linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v6.9.7

kprobe/ftrace: fix build error due to bad function definition

2024-06-27T11:52:32+00:00

commit 4b377b4868ef17b040065bd468668c707d2477a5 upstream.

Commit 1a7d0890dd4a ("kprobe/ftrace: bail out if ftrace was killed")
introduced a bad K&R function definition, which we haven't accepted in a
long long time.

Gcc seems to let it slide, but clang notices with the appropriate error:

  kernel/kprobes.c:1140:24: error: a function declaration without a prototype is deprecated in all >
   1140 | void kprobe_ftrace_kill()
        |                        ^
        |                         void

but this commit was apparently never in linux-next before it was sent
upstream, so it didn't get the appropriate build test coverage.

Fixes: 1a7d0890dd4a kprobe/ftrace: bail out if ftrace was killed
Cc: Stephen Brennan 
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) 
Cc: Guo Ren 
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tracing: Add MODULE_DESCRIPTION() to preemptirq_delay_test

2024-06-27T11:52:31+00:00

[ Upstream commit 23748e3e0fbfe471eff5ce439921629f6a427828 ]

Fix the 'make W=1' warning:

WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() in kernel/trace/preemptirq_delay_test.o

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240518-md-preemptirq_delay_test-v1-1-387d11b30d85@quicinc.com

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers 
Fixes: f96e8577da10 ("lib: Add module for testing preemptoff/irqsoff latency tracers")
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Jeff Johnson 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section

2024-06-27T11:52:30+00:00

commit 9a95c5bfbf02a0a7f5983280fe284a0ff0836c34 upstream.

A panic happens in ima_match_policy:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
PGD 42f873067 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh
Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
               BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450
Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39
      7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d
      f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea
      44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f
RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200
RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739
R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970
R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  00007f5195b51740(0000)
GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 ima_get_action+0x22/0x30
 process_measurement+0xb0/0x830
 ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170
 ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0
 ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140
 ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0
 ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0
 ima_file_check+0x64/0x90
 path_openat+0x571/0x1720
 do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110
 ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0
 ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60
 ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250
 ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
 do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca

Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by
ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a
RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL.
This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side
critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems.

Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause
synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a
UAF to happen.

The root cause of this issue could be described as follows:
|	Thread A	|	Thread B	|
|			|ima_match_policy	|
|			|  rcu_read_lock	|
|ima_lsm_update_rule	|			|
|  synchronize_rcu	|			|
|			|    kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)|
|			|      sleep		|
==> synchronize_rcu returns early
|  kfree(entry)		|			|
|			|    entry = entry->next|
==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything).
|			|    entry->action	|
==> Accessing entry might cause panic.

To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within
RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC.

Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua 
Acked-by: John Johansen 
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar 
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler 
[PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kcov: don't lose track of remote references during softirqs

2024-06-27T11:52:29+00:00

commit 01c8f9806bde438ca1c8cbbc439f0a14a6694f6c upstream.

In kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop(), we swap the previous KCOV
metadata of the current task into a per-CPU variable.  However, the
kcov_mode_enabled(mode) check is not sufficient in the case of remote KCOV
coverage: current->kcov_mode always remains KCOV_MODE_DISABLED for remote
KCOV objects.

If the original task that has invoked the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl happens
to get interrupted and kcov_remote_start() is called, it ultimately leads
to kcov_remote_stop() NOT restoring the original KCOV reference.  So when
the task exits, all registered remote KCOV handles remain active forever.

The most uncomfortable effect (at least for syzkaller) is that the bug
prevents the reuse of the same /sys/kernel/debug/kcov descriptor.  If
we obtain it in the parent process and then e.g.  drop some
capabilities and continuously fork to execute individual programs, at
some point current->kcov of the forked process is lost,
kcov_task_exit() takes no action, and all KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctls
calls from subsequent forks fail.

And, yes, the efficiency is also affected if we keep on losing remote
kcov objects.
a) kcov_remote_map keeps on growing forever.
b) (If I'm not mistaken), we're also not freeing the memory referenced
by kcov->area.

Fix it by introducing a special kcov_mode that is assigned to the task
that owns a KCOV remote object.  It makes kcov_mode_enabled() return true
and yet does not trigger coverage collection in __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc()
and write_comp_data().

[nogikh@google.com: replace WRITE_ONCE() with an ordinary assignment]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240614171221.2837584-1-nogikh@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240611133229.527822-1-nogikh@google.com
Fixes: 5ff3b30ab57d ("kcov: collect coverage from interrupts")
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nogikh 
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov 
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov 
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov 
Cc: Alexander Potapenko 
Cc: Arnd Bergmann 
Cc: Marco Elver 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

gcov: add support for GCC 14

2024-06-27T11:52:29+00:00

commit c1558bc57b8e5b4da5d821537cd30e2e660861d8 upstream.

Using gcov on kernels compiled with GCC 14 results in truncated 16-byte
long .gcda files with no usable data.  To fix this, update GCOV_COUNTERS
to match the value defined by GCC 14.

Tested with GCC versions 14.1.0 and 13.2.0.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240610092743.1609845-1-oberpar@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Oberparleiter 
Reported-by: Allison Henderson 
Reported-by: Chuck Lever III 
Tested-by: Chuck Lever 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: Fix reg_set_min_max corruption of fake_reg

2024-06-27T11:52:20+00:00

[ Upstream commit 92424801261d1564a0bb759da3cf3ccd69fdf5a2 ]

Juan reported that after doing some changes to buzzer [0] and implementing
a new fuzzing strategy guided by coverage, they noticed the following in
one of the probes:

  [...]
  13: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0)         ; R0=map_value(ks=4,vs=8) R6_w=scalar()
  14: (b7) r0 = 0                       ; R0_w=0
  15: (b4) w0 = -1                      ; R0_w=0xffffffff
  16: (74) w0 >>= 1                     ; R0_w=0x7fffffff
  17: (5c) w6 &= w0                     ; R0_w=0x7fffffff R6_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=umax32=0x7fffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffff))
  18: (44) w6 |= 2                      ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=umax32=0x7fffffff,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd))
  19: (56) if w6 != 0x7ffffffd goto pc+1
  REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (true_reg2): range bounds violation u64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] u32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0)
  REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (false_reg1): range bounds violation u64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] u32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0)
  REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (false_reg2): const tnum out of sync with range bounds u64=[0x0, 0xffffffffffffffff] s64=[0x8000000000000000, 0x7fffffffffffffff] u32=[0x0, 0xffffffff] s32=[0x80000000, 0x7fffffff] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0)
  19: R6_w=0x7fffffff
  20: (95) exit

  from 19 to 21: R0=0x7fffffff R6=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=0x7ffffffe,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd)) R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm
  21: R0=0x7fffffff R6=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=0x7ffffffe,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd)) R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm
  21: (14) w6 -= 2147483632             ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=2,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=0x80000012,smax32=14,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffd))
  22: (76) if w6 s>= 0xe goto pc+1      ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=2,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=0x80000012,smax32=13,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffd))
  23: (95) exit

  from 22 to 24: R0=0x7fffffff R6_w=14 R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm
  24: R0=0x7fffffff R6_w=14 R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm
  24: (14) w6 -= 14                     ; R6_w=0
  [...]

What can be seen here is a register invariant violation on line 19. After
the binary-or in line 18, the verifier knows that bit 2 is set but knows
nothing about the rest of the content which was loaded from a map value,
meaning, range is [2,0x7fffffff] with var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd). When in
line 19 the verifier analyzes the branch, it splits the register states
in reg_set_min_max() into the registers of the true branch (true_reg1,
true_reg2) and the registers of the false branch (false_reg1, false_reg2).

Since the test is w6 != 0x7ffffffd, the src_reg is a known constant.
Internally, the verifier creates a "fake" register initialized as scalar
to the value of 0x7ffffffd, and then passes it onto reg_set_min_max(). Now,
for line 19, it is mathematically impossible to take the false branch of
this program, yet the verifier analyzes it. It is impossible because the
second bit of r6 will be set due to the prior or operation and the
constant in the condition has that bit unset (hex(fd) == binary(1111 1101).

When the verifier first analyzes the false / fall-through branch, it will
compute an intersection between the var_off of r6 and of the constant. This
is because the verifier creates a "fake" register initialized to the value
of the constant. The intersection result later refines both registers in
regs_refine_cond_op():

  [...]
  t = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off), tnum_subreg(reg2->var_off));
  reg1->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg1->var_off, t);
  reg2->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg2->var_off, t);
  [...]

Since the verifier is analyzing the false branch of the conditional jump,
reg1 is equal to false_reg1 and reg2 is equal to false_reg2, i.e. the reg2
is the "fake" register that was meant to hold a constant value. The resulting
var_off of the intersection says that both registers now hold a known value
of var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0) or in other words: this operation manages to
make the verifier think that the "constant" value that was passed in the
jump operation now holds a different value.

Normally this would not be an issue since it should not influence the true
branch, however, false_reg2 and true_reg2 are pointers to the same "fake"
register. Meaning, the false branch can influence the results of the true
branch. In line 24, the verifier assumes R6_w=0, but the actual runtime
value in this case is 1. The fix is simply not passing in the same "fake"
register location as inputs to reg_set_min_max(), but instead making a
copy. Moving the fake_reg into the env also reduces stack consumption by
120 bytes. With this, the verifier successfully rejects invalid accesses
from the test program.

  [0] https://github.com/google/buzzer

Fixes: 67420501e868 ("bpf: generalize reg_set_min_max() to handle non-const register comparisons")
Reported-by: Juan José López Jaimez 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240613115310.25383-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

tracing: Build event generation tests only as modules

2024-06-27T11:52:19+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3572bd5689b0812b161b40279e39ca5b66d73e88 ]

The kprobes and synth event generation test modules add events and lock
(get a reference) those event file reference in module init function,
and unlock and delete it in module exit function. This is because those
are designed for playing as modules.

If we make those modules as built-in, those events are left locked in the
kernel, and never be removed. This causes kprobe event self-test failure
as below.

[   97.349708] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   97.353453] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1 at kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c:2133 kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480
[   97.357106] Modules linked in:
[   97.358488] CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.9.0-g699646734ab5-dirty #14
[   97.361556] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
[   97.363880] RIP: 0010:kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480
[   97.365538] Code: a8 24 08 82 e9 ae fd ff ff 90 0f 0b 90 48 c7 c7 e5 aa 0b 82 e9 ee fc ff ff 90 0f 0b 90 48 c7 c7 2d 61 06 82 e9 8e fd ff ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 48 c7 c7 33 0b 0c 82 89 c6 e8 6e 03 1f ff 41 ff c7 e9 90
[   97.370429] RSP: 0000:ffffc90000013b50 EFLAGS: 00010286
[   97.371852] RAX: 00000000fffffff0 RBX: ffff888005919c00 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   97.373829] RDX: ffff888003f40000 RSI: ffffffff8236a598 RDI: ffff888003f40a68
[   97.375715] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[   97.377675] R10: ffffffff811c9ae5 R11: ffffffff8120c4e0 R12: 0000000000000000
[   97.379591] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000015 R15: 0000000000000000
[   97.381536] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88807dcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   97.383813] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   97.385449] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000002244000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
[   97.387347] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   97.389277] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   97.391196] Call Trace:
[   97.391967]  
[   97.392647]  ? __warn+0xcc/0x180
[   97.393640]  ? kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480
[   97.395181]  ? report_bug+0xbd/0x150
[   97.396234]  ? handle_bug+0x3e/0x60
[   97.397311]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x50
[   97.398434]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[   97.399652]  ? trace_kprobe_is_busy+0x20/0x20
[   97.400904]  ? tracing_reset_all_online_cpus+0x15/0x90
[   97.402304]  ? kprobe_trace_self_tests_init+0x3f1/0x480
[   97.403773]  ? init_kprobe_trace+0x50/0x50
[   97.404972]  do_one_initcall+0x112/0x240
[   97.406113]  do_initcall_level+0x95/0xb0
[   97.407286]  ? kernel_init+0x1a/0x1a0
[   97.408401]  do_initcalls+0x3f/0x70
[   97.409452]  kernel_init_freeable+0x16f/0x1e0
[   97.410662]  ? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
[   97.411738]  kernel_init+0x1a/0x1a0
[   97.412788]  ret_from_fork+0x39/0x50
[   97.413817]  ? rest_init+0x1f0/0x1f0
[   97.414844]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
[   97.416285]  
[   97.417134] irq event stamp: 13437323
[   97.418376] hardirqs last  enabled at (13437337): [] console_unlock+0x11c/0x150
[   97.421285] hardirqs last disabled at (13437370): [] console_unlock+0x101/0x150
[   97.423838] softirqs last  enabled at (13437366): [] handle_softirqs+0x23f/0x2a0
[   97.426450] softirqs last disabled at (13437393): [] __irq_exit_rcu+0x66/0xd0
[   97.428850] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

And also, since we can not cleanup dynamic_event file, ftracetest are
failed too.

To avoid these issues, build these tests only as modules.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/171811263754.85078.5877446624311852525.stgit@devnote2/

Fixes: 9fe41efaca08 ("tracing: Add synth event generation test module")
Fixes: 64836248dda2 ("tracing: Add kprobe event command generation test module")
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) 
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

kprobe/ftrace: bail out if ftrace was killed

2024-06-27T11:52:17+00:00

[ Upstream commit 1a7d0890dd4a502a202aaec792a6c04e6e049547 ]

If an error happens in ftrace, ftrace_kill() will prevent disarming
kprobes. Eventually, the ftrace_ops associated with the kprobes will be
freed, yet the kprobes will still be active, and when triggered, they
will use the freed memory, likely resulting in a page fault and panic.

This behavior can be reproduced quite easily, by creating a kprobe and
then triggering a ftrace_kill(). For simplicity, we can simulate an
ftrace error with a kernel module like [1]:

[1]: https://github.com/brenns10/kernel_stuff/tree/master/ftrace_killer

  sudo perf probe --add commit_creds
  sudo perf trace -e probe:commit_creds
  # In another terminal
  make
  sudo insmod ftrace_killer.ko  # calls ftrace_kill(), simulating bug
  # Back to perf terminal
  # ctrl-c
  sudo perf probe --del commit_creds

After a short period, a page fault and panic would occur as the kprobe
continues to execute and uses the freed ftrace_ops. While ftrace_kill()
is supposed to be used only in extreme circumstances, it is invoked in
FTRACE_WARN_ON() and so there are many places where an unexpected bug
could be triggered, yet the system may continue operating, possibly
without the administrator noticing. If ftrace_kill() does not panic the
system, then we should do everything we can to continue operating,
rather than leave a ticking time bomb.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240501162956.229427-1-stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com/

Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan 
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) 
Acked-by: Guo Ren 
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

cgroup/cpuset: Make cpuset hotplug processing synchronous

2024-06-27T11:52:15+00:00

[ Upstream commit 2125c0034c5dfd61171b494bd309bb7637bff6eb ]

Since commit 3a5a6d0c2b03("cpuset: don't nest cgroup_mutex inside
get_online_cpus()"), cpuset hotplug was done asynchronously via a work
function. This is to avoid recursive locking of cgroup_mutex.

Since then, the cgroup locking scheme has changed quite a bit. A
cpuset_mutex was introduced to protect cpuset specific operations.
The cpuset_mutex is then replaced by a cpuset_rwsem. With commit
d74b27d63a8b ("cgroup/cpuset: Change cpuset_rwsem and hotplug lock
order"), cpu_hotplug_lock is acquired before cpuset_rwsem. Later on,
cpuset_rwsem is reverted back to cpuset_mutex. All these locking changes
allow the hotplug code to call into cpuset core directly.

The following commits were also merged due to the asynchronous nature
of cpuset hotplug processing.

  - commit b22afcdf04c9 ("cpu/hotplug: Cure the cpusets trainwreck")
  - commit 50e76632339d ("sched/cpuset/pm: Fix cpuset vs. suspend-resume
    bugs")
  - commit 28b89b9e6f7b ("cpuset: handle race between CPU hotplug and
    cpuset_hotplug_work")

Clean up all these bandages by making cpuset hotplug
processing synchronous again with the exception that the call to
cgroup_transfer_tasks() to transfer tasks out of an empty cgroup v1
cpuset, if necessary, will still be done via a work function due to the
existing cgroup_mutex -> cpu_hotplug_lock dependency. It is possible
to reverse that dependency, but that will require updating a number of
different cgroup controllers. This special hotplug code path should be
rarely taken anyway.

As all the cpuset states will be updated by the end of the hotplug
operation, we can revert most the above commits except commit
50e76632339d ("sched/cpuset/pm: Fix cpuset vs. suspend-resume bugs")
which is partially reverted.  Also removing some cpus_read_lock trylock
attempts in the cpuset partition code as they are no longer necessary
since the cpu_hotplug_lock is now held for the whole duration of the
cpuset hotplug code path.

Signed-off-by: Waiman Long 
Tested-by: Valentin Schneider 
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

clocksource: Make watchdog and suspend-timing multiplication overflow safe

2024-06-27T11:52:13+00:00

[ Upstream commit d0304569fb019d1bcfbbbce1ce6df6b96f04079b ]

Kernel timekeeping is designed to keep the change in cycles (since the last
timer interrupt) below max_cycles, which prevents multiplication overflow
when converting cycles to nanoseconds. However, if timer interrupts stop,
the clocksource_cyc2ns() calculation will eventually overflow.

Add protection against that. Simplify by folding together
clocksource_delta() and clocksource_cyc2ns() into cycles_to_nsec_safe().
Check against max_cycles, falling back to a slower higher precision
calculation.

Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325064023.2997-20-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin