linux-stable.git/lib, branch v6.12.85

x86-64/arm64/powerpc: clean up and rename __copy_from_user_flushcache

2026-04-22T11:19:02+00:00

commit 809b997a5ce945ab470f70c187048fe4f5df20bf upstream.

This finishes the work on these odd functions that were only implemented
by a handful of architectures.

The 'flushcache' function was only used from the iterator code, and
let's make it do the same thing that the nontemporal version does:
remove the two underscores and add the user address checking.

Yes, yes, the user address checking is also done at iovec import time,
but we have long since walked away from the old double-underscore thing
where we try to avoid address checking overhead at access time, and
these functions shouldn't be so special and old-fashioned.

The arm64 version already did the address check, in fact, so there it's
just a matter of renaming it.  For powerpc and x86-64 we now do the
proper user access boilerplate.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86: rename and clean up __copy_from_user_inatomic_nocache()

2026-04-22T11:19:02+00:00

commit 5de7bcaadf160c1716b20a263cf8f5b06f658959 upstream.

Similarly to the previous commit, this renames the somewhat confusingly
named function.  But in this case, it was at least less confusing: the
__copy_from_user_inatomic_nocache is indeed copying from user memory,
and it is indeed ok to be used in an atomic context, so it will not warn
about it.

But the previous commit also removed the NTB mis-use of the
__copy_from_user_inatomic_nocache() function, and as a result every
call-site is now _actually_ doing a real user copy.  That means that we
can now do the proper user pointer verification too.

End result: add proper address checking, remove the double underscores,
and change the "nocache" to "nontemporal" to more accurately describe
what this x86-only function actually does.  It might be worth noting
that only the target is non-temporal: the actual user accesses are
normal memory accesses.

Also worth noting is that non-x86 targets (and on older 32-bit x86 CPU's
before XMM2 in the Pentium III) we end up just falling back on a regular
user copy, so nothing can actually depend on the non-temporal semantics,
but that has always been true.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

lib/crypto: chacha: Zeroize permuted_state before it leaves scope

2026-04-18T08:41:54+00:00

commit e5046823f8fa3677341b541a25af2fcb99a5b1e0 upstream.

Since the ChaCha permutation is invertible, the local variable
'permuted_state' is sufficient to compute the original 'state', and thus
the key, even after the permutation has been done.

While the kernel is quite inconsistent about zeroizing secrets on the
stack (and some prominent userspace crypto libraries don't bother at all
since it's not guaranteed to work anyway), the kernel does try to do it
as a best practice, especially in cases involving the RNG.

Thus, explicitly zeroize 'permuted_state' before it goes out of scope.

Fixes: c08d0e647305 ("crypto: chacha20 - Add a generic ChaCha20 stream cipher implementation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260326032920.39408-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

lib/bootconfig: check xbc_init_node() return in override path

2026-03-25T10:08:57+00:00

[ Upstream commit bb288d7d869e86d382f35a0e26242c5ccb05ca82 ]

The ':=' override path in xbc_parse_kv() calls xbc_init_node() to
re-initialize an existing value node but does not check the return
value. If xbc_init_node() fails (data offset out of range), parsing
silently continues with stale node data.

Add the missing error check to match the xbc_add_node() call path
which already checks for failure.

In practice, a bootconfig using ':=' to override a value near the
32KB data limit could silently retain the old value, meaning a
security-relevant boot parameter override (e.g., a trace filter or
debug setting) would not take effect as intended.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260318155847.78065-2-objecting@objecting.org/

Fixes: e5efaeb8a8f5 ("bootconfig: Support mixing a value and subkeys under a key")
Signed-off-by: Josh Law 
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

lib/bootconfig: check bounds before writing in __xbc_open_brace()

2026-03-25T10:08:38+00:00

commit 560f763baa0f2c9a44da4294c06af071405ac46f upstream.

The bounds check for brace_index happens after the array write.
While the current call pattern prevents an actual out-of-bounds
access (the previous call would have returned an error), the
write-before-check pattern is fragile and would become a real
out-of-bounds write if the error return were ever not propagated.

Move the bounds check before the array write so the function is
self-contained and safe regardless of caller behavior.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260312191143.28719-3-objecting@objecting.org/

Fixes: ead1e19ad905 ("lib/bootconfig: Fix a bug of breaking existing tree nodes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Josh Law 
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

lib/bootconfig: fix snprintf truncation check in xbc_node_compose_key_after()

2026-03-25T10:08:38+00:00

commit 1120a36bb1e9b9e22de75ecb4ef0b998f73a97f1 upstream.

snprintf() returns the number of characters that would have been
written excluding the NUL terminator.  Output is truncated when the
return value is >= the buffer size, not just > the buffer size.

When ret == size, the current code takes the non-truncated path,
advancing buf by ret and reducing size to 0.  This is wrong because
the output was actually truncated (the last character was replaced by
NUL).  Fix by using >= so the truncation path is taken correctly.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260312191143.28719-4-objecting@objecting.org/

Fixes: 76db5a27a827 ("bootconfig: Add Extra Boot Config support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Josh Law 
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

lib/bootconfig: fix off-by-one in xbc_verify_tree() unclosed brace error

2026-03-25T10:08:38+00:00

commit 39ebc8d7f561e1b64eca87353ef9b18e2825e591 upstream.

__xbc_open_brace() pushes entries with post-increment
(open_brace[brace_index++]), so brace_index always points one past
the last valid entry.  xbc_verify_tree() reads open_brace[brace_index]
to report which brace is unclosed, but this is one past the last
pushed entry and contains stale/zero data, causing the error message
to reference the wrong node.

Use open_brace[brace_index - 1] to correctly identify the unclosed
brace.  brace_index is known to be > 0 here since we are inside the
if (brace_index) guard.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260312191143.28719-2-objecting@objecting.org/

Fixes: ead1e19ad905 ("lib/bootconfig: Fix a bug of breaking existing tree nodes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Josh Law 
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Remove WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM kernel config option

2026-03-04T12:21:32+00:00

[ Upstream commit 7dff99b354601dd01829e1511711846e04340a69 ]

This config option goes way back - it used to be an internal debug
option to random.c (at that point called DEBUG_RANDOM_BOOT), then was
renamed and exposed as a config option as CONFIG_WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM,
and then further renamed to the current CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM.

It was all done with the best of intentions: the more limited
rate-limited reports were reporting some cases, but if you wanted to see
all the gory details, you'd enable this "ALL" option.

However, it turns out - perhaps not surprisingly - that when people
don't care about and fix the first rate-limited cases, they most
certainly don't care about any others either, and so warning about all
of them isn't actually helping anything.

And the non-ratelimited reporting causes problems, where well-meaning
people enable debug options, but the excessive flood of messages that
nobody cares about will hide actual real information when things go
wrong.

I just got a kernel bug report (which had nothing to do with randomness)
where two thirds of the the truncated dmesg was just variations of

   random: get_random_u32 called from __get_random_u32_below+0x10/0x70 with crng_init=0

and in the process early boot messages had been lost (in addition to
making the messages that _hadn't_ been lost harder to read).

The proper way to find these things for the hypothetical developer that
cares - if such a person exists - is almost certainly with boot time
tracing.  That gives you the option to get call graphs etc too, which is
likely a requirement for fixing any problems anyway.

See Documentation/trace/boottime-trace.rst for that option.

And if we for some reason do want to re-introduce actual printing of
these things, it will need to have some uniqueness filtering rather than
this "just print it all" model.

Fixes: cc1e127bfa95 ("random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness")
Acked-by: Jason Donenfeld 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

objpool: fix the overestimation of object pooling metadata size

2026-03-04T12:20:35+00:00

[ Upstream commit 5ed4b6b37c647d168ae31035b3f61b705997e043 ]

objpool uses struct objpool_head to store metadata information, and its
cpu_slots member points to an array of pointers that store the addresses
of the percpu ring arrays.  However, the memory size allocated during the
initialization of cpu_slots is nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(struct objpool_slot).
On a 64-bit machine, the size of struct objpool_slot is 16 bytes, which is
twice the size of the actual pointer required, and the extra memory is
never be used, resulting in a waste of memory.  Therefore, the memory size
required for cpu_slots needs to be corrected.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260202132846.68257-1-zhouwenhao7600@gmail.com
Fixes: b4edb8d2d464 ("lib: objpool added: ring-array based lockless MPMC")
Signed-off-by: zhouwenhao 
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton 
Cc: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" 
Cc: Matt Wu 
Cc: wuqiang.matt 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

procfs: avoid fetching build ID while holding VMA lock

2026-02-11T12:40:18+00:00

[ Upstream commit b5cbacd7f86f4f62b8813688c8e73be94e8e1951 ]

Fix PROCMAP_QUERY to fetch optional build ID only after dropping mmap_lock
or per-VMA lock, whichever was used to lock VMA under question, to avoid
deadlock reported by syzbot:

 -> #1 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}:
        __might_fault+0xed/0x170
        _copy_to_iter+0x118/0x1720
        copy_page_to_iter+0x12d/0x1e0
        filemap_read+0x720/0x10a0
        blkdev_read_iter+0x2b5/0x4e0
        vfs_read+0x7f4/0xae0
        ksys_read+0x12a/0x250
        do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xf80
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

 -> #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){++++}-{4:4}:
        __lock_acquire+0x1509/0x26d0
        lock_acquire+0x185/0x340
        down_read+0x98/0x490
        blkdev_read_iter+0x2a7/0x4e0
        __kernel_read+0x39a/0xa90
        freader_fetch+0x1d5/0xa80
        __build_id_parse.isra.0+0xea/0x6a0
        do_procmap_query+0xd75/0x1050
        procfs_procmap_ioctl+0x7a/0xb0
        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210
        do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xf80
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

 other info that might help us debug this:

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   rlock(&mm->mmap_lock);
                                lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8);
                                lock(&mm->mmap_lock);
   rlock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

This seems to be exacerbated (as we haven't seen these syzbot reports
before that) by the recent:

	777a8560fd29 ("lib/buildid: use __kernel_read() for sleepable context")

To make this safe, we need to grab file refcount while VMA is still locked, but
other than that everything is pretty straightforward. Internal build_id_parse()
API assumes VMA is passed, but it only needs the underlying file reference, so
just add another variant build_id_parse_file() that expects file passed
directly.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix up kerneldoc]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260129215340.3742283-1-andrii@kernel.org
Fixes: ed5d583a88a9 ("fs/procfs: implement efficient VMA querying API for /proc//maps")
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko 
Reported-by: 
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan 
Tested-by: Suren Baghdasaryan 
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt 
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov 
Cc: Daniel Borkmann 
Cc: Eduard Zingerman 
Cc: Hao Luo 
Cc: Jiri Olsa 
Cc: John Fastabend 
Cc: KP Singh 
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau 
Cc: Song Liu 
Cc: Stanislav Fomichev 
Cc: Yonghong Song 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
[ mm is local var instead of function param ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman