<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/lib, branch v3.16.40</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>mpi: Fix NULL ptr dereference in mpi_powm() [ver #3]</title>
<updated>2017-02-23T03:54:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Ryabinin</name>
<email>aryabinin@virtuozzo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-24T13:23:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0a74b364c4c2ce4bfffdbefd62cced99ad76bec9'/>
<id>0a74b364c4c2ce4bfffdbefd62cced99ad76bec9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f5527fffff3f002b0a6b376163613b82f69de073 upstream.

This fixes CVE-2016-8650.

If mpi_powm() is given a zero exponent, it wants to immediately return
either 1 or 0, depending on the modulus.  However, if the result was
initalised with zero limb space, no limbs space is allocated and a
NULL-pointer exception ensues.

Fix this by allocating a minimal amount of limb space for the result when
the 0-exponent case when the result is 1 and not touching the limb space
when the result is 0.

This affects the use of RSA keys and X.509 certificates that carry them.

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
IP: [&lt;ffffffff8138ce5d&gt;] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 3014 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.9.0-rc6-fscache+ #278
Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014
task: ffff8804011944c0 task.stack: ffff880401294000
RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff8138ce5d&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff8138ce5d&gt;] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6
RSP: 0018:ffff880401297ad8  EFLAGS: 00010212
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88040868bec0 RCX: ffff88040868bba0
RDX: ffff88040868b260 RSI: ffff88040868bec0 RDI: ffff88040868bee0
RBP: ffff880401297ba8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000047 R11: ffffffff8183b210 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8804087c7600 R14: 000000000000001f R15: ffff880401297c50
FS:  00007f7a7918c700(0000) GS:ffff88041fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000401250000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Stack:
 ffff88040868bec0 0000000000000020 ffff880401297b00 ffffffff81376cd4
 0000000000000100 ffff880401297b10 ffffffff81376d12 ffff880401297b30
 ffffffff81376f37 0000000000000100 0000000000000000 ffff880401297ba8
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff81376cd4&gt;] ? __sg_page_iter_next+0x43/0x66
 [&lt;ffffffff81376d12&gt;] ? sg_miter_get_next_page+0x1b/0x5d
 [&lt;ffffffff81376f37&gt;] ? sg_miter_next+0x17/0xbd
 [&lt;ffffffff8138ba3a&gt;] ? mpi_read_raw_from_sgl+0xf2/0x146
 [&lt;ffffffff8132a95c&gt;] rsa_verify+0x9d/0xee
 [&lt;ffffffff8132acca&gt;] ? pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf+0x2e/0xbb
 [&lt;ffffffff8132af40&gt;] pkcs1pad_verify+0xc0/0xe1
 [&lt;ffffffff8133cb5e&gt;] public_key_verify_signature+0x1b0/0x228
 [&lt;ffffffff8133d974&gt;] x509_check_for_self_signed+0xa1/0xc4
 [&lt;ffffffff8133cdde&gt;] x509_cert_parse+0x167/0x1a1
 [&lt;ffffffff8133d609&gt;] x509_key_preparse+0x21/0x1a1
 [&lt;ffffffff8133c3d7&gt;] asymmetric_key_preparse+0x34/0x61
 [&lt;ffffffff812fc9f3&gt;] key_create_or_update+0x145/0x399
 [&lt;ffffffff812fe227&gt;] SyS_add_key+0x154/0x19e
 [&lt;ffffffff81001c2b&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x191
 [&lt;ffffffff816825e4&gt;] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
Code: 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 81 ec a8 00 00 00 44 8b 71 04 8b 42 04 4c 8b 67 18 45 85 f6 89 45 80 0f 84 b4 06 00 00 85 c0 75 2f 41 ff ce &lt;49&gt; c7 04 24 01 00 00 00 b0 01 75 0b 48 8b 41 18 48 83 38 01 0f
RIP  [&lt;ffffffff8138ce5d&gt;] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6
 RSP &lt;ffff880401297ad8&gt;
CR2: 0000000000000000
---[ end trace d82015255d4a5d8d ]---

Basically, this is a backport of a libgcrypt patch:

	http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libgcrypt.git;a=patch;h=6e1adb05d290aeeb1c230c763970695f4a538526

Fixes: cdec9cb5167a ("crypto: GnuPG based MPI lib - source files (part 1)")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com&gt;
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f5527fffff3f002b0a6b376163613b82f69de073 upstream.

This fixes CVE-2016-8650.

If mpi_powm() is given a zero exponent, it wants to immediately return
either 1 or 0, depending on the modulus.  However, if the result was
initalised with zero limb space, no limbs space is allocated and a
NULL-pointer exception ensues.

Fix this by allocating a minimal amount of limb space for the result when
the 0-exponent case when the result is 1 and not touching the limb space
when the result is 0.

This affects the use of RSA keys and X.509 certificates that carry them.

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
IP: [&lt;ffffffff8138ce5d&gt;] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 3014 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.9.0-rc6-fscache+ #278
Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014
task: ffff8804011944c0 task.stack: ffff880401294000
RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff8138ce5d&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff8138ce5d&gt;] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6
RSP: 0018:ffff880401297ad8  EFLAGS: 00010212
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88040868bec0 RCX: ffff88040868bba0
RDX: ffff88040868b260 RSI: ffff88040868bec0 RDI: ffff88040868bee0
RBP: ffff880401297ba8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000047 R11: ffffffff8183b210 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8804087c7600 R14: 000000000000001f R15: ffff880401297c50
FS:  00007f7a7918c700(0000) GS:ffff88041fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000401250000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Stack:
 ffff88040868bec0 0000000000000020 ffff880401297b00 ffffffff81376cd4
 0000000000000100 ffff880401297b10 ffffffff81376d12 ffff880401297b30
 ffffffff81376f37 0000000000000100 0000000000000000 ffff880401297ba8
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff81376cd4&gt;] ? __sg_page_iter_next+0x43/0x66
 [&lt;ffffffff81376d12&gt;] ? sg_miter_get_next_page+0x1b/0x5d
 [&lt;ffffffff81376f37&gt;] ? sg_miter_next+0x17/0xbd
 [&lt;ffffffff8138ba3a&gt;] ? mpi_read_raw_from_sgl+0xf2/0x146
 [&lt;ffffffff8132a95c&gt;] rsa_verify+0x9d/0xee
 [&lt;ffffffff8132acca&gt;] ? pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf+0x2e/0xbb
 [&lt;ffffffff8132af40&gt;] pkcs1pad_verify+0xc0/0xe1
 [&lt;ffffffff8133cb5e&gt;] public_key_verify_signature+0x1b0/0x228
 [&lt;ffffffff8133d974&gt;] x509_check_for_self_signed+0xa1/0xc4
 [&lt;ffffffff8133cdde&gt;] x509_cert_parse+0x167/0x1a1
 [&lt;ffffffff8133d609&gt;] x509_key_preparse+0x21/0x1a1
 [&lt;ffffffff8133c3d7&gt;] asymmetric_key_preparse+0x34/0x61
 [&lt;ffffffff812fc9f3&gt;] key_create_or_update+0x145/0x399
 [&lt;ffffffff812fe227&gt;] SyS_add_key+0x154/0x19e
 [&lt;ffffffff81001c2b&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x191
 [&lt;ffffffff816825e4&gt;] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
Code: 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 81 ec a8 00 00 00 44 8b 71 04 8b 42 04 4c 8b 67 18 45 85 f6 89 45 80 0f 84 b4 06 00 00 85 c0 75 2f 41 ff ce &lt;49&gt; c7 04 24 01 00 00 00 b0 01 75 0b 48 8b 41 18 48 83 38 01 0f
RIP  [&lt;ffffffff8138ce5d&gt;] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6
 RSP &lt;ffff880401297ad8&gt;
CR2: 0000000000000000
---[ end trace d82015255d4a5d8d ]---

Basically, this is a backport of a libgcrypt patch:

	http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libgcrypt.git;a=patch;h=6e1adb05d290aeeb1c230c763970695f4a538526

Fixes: cdec9cb5167a ("crypto: GnuPG based MPI lib - source files (part 1)")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com&gt;
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/genalloc.c: start search from start of chunk</title>
<updated>2017-02-23T03:54:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Mentz</name>
<email>danielmentz@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-28T00:46:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2c1a5759282f8c8650a600587091e00e52942eed'/>
<id>2c1a5759282f8c8650a600587091e00e52942eed</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 62e931fac45b17c2a42549389879411572f75804 upstream.

gen_pool_alloc_algo() iterates over the chunks of a pool trying to find
a contiguous block of memory that satisfies the allocation request.

The shortcut

	if (size &gt; atomic_read(&amp;chunk-&gt;avail))
		continue;

makes the loop skip over chunks that do not have enough bytes left to
fulfill the request.  There are two situations, though, where an
allocation might still fail:

(1) The available memory is not contiguous, i.e.  the request cannot
    be fulfilled due to external fragmentation.

(2) A race condition.  Another thread runs the same code concurrently
    and is quicker to grab the available memory.

In those situations, the loop calls pool-&gt;algo() to search the entire
chunk, and pool-&gt;algo() returns some value that is &gt;= end_bit to
indicate that the search failed.  This return value is then assigned to
start_bit.  The variables start_bit and end_bit describe the range that
should be searched, and this range should be reset for every chunk that
is searched.  Today, the code fails to reset start_bit to 0.  As a
result, prefixes of subsequent chunks are ignored.  Memory allocations
might fail even though there is plenty of room left in these prefixes of
those other chunks.

Fixes: 7f184275aa30 ("lib, Make gen_pool memory allocator lockless")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1477420604-28918-1-git-send-email-danielmentz@google.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Mentz &lt;danielmentz@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 62e931fac45b17c2a42549389879411572f75804 upstream.

gen_pool_alloc_algo() iterates over the chunks of a pool trying to find
a contiguous block of memory that satisfies the allocation request.

The shortcut

	if (size &gt; atomic_read(&amp;chunk-&gt;avail))
		continue;

makes the loop skip over chunks that do not have enough bytes left to
fulfill the request.  There are two situations, though, where an
allocation might still fail:

(1) The available memory is not contiguous, i.e.  the request cannot
    be fulfilled due to external fragmentation.

(2) A race condition.  Another thread runs the same code concurrently
    and is quicker to grab the available memory.

In those situations, the loop calls pool-&gt;algo() to search the entire
chunk, and pool-&gt;algo() returns some value that is &gt;= end_bit to
indicate that the search failed.  This return value is then assigned to
start_bit.  The variables start_bit and end_bit describe the range that
should be searched, and this range should be reset for every chunk that
is searched.  Today, the code fails to reset start_bit to 0.  As a
result, prefixes of subsequent chunks are ignored.  Memory allocations
might fail even though there is plenty of room left in these prefixes of
those other chunks.

Fixes: 7f184275aa30 ("lib, Make gen_pool memory allocator lockless")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1477420604-28918-1-git-send-email-danielmentz@google.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Mentz &lt;danielmentz@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/mpi: mpi_read_raw_data(): fix nbits calculation</title>
<updated>2016-11-20T01:16:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicolai Stange</name>
<email>nicstange@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-26T11:05:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b15ff9473556d30e47ec4e8516613ba468328d7d'/>
<id>b15ff9473556d30e47ec4e8516613ba468328d7d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit eef0df6a59537032ab6b708f30b28d9530f8760e upstream.

The number of bits, nbits, is calculated in mpi_read_raw_data() as follows:

  nbits = nbytes * 8;

Afterwards, the number of leading zero bits of the first byte get
subtracted:

  nbits -= count_leading_zeros(buffer[0]);

However, count_leading_zeros() takes an unsigned long and thus,
the u8 gets promoted to an unsigned long.

Thus, the above doesn't subtract the number of leading zeros in the most
significant nonzero input byte from nbits, but the number of leading
zeros of the most significant nonzero input byte promoted to unsigned long,
i.e. BITS_PER_LONG - 8 too many.

Fix this by subtracting

  count_leading_zeros(...) - (BITS_PER_LONG - 8)

from nbits only.

Fixes: e1045992949 ("MPILIB: Provide a function to read raw data into an
                     MPI")
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange &lt;nicstange@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit eef0df6a59537032ab6b708f30b28d9530f8760e upstream.

The number of bits, nbits, is calculated in mpi_read_raw_data() as follows:

  nbits = nbytes * 8;

Afterwards, the number of leading zero bits of the first byte get
subtracted:

  nbits -= count_leading_zeros(buffer[0]);

However, count_leading_zeros() takes an unsigned long and thus,
the u8 gets promoted to an unsigned long.

Thus, the above doesn't subtract the number of leading zeros in the most
significant nonzero input byte from nbits, but the number of leading
zeros of the most significant nonzero input byte promoted to unsigned long,
i.e. BITS_PER_LONG - 8 too many.

Fix this by subtracting

  count_leading_zeros(...) - (BITS_PER_LONG - 8)

from nbits only.

Fixes: e1045992949 ("MPILIB: Provide a function to read raw data into an
                     MPI")
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange &lt;nicstange@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dma-debug: avoid spinlock recursion when disabling dma-debug</title>
<updated>2016-08-22T21:38:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ville Syrjälä</name>
<email>ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-26T22:16:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a86f55da2b8dc301d14a64b18f43c93ef97066f0'/>
<id>a86f55da2b8dc301d14a64b18f43c93ef97066f0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3017cd63f26fc655d56875aaf497153ba60e9edf upstream.

With netconsole (at least) the pr_err("...  disablingn") call can
recurse back into the dma-debug code, where it'll try to grab
free_entries_lock again.  Avoid the problem by doing the printk after
dropping the lock.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1463678421-18683-1-git-send-email-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä &lt;ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3017cd63f26fc655d56875aaf497153ba60e9edf upstream.

With netconsole (at least) the pr_err("...  disablingn") call can
recurse back into the dma-debug code, where it'll try to grab
free_entries_lock again.  Avoid the problem by doing the printk after
dropping the lock.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1463678421-18683-1-git-send-email-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä &lt;ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Fix ASN.1 indefinite length object parsing</title>
<updated>2016-06-15T20:29:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-23T11:03:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=af00ae6ef5a2c73f21ba215c476570b7772a14fb'/>
<id>af00ae6ef5a2c73f21ba215c476570b7772a14fb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 23c8a812dc3c621009e4f0e5342aa4e2ede1ceaa upstream.

This fixes CVE-2016-0758.

In the ASN.1 decoder, when the length field of an ASN.1 value is extracted,
it isn't validated against the remaining amount of data before being added
to the cursor.  With a sufficiently large size indicated, the check:

	datalen - dp &lt; 2

may then fail due to integer overflow.

Fix this by checking the length indicated against the amount of remaining
data in both places a definite length is determined.

Whilst we're at it, make the following changes:

 (1) Check the maximum size of extended length does not exceed the capacity
     of the variable it's being stored in (len) rather than the type that
     variable is assumed to be (size_t).

 (2) Compare the EOC tag to the symbolic constant ASN1_EOC rather than the
     integer 0.

 (3) To reduce confusion, move the initialisation of len outside of:

	for (len = 0; n &gt; 0; n--) {

     since it doesn't have anything to do with the loop counter n.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Woodhouse &lt;David.Woodhouse@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 23c8a812dc3c621009e4f0e5342aa4e2ede1ceaa upstream.

This fixes CVE-2016-0758.

In the ASN.1 decoder, when the length field of an ASN.1 value is extracted,
it isn't validated against the remaining amount of data before being added
to the cursor.  With a sufficiently large size indicated, the check:

	datalen - dp &lt; 2

may then fail due to integer overflow.

Fix this by checking the length indicated against the amount of remaining
data in both places a definite length is determined.

Whilst we're at it, make the following changes:

 (1) Check the maximum size of extended length does not exceed the capacity
     of the variable it's being stored in (len) rather than the type that
     variable is assumed to be (size_t).

 (2) Compare the EOC tag to the symbolic constant ASN1_EOC rather than the
     integer 0.

 (3) To reduce confusion, move the initialisation of len outside of:

	for (len = 0; n &gt; 0; n--) {

     since it doesn't have anything to do with the loop counter n.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Woodhouse &lt;David.Woodhouse@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib: lz4: fixed zram with lz4 on big endian machines</title>
<updated>2016-06-15T20:29:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rui Salvaterra</name>
<email>rsalvaterra@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-09T21:05:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b6128b21bd6ce80a200cd1fbc437eda02686273a'/>
<id>b6128b21bd6ce80a200cd1fbc437eda02686273a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3e26a691fe3fe1e02a76e5bab0c143ace4b137b4 upstream.

Based on Sergey's test patch [1], this fixes zram with lz4 compression
on big endian cpus.

Note that the 64-bit preprocessor test is not a cleanup, it's part of
the fix, since those identifiers are bogus (for example, __ppc64__
isn't defined anywhere else in the kernel, which means we'd fall into
the 32-bit definitions on ppc64).

Tested on ppc64 with no regression on x86_64.

[1] http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=145994470805853&amp;w=4

Suggested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rui Salvaterra &lt;rsalvaterra@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3e26a691fe3fe1e02a76e5bab0c143ace4b137b4 upstream.

Based on Sergey's test patch [1], this fixes zram with lz4 compression
on big endian cpus.

Note that the 64-bit preprocessor test is not a cleanup, it's part of
the fix, since those identifiers are bogus (for example, __ppc64__
isn't defined anywhere else in the kernel, which means we'd fall into
the 32-bit definitions on ppc64).

Tested on ppc64 with no regression on x86_64.

[1] http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=145994470805853&amp;w=4

Suggested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rui Salvaterra &lt;rsalvaterra@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>assoc_array: don't call compare_object() on a node</title>
<updated>2016-06-15T20:29:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jerome Marchand</name>
<email>jmarchan@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-06T13:06:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d513fcfdc14b44cc22f85bd1a5206fc6cd68d354'/>
<id>d513fcfdc14b44cc22f85bd1a5206fc6cd68d354</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8d4a2ec1e0b41b0cf9a0c5cd4511da7f8e4f3de2 upstream.

Changes since V1: fixed the description and added KASan warning.

In assoc_array_insert_into_terminal_node(), we call the
compare_object() method on all non-empty slots, even when they're
not leaves, passing a pointer to an unexpected structure to
compare_object(). Currently it causes an out-of-bound read access
in keyring_compare_object detected by KASan (see below). The issue
is easily reproduced with keyutils testsuite.
Only call compare_object() when the slot is a leave.

KASan warning:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in keyring_compare_object+0x213/0x240 at addr ffff880060a6f838
Read of size 8 by task keyctl/1655
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-192 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in assoc_array_insert+0xfd0/0x3a60 age=69 cpu=1 pid=1647
	___slab_alloc+0x563/0x5c0
	__slab_alloc+0x51/0x90
	kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x263/0x300
	assoc_array_insert+0xfd0/0x3a60
	__key_link_begin+0xfc/0x270
	key_create_or_update+0x459/0xaf0
	SyS_add_key+0x1ba/0x350
	entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001829b80 objects=16 used=8 fp=0xffff880060a6f550 flags=0x3fff8000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880060a6f740 @offset=5952 fp=0xffff880060a6e5d1

Bytes b4 ffff880060a6f730: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
Object ffff880060a6f740: d1 e5 a6 60 00 88 ff ff 0e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ...`............
Object ffff880060a6f750: 02 cf 8e 60 00 88 ff ff 02 c0 8e 60 00 88 ff ff  ...`.......`....
Object ffff880060a6f760: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
Object ffff880060a6f770: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
Object ffff880060a6f780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
Object ffff880060a6f790: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
Object ffff880060a6f7a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
Object ffff880060a6f7b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
Object ffff880060a6f7c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
Object ffff880060a6f7d0: 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
Object ffff880060a6f7e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
Object ffff880060a6f7f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
CPU: 0 PID: 1655 Comm: keyctl Tainted: G    B           4.5.0-rc4-kasan+ #291
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
 0000000000000000 000000001b2800b4 ffff880060a179e0 ffffffff81b60491
 ffff88006c802900 ffff880060a6f740 ffff880060a17a10 ffffffff815e2969
 ffff88006c802900 ffffea0001829b80 ffff880060a6f740 ffff880060a6e650
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff81b60491&gt;] dump_stack+0x85/0xc4
 [&lt;ffffffff815e2969&gt;] print_trailer+0xf9/0x150
 [&lt;ffffffff815e9454&gt;] object_err+0x34/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff815ebe50&gt;] kasan_report_error+0x230/0x550
 [&lt;ffffffff819949be&gt;] ? keyring_get_key_chunk+0x13e/0x210
 [&lt;ffffffff815ec62d&gt;] __asan_report_load_n_noabort+0x5d/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffff81994cc3&gt;] ? keyring_compare_object+0x213/0x240
 [&lt;ffffffff81994cc3&gt;] keyring_compare_object+0x213/0x240
 [&lt;ffffffff81bc238c&gt;] assoc_array_insert+0x86c/0x3a60
 [&lt;ffffffff81bc1b20&gt;] ? assoc_array_cancel_edit+0x70/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffff8199797d&gt;] ? __key_link_begin+0x20d/0x270
 [&lt;ffffffff8199786c&gt;] __key_link_begin+0xfc/0x270
 [&lt;ffffffff81993389&gt;] key_create_or_update+0x459/0xaf0
 [&lt;ffffffff8128ce0d&gt;] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
 [&lt;ffffffff81992f30&gt;] ? key_type_lookup+0xc0/0xc0
 [&lt;ffffffff8199e19d&gt;] ? lookup_user_key+0x13d/0xcd0
 [&lt;ffffffff81534763&gt;] ? memdup_user+0x53/0x80
 [&lt;ffffffff819983ea&gt;] SyS_add_key+0x1ba/0x350
 [&lt;ffffffff81998230&gt;] ? key_get_type_from_user.constprop.6+0xa0/0xa0
 [&lt;ffffffff828bcf4e&gt;] ? retint_user+0x18/0x23
 [&lt;ffffffff8128cc7e&gt;] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x3fe/0x580
 [&lt;ffffffff81004017&gt;] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x17/0x19
 [&lt;ffffffff828bc432&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff880060a6f700: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff880060a6f780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc
&gt;ffff880060a6f800: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                        ^
 ffff880060a6f880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff880060a6f900: fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================

Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand &lt;jmarchan@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8d4a2ec1e0b41b0cf9a0c5cd4511da7f8e4f3de2 upstream.

Changes since V1: fixed the description and added KASan warning.

In assoc_array_insert_into_terminal_node(), we call the
compare_object() method on all non-empty slots, even when they're
not leaves, passing a pointer to an unexpected structure to
compare_object(). Currently it causes an out-of-bound read access
in keyring_compare_object detected by KASan (see below). The issue
is easily reproduced with keyutils testsuite.
Only call compare_object() when the slot is a leave.

KASan warning:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in keyring_compare_object+0x213/0x240 at addr ffff880060a6f838
Read of size 8 by task keyctl/1655
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-192 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in assoc_array_insert+0xfd0/0x3a60 age=69 cpu=1 pid=1647
	___slab_alloc+0x563/0x5c0
	__slab_alloc+0x51/0x90
	kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x263/0x300
	assoc_array_insert+0xfd0/0x3a60
	__key_link_begin+0xfc/0x270
	key_create_or_update+0x459/0xaf0
	SyS_add_key+0x1ba/0x350
	entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001829b80 objects=16 used=8 fp=0xffff880060a6f550 flags=0x3fff8000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880060a6f740 @offset=5952 fp=0xffff880060a6e5d1

Bytes b4 ffff880060a6f730: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
Object ffff880060a6f740: d1 e5 a6 60 00 88 ff ff 0e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ...`............
Object ffff880060a6f750: 02 cf 8e 60 00 88 ff ff 02 c0 8e 60 00 88 ff ff  ...`.......`....
Object ffff880060a6f760: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
Object ffff880060a6f770: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
Object ffff880060a6f780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
Object ffff880060a6f790: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
Object ffff880060a6f7a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
Object ffff880060a6f7b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
Object ffff880060a6f7c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
Object ffff880060a6f7d0: 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
Object ffff880060a6f7e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
Object ffff880060a6f7f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
CPU: 0 PID: 1655 Comm: keyctl Tainted: G    B           4.5.0-rc4-kasan+ #291
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
 0000000000000000 000000001b2800b4 ffff880060a179e0 ffffffff81b60491
 ffff88006c802900 ffff880060a6f740 ffff880060a17a10 ffffffff815e2969
 ffff88006c802900 ffffea0001829b80 ffff880060a6f740 ffff880060a6e650
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff81b60491&gt;] dump_stack+0x85/0xc4
 [&lt;ffffffff815e2969&gt;] print_trailer+0xf9/0x150
 [&lt;ffffffff815e9454&gt;] object_err+0x34/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff815ebe50&gt;] kasan_report_error+0x230/0x550
 [&lt;ffffffff819949be&gt;] ? keyring_get_key_chunk+0x13e/0x210
 [&lt;ffffffff815ec62d&gt;] __asan_report_load_n_noabort+0x5d/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffff81994cc3&gt;] ? keyring_compare_object+0x213/0x240
 [&lt;ffffffff81994cc3&gt;] keyring_compare_object+0x213/0x240
 [&lt;ffffffff81bc238c&gt;] assoc_array_insert+0x86c/0x3a60
 [&lt;ffffffff81bc1b20&gt;] ? assoc_array_cancel_edit+0x70/0x70
 [&lt;ffffffff8199797d&gt;] ? __key_link_begin+0x20d/0x270
 [&lt;ffffffff8199786c&gt;] __key_link_begin+0xfc/0x270
 [&lt;ffffffff81993389&gt;] key_create_or_update+0x459/0xaf0
 [&lt;ffffffff8128ce0d&gt;] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
 [&lt;ffffffff81992f30&gt;] ? key_type_lookup+0xc0/0xc0
 [&lt;ffffffff8199e19d&gt;] ? lookup_user_key+0x13d/0xcd0
 [&lt;ffffffff81534763&gt;] ? memdup_user+0x53/0x80
 [&lt;ffffffff819983ea&gt;] SyS_add_key+0x1ba/0x350
 [&lt;ffffffff81998230&gt;] ? key_get_type_from_user.constprop.6+0xa0/0xa0
 [&lt;ffffffff828bcf4e&gt;] ? retint_user+0x18/0x23
 [&lt;ffffffff8128cc7e&gt;] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x3fe/0x580
 [&lt;ffffffff81004017&gt;] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x17/0x19
 [&lt;ffffffff828bc432&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff880060a6f700: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff880060a6f780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc
&gt;ffff880060a6f800: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                        ^
 ffff880060a6f880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff880060a6f900: fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================

Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand &lt;jmarchan@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/ucs2_string: Correct ucs2 -&gt; utf8 conversion</title>
<updated>2016-03-24T10:01:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason Andryuk</name>
<email>jandryuk@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-12T23:13:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=32cb48418cf716160e321c97d1c97306b26866e5'/>
<id>32cb48418cf716160e321c97d1c97306b26866e5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a68075908a37850918ad96b056acc9ac4ce1bd90 upstream.

The comparisons should be &gt;= since 0x800 and 0x80 require an additional bit
to store.

For the 3 byte case, the existing shift would drop off 2 more bits than
intended.

For the 2 byte case, there should be 5 bits bits in byte 1, and 6 bits in
byte 2.

Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk &lt;jandryuk@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek &lt;lersek@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@coreos.com&gt;
Cc: "Lee, Chun-Yi" &lt;jlee@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques &lt;luis.henriques@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a68075908a37850918ad96b056acc9ac4ce1bd90 upstream.

The comparisons should be &gt;= since 0x800 and 0x80 require an additional bit
to store.

For the 3 byte case, the existing shift would drop off 2 more bits than
intended.

For the 2 byte case, there should be 5 bits bits in byte 1, and 6 bits in
byte 2.

Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk &lt;jandryuk@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek &lt;lersek@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@coreos.com&gt;
Cc: "Lee, Chun-Yi" &lt;jlee@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques &lt;luis.henriques@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib/ucs2_string: Add ucs2 -&gt; utf8 helper functions</title>
<updated>2016-03-24T10:01:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Jones</name>
<email>pjones@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-08T19:48:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b1118bdc0c2e8683fa5a953ad128056668065594'/>
<id>b1118bdc0c2e8683fa5a953ad128056668065594</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 73500267c930baadadb0d02284909731baf151f7 upstream.

This adds ucs2_utf8size(), which tells us how big our ucs2 string is in
bytes, and ucs2_as_utf8, which translates from ucs2 to utf8..

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Lee, Chun-Yi &lt;jlee@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@coreos.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques &lt;luis.henriques@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 73500267c930baadadb0d02284909731baf151f7 upstream.

This adds ucs2_utf8size(), which tells us how big our ucs2 string is in
bytes, and ucs2_as_utf8, which translates from ucs2 to utf8..

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Lee, Chun-Yi &lt;jlee@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@coreos.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques &lt;luis.henriques@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>klist: fix starting point removed bug in klist iterators</title>
<updated>2016-02-25T10:34:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James Bottomley</name>
<email>James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-13T16:10:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d5dc8862b56acf8dc2e78f59a1a962728f57e72d'/>
<id>d5dc8862b56acf8dc2e78f59a1a962728f57e72d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 00cd29b799e3449f0c68b1cc77cd4a5f95b42d17 upstream.

The starting node for a klist iteration is often passed in from
somewhere way above the klist infrastructure, meaning there's no
guarantee the node is still on the list.  We've seen this in SCSI where
we use bus_find_device() to iterate through a list of devices.  In the
face of heavy hotplug activity, the last device returned by
bus_find_device() can be removed before the next call.  This leads to

Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 28073 at include/linux/kref.h:47 klist_iter_init_node+0x3d/0x50()
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: Modules linked in: scsi_debug x86_pkg_temp_thermal kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crc32c_intel joydev iTCO_wdt dcdbas ipmi_devintf acpi_power_meter iTCO_vendor_support ipmi_si imsghandler pcspkr wmi acpi_cpufreq tpm_tis tpm shpchp lpc_ich mfd_core nfsd nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc tg3 ptp pps_core
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: CPU: 2 PID: 28073 Comm: cat Not tainted 4.4.0-rc1+ #2
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R320/08VT7V, BIOS 2.0.22 11/19/2013
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: ffffffff81a20e77 ffff880613acfd18 ffffffff81321eef 0000000000000000
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: ffff880613acfd50 ffffffff8107ca52 ffff88061176b198 0000000000000000
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: ffffffff814542b0 ffff880610cfb100 ffff88061176b198 ffff880613acfd60
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: Call Trace:
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: [&lt;ffffffff81321eef&gt;] dump_stack+0x44/0x55
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: [&lt;ffffffff8107ca52&gt;] warn_slowpath_common+0x82/0xc0
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: [&lt;ffffffff814542b0&gt;] ? proc_scsi_show+0x20/0x20
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: [&lt;ffffffff8107cb4a&gt;] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: [&lt;ffffffff8167225d&gt;] klist_iter_init_node+0x3d/0x50
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: [&lt;ffffffff81421d41&gt;] bus_find_device+0x51/0xb0
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: [&lt;ffffffff814545ad&gt;] scsi_seq_next+0x2d/0x40
[...]

And an eventual crash. It can actually occur in any hotplug system
which has a device finder and a starting device.

We can fix this globally by making sure the starting node for
klist_iter_init_node() is actually a member of the list before using it
(and by starting from the beginning if it isn't).

Reported-by: Ewan D. Milne &lt;emilne@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Ewan D. Milne &lt;emilne@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley &lt;James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques &lt;luis.henriques@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 00cd29b799e3449f0c68b1cc77cd4a5f95b42d17 upstream.

The starting node for a klist iteration is often passed in from
somewhere way above the klist infrastructure, meaning there's no
guarantee the node is still on the list.  We've seen this in SCSI where
we use bus_find_device() to iterate through a list of devices.  In the
face of heavy hotplug activity, the last device returned by
bus_find_device() can be removed before the next call.  This leads to

Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 28073 at include/linux/kref.h:47 klist_iter_init_node+0x3d/0x50()
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: Modules linked in: scsi_debug x86_pkg_temp_thermal kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crc32c_intel joydev iTCO_wdt dcdbas ipmi_devintf acpi_power_meter iTCO_vendor_support ipmi_si imsghandler pcspkr wmi acpi_cpufreq tpm_tis tpm shpchp lpc_ich mfd_core nfsd nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc tg3 ptp pps_core
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: CPU: 2 PID: 28073 Comm: cat Not tainted 4.4.0-rc1+ #2
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R320/08VT7V, BIOS 2.0.22 11/19/2013
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: ffffffff81a20e77 ffff880613acfd18 ffffffff81321eef 0000000000000000
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: ffff880613acfd50 ffffffff8107ca52 ffff88061176b198 0000000000000000
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: ffffffff814542b0 ffff880610cfb100 ffff88061176b198 ffff880613acfd60
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: Call Trace:
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: [&lt;ffffffff81321eef&gt;] dump_stack+0x44/0x55
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: [&lt;ffffffff8107ca52&gt;] warn_slowpath_common+0x82/0xc0
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: [&lt;ffffffff814542b0&gt;] ? proc_scsi_show+0x20/0x20
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: [&lt;ffffffff8107cb4a&gt;] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: [&lt;ffffffff8167225d&gt;] klist_iter_init_node+0x3d/0x50
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: [&lt;ffffffff81421d41&gt;] bus_find_device+0x51/0xb0
Dec  3 13:22:02 localhost kernel: [&lt;ffffffff814545ad&gt;] scsi_seq_next+0x2d/0x40
[...]

And an eventual crash. It can actually occur in any hotplug system
which has a device finder and a starting device.

We can fix this globally by making sure the starting node for
klist_iter_init_node() is actually a member of the list before using it
(and by starting from the beginning if it isn't).

Reported-by: Ewan D. Milne &lt;emilne@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Ewan D. Milne &lt;emilne@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley &lt;James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques &lt;luis.henriques@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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