commit af73483f4e8b6f5c68c9aa63257bdd929a9c194a upstream. The IDA usually detects double-frees, but that detection failed to consider the case when there are no nearby IDs allocated and so we have a NULL bitmap rather than simply having a clear bit. Add some tests to the test-suite to be sure we don't inadvertently reintroduce this problem. Unfortunately they're quite noisy so include a message to disregard the warnings. Reported-by: Zhenghan Wang <wzhmmmmm@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Hugo SIMELIERE <hsimeliere.opensource@witekio.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e1be43d9b5d0d1310dbd90185a8e5c7145dde40f upstream.
In order to perform more open-coded replacements of common allocation
size arithmetic, the kernel needs saturating (SIZE_MAX) helpers for
multiplication, addition, and subtraction. For example, it is common in
allocators, especially on realloc, to add to an existing size:
p = krealloc(map->patch,
sizeof(struct reg_sequence) * (map->patch_regs + num_regs),
GFP_KERNEL);
There is no existing saturating replacement for this calculation, and
just leaving the addition open coded inside array_size() could
potentially overflow as well. For example, an overflow in an expression
for a size_t argument might wrap to zero:
array_size(anything, something_at_size_max + 1) == 0
Introduce size_mul(), size_add(), and size_sub() helpers that
implicitly promote arguments to size_t and saturated calculations for
use in allocations. With these helpers it is also possible to redefine
array_size(), array3_size(), flex_array_size(), and struct_size() in
terms of the new helpers.
As with the check_*_overflow() helpers, the new helpers use __must_check,
though what is really desired is a way to make sure that assignment is
only to a size_t lvalue. Without this, it's still possible to introduce
overflow/underflow via type conversion (i.e. from size_t to int).
Enforcing this will currently need to be left to static analysis or
future use of -Wconversion.
Additionally update the overflow unit tests to force runtime evaluation
for the pathological cases.
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Cc: Len Baker <len.baker@gmx.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dd6e9894b451e7c85cceb8e9dc5432679a70e7dc upstream.
zap_modalias_env() wrongly calculates size of memory block to move, so
will cause OOB memory access issue if variable MODALIAS is not the last
one within its @env parameter, fixed by correcting size to memmove.
Fixes: 9b3fa47d4a76 ("kobject: fix suppressing modalias in uevents delivered over netlink")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Lk Sii <lk_sii@163.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1717074877-11352-1-git-send-email-quic_zijuhu@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bf6acd5d16057d7accbbb1bf7dc6d8c56eeb4ecc upstream.
The decompression code parses a huffman tree and counts the number of
symbols for a given bit length. In rare cases, there may be >= 256
symbols with a given bit length, causing the unsigned char to overflow.
This causes a decompression failure later when the code tries and fails to
find the bit length for a given symbol.
Since the maximum number of symbols is 258, use unsigned short instead.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240717162016.1514077-1-ross.lagerwall@citrix.com
Fixes: bc22c17e12c1 ("bzip2/lzma: library support for gzip, bzip2 and lzma decompression")
Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Cc: Alain Knaff <alain@knaff.lu>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 00e7d3bea2ce7dac7bee1cf501fb071fd0ea8f6c upstream. Fix a BUG_ON from 2009. Even if it looks "unreachable" (I didn't really look), lets make sure by removing it, doing pr_err and return -EINVAL instead. Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jim Cromie <jim.cromie@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240429193145.66543-2-jim.cromie@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6fe60465e1d53ea321ee909be26d97529e8f746c upstream.
If stack_depot_save_flags() allocates memory it always drops
__GFP_NOLOCKDEP flag. So when KASAN tries to track __GFP_NOLOCKDEP
allocation we may end up with lockdep splat like bellow:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.9.0-rc3+ #49 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kswapd0/149 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88811346a920
(&xfs_nondir_ilock_class){++++}-{4:4}, at: xfs_reclaim_inode+0x3ac/0x590
[xfs]
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8bb33100 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
balance_pgdat+0x5d9/0xad0
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}:
__lock_acquire+0x7da/0x1030
lock_acquire+0x15d/0x400
fs_reclaim_acquire+0xb5/0x100
prepare_alloc_pages.constprop.0+0xc5/0x230
__alloc_pages+0x12a/0x3f0
alloc_pages_mpol+0x175/0x340
stack_depot_save_flags+0x4c5/0x510
kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x83/0x90
kmem_cache_alloc+0x15e/0x4a0
__alloc_object+0x35/0x370
__create_object+0x22/0x90
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x477/0x5b0
krealloc+0x5f/0x110
xfs_iext_insert_raw+0x4b2/0x6e0 [xfs]
xfs_iext_insert+0x2e/0x130 [xfs]
xfs_iread_bmbt_block+0x1a9/0x4d0 [xfs]
xfs_btree_visit_block+0xfb/0x290 [xfs]
xfs_btree_visit_blocks+0x215/0x2c0 [xfs]
xfs_iread_extents+0x1a2/0x2e0 [xfs]
xfs_buffered_write_iomap_begin+0x376/0x10a0 [xfs]
iomap_iter+0x1d1/0x2d0
iomap_file_buffered_write+0x120/0x1a0
xfs_file_buffered_write+0x128/0x4b0 [xfs]
vfs_write+0x675/0x890
ksys_write+0xc3/0x160
do_syscall_64+0x94/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79
Always preserve __GFP_NOLOCKDEP to fix this.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240418141133.22950-1-ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com
Fixes: cd11016e5f52 ("mm, kasan: stackdepot implementation. Enable stackdepot for SLAB")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/a0caa289-ca02-48eb-9bf2-d86fd47b71f4@redhat.com/
Reported-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/f9ff999a-e170-b66b-7caf-293f2b147ac2@opensource.wdc.com/
Suggested-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Tested-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3bb2a01caa813d3a1845d378bbe4169ef280d394 upstream.
In kobject_get_path(), if kobj->name is changed between calls
get_kobj_path_length() and fill_kobj_path() and the length becomes
longer, then fill_kobj_path() will have an out-of-bounds bug.
The actual current problem occurs when the ixgbe probe.
In ixgbe_mii_bus_init(), if the length of netdev->dev.kobj.name
length becomes longer, out-of-bounds will occur.
cpu0 cpu1
ixgbe_probe
register_netdev(netdev)
netdev_register_kobject
device_add
kobject_uevent // Sending ADD events
systemd-udevd // rename netdev
dev_change_name
device_rename
kobject_rename
ixgbe_mii_bus_init |
mdiobus_register |
__mdiobus_register |
device_register |
device_add |
kobject_uevent |
kobject_get_path |
len = get_kobj_path_length // old name |
path = kzalloc(len, gfp_mask); |
kobj->name = name;
/* name length becomes
* longer
*/
fill_kobj_path /* kobj path length is
* longer than path,
* resulting in out of
* bounds when filling path
*/
This is the kasan report:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fill_kobj_path+0x50/0xc0
Write of size 7 at addr ff1100090573d1fd by task kworker/28:1/673
Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x86/0x1e7
print_report+0x36/0x4f
kasan_report+0xad/0x130
kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1c0
memcpy+0x39/0x60
fill_kobj_path+0x50/0xc0
kobject_get_path+0x5a/0xc0
kobject_uevent_env+0x140/0x460
device_add+0x5c7/0x910
__mdiobus_register+0x14e/0x490
ixgbe_probe.cold+0x441/0x574 [ixgbe]
local_pci_probe+0x78/0xc0
work_for_cpu_fn+0x26/0x40
process_one_work+0x3b6/0x6a0
worker_thread+0x368/0x520
kthread+0x165/0x1a0
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
This reproducer triggers that bug:
while:
do
rmmod ixgbe
sleep 0.5
modprobe ixgbe
sleep 0.5
When calling fill_kobj_path() to fill path, if the name length of
kobj becomes longer, return failure and retry. This fixes the problem.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221220012143.52141-1-wanghai38@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tymoshenko <ovt@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 4d0fe8c52bb3029d83e323c961221156ab98680b ]
When I register a kset in the following way:
static struct kset my_kset;
kobject_set_name(&my_kset.kobj, "my_kset");
ret = kset_register(&my_kset);
A null pointer dereference exception is occurred:
[ 4453.568337] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at \
virtual address 0000000000000028
... ...
[ 4453.810361] Call trace:
[ 4453.813062] kobject_get_ownership+0xc/0x34
[ 4453.817493] kobject_add_internal+0x98/0x274
[ 4453.822005] kset_register+0x5c/0xb4
[ 4453.825820] my_kobj_init+0x44/0x1000 [my_kset]
... ...
Because I didn't initialize my_kset.kobj.ktype.
According to the description in Documentation/core-api/kobject.rst:
- A ktype is the type of object that embeds a kobject. Every structure
that embeds a kobject needs a corresponding ktype.
So add sanity check to make sure kset->kobj.ktype is not NULL.
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230805084114.1298-2-thunder.leizhen@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9e47a758b70167c9301d2b44d2569f86c7796f2d ] During NVMeTCP Authentication a controller can trigger a kernel oops by specifying the 8192 bit Diffie Hellman group and passing a correctly sized, but zeroed Diffie Hellamn value. mpi_cmp_ui() was detecting this if the second parameter was 0, but 1 is passed from dh_is_pubkey_valid(). This causes the null pointer u->d to be dereferenced towards the end of mpi_cmp_ui() Signed-off-by: Mark O'Donovan <shiftee@posteo.net> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2a15de80dd0f7e04a823291aa9eb49c5294f56af ]
The relevant parameter is 'start' and not 'nextid'
Fixes: 460488c58ca8 ("idr: Remove idr_alloc_ext")
Signed-off-by: Ariel Marcovitch <arielmarcovitch@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>