<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v6.6.156</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix use-after-free in offloaded map/prog info fill</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:29:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiayuan Chen</name>
<email>jiayuan.chen@linux.dev</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-09T02:37:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5662dac41a3442aa378d7c405164903eb109fc05'/>
<id>5662dac41a3442aa378d7c405164903eb109fc05</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a0c584fc18056709c8e047a82a6045d6c209f4ce ]

When querying info for an offloaded BPF map or program,
bpf_map_offload_info_fill_ns() and bpf_prog_offload_info_fill_ns()
obtain the network namespace with get_net(dev_net(offmap-&gt;netdev)).
However, the associated netdev's netns may be racing with teardown
during netns destruction. If the netns refcount has already reached 0,
get_net() performs a refcount_t increment on 0, triggering:

  refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.

Although rtnl_lock and bpf_devs_lock ensure the netdev pointer remains
valid, they cannot prevent the netns refcount from reaching zero.

Fix this by using maybe_get_net() instead of get_net(). maybe_get_net()
uses refcount_inc_not_zero() and returns NULL if the refcount is already
zero, which causes ns_get_path_cb() to fail and the caller to return
-ENOENT -- the correct behavior when the netns is being destroyed.

Fixes: 675fc275a3a2d ("bpf: offload: report device information for offloaded programs")
Fixes: 52775b33bb507 ("bpf: offload: report device information about offloaded maps")
Reported-by: Yinhao Hu &lt;dddddd@hust.edu.cn&gt;
Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei &lt;M202472210@hust.edu.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dongliang Mu &lt;dzm91@hust.edu.cn&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/f0aa3678-79c9-47ae-9e8c-02a3d1df160a@hust.edu.cn/
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen &lt;jiayuan.chen@linux.dev&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260409023733.168050-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a0c584fc18056709c8e047a82a6045d6c209f4ce ]

When querying info for an offloaded BPF map or program,
bpf_map_offload_info_fill_ns() and bpf_prog_offload_info_fill_ns()
obtain the network namespace with get_net(dev_net(offmap-&gt;netdev)).
However, the associated netdev's netns may be racing with teardown
during netns destruction. If the netns refcount has already reached 0,
get_net() performs a refcount_t increment on 0, triggering:

  refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.

Although rtnl_lock and bpf_devs_lock ensure the netdev pointer remains
valid, they cannot prevent the netns refcount from reaching zero.

Fix this by using maybe_get_net() instead of get_net(). maybe_get_net()
uses refcount_inc_not_zero() and returns NULL if the refcount is already
zero, which causes ns_get_path_cb() to fail and the caller to return
-ENOENT -- the correct behavior when the netns is being destroyed.

Fixes: 675fc275a3a2d ("bpf: offload: report device information for offloaded programs")
Fixes: 52775b33bb507 ("bpf: offload: report device information about offloaded maps")
Reported-by: Yinhao Hu &lt;dddddd@hust.edu.cn&gt;
Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei &lt;M202472210@hust.edu.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dongliang Mu &lt;dzm91@hust.edu.cn&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/f0aa3678-79c9-47ae-9e8c-02a3d1df160a@hust.edu.cn/
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen &lt;jiayuan.chen@linux.dev&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260409023733.168050-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Reject exited events as group leaders</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:29:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kyle Zeng</name>
<email>kylebot@openai.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-06T20:56:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ce12e1170c0c78dffb9b28af6d287492ae7dd99d'/>
<id>ce12e1170c0c78dffb9b28af6d287492ae7dd99d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fa091f46c3833fb22384f10eade2b4e1e1d0b278 ]

perf_event_remove_on_exec() sets remove-on-exec events to the EXIT state
and detaches their group relationships.  The event's file descriptor can
remain open, however, and perf_event_open() currently accepts that event
as a group leader because its early validation rejects only REVOKED and
DEAD events.

A new sibling can consequently be linked to the detached leader.  When
the leader is closed, perf_group_detach() observes that its
PERF_ATTACH_GROUP bit is already clear and skips the new sibling.  The
sibling then retains a group_leader pointer to the freed event.

Reject group leaders in the EXIT state.  Perform the check while holding
the shared context mutex so that an exec in the target task cannot detach
the leader between validation and group attachment.

[peterz: make the earlier test fully consistent]
Fixes: 037a3c43edfb ("perf/core: Detach event groups during remove_on_exec")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng &lt;kylebot@openai.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806205655.75722-1-kylebot@openai.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit fa091f46c3833fb22384f10eade2b4e1e1d0b278 ]

perf_event_remove_on_exec() sets remove-on-exec events to the EXIT state
and detaches their group relationships.  The event's file descriptor can
remain open, however, and perf_event_open() currently accepts that event
as a group leader because its early validation rejects only REVOKED and
DEAD events.

A new sibling can consequently be linked to the detached leader.  When
the leader is closed, perf_group_detach() observes that its
PERF_ATTACH_GROUP bit is already clear and skips the new sibling.  The
sibling then retains a group_leader pointer to the freed event.

Reject group leaders in the EXIT state.  Perform the check while holding
the shared context mutex so that an exec in the target task cannot detach
the leader between validation and group attachment.

[peterz: make the earlier test fully consistent]
Fixes: 037a3c43edfb ("perf/core: Detach event groups during remove_on_exec")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng &lt;kylebot@openai.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806205655.75722-1-kylebot@openai.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Ensure reg is PTR_TO_STACK in process_iter_arg</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:29:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tao Lyu</name>
<email>tao.lyu@epfl.ch</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-29T03:27:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c1164f14c636630b84270362bfff2382186ac048'/>
<id>c1164f14c636630b84270362bfff2382186ac048</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 12659d28615d606b36e382f4de2dd05550d202af upstream.

Currently, KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER handling missed checking the reg-&gt;type and
ensuring it is PTR_TO_STACK. Instead of enforcing this in the caller of
process_iter_arg, move the check into it instead so that all callers
will gain the check by default. This is similar to process_dynptr_func.

An existing selftest in verifier_bits_iter.c fails due to this change,
but it's because it was passing a NULL pointer into iter_next helper and
getting an error further down the checks, but probably meant to pass an
uninitialized iterator on the stack (as is done in the subsequent test
below it). We will gain coverage for non-PTR_TO_STACK arguments in later
patches hence just change the declaration to zero-ed stack object.

Fixes: 06accc8779c1 ("bpf: add support for open-coded iterator loops")
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tao Lyu &lt;tao.lyu@epfl.ch&gt;
[ Kartikeya: move check into process_iter_arg, rewrite commit log ]
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241203000238.3602922-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;

[ Xu Yunxiang: Resolve the verifier.c context conflict by retaining the
  6.6.y BTF lookup and its regno diagnostic convention. Omit the
  verifier_bits_iter.c change because that selftest does not exist in
  6.6.y. ]
Assisted-by: Pi:GLM-5.3
[ sashal: print regno - 1 to match upstream and 6.6's own 0-based arg#
  messages in check_kfunc_args(); supersedes the regno convention noted
  above ]

Signed-off-by: Xu Yunxiang &lt;xyx2021@mail.ustc.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 12659d28615d606b36e382f4de2dd05550d202af upstream.

Currently, KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER handling missed checking the reg-&gt;type and
ensuring it is PTR_TO_STACK. Instead of enforcing this in the caller of
process_iter_arg, move the check into it instead so that all callers
will gain the check by default. This is similar to process_dynptr_func.

An existing selftest in verifier_bits_iter.c fails due to this change,
but it's because it was passing a NULL pointer into iter_next helper and
getting an error further down the checks, but probably meant to pass an
uninitialized iterator on the stack (as is done in the subsequent test
below it). We will gain coverage for non-PTR_TO_STACK arguments in later
patches hence just change the declaration to zero-ed stack object.

Fixes: 06accc8779c1 ("bpf: add support for open-coded iterator loops")
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tao Lyu &lt;tao.lyu@epfl.ch&gt;
[ Kartikeya: move check into process_iter_arg, rewrite commit log ]
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241203000238.3602922-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;

[ Xu Yunxiang: Resolve the verifier.c context conflict by retaining the
  6.6.y BTF lookup and its regno diagnostic convention. Omit the
  verifier_bits_iter.c change because that selftest does not exist in
  6.6.y. ]
Assisted-by: Pi:GLM-5.3
[ sashal: print regno - 1 to match upstream and 6.6's own 0-based arg#
  messages in check_kfunc_args(); supersedes the regno convention noted
  above ]

Signed-off-by: Xu Yunxiang &lt;xyx2021@mail.ustc.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kcov: fix data corruption and race conditions on PREEMPT_RT</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-15T23:01:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a2fb8222cde23b0001812ed3acb7c0ea36dd94e2'/>
<id>a2fb8222cde23b0001812ed3acb7c0ea36dd94e2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2eed77fdcb0cc48e8eccb2bcd4b7f2c6d650e84c upstream.

syzbot is reporting KCOV state corruption on PREEMPT_RT kernels, for the
temporary storage used for saving/restoring remote KCOV state is currently
allocated as the per-CPU area.

On PREEMPT_RT kernels, softirq handlers run as preemptible task threads
(e.g., ksoftirqd). If a softirq context preempts a task running a remote
KCOV session, it safely saves the task's state into the per-CPU area.
However, if that softirq thread is subsequently preempted by a higher-
priority softirq thread on the same CPU, the second softirq will overwrite
the same per-CPU area, permanently destroying the original task's KCOV
state.

Fix this data corruption by moving the temporary storage from the per-CPU
area to the per-thread area. Since each softirq thread now owns its own
task context, nested softirq preemption no longer causes data overwrites.

Note that while the temporary storage is now on a per-thread basis, the
per-CPU kcov_percpu_data.lock must be retained, for we need to ensure that
kcov_remote_start() and kcov_remote_stop() operate atomically without
racing against asynchronous interrupts that manipulate the current task's
KCOV state.

It is likely that GFP_KERNEL allocation by vmalloc_node() in kcov_init()
has already called panic() before returning NULL, for there will be no
OOM-killable userspace processes when __init function of built-in module
runs. But this patch also fixes crashing the kernel when vmalloc_node()
in kcov_init() returned NULL, for kcov_init() left per-CPU irq_area == NULL
but kcov_remote_start() depends on per-CPU irq_area != NULL, resulting in

  (1) doing vmalloc() in kcov_remote_start() despite !in_task() context

  (2) out-of-array-bounds access if (1) succeeded but
      kcov-&gt;remote_size &lt; CONFIG_KCOV_IRQ_AREA_SIZE

  (3) always leak memory allocated by (1), eventually killing all
      OOM-killable userspace processes

problems.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/43552d09-2ce2-4b19-b0d3-a2d1ab952145@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Reported-by: syzbot+3f51ad7ac3ae57a6fdcc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=3f51ad7ac3ae57a6fdcc
Reported-by: syzbot+47cf95ca1f9dcca872c8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=47cf95ca1f9dcca872c8
Reported-by: syzbot+8a173e13208949931dc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=8a173e13208949931dc7
Reported-by: syzbot+90984d3713722683112e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=90984d3713722683112e
Analyzed-by: AI Mode in Google Search (no mail address)
Fixes: 5ff3b30ab57d ("kcov: collect coverage from interrupts")
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alan Stern &lt;stern@rowland.harvard.edu&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Clark Williams &lt;williams@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Roman Gushchin &lt;roman.gushchin@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2eed77fdcb0cc48e8eccb2bcd4b7f2c6d650e84c upstream.

syzbot is reporting KCOV state corruption on PREEMPT_RT kernels, for the
temporary storage used for saving/restoring remote KCOV state is currently
allocated as the per-CPU area.

On PREEMPT_RT kernels, softirq handlers run as preemptible task threads
(e.g., ksoftirqd). If a softirq context preempts a task running a remote
KCOV session, it safely saves the task's state into the per-CPU area.
However, if that softirq thread is subsequently preempted by a higher-
priority softirq thread on the same CPU, the second softirq will overwrite
the same per-CPU area, permanently destroying the original task's KCOV
state.

Fix this data corruption by moving the temporary storage from the per-CPU
area to the per-thread area. Since each softirq thread now owns its own
task context, nested softirq preemption no longer causes data overwrites.

Note that while the temporary storage is now on a per-thread basis, the
per-CPU kcov_percpu_data.lock must be retained, for we need to ensure that
kcov_remote_start() and kcov_remote_stop() operate atomically without
racing against asynchronous interrupts that manipulate the current task's
KCOV state.

It is likely that GFP_KERNEL allocation by vmalloc_node() in kcov_init()
has already called panic() before returning NULL, for there will be no
OOM-killable userspace processes when __init function of built-in module
runs. But this patch also fixes crashing the kernel when vmalloc_node()
in kcov_init() returned NULL, for kcov_init() left per-CPU irq_area == NULL
but kcov_remote_start() depends on per-CPU irq_area != NULL, resulting in

  (1) doing vmalloc() in kcov_remote_start() despite !in_task() context

  (2) out-of-array-bounds access if (1) succeeded but
      kcov-&gt;remote_size &lt; CONFIG_KCOV_IRQ_AREA_SIZE

  (3) always leak memory allocated by (1), eventually killing all
      OOM-killable userspace processes

problems.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/43552d09-2ce2-4b19-b0d3-a2d1ab952145@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Reported-by: syzbot+3f51ad7ac3ae57a6fdcc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=3f51ad7ac3ae57a6fdcc
Reported-by: syzbot+47cf95ca1f9dcca872c8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=47cf95ca1f9dcca872c8
Reported-by: syzbot+8a173e13208949931dc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=8a173e13208949931dc7
Reported-by: syzbot+90984d3713722683112e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=90984d3713722683112e
Analyzed-by: AI Mode in Google Search (no mail address)
Fixes: 5ff3b30ab57d ("kcov: collect coverage from interrupts")
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alan Stern &lt;stern@rowland.harvard.edu&gt;
Cc: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Clark Williams &lt;williams@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Roman Gushchin &lt;roman.gushchin@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Fix group leader use-after-free after sibling detach</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Aditya Chillara</name>
<email>aditya.chillara@oss.qualcomm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-20T22:28:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=80c6054a4c40a0ffad82acef9f9a0dee108d152a'/>
<id>80c6054a4c40a0ffad82acef9f9a0dee108d152a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 42c5ca1f0a288a52878bd72a5595b08261057438 ]

perf_group_detach() handles leader and sibling detach differently. When the
group leader is detached, all siblings are promoted to singleton events and
their group_leader pointer is reset to themselves. When a sibling is
detached, it is removed from the leader's sibling_list, but its
group_leader pointer is left pointing at the old leader.

That is harmless when the sibling is being closed and freed immediately, as
in the DETACH_DEAD path. It is not safe when the sibling is detached but
kept alive, such as during CPU hotplug with DETACH_GROUP. In that case the
sibling is removed from the context, while its file descriptor can still
keep it alive.

A typical failing sequence is:

  - A group contains leader L and sibling S.
  - CPU hot-unplug detaches S with DETACH_GROUP, removing it from
    L-&gt;sibling_list but leaving S-&gt;group_leader == L.
  - L is later closed and freed.
  - A PERF_IOC_FLAG_GROUP ioctl on S follows S-&gt;group_leader and
    dereferences the freed leader.

This was reproduced by running the perf event fuzzer, CPU hotplug, and a
stress workload concurrently:

  Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 006b6b6b6b6b6cdb
  CPU: 2 PID: 12489 Comm: perf_fuzzer 6.18.7 PREEMPT
  pc : perf_ioctl+0x34c/0xc68
  x20: ffffff89a3fa2c70 x8 : 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b
  Code: 943c4a0e 340047a0 f9404a94 f9411e88 (f940b908)
  Call trace:
  perf_ioctl+0x34c/0xc68 (P)
  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa0/0xf4
  invoke_syscall+0x58/0xe4
  el0_svc_common+0xa8/0xdc
  do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
  el0_svc+0x40/0xc0
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xdc
  el0t_64_sync+0x1c4/0x1c8

The fault happened in perf_ioctl(), where perf_event_for_each() follows
the stale group_leader pointer and perf_event_for_each_child() then
dereferences the freed leader's context.

Fix the use-after-free by promoting the detached sibling to a singleton.
Also fix __event_disable() cgroup accounting and event state change.

Fixes: 8a49542c0554 ("perf_events: Fix races in group composition")
Assisted-by: PatchWise:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Aditya Chillara &lt;aditya.chillara@oss.qualcomm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi &lt;dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807-fix-group-leader-uaf-v3-1-b0c2310c9a0d@oss.qualcomm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 42c5ca1f0a288a52878bd72a5595b08261057438 ]

perf_group_detach() handles leader and sibling detach differently. When the
group leader is detached, all siblings are promoted to singleton events and
their group_leader pointer is reset to themselves. When a sibling is
detached, it is removed from the leader's sibling_list, but its
group_leader pointer is left pointing at the old leader.

That is harmless when the sibling is being closed and freed immediately, as
in the DETACH_DEAD path. It is not safe when the sibling is detached but
kept alive, such as during CPU hotplug with DETACH_GROUP. In that case the
sibling is removed from the context, while its file descriptor can still
keep it alive.

A typical failing sequence is:

  - A group contains leader L and sibling S.
  - CPU hot-unplug detaches S with DETACH_GROUP, removing it from
    L-&gt;sibling_list but leaving S-&gt;group_leader == L.
  - L is later closed and freed.
  - A PERF_IOC_FLAG_GROUP ioctl on S follows S-&gt;group_leader and
    dereferences the freed leader.

This was reproduced by running the perf event fuzzer, CPU hotplug, and a
stress workload concurrently:

  Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 006b6b6b6b6b6cdb
  CPU: 2 PID: 12489 Comm: perf_fuzzer 6.18.7 PREEMPT
  pc : perf_ioctl+0x34c/0xc68
  x20: ffffff89a3fa2c70 x8 : 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b
  Code: 943c4a0e 340047a0 f9404a94 f9411e88 (f940b908)
  Call trace:
  perf_ioctl+0x34c/0xc68 (P)
  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa0/0xf4
  invoke_syscall+0x58/0xe4
  el0_svc_common+0xa8/0xdc
  do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
  el0_svc+0x40/0xc0
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xdc
  el0t_64_sync+0x1c4/0x1c8

The fault happened in perf_ioctl(), where perf_event_for_each() follows
the stale group_leader pointer and perf_event_for_each_child() then
dereferences the freed leader's context.

Fix the use-after-free by promoting the detached sibling to a singleton.
Also fix __event_disable() cgroup accounting and event state change.

Fixes: 8a49542c0554 ("perf_events: Fix races in group composition")
Assisted-by: PatchWise:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Aditya Chillara &lt;aditya.chillara@oss.qualcomm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi &lt;dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807-fix-group-leader-uaf-v3-1-b0c2310c9a0d@oss.qualcomm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Unify perf_event_free_task() / perf_event_exit_task_context()</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-20T22:28:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c4ab0d6888022298f781410e44be7a4082997a42'/>
<id>c4ab0d6888022298f781410e44be7a4082997a42</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 90661365021a6d0d7f3a2c5046ebe33e4df53b92 ]

Both perf_event_free_task() and perf_event_exit_task_context() are
very similar, except perf_event_exit_task_context() is a little more
generic / makes less assumptions.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ravi Bangoria &lt;ravi.bangoria@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250307193723.274039710@infradead.org
Stable-dep-of: 42c5ca1f0a28 ("perf/core: Fix group leader use-after-free after sibling detach")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 90661365021a6d0d7f3a2c5046ebe33e4df53b92 ]

Both perf_event_free_task() and perf_event_exit_task_context() are
very similar, except perf_event_exit_task_context() is a little more
generic / makes less assumptions.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ravi Bangoria &lt;ravi.bangoria@amd.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250307193723.274039710@infradead.org
Stable-dep-of: 42c5ca1f0a28 ("perf/core: Fix group leader use-after-free after sibling detach")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ring-buffer: Use current_context for safe per-CPU buffer swap</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:20:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tengda Wu</name>
<email>wutengda@huaweicloud.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-03T00:56:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=22709117d9ae95e52673685f98caac7c356a8227'/>
<id>22709117d9ae95e52673685f98caac7c356a8227</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f27bdc43077e4fcb5557dfc315ee8d91e741f483 ]

The ring_buffer_swap_cpu() function currently checks the per-CPU
committing counter to determine if a buffer is actively being written to
before performing the swap. However, there exists a race window where
this check can be bypassed:

    ring_buffer_lock_reserve
        cpu_buffer = buffer-&gt;buffers[cpu];       // cpu_buffer_a
        rb_reserve_next_event
            rb_start_commit // inc committing
            if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer-&gt;buffer) != buffer)) {...}
            __rb_reserve_next
                rb_move_tail
                    rb_end_commit(cpu_buffer);   // dec committing =&gt; 0
                    /* interrupt hits here, successfully swaps! */
                    local_inc(&amp;cpu_buffer-&gt;committing);

    ring_buffer_unlock_commit
        cpu_buffer = buffer-&gt;buffers[cpu];      // cpu_buffer_b
        rb_commit
            rb_end_commit
            RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, !local_read(&amp;cpu_buffer-&gt;committing))
                                                // triggers warning

The committing counter can temporarily drop to 0 during a single write
operation (within rb_move_tail), creating a window where swap can
succeed even though the write is still in progress. This leads to
inconsistent buffer state and triggers the RB_WARN_ON in rb_commit().

Replace the committing counter check with current_context checks, which
are set at the entry of ring_buffer_lock_reserve() and remain valid
throughout the entire write operation, providing a reliable indicator of
buffer busy state during swap.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4239c38fe0b3 ("ring-buffer: Process commits whenever moving to a new page.")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260803005640.2445666-2-wutengda@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu &lt;wutengda@huaweicloud.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f27bdc43077e4fcb5557dfc315ee8d91e741f483 ]

The ring_buffer_swap_cpu() function currently checks the per-CPU
committing counter to determine if a buffer is actively being written to
before performing the swap. However, there exists a race window where
this check can be bypassed:

    ring_buffer_lock_reserve
        cpu_buffer = buffer-&gt;buffers[cpu];       // cpu_buffer_a
        rb_reserve_next_event
            rb_start_commit // inc committing
            if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer-&gt;buffer) != buffer)) {...}
            __rb_reserve_next
                rb_move_tail
                    rb_end_commit(cpu_buffer);   // dec committing =&gt; 0
                    /* interrupt hits here, successfully swaps! */
                    local_inc(&amp;cpu_buffer-&gt;committing);

    ring_buffer_unlock_commit
        cpu_buffer = buffer-&gt;buffers[cpu];      // cpu_buffer_b
        rb_commit
            rb_end_commit
            RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, !local_read(&amp;cpu_buffer-&gt;committing))
                                                // triggers warning

The committing counter can temporarily drop to 0 during a single write
operation (within rb_move_tail), creating a window where swap can
succeed even though the write is still in progress. This leads to
inconsistent buffer state and triggers the RB_WARN_ON in rb_commit().

Replace the committing counter check with current_context checks, which
are set at the entry of ring_buffer_lock_reserve() and remain valid
throughout the entire write operation, providing a reliable indicator of
buffer busy state during swap.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4239c38fe0b3 ("ring-buffer: Process commits whenever moving to a new page.")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260803005640.2445666-2-wutengda@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu &lt;wutengda@huaweicloud.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ring-buffer: Remove jump to out label in ring_buffer_swap_cpu()</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:20:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-27T18:57:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cf0bc75d1ca9dfe2cf4f551e5937fbbff291a747'/>
<id>cf0bc75d1ca9dfe2cf4f551e5937fbbff291a747</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f115d2b70bff2665f67fa8e8dc5ed9452b696c44 ]

The function ring_buffer_swap_cpu() has a bunch of jumps to the label out
that simply returns "ret". There's no reason to jump to a label that
simply returns a value. Just return directly from there.

This goes back to almost the beginning when commit 8aabee573dff
("ring-buffer: remove unneeded get_online_cpus") was introduced. That
commit removed a put_online_cpus() from that label, but never updated all
the jumps to it that now no longer needed to do anything but return a
value.

Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250527145753.6b45d840@gandalf.local.home
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: f27bdc43077e ("ring-buffer: Use current_context for safe per-CPU buffer swap")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f115d2b70bff2665f67fa8e8dc5ed9452b696c44 ]

The function ring_buffer_swap_cpu() has a bunch of jumps to the label out
that simply returns "ret". There's no reason to jump to a label that
simply returns a value. Just return directly from there.

This goes back to almost the beginning when commit 8aabee573dff
("ring-buffer: remove unneeded get_online_cpus") was introduced. That
commit removed a put_online_cpus() from that label, but never updated all
the jumps to it that now no longer needed to do anything but return a
value.

Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250527145753.6b45d840@gandalf.local.home
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: f27bdc43077e ("ring-buffer: Use current_context for safe per-CPU buffer swap")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dma-direct: add a CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_DMA_ALLOC symbol</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:20:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-05T07:05:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5904c758e0e95506d458931e69bc59fb8c901560'/>
<id>5904c758e0e95506d458931e69bc59fb8c901560</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2c8ed1b960fb97c82ede5afc974329bfdb457f5f ]

Instead of using arch_dma_alloc if none of the generic coherent
allocators are used, require the architectures to explicitly opt into
providing it.  This will used to deal with the case of m68knommu and
coldfire where we can't do any coherent allocations whatsoever, and
also makes it clear that arch_dma_alloc is a last resort.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy &lt;robin.murphy@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Ungerer &lt;gerg@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Tested-by: Greg Ungerer &lt;gerg@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 1fd495ef09ee ("m68k: Define NR_CPUS to 1")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2c8ed1b960fb97c82ede5afc974329bfdb457f5f ]

Instead of using arch_dma_alloc if none of the generic coherent
allocators are used, require the architectures to explicitly opt into
providing it.  This will used to deal with the case of m68knommu and
coldfire where we can't do any coherent allocations whatsoever, and
also makes it clear that arch_dma_alloc is a last resort.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy &lt;robin.murphy@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Ungerer &lt;gerg@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Tested-by: Greg Ungerer &lt;gerg@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 1fd495ef09ee ("m68k: Define NR_CPUS to 1")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: don't block write during exec on pre-content watched files</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:20:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amir Goldstein</name>
<email>amir73il@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-12T00:09:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bf5ed2ef5cdb7b47ce606e3d48ea6eb803b31503'/>
<id>bf5ed2ef5cdb7b47ce606e3d48ea6eb803b31503</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0357ef03c94ef835bd44a0658b8edb672a9dbf51 ]

Commit 2a010c412853 ("fs: don't block i_writecount during exec") removed
the legacy behavior of getting ETXTBSY on attempt to open and executable
file for write while it is being executed.

This commit was reverted because an application that depends on this
legacy behavior was broken by the change.

We need to allow HSM writing into executable files while executed to
fill their content on-the-fly.

To that end, disable the ETXTBSY legacy behavior for files that are
watched by pre-content events.

This change is not expected to cause regressions with existing systems
which do not have any pre-content event listeners.

Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241128142532.465176-1-amir73il@gmail.com
Stable-dep-of: db1856ea9196 ("binfmt_misc: restore write access when removing an entry")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0357ef03c94ef835bd44a0658b8edb672a9dbf51 ]

Commit 2a010c412853 ("fs: don't block i_writecount during exec") removed
the legacy behavior of getting ETXTBSY on attempt to open and executable
file for write while it is being executed.

This commit was reverted because an application that depends on this
legacy behavior was broken by the change.

We need to allow HSM writing into executable files while executed to
fill their content on-the-fly.

To that end, disable the ETXTBSY legacy behavior for files that are
watched by pre-content events.

This change is not expected to cause regressions with existing systems
which do not have any pre-content event listeners.

Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241128142532.465176-1-amir73il@gmail.com
Stable-dep-of: db1856ea9196 ("binfmt_misc: restore write access when removing an entry")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
