and thereby
fulfil the conditions to trigger the bug:

  sys_keyctl()
    keyctl_pkey_e_d_s()
      asymmetric_key_eds_op()
        software_key_eds_op()
          crypto_akcipher_sync_encrypt()
            crypto_akcipher_sync_prep()
              crypto_akcipher_encrypt()
                rsa_enc()
                  mpi_read_raw_from_sgl()

To the user this will be visible as a DoS as the kernel spins forever,
causing soft lockup splats as a side effect.

Fix it.

Reported-by: Yiming Qian &lt;yimingqian591@gmail.com&gt; # off-list
Fixes: 2d4d1eea540b ("lib/mpi: Add mpi sgl helpers")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner &lt;lukas@wunner.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reviewed-by: Ignat Korchagin &lt;ignat@linux.win&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/59eca92ff4f87e2081777f1423a0efaaadcfdb39.1776003111.git.lukas@wunner.de
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/ts_kmp: fix integer overflow in pattern length calculation</title>
<updated>2026-05-17T15:13:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Law</name>
<email>objecting@objecting.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-08T20:20:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4a34fd6b04f96db8bda240529a29cfb84490287f'/>
<id>4a34fd6b04f96db8bda240529a29cfb84490287f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8cdf30813ea8ce881cecc08664144416dbdb3e16 upstream.

The ts_kmp algorithm stores its prefix_tbl[] table and pattern in a single
allocation sized from the pattern length.  If the prefix_tbl[] size
calculation wraps, the resulting allocation can be too small and
subsequent pattern copies can overflow it.

Fix this by rejecting zero-length patterns and by using overflow helpers
before calculating the combined allocation size.


This fixes a potential heap overflow.  The pattern length calculation can
wrap during a size_t addition, leading to an undersized allocation.
Because the textsearch library is reachable from userspace via Netfilter's
xt_string module, this is a security risk that should be backported to LTS
kernels.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260308202028.2889285-2-objecting@objecting.org
Signed-off-by: Josh Law &lt;objecting@objecting.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8cdf30813ea8ce881cecc08664144416dbdb3e16 upstream.

The ts_kmp algorithm stores its prefix_tbl[] table and pattern in a single
allocation sized from the pattern length.  If the prefix_tbl[] size
calculation wraps, the resulting allocation can be too small and
subsequent pattern copies can overflow it.

Fix this by rejecting zero-length patterns and by using overflow helpers
before calculating the combined allocation size.


This fixes a potential heap overflow.  The pattern length calculation can
wrap during a size_t addition, leading to an undersized allocation.
Because the textsearch library is reachable from userspace via Netfilter's
xt_string module, this is a security risk that should be backported to LTS
kernels.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260308202028.2889285-2-objecting@objecting.org
Signed-off-by: Josh Law &lt;objecting@objecting.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/crypto: chacha: Zeroize permuted_state before it leaves scope</title>
<updated>2026-04-18T08:39:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-26T03:29:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=066c760acead1fb743bae294dbd89f479ae43b9b'/>
<id>066c760acead1fb743bae294dbd89f479ae43b9b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e5046823f8fa3677341b541a25af2fcb99a5b1e0 upstream.

Since the ChaCha permutation is invertible, the local variable
'permuted_state' is sufficient to compute the original 'state', and thus
the key, even after the permutation has been done.

While the kernel is quite inconsistent about zeroizing secrets on the
stack (and some prominent userspace crypto libraries don't bother at all
since it's not guaranteed to work anyway), the kernel does try to do it
as a best practice, especially in cases involving the RNG.

Thus, explicitly zeroize 'permuted_state' before it goes out of scope.

Fixes: c08d0e647305 ("crypto: chacha20 - Add a generic ChaCha20 stream cipher implementation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260326032920.39408-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e5046823f8fa3677341b541a25af2fcb99a5b1e0 upstream.

Since the ChaCha permutation is invertible, the local variable
'permuted_state' is sufficient to compute the original 'state', and thus
the key, even after the permutation has been done.

While the kernel is quite inconsistent about zeroizing secrets on the
stack (and some prominent userspace crypto libraries don't bother at all
since it's not guaranteed to work anyway), the kernel does try to do it
as a best practice, especially in cases involving the RNG.

Thus, explicitly zeroize 'permuted_state' before it goes out of scope.

Fixes: c08d0e647305 ("crypto: chacha20 - Add a generic ChaCha20 stream cipher implementation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260326032920.39408-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/bootconfig: check xbc_init_node() return in override path</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:06:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Law</name>
<email>objecting@objecting.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-18T23:43:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c1bfc25d62d83160799bd731bcce5d6ab8dfd2a0'/>
<id>c1bfc25d62d83160799bd731bcce5d6ab8dfd2a0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit bb288d7d869e86d382f35a0e26242c5ccb05ca82 ]

The ':=' override path in xbc_parse_kv() calls xbc_init_node() to
re-initialize an existing value node but does not check the return
value. If xbc_init_node() fails (data offset out of range), parsing
silently continues with stale node data.

Add the missing error check to match the xbc_add_node() call path
which already checks for failure.

In practice, a bootconfig using ':=' to override a value near the
32KB data limit could silently retain the old value, meaning a
security-relevant boot parameter override (e.g., a trace filter or
debug setting) would not take effect as intended.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260318155847.78065-2-objecting@objecting.org/

Fixes: e5efaeb8a8f5 ("bootconfig: Support mixing a value and subkeys under a key")
Signed-off-by: Josh Law &lt;objecting@objecting.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit bb288d7d869e86d382f35a0e26242c5ccb05ca82 ]

The ':=' override path in xbc_parse_kv() calls xbc_init_node() to
re-initialize an existing value node but does not check the return
value. If xbc_init_node() fails (data offset out of range), parsing
silently continues with stale node data.

Add the missing error check to match the xbc_add_node() call path
which already checks for failure.

In practice, a bootconfig using ':=' to override a value near the
32KB data limit could silently retain the old value, meaning a
security-relevant boot parameter override (e.g., a trace filter or
debug setting) would not take effect as intended.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260318155847.78065-2-objecting@objecting.org/

Fixes: e5efaeb8a8f5 ("bootconfig: Support mixing a value and subkeys under a key")
Signed-off-by: Josh Law &lt;objecting@objecting.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/bootconfig: check bounds before writing in __xbc_open_brace()</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:05:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Law</name>
<email>objecting@objecting.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-12T19:11:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2ca6bdf449b1beadc263886262313bf3419ea76e'/>
<id>2ca6bdf449b1beadc263886262313bf3419ea76e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 560f763baa0f2c9a44da4294c06af071405ac46f upstream.

The bounds check for brace_index happens after the array write.
While the current call pattern prevents an actual out-of-bounds
access (the previous call would have returned an error), the
write-before-check pattern is fragile and would become a real
out-of-bounds write if the error return were ever not propagated.

Move the bounds check before the array write so the function is
self-contained and safe regardless of caller behavior.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260312191143.28719-3-objecting@objecting.org/

Fixes: ead1e19ad905 ("lib/bootconfig: Fix a bug of breaking existing tree nodes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Josh Law &lt;objecting@objecting.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 560f763baa0f2c9a44da4294c06af071405ac46f upstream.

The bounds check for brace_index happens after the array write.
While the current call pattern prevents an actual out-of-bounds
access (the previous call would have returned an error), the
write-before-check pattern is fragile and would become a real
out-of-bounds write if the error return were ever not propagated.

Move the bounds check before the array write so the function is
self-contained and safe regardless of caller behavior.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260312191143.28719-3-objecting@objecting.org/

Fixes: ead1e19ad905 ("lib/bootconfig: Fix a bug of breaking existing tree nodes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Josh Law &lt;objecting@objecting.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/bootconfig: fix snprintf truncation check in xbc_node_compose_key_after()</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:05:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Law</name>
<email>objecting@objecting.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-12T19:11:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bbdb80f29ee996fad8e558ea0273051471fc3287'/>
<id>bbdb80f29ee996fad8e558ea0273051471fc3287</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1120a36bb1e9b9e22de75ecb4ef0b998f73a97f1 upstream.

snprintf() returns the number of characters that would have been
written excluding the NUL terminator.  Output is truncated when the
return value is &gt;= the buffer size, not just &gt; the buffer size.

When ret == size, the current code takes the non-truncated path,
advancing buf by ret and reducing size to 0.  This is wrong because
the output was actually truncated (the last character was replaced by
NUL).  Fix by using &gt;= so the truncation path is taken correctly.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260312191143.28719-4-objecting@objecting.org/

Fixes: 76db5a27a827 ("bootconfig: Add Extra Boot Config support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Josh Law &lt;objecting@objecting.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1120a36bb1e9b9e22de75ecb4ef0b998f73a97f1 upstream.

snprintf() returns the number of characters that would have been
written excluding the NUL terminator.  Output is truncated when the
return value is &gt;= the buffer size, not just &gt; the buffer size.

When ret == size, the current code takes the non-truncated path,
advancing buf by ret and reducing size to 0.  This is wrong because
the output was actually truncated (the last character was replaced by
NUL).  Fix by using &gt;= so the truncation path is taken correctly.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260312191143.28719-4-objecting@objecting.org/

Fixes: 76db5a27a827 ("bootconfig: Add Extra Boot Config support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Josh Law &lt;objecting@objecting.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/bootconfig: fix off-by-one in xbc_verify_tree() unclosed brace error</title>
<updated>2026-03-25T10:05:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Law</name>
<email>objecting@objecting.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-12T19:11:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cc7d44c59ea5ca881db8528ebe08dbf5ec5aabf1'/>
<id>cc7d44c59ea5ca881db8528ebe08dbf5ec5aabf1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 39ebc8d7f561e1b64eca87353ef9b18e2825e591 upstream.

__xbc_open_brace() pushes entries with post-increment
(open_brace[brace_index++]), so brace_index always points one past
the last valid entry.  xbc_verify_tree() reads open_brace[brace_index]
to report which brace is unclosed, but this is one past the last
pushed entry and contains stale/zero data, causing the error message
to reference the wrong node.

Use open_brace[brace_index - 1] to correctly identify the unclosed
brace.  brace_index is known to be &gt; 0 here since we are inside the
if (brace_index) guard.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260312191143.28719-2-objecting@objecting.org/

Fixes: ead1e19ad905 ("lib/bootconfig: Fix a bug of breaking existing tree nodes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Josh Law &lt;objecting@objecting.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 39ebc8d7f561e1b64eca87353ef9b18e2825e591 upstream.

__xbc_open_brace() pushes entries with post-increment
(open_brace[brace_index++]), so brace_index always points one past
the last valid entry.  xbc_verify_tree() reads open_brace[brace_index]
to report which brace is unclosed, but this is one past the last
pushed entry and contains stale/zero data, causing the error message
to reference the wrong node.

Use open_brace[brace_index - 1] to correctly identify the unclosed
brace.  brace_index is known to be &gt; 0 here since we are inside the
if (brace_index) guard.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260312191143.28719-2-objecting@objecting.org/

Fixes: ead1e19ad905 ("lib/bootconfig: Fix a bug of breaking existing tree nodes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Josh Law &lt;objecting@objecting.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
