linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v6.6.155

kcov: fix data corruption and race conditions on PREEMPT_RT

2026-08-27T12:29:45+00:00

commit 2eed77fdcb0cc48e8eccb2bcd4b7f2c6d650e84c upstream.

syzbot is reporting KCOV state corruption on PREEMPT_RT kernels, for the
temporary storage used for saving/restoring remote KCOV state is currently
allocated as the per-CPU area.

On PREEMPT_RT kernels, softirq handlers run as preemptible task threads
(e.g., ksoftirqd). If a softirq context preempts a task running a remote
KCOV session, it safely saves the task's state into the per-CPU area.
However, if that softirq thread is subsequently preempted by a higher-
priority softirq thread on the same CPU, the second softirq will overwrite
the same per-CPU area, permanently destroying the original task's KCOV
state.

Fix this data corruption by moving the temporary storage from the per-CPU
area to the per-thread area. Since each softirq thread now owns its own
task context, nested softirq preemption no longer causes data overwrites.

Note that while the temporary storage is now on a per-thread basis, the
per-CPU kcov_percpu_data.lock must be retained, for we need to ensure that
kcov_remote_start() and kcov_remote_stop() operate atomically without
racing against asynchronous interrupts that manipulate the current task's
KCOV state.

It is likely that GFP_KERNEL allocation by vmalloc_node() in kcov_init()
has already called panic() before returning NULL, for there will be no
OOM-killable userspace processes when __init function of built-in module
runs. But this patch also fixes crashing the kernel when vmalloc_node()
in kcov_init() returned NULL, for kcov_init() left per-CPU irq_area == NULL
but kcov_remote_start() depends on per-CPU irq_area != NULL, resulting in

  (1) doing vmalloc() in kcov_remote_start() despite !in_task() context

  (2) out-of-array-bounds access if (1) succeeded but
      kcov->remote_size < CONFIG_KCOV_IRQ_AREA_SIZE

  (3) always leak memory allocated by (1), eventually killing all
      OOM-killable userspace processes

problems.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/43552d09-2ce2-4b19-b0d3-a2d1ab952145@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Reported-by: syzbot+3f51ad7ac3ae57a6fdcc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=3f51ad7ac3ae57a6fdcc
Reported-by: syzbot+47cf95ca1f9dcca872c8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=47cf95ca1f9dcca872c8
Reported-by: syzbot+8a173e13208949931dc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=8a173e13208949931dc7
Reported-by: syzbot+90984d3713722683112e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=90984d3713722683112e
Analyzed-by: AI Mode in Google Search (no mail address)
Fixes: 5ff3b30ab57d ("kcov: collect coverage from interrupts")
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa 
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko 
Cc: Alan Stern 
Cc: Andrey Konovalov 
Cc: Christoph Hellwig 
Cc: Clark Williams 
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Marco Elver 
Cc: Mark Brown 
Cc: Roman Gushchin 
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

perf/core: Fix group leader use-after-free after sibling detach

2026-08-27T12:29:44+00:00

[ Upstream commit 42c5ca1f0a288a52878bd72a5595b08261057438 ]

perf_group_detach() handles leader and sibling detach differently. When the
group leader is detached, all siblings are promoted to singleton events and
their group_leader pointer is reset to themselves. When a sibling is
detached, it is removed from the leader's sibling_list, but its
group_leader pointer is left pointing at the old leader.

That is harmless when the sibling is being closed and freed immediately, as
in the DETACH_DEAD path. It is not safe when the sibling is detached but
kept alive, such as during CPU hotplug with DETACH_GROUP. In that case the
sibling is removed from the context, while its file descriptor can still
keep it alive.

A typical failing sequence is:

  - A group contains leader L and sibling S.
  - CPU hot-unplug detaches S with DETACH_GROUP, removing it from
    L->sibling_list but leaving S->group_leader == L.
  - L is later closed and freed.
  - A PERF_IOC_FLAG_GROUP ioctl on S follows S->group_leader and
    dereferences the freed leader.

This was reproduced by running the perf event fuzzer, CPU hotplug, and a
stress workload concurrently:

  Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 006b6b6b6b6b6cdb
  CPU: 2 PID: 12489 Comm: perf_fuzzer 6.18.7 PREEMPT
  pc : perf_ioctl+0x34c/0xc68
  x20: ffffff89a3fa2c70 x8 : 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b
  Code: 943c4a0e 340047a0 f9404a94 f9411e88 (f940b908)
  Call trace:
  perf_ioctl+0x34c/0xc68 (P)
  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa0/0xf4
  invoke_syscall+0x58/0xe4
  el0_svc_common+0xa8/0xdc
  do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
  el0_svc+0x40/0xc0
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xdc
  el0t_64_sync+0x1c4/0x1c8

The fault happened in perf_ioctl(), where perf_event_for_each() follows
the stale group_leader pointer and perf_event_for_each_child() then
dereferences the freed leader's context.

Fix the use-after-free by promoting the detached sibling to a singleton.
Also fix __event_disable() cgroup accounting and event state change.

Fixes: 8a49542c0554 ("perf_events: Fix races in group composition")
Assisted-by: PatchWise:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Aditya Chillara 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807-fix-group-leader-uaf-v3-1-b0c2310c9a0d@oss.qualcomm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

perf: Unify perf_event_free_task() / perf_event_exit_task_context()

2026-08-27T12:29:44+00:00

[ Upstream commit 90661365021a6d0d7f3a2c5046ebe33e4df53b92 ]

Both perf_event_free_task() and perf_event_exit_task_context() are
very similar, except perf_event_exit_task_context() is a little more
generic / makes less assumptions.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Reviewed-by: Ravi Bangoria 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250307193723.274039710@infradead.org
Stable-dep-of: 42c5ca1f0a28 ("perf/core: Fix group leader use-after-free after sibling detach")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ring-buffer: Use current_context for safe per-CPU buffer swap

2026-08-23T12:20:07+00:00

[ Upstream commit f27bdc43077e4fcb5557dfc315ee8d91e741f483 ]

The ring_buffer_swap_cpu() function currently checks the per-CPU
committing counter to determine if a buffer is actively being written to
before performing the swap. However, there exists a race window where
this check can be bypassed:

    ring_buffer_lock_reserve
        cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];       // cpu_buffer_a
        rb_reserve_next_event
            rb_start_commit // inc committing
            if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->buffer) != buffer)) {...}
            __rb_reserve_next
                rb_move_tail
                    rb_end_commit(cpu_buffer);   // dec committing => 0
                    /* interrupt hits here, successfully swaps! */
                    local_inc(&cpu_buffer->committing);

    ring_buffer_unlock_commit
        cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];      // cpu_buffer_b
        rb_commit
            rb_end_commit
            RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, !local_read(&cpu_buffer->committing))
                                                // triggers warning

The committing counter can temporarily drop to 0 during a single write
operation (within rb_move_tail), creating a window where swap can
succeed even though the write is still in progress. This leads to
inconsistent buffer state and triggers the RB_WARN_ON in rb_commit().

Replace the committing counter check with current_context checks, which
are set at the entry of ring_buffer_lock_reserve() and remain valid
throughout the entire write operation, providing a reliable indicator of
buffer busy state during swap.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4239c38fe0b3 ("ring-buffer: Process commits whenever moving to a new page.")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260803005640.2445666-2-wutengda@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ring-buffer: Remove jump to out label in ring_buffer_swap_cpu()

2026-08-23T12:20:07+00:00

[ Upstream commit f115d2b70bff2665f67fa8e8dc5ed9452b696c44 ]

The function ring_buffer_swap_cpu() has a bunch of jumps to the label out
that simply returns "ret". There's no reason to jump to a label that
simply returns a value. Just return directly from there.

This goes back to almost the beginning when commit 8aabee573dff
("ring-buffer: remove unneeded get_online_cpus") was introduced. That
commit removed a put_online_cpus() from that label, but never updated all
the jumps to it that now no longer needed to do anything but return a
value.

Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250527145753.6b45d840@gandalf.local.home
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) 
Stable-dep-of: f27bdc43077e ("ring-buffer: Use current_context for safe per-CPU buffer swap")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

dma-direct: add a CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_DMA_ALLOC symbol

2026-08-23T12:20:06+00:00

[ Upstream commit 2c8ed1b960fb97c82ede5afc974329bfdb457f5f ]

Instead of using arch_dma_alloc if none of the generic coherent
allocators are used, require the architectures to explicitly opt into
providing it.  This will used to deal with the case of m68knommu and
coldfire where we can't do any coherent allocations whatsoever, and
also makes it clear that arch_dma_alloc is a last resort.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig 
Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy 
Reviewed-by: Greg Ungerer 
Tested-by: Greg Ungerer 
Stable-dep-of: 1fd495ef09ee ("m68k: Define NR_CPUS to 1")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

fs: don't block write during exec on pre-content watched files

2026-08-23T12:20:03+00:00

[ Upstream commit 0357ef03c94ef835bd44a0658b8edb672a9dbf51 ]

Commit 2a010c412853 ("fs: don't block i_writecount during exec") removed
the legacy behavior of getting ETXTBSY on attempt to open and executable
file for write while it is being executed.

This commit was reverted because an application that depends on this
legacy behavior was broken by the change.

We need to allow HSM writing into executable files while executed to
fill their content on-the-fly.

To that end, disable the ETXTBSY legacy behavior for files that are
watched by pre-content events.

This change is not expected to cause regressions with existing systems
which do not have any pre-content event listeners.

Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein 
Acked-by: Christian Brauner 
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241128142532.465176-1-amir73il@gmail.com
Stable-dep-of: db1856ea9196 ("binfmt_misc: restore write access when removing an entry")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ftrace: Fix off-by-one fentry site disable in ftrace_free_mem()

2026-08-23T12:19:58+00:00

commit 8b8292d6487c81bd57c2605a9b404b1cf8f1edfb upstream.

When a module's init text is freed, do_init_module() calls
ftrace_free_mem() with a half-open [start, end) range.  However the
ftrace_cmp_recs() comparator treats the upper bound as inclusive, as all
its other users do, passing 'ip + size - 1'.  So ftrace_free_mem() can
delete a record sitting exactly at 'end', which is outside the freed
range.

For a kernel without CFI or IBT, the first record of a function is at
the function start, which for the first function in a module is also the
base of its text allocation.  As the module allocator packs its regions,
that address is often the 'end' passed by a neighboring module's
do_init_module(), causing the first function's ftrace location to get
disabled, preventing an attempt to livepatch it:

  livepatch: failed to find location for function 'pcspkr_probe'

Convert the exclusive end to the inclusive 'end - 1' the comparator
expects, and return early for an empty range to avoid the subtraction
from underflowing when the init text size is zero.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 42c269c88dc1 ("ftrace: Allow for function tracing to record init functions on boot up")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1b5ccfa8095bdb1277f84af1c2c2e2205aca03ae.1785992188.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ftrace: Protect direct_functions in ftrace_find_rec_direct

2026-08-23T12:19:58+00:00

commit 63444b7617c09aeed36282e061c3f80818f2b600 upstream.

Fix accessing the __rcu pointer direct_functions with RCU protection.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260730150411.88667-2-leon.hwang@linux.dev
Fixes: d05cb470663a ("ftrace: Fix modification of direct_function hash while in use")
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa 
Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt 
Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sched/psi: Shut down rtpoll_timer in psi_cgroup_free()

2026-08-19T16:13:14+00:00

commit 5457025fa8ca3c0d2732109513de839e3e797190 upstream.

psi_schedule_rtpoll_work() is called locklessly from the scheduler hotpath
and can race psi_trigger_destroy() taking down the last rtpoll trigger under
rtpoll_trigger_lock:

  psi_schedule_rtpoll_work()        psi_trigger_destroy()

  rcu_read_lock();
  task = rcu_dereference(rtpoll_task);
                                    rcu_assign_pointer(rtpoll_task, NULL);
                                    timer_delete(&rtpoll_timer);
  mod_timer(&rtpoll_timer, ...);
  rcu_read_unlock();
                                    synchronize_rcu();
                                    kthread_stop(task_to_destroy);

The group can then be freed with the re-armed timer still pending, and
poll_timer_fn() runs on freed memory.

461daba06bdc ("psi: eliminate kthread_worker from psi trigger scheduling
mechanism") deleted the timer synchronously after the synchronize_rcu(),
which prevented this but raced trigger creation instead: the deletion could
cancel the timer that a new trigger set armed during the grace period and,
as creation also reinitialized the timer at the time, corrupt it.
8f91efd870ea ("psi: Fix race between psi_trigger_create/destroy") moved the
initialization into group_init() and the deletion into the locked section,
trading the creation races for the window above.

Neither placement in the destruction path works. A pending timer firing
while the group is alive is harmless though. poll_timer_fn() just wakes the
rtpoll waitqueue and doesn't re-arm itself. Bind the timer to the group's
lifetime instead and shut it down in psi_cgroup_free(). Nothing can arm it
by then. timer_shutdown_sync() because the timer is never armed again.

Fixes: 8f91efd870ea ("psi: Fix race between psi_trigger_create/destroy")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Reported-by: Sashiko AI 
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260711000434.36C4A1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo 
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner 
Tested-by: Matt Fleming 
Acked-by: Suren Baghdasaryan 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman