<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v6.6.98</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>rcu: Return early if callback is not specified</title>
<updated>2025-07-10T14:03:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)</name>
<email>urezki@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-10T17:34:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=817662f9bdf81fb5c040aa94b44669f3d345a07d'/>
<id>817662f9bdf81fb5c040aa94b44669f3d345a07d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 33b6a1f155d627f5bd80c7485c598ce45428f74f ]

Currently the call_rcu() API does not check whether a callback
pointer is NULL. If NULL is passed, rcu_core() will try to invoke
it, resulting in NULL pointer dereference and a kernel crash.

To prevent this and improve debuggability, this patch adds a check
for NULL and emits a kernel stack trace to help identify a faulty
caller.

Signed-off-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) &lt;urezki@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes &lt;joelagnelf@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes &lt;joelagnelf@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 33b6a1f155d627f5bd80c7485c598ce45428f74f ]

Currently the call_rcu() API does not check whether a callback
pointer is NULL. If NULL is passed, rcu_core() will try to invoke
it, resulting in NULL pointer dereference and a kernel crash.

To prevent this and improve debuggability, this patch adds a check
for NULL and emits a kernel stack trace to help identify a faulty
caller.

Signed-off-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) &lt;urezki@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes &lt;joelagnelf@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes &lt;joelagnelf@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Fix WARN in perf_cgroup_switch()</title>
<updated>2025-06-27T10:09:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Luo Gengkun</name>
<email>luogengkun@huaweicloud.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-04T03:39:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7c631e5cd38ed3067240ab70e6390dd8dde39284'/>
<id>7c631e5cd38ed3067240ab70e6390dd8dde39284</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3172fb986666dfb71bf483b6d3539e1e587fa197 ]

There may be concurrency between perf_cgroup_switch and
perf_cgroup_event_disable. Consider the following scenario: after a new
perf cgroup event is created on CPU0, the new event may not trigger
a reprogramming, causing ctx-&gt;is_active to be 0. In this case, when CPU1
disables this perf event, it executes __perf_remove_from_context-&gt;
list _del_event-&gt;perf_cgroup_event_disable on CPU1, which causes a race
with perf_cgroup_switch running on CPU0.

The following describes the details of this concurrency scenario:

CPU0						CPU1

perf_cgroup_switch:
   ...
   # cpuctx-&gt;cgrp is not NULL here
   if (READ_ONCE(cpuctx-&gt;cgrp) == NULL)
   	return;

						perf_remove_from_context:
						   ...
						   raw_spin_lock_irq(&amp;ctx-&gt;lock);
						   ...
						   # ctx-&gt;is_active == 0 because reprogramm is not
						   # tigger, so CPU1 can do __perf_remove_from_context
						   # for CPU0
						   __perf_remove_from_context:
						         perf_cgroup_event_disable:
							    ...
							    if (--ctx-&gt;nr_cgroups)
							    ...

   # this warning will happened because CPU1 changed
   # ctx.nr_cgroups to 0.
   WARN_ON_ONCE(cpuctx-&gt;ctx.nr_cgroups == 0);

[peterz: use guard instead of goto unlock]
Fixes: db4a835601b7 ("perf/core: Set cgroup in CPU contexts for new cgroup events")
Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun &lt;luogengkun@huaweicloud.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250604033924.3914647-3-luogengkun@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3172fb986666dfb71bf483b6d3539e1e587fa197 ]

There may be concurrency between perf_cgroup_switch and
perf_cgroup_event_disable. Consider the following scenario: after a new
perf cgroup event is created on CPU0, the new event may not trigger
a reprogramming, causing ctx-&gt;is_active to be 0. In this case, when CPU1
disables this perf event, it executes __perf_remove_from_context-&gt;
list _del_event-&gt;perf_cgroup_event_disable on CPU1, which causes a race
with perf_cgroup_switch running on CPU0.

The following describes the details of this concurrency scenario:

CPU0						CPU1

perf_cgroup_switch:
   ...
   # cpuctx-&gt;cgrp is not NULL here
   if (READ_ONCE(cpuctx-&gt;cgrp) == NULL)
   	return;

						perf_remove_from_context:
						   ...
						   raw_spin_lock_irq(&amp;ctx-&gt;lock);
						   ...
						   # ctx-&gt;is_active == 0 because reprogramm is not
						   # tigger, so CPU1 can do __perf_remove_from_context
						   # for CPU0
						   __perf_remove_from_context:
						         perf_cgroup_event_disable:
							    ...
							    if (--ctx-&gt;nr_cgroups)
							    ...

   # this warning will happened because CPU1 changed
   # ctx.nr_cgroups to 0.
   WARN_ON_ONCE(cpuctx-&gt;ctx.nr_cgroups == 0);

[peterz: use guard instead of goto unlock]
Fixes: db4a835601b7 ("perf/core: Set cgroup in CPU contexts for new cgroup events")
Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun &lt;luogengkun@huaweicloud.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250604033924.3914647-3-luogengkun@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Fix cgroup state vs ERROR</title>
<updated>2025-06-27T10:09:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-05T10:37:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bddec730501b11c530b1ae84a70f1012264824b4'/>
<id>bddec730501b11c530b1ae84a70f1012264824b4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 61988e36dc5457cdff7ae7927e8d9ad1419ee998 ]

While chasing down a missing perf_cgroup_event_disable() elsewhere,
Leo Yan found that both perf_put_aux_event() and
perf_remove_sibling_event() were also missing one.

Specifically, the rule is that events that switch to OFF,ERROR need to
call perf_cgroup_event_disable().

Unify the disable paths to ensure this.

Fixes: ab43762ef010 ("perf: Allow normal events to output AUX data")
Fixes: 9f0c4fa111dc ("perf/core: Add a new PERF_EV_CAP_SIBLING event capability")
Reported-by: Leo Yan &lt;leo.yan@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250605123343.GD35970@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 61988e36dc5457cdff7ae7927e8d9ad1419ee998 ]

While chasing down a missing perf_cgroup_event_disable() elsewhere,
Leo Yan found that both perf_put_aux_event() and
perf_remove_sibling_event() were also missing one.

Specifically, the rule is that events that switch to OFF,ERROR need to
call perf_cgroup_event_disable().

Unify the disable paths to ensure this.

Fixes: ab43762ef010 ("perf: Allow normal events to output AUX data")
Fixes: 9f0c4fa111dc ("perf/core: Add a new PERF_EV_CAP_SIBLING event capability")
Reported-by: Leo Yan &lt;leo.yan@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250605123343.GD35970@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Fix sample vs do_exit()</title>
<updated>2025-06-27T10:09:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-05T10:31:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2ee6044a693735396bb47eeaba1ac3ae26c1c99b'/>
<id>2ee6044a693735396bb47eeaba1ac3ae26c1c99b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4f6fc782128355931527cefe3eb45338abd8ab39 ]

Baisheng Gao reported an ARM64 crash, which Mark decoded as being a
synchronous external abort -- most likely due to trying to access
MMIO in bad ways.

The crash further shows perf trying to do a user stack sample while in
exit_mmap()'s tlb_finish_mmu() -- i.e. while tearing down the address
space it is trying to access.

It turns out that we stop perf after we tear down the userspace mm; a
receipie for disaster, since perf likes to access userspace for
various reasons.

Flip this order by moving up where we stop perf in do_exit().

Additionally, harden PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN and PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER
to abort when the current task does not have an mm (exit_mm() makes
sure to set current-&gt;mm = NULL; before commencing with the actual
teardown). Such that CPU wide events don't trip on this same problem.

Fixes: c5ebcedb566e ("perf: Add ability to attach user stack dump to sample")
Reported-by: Baisheng Gao &lt;baisheng.gao@unisoc.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250605110815.GQ39944@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4f6fc782128355931527cefe3eb45338abd8ab39 ]

Baisheng Gao reported an ARM64 crash, which Mark decoded as being a
synchronous external abort -- most likely due to trying to access
MMIO in bad ways.

The crash further shows perf trying to do a user stack sample while in
exit_mmap()'s tlb_finish_mmu() -- i.e. while tearing down the address
space it is trying to access.

It turns out that we stop perf after we tear down the userspace mm; a
receipie for disaster, since perf likes to access userspace for
various reasons.

Flip this order by moving up where we stop perf in do_exit().

Additionally, harden PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN and PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER
to abort when the current task does not have an mm (exit_mm() makes
sure to set current-&gt;mm = NULL; before commencing with the actual
teardown). Such that CPU wide events don't trip on this same problem.

Fixes: c5ebcedb566e ("perf: Add ability to attach user stack dump to sample")
Reported-by: Baisheng Gao &lt;baisheng.gao@unisoc.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250605110815.GQ39944@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Check rcu_read_lock_trace_held() in bpf_map_lookup_percpu_elem()</title>
<updated>2025-06-27T10:08:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hou Tao</name>
<email>houtao1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-26T06:25:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7bf4461f1c97207fda757014690d55a447ce859f'/>
<id>7bf4461f1c97207fda757014690d55a447ce859f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d4965578267e2e81f67c86e2608481e77e9c8569 ]

bpf_map_lookup_percpu_elem() helper is also available for sleepable bpf
program. When BPF JIT is disabled or under 32-bit host,
bpf_map_lookup_percpu_elem() will not be inlined. Using it in a
sleepable bpf program will trigger the warning in
bpf_map_lookup_percpu_elem(), because the bpf program only holds
rcu_read_lock_trace lock. Therefore, add the missed check.

Reported-by: syzbot+dce5aae19ae4d6399986@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/000000000000176a130617420310@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao &lt;houtao1@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250526062534.1105938-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d4965578267e2e81f67c86e2608481e77e9c8569 ]

bpf_map_lookup_percpu_elem() helper is also available for sleepable bpf
program. When BPF JIT is disabled or under 32-bit host,
bpf_map_lookup_percpu_elem() will not be inlined. Using it in a
sleepable bpf program will trigger the warning in
bpf_map_lookup_percpu_elem(), because the bpf program only holds
rcu_read_lock_trace lock. Therefore, add the missed check.

Reported-by: syzbot+dce5aae19ae4d6399986@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/000000000000176a130617420310@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao &lt;houtao1@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250526062534.1105938-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>clocksource: Fix the CPUs' choice in the watchdog per CPU verification</title>
<updated>2025-06-27T10:08:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Guilherme G. Piccoli</name>
<email>gpiccoli@igalia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-03-23T17:36:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1c24a738971cb012ff7f450ca5656a52aeba6de3'/>
<id>1c24a738971cb012ff7f450ca5656a52aeba6de3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 08d7becc1a6b8c936e25d827becabfe3bff72a36 ]

Right now, if the clocksource watchdog detects a clocksource skew, it might
perform a per CPU check, for example in the TSC case on x86.  In other
words: supposing TSC is detected as unstable by the clocksource watchdog
running at CPU1, as part of marking TSC unstable the kernel will also run a
check of TSC readings on some CPUs to be sure it is synced between them
all.

But that check happens only on some CPUs, not all of them; this choice is
based on the parameter "verify_n_cpus" and in some random cpumask
calculation. So, the watchdog runs such per CPU checks on up to
"verify_n_cpus" random CPUs among all online CPUs, with the risk of
repeating CPUs (that aren't double checked) in the cpumask random
calculation.

But if "verify_n_cpus" &gt; num_online_cpus(), it should skip the random
calculation and just go ahead and check the clocksource sync between
all online CPUs, without the risk of skipping some CPUs due to
duplicity in the random cpumask calculation.

Tests in a 4 CPU laptop with TSC skew detected led to some cases of the per
CPU verification skipping some CPU even with verify_n_cpus=8, due to the
duplicity on random cpumask generation. Skipping the randomization when the
number of online CPUs is smaller than verify_n_cpus, solves that.

Suggested-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo &lt;cascardo@igalia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli &lt;gpiccoli@igalia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250323173857.372390-1-gpiccoli@igalia.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 08d7becc1a6b8c936e25d827becabfe3bff72a36 ]

Right now, if the clocksource watchdog detects a clocksource skew, it might
perform a per CPU check, for example in the TSC case on x86.  In other
words: supposing TSC is detected as unstable by the clocksource watchdog
running at CPU1, as part of marking TSC unstable the kernel will also run a
check of TSC readings on some CPUs to be sure it is synced between them
all.

But that check happens only on some CPUs, not all of them; this choice is
based on the parameter "verify_n_cpus" and in some random cpumask
calculation. So, the watchdog runs such per CPU checks on up to
"verify_n_cpus" random CPUs among all online CPUs, with the risk of
repeating CPUs (that aren't double checked) in the cpumask random
calculation.

But if "verify_n_cpus" &gt; num_online_cpus(), it should skip the random
calculation and just go ahead and check the clocksource sync between
all online CPUs, without the risk of skipping some CPUs due to
duplicity in the random cpumask calculation.

Tests in a 4 CPU laptop with TSC skew detected led to some cases of the per
CPU verification skipping some CPU even with verify_n_cpus=8, due to the
duplicity on random cpumask generation. Skipping the randomization when the
number of online CPUs is smaller than verify_n_cpus, solves that.

Suggested-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo &lt;cascardo@igalia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli &lt;gpiccoli@igalia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250323173857.372390-1-gpiccoli@igalia.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ftrace: Fix UAF when lookup kallsym after ftrace disabled</title>
<updated>2025-06-27T10:08:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ye Bin</name>
<email>yebin10@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-29T11:19:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=83a692a9792aa86249d68a8ac0b9d55ecdd255fa'/>
<id>83a692a9792aa86249d68a8ac0b9d55ecdd255fa</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f914b52c379c12288b7623bb814d0508dbe7481d upstream.

The following issue happens with a buggy module:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc05d0218
PGD 1bd66f067 P4D 1bd66f067 PUD 1bd671067 PMD 101808067 PTE 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
RIP: 0010:sized_strscpy+0x81/0x2f0
RSP: 0018:ffff88812d76fa08 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffc0601010 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000038 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88812608da2d
RBP: 8080808080808080 R08: ffff88812608da2d R09: ffff88812608da68
R10: ffff88812608d82d R11: ffff88812608d810 R12: 0000000000000038
R13: ffff88812608da2d R14: ffffffffc05d0218 R15: fefefefefefefeff
FS:  00007fef552de740(0000) GS:ffff8884251c7000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffc05d0218 CR3: 00000001146f0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 ftrace_mod_get_kallsym+0x1ac/0x590
 update_iter_mod+0x239/0x5b0
 s_next+0x5b/0xa0
 seq_read_iter+0x8c9/0x1070
 seq_read+0x249/0x3b0
 proc_reg_read+0x1b0/0x280
 vfs_read+0x17f/0x920
 ksys_read+0xf3/0x1c0
 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x2e0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The above issue may happen as follows:
(1) Add kprobe tracepoint;
(2) insmod test.ko;
(3)  Module triggers ftrace disabled;
(4) rmmod test.ko;
(5) cat /proc/kallsyms; --&gt; Will trigger UAF as test.ko already removed;
ftrace_mod_get_kallsym()
...
strscpy(module_name, mod_map-&gt;mod-&gt;name, MODULE_NAME_LEN);
...

The problem is when a module triggers an issue with ftrace and
sets ftrace_disable. The ftrace_disable is set when an anomaly is
discovered and to prevent any more damage, ftrace stops all text
modification. The issue that happened was that the ftrace_disable stops
more than just the text modification.

When a module is loaded, its init functions can also be traced. Because
kallsyms deletes the init functions after a module has loaded, ftrace
saves them when the module is loaded and function tracing is enabled. This
allows the output of the function trace to show the init function names
instead of just their raw memory addresses.

When a module is removed, ftrace_release_mod() is called, and if
ftrace_disable is set, it just returns without doing anything more. The
problem here is that it leaves the mod_list still around and if kallsyms
is called, it will call into this code and access the module memory that
has already been freed as it will return:

  strscpy(module_name, mod_map-&gt;mod-&gt;name, MODULE_NAME_LEN);

Where the "mod" no longer exists and triggers a UAF bug.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250523135452.626d8dcd@gandalf.local.home/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: aba4b5c22cba ("ftrace: Save module init functions kallsyms symbols for tracing")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250529111955.2349189-2-yebin@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin &lt;yebin10@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f914b52c379c12288b7623bb814d0508dbe7481d upstream.

The following issue happens with a buggy module:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc05d0218
PGD 1bd66f067 P4D 1bd66f067 PUD 1bd671067 PMD 101808067 PTE 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
RIP: 0010:sized_strscpy+0x81/0x2f0
RSP: 0018:ffff88812d76fa08 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffc0601010 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000038 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88812608da2d
RBP: 8080808080808080 R08: ffff88812608da2d R09: ffff88812608da68
R10: ffff88812608d82d R11: ffff88812608d810 R12: 0000000000000038
R13: ffff88812608da2d R14: ffffffffc05d0218 R15: fefefefefefefeff
FS:  00007fef552de740(0000) GS:ffff8884251c7000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffc05d0218 CR3: 00000001146f0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 ftrace_mod_get_kallsym+0x1ac/0x590
 update_iter_mod+0x239/0x5b0
 s_next+0x5b/0xa0
 seq_read_iter+0x8c9/0x1070
 seq_read+0x249/0x3b0
 proc_reg_read+0x1b0/0x280
 vfs_read+0x17f/0x920
 ksys_read+0xf3/0x1c0
 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x2e0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The above issue may happen as follows:
(1) Add kprobe tracepoint;
(2) insmod test.ko;
(3)  Module triggers ftrace disabled;
(4) rmmod test.ko;
(5) cat /proc/kallsyms; --&gt; Will trigger UAF as test.ko already removed;
ftrace_mod_get_kallsym()
...
strscpy(module_name, mod_map-&gt;mod-&gt;name, MODULE_NAME_LEN);
...

The problem is when a module triggers an issue with ftrace and
sets ftrace_disable. The ftrace_disable is set when an anomaly is
discovered and to prevent any more damage, ftrace stops all text
modification. The issue that happened was that the ftrace_disable stops
more than just the text modification.

When a module is loaded, its init functions can also be traced. Because
kallsyms deletes the init functions after a module has loaded, ftrace
saves them when the module is loaded and function tracing is enabled. This
allows the output of the function trace to show the init function names
instead of just their raw memory addresses.

When a module is removed, ftrace_release_mod() is called, and if
ftrace_disable is set, it just returns without doing anything more. The
problem here is that it leaves the mod_list still around and if kallsyms
is called, it will call into this code and access the module memory that
has already been freed as it will return:

  strscpy(module_name, mod_map-&gt;mod-&gt;name, MODULE_NAME_LEN);

Where the "mod" no longer exists and triggers a UAF bug.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250523135452.626d8dcd@gandalf.local.home/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: aba4b5c22cba ("ftrace: Save module init functions kallsyms symbols for tracing")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250529111955.2349189-2-yebin@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin &lt;yebin10@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>watchdog: fix watchdog may detect false positive of softlockup</title>
<updated>2025-06-27T10:08:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Luo Gengkun</name>
<email>luogengkun@huaweicloud.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-21T03:50:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=442e80dcf6fe32f482bc890a0852f5192abf67b2'/>
<id>442e80dcf6fe32f482bc890a0852f5192abf67b2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7123dbbef88cfd9f09e8a7899b0911834600cfa3 upstream.

When updating `watchdog_thresh`, there is a race condition between writing
the new `watchdog_thresh` value and stopping the old watchdog timer.  If
the old timer triggers during this window, it may falsely detect a
softlockup due to the old interval and the new `watchdog_thresh` value
being used.  The problem can be described as follow:

 # We asuume previous watchdog_thresh is 60, so the watchdog timer is
 # coming every 24s.
echo 10 &gt; /proc/sys/kernel/watchdog_thresh (User space)
|
+------&gt;+ update watchdog_thresh (We are in kernel now)
	|
	|	  # using old interval and new `watchdog_thresh`
	+------&gt;+ watchdog hrtimer (irq context: detect softlockup)
		|
		|
	+-------+
	|
	|
	+ softlockup_stop_all

To fix this problem, introduce a shadow variable for `watchdog_thresh`.
The update to the actual `watchdog_thresh` is delayed until after the old
timer is stopped, preventing false positives.

The following testcase may help to understand this problem.

---------------------------------------------
echo RT_RUNTIME_SHARE &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/sched/features
echo -1 &gt; /proc/sys/kernel/sched_rt_runtime_us
echo 0 &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/sched/fair_server/cpu3/runtime
echo 60 &gt; /proc/sys/kernel/watchdog_thresh
taskset -c 3 chrt -r 99 /bin/bash -c "while true;do true; done" &amp;
echo 10 &gt; /proc/sys/kernel/watchdog_thresh &amp;
---------------------------------------------

The test case above first removes the throttling restrictions for
real-time tasks.  It then sets watchdog_thresh to 60 and executes a
real-time task ,a simple while(1) loop, on cpu3.  Consequently, the final
command gets blocked because the presence of this real-time thread
prevents kworker:3 from being selected by the scheduler.  This eventually
triggers a softlockup detection on cpu3 due to watchdog_timer_fn operating
with inconsistent variable - using both the old interval and the updated
watchdog_thresh simultaneously.

[nysal@linux.ibm.com: fix the SOFTLOCKUP_DETECTOR=n case]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250502111120.282690-1-nysal@linux.ibm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250421035021.3507649-1-luogengkun@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun &lt;luogengkun@huaweicloud.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nysal Jan K.A. &lt;nysal@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Doug Anderson &lt;dianders@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Joel Granados &lt;joel.granados@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Song Liu &lt;song@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleinxer &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "Nysal Jan K.A." &lt;nysal@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Venkat Rao Bagalkote &lt;venkat88@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7123dbbef88cfd9f09e8a7899b0911834600cfa3 upstream.

When updating `watchdog_thresh`, there is a race condition between writing
the new `watchdog_thresh` value and stopping the old watchdog timer.  If
the old timer triggers during this window, it may falsely detect a
softlockup due to the old interval and the new `watchdog_thresh` value
being used.  The problem can be described as follow:

 # We asuume previous watchdog_thresh is 60, so the watchdog timer is
 # coming every 24s.
echo 10 &gt; /proc/sys/kernel/watchdog_thresh (User space)
|
+------&gt;+ update watchdog_thresh (We are in kernel now)
	|
	|	  # using old interval and new `watchdog_thresh`
	+------&gt;+ watchdog hrtimer (irq context: detect softlockup)
		|
		|
	+-------+
	|
	|
	+ softlockup_stop_all

To fix this problem, introduce a shadow variable for `watchdog_thresh`.
The update to the actual `watchdog_thresh` is delayed until after the old
timer is stopped, preventing false positives.

The following testcase may help to understand this problem.

---------------------------------------------
echo RT_RUNTIME_SHARE &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/sched/features
echo -1 &gt; /proc/sys/kernel/sched_rt_runtime_us
echo 0 &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/sched/fair_server/cpu3/runtime
echo 60 &gt; /proc/sys/kernel/watchdog_thresh
taskset -c 3 chrt -r 99 /bin/bash -c "while true;do true; done" &amp;
echo 10 &gt; /proc/sys/kernel/watchdog_thresh &amp;
---------------------------------------------

The test case above first removes the throttling restrictions for
real-time tasks.  It then sets watchdog_thresh to 60 and executes a
real-time task ,a simple while(1) loop, on cpu3.  Consequently, the final
command gets blocked because the presence of this real-time thread
prevents kworker:3 from being selected by the scheduler.  This eventually
triggers a softlockup detection on cpu3 due to watchdog_timer_fn operating
with inconsistent variable - using both the old interval and the updated
watchdog_thresh simultaneously.

[nysal@linux.ibm.com: fix the SOFTLOCKUP_DETECTOR=n case]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250502111120.282690-1-nysal@linux.ibm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250421035021.3507649-1-luogengkun@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun &lt;luogengkun@huaweicloud.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nysal Jan K.A. &lt;nysal@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Doug Anderson &lt;dianders@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Joel Granados &lt;joel.granados@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Song Liu &lt;song@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleinxer &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "Nysal Jan K.A." &lt;nysal@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Venkat Rao Bagalkote &lt;venkat88@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cgroup,freezer: fix incomplete freezing when attaching tasks</title>
<updated>2025-06-27T10:08:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chen Ridong</name>
<email>chenridong@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-18T07:32:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=48f35a32947b7162cfac9c0027542157c471a655'/>
<id>48f35a32947b7162cfac9c0027542157c471a655</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 37fb58a7273726e59f9429c89ade5116083a213d upstream.

An issue was found:

	# cd /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer/
	# mkdir test
	# echo FROZEN &gt; test/freezer.state
	# cat test/freezer.state
	FROZEN
	# sleep 1000 &amp;
	[1] 863
	# echo 863 &gt; test/cgroup.procs
	# cat test/freezer.state
	FREEZING

When tasks are migrated to a frozen cgroup, the freezer fails to
immediately freeze the tasks, causing the cgroup to remain in the
"FREEZING".

The freeze_task() function is called before clearing the CGROUP_FROZEN
flag. This causes the freezing() check to incorrectly return false,
preventing __freeze_task() from being invoked for the migrated task.

To fix this issue, clear the CGROUP_FROZEN state before calling
freeze_task().

Fixes: f5d39b020809 ("freezer,sched: Rewrite core freezer logic")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.1+
Reported-by: Zhong Jiawei &lt;zhongjiawei1@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong &lt;chenridong@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Koutný &lt;mkoutny@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 37fb58a7273726e59f9429c89ade5116083a213d upstream.

An issue was found:

	# cd /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer/
	# mkdir test
	# echo FROZEN &gt; test/freezer.state
	# cat test/freezer.state
	FROZEN
	# sleep 1000 &amp;
	[1] 863
	# echo 863 &gt; test/cgroup.procs
	# cat test/freezer.state
	FREEZING

When tasks are migrated to a frozen cgroup, the freezer fails to
immediately freeze the tasks, causing the cgroup to remain in the
"FREEZING".

The freeze_task() function is called before clearing the CGROUP_FROZEN
flag. This causes the freezing() check to incorrectly return false,
preventing __freeze_task() from being invoked for the migrated task.

To fix this issue, clear the CGROUP_FROZEN state before calling
freeze_task().

Fixes: f5d39b020809 ("freezer,sched: Rewrite core freezer logic")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.1+
Reported-by: Zhong Jiawei &lt;zhongjiawei1@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong &lt;chenridong@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Koutný &lt;mkoutny@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>posix-cpu-timers: fix race between handle_posix_cpu_timers() and posix_cpu_timer_del()</title>
<updated>2025-06-19T13:28:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-13T17:26:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2c72fe18cc5f9f1750f5bc148cf1c94c29e106ff'/>
<id>2c72fe18cc5f9f1750f5bc148cf1c94c29e106ff</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f90fff1e152dedf52b932240ebbd670d83330eca upstream.

If an exiting non-autoreaping task has already passed exit_notify() and
calls handle_posix_cpu_timers() from IRQ, it can be reaped by its parent
or debugger right after unlock_task_sighand().

If a concurrent posix_cpu_timer_del() runs at that moment, it won't be
able to detect timer-&gt;it.cpu.firing != 0: cpu_timer_task_rcu() and/or
lock_task_sighand() will fail.

Add the tsk-&gt;exit_state check into run_posix_cpu_timers() to fix this.

This fix is not needed if CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK=y, because
exit_task_work() is called before exit_notify(). But the check still
makes sense, task_work_add(&amp;tsk-&gt;posix_cputimers_work.work) will fail
anyway in this case.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Benoît Sevens &lt;bsevens@google.com&gt;
Fixes: 0bdd2ed4138e ("sched: run_posix_cpu_timers: Don't check -&gt;exit_state, use lock_task_sighand()")
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f90fff1e152dedf52b932240ebbd670d83330eca upstream.

If an exiting non-autoreaping task has already passed exit_notify() and
calls handle_posix_cpu_timers() from IRQ, it can be reaped by its parent
or debugger right after unlock_task_sighand().

If a concurrent posix_cpu_timer_del() runs at that moment, it won't be
able to detect timer-&gt;it.cpu.firing != 0: cpu_timer_task_rcu() and/or
lock_task_sighand() will fail.

Add the tsk-&gt;exit_state check into run_posix_cpu_timers() to fix this.

This fix is not needed if CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK=y, because
exit_task_work() is called before exit_notify(). But the check still
makes sense, task_work_add(&amp;tsk-&gt;posix_cputimers_work.work) will fail
anyway in this case.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Benoît Sevens &lt;bsevens@google.com&gt;
Fixes: 0bdd2ed4138e ("sched: run_posix_cpu_timers: Don't check -&gt;exit_state, use lock_task_sighand()")
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
