linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v6.1.90

bounds: Use the right number of bits for power-of-two CONFIG_NR_CPUS

2024-05-02T14:29:32+00:00

commit 5af385f5f4cddf908f663974847a4083b2ff2c79 upstream.

bits_per() rounds up to the next power of two when passed a power of
two.  This causes crashes on some machines and configurations.

Reported-by: Михаил Новоселов 
Tested-by: Ильфат Гаптрахманов 
Link: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/3347
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1c978cf1-2934-4e66-e4b3-e81b04cb3571@rosalinux.ru/
Fixes: f2d5dcb48f7b (bounds: support non-power-of-two CONFIG_NR_CPUS)
Cc:  
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Mel Gorman 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

cpu: Re-enable CPU mitigations by default for !X86 architectures

2024-05-02T14:29:28+00:00

commit fe42754b94a42d08cf9501790afc25c4f6a5f631 upstream.

Rename x86's to CPU_MITIGATIONS, define it in generic code, and force it
on for all architectures exception x86.  A recent commit to turn
mitigations off by default if SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n kinda sorta
missed that "cpu_mitigations" is completely generic, whereas
SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is x86-specific.

Rename x86's SPECULATIVE_MITIGATIONS instead of keeping both and have it
select CPU_MITIGATIONS, as having two configs for the same thing is
unnecessary and confusing.  This will also allow x86 to use the knob to
manage mitigations that aren't strictly related to speculative
execution.

Use another Kconfig to communicate to common code that CPU_MITIGATIONS
is already defined instead of having x86's menu depend on the common
CPU_MITIGATIONS.  This allows keeping a single point of contact for all
of x86's mitigations, and it's not clear that other architectures *want*
to allow disabling mitigations at compile-time.

Fixes: f337a6a21e2f ("x86/cpu: Actually turn off mitigations by default for SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n")
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240413115324.53303a68%40canb.auug.org.au
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell 
Reported-by: Michael Ellerman 
Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven 
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) 
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420000556.2645001-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fork: defer linking file vma until vma is fully initialized

2024-05-02T14:29:27+00:00

commit 35e351780fa9d8240dd6f7e4f245f9ea37e96c19 upstream.

Thorvald reported a WARNING [1]. And the root cause is below race:

 CPU 1					CPU 2
 fork					hugetlbfs_fallocate
  dup_mmap				 hugetlbfs_punch_hole
   i_mmap_lock_write(mapping);
   vma_interval_tree_insert_after -- Child vma is visible through i_mmap tree.
   i_mmap_unlock_write(mapping);
   hugetlb_dup_vma_private -- Clear vma_lock outside i_mmap_rwsem!
					 i_mmap_lock_write(mapping);
   					 hugetlb_vmdelete_list
					  vma_interval_tree_foreach
					   hugetlb_vma_trylock_write -- Vma_lock is cleared.
   tmp->vm_ops->open -- Alloc new vma_lock outside i_mmap_rwsem!
					   hugetlb_vma_unlock_write -- Vma_lock is assigned!!!
					 i_mmap_unlock_write(mapping);

hugetlb_dup_vma_private() and hugetlb_vm_op_open() are called outside
i_mmap_rwsem lock while vma lock can be used in the same time.  Fix this
by deferring linking file vma until vma is fully initialized.  Those vmas
should be initialized first before they can be used.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240410091441.3539905-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Fixes: 8d9bfb260814 ("hugetlb: add vma based lock for pmd sharing")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin 
Reported-by: Thorvald Natvig 
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20240129161735.6gmjsswx62o4pbja@revolver/T/ [1]
Reviewed-by: Jane Chu 
Cc: Christian Brauner 
Cc: Heiko Carstens 
Cc: Kent Overstreet 
Cc: Liam R. Howlett 
Cc: Mateusz Guzik 
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) 
Cc: Miaohe Lin 
Cc: Muchun Song 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Peng Zhang 
Cc: Tycho Andersen 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/cpu: Actually turn off mitigations by default for SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n

2024-04-17T09:18:27+00:00

commit f337a6a21e2fd67eadea471e93d05dd37baaa9be upstream.

Initialize cpu_mitigations to CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF if the kernel is built
with CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n, as the help text quite clearly
states that disabling SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is supposed to turn off all
mitigations by default.

  │ If you say N, all mitigations will be disabled. You really
  │ should know what you are doing to say so.

As is, the kernel still defaults to CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO, which results in
some mitigations being enabled in spite of SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n.

Fixes: f43b9876e857 ("x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Reviewed-by: Daniel Sneddon 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240409175108.1512861-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kprobes: Fix possible use-after-free issue on kprobe registration

2024-04-17T09:18:27+00:00

commit 325f3fb551f8cd672dbbfc4cf58b14f9ee3fc9e8 upstream.

When unloading a module, its state is changing MODULE_STATE_LIVE ->
 MODULE_STATE_GOING -> MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED. Each change will take
a time. `is_module_text_address()` and `__module_text_address()`
works with MODULE_STATE_LIVE and MODULE_STATE_GOING.
If we use `is_module_text_address()` and `__module_text_address()`
separately, there is a chance that the first one is succeeded but the
next one is failed because module->state becomes MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED
between those operations.

In `check_kprobe_address_safe()`, if the second `__module_text_address()`
is failed, that is ignored because it expected a kernel_text address.
But it may have failed simply because module->state has been changed
to MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED. In this case, arm_kprobe() will try to modify
non-exist module text address (use-after-free).

To fix this problem, we should not use separated `is_module_text_address()`
and `__module_text_address()`, but use only `__module_text_address()`
once and do `try_module_get(module)` which is only available with
MODULE_STATE_LIVE.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240410015802.265220-1-zhengyejian1@huawei.com/

Fixes: 28f6c37a2910 ("kprobes: Forbid probing on trampoline and BPF code areas")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian 
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tracing: hide unused ftrace_event_id_fops

2024-04-17T09:18:26+00:00

[ Upstream commit 5281ec83454d70d98b71f1836fb16512566c01cd ]

When CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS, a 'make W=1' build produces a warning about the
unused ftrace_event_id_fops variable:

kernel/trace/trace_events.c:2155:37: error: 'ftrace_event_id_fops' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-const-variable=]
 2155 | static const struct file_operations ftrace_event_id_fops = {

Hide this in the same #ifdef as the reference to it.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240403080702.3509288-7-arnd@kernel.org

Cc: Masami Hiramatsu 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers 
Cc: Zheng Yejian 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Ajay Kaher 
Cc: Jinjie Ruan 
Cc: Clément Léger 
Cc: Dan Carpenter 
Cc: "Tzvetomir Stoyanov (VMware)" 
Fixes: 620a30e97feb ("tracing: Don't pass file_operations array to event_create_dir()")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

PM: s2idle: Make sure CPUs will wakeup directly on resume

2024-04-17T09:18:22+00:00

commit 3c89a068bfd0698a5478f4cf39493595ef757d5e upstream.

s2idle works like a regular suspend with freezing processes and freezing
devices. All CPUs except the control CPU go into idle. Once this is
completed the control CPU kicks all other CPUs out of idle, so that they
reenter the idle loop and then enter s2idle state. The control CPU then
issues an swait() on the suspend state and therefore enters the idle loop
as well.

Due to being kicked out of idle, the other CPUs leave their NOHZ states,
which means the tick is active and the corresponding hrtimer is programmed
to the next jiffie.

On entering s2idle the CPUs shut down their local clockevent device to
prevent wakeups. The last CPU which enters s2idle shuts down its local
clockevent and freezes timekeeping.

On resume, one of the CPUs receives the wakeup interrupt, unfreezes
timekeeping and its local clockevent and starts the resume process. At that
point all other CPUs are still in s2idle with their clockevents switched
off. They only resume when they are kicked by another CPU or after resuming
devices and then receiving a device interrupt.

That means there is no guarantee that all CPUs will wakeup directly on
resume. As a consequence there is no guarantee that timers which are queued
on those CPUs and should expire directly after resume, are handled. Also
timer list timers which are remotely queued to one of those CPUs after
resume will not result in a reprogramming IPI as the tick is
active. Queueing a hrtimer will also not result in a reprogramming IPI
because the first hrtimer event is already in the past.

The recent introduction of the timer pull model (7ee988770326 ("timers:
Implement the hierarchical pull model")) amplifies this problem, if the
current migrator is one of the non woken up CPUs. When a non pinned timer
list timer is queued and the queuing CPU goes idle, it relies on the still
suspended migrator CPU to expire the timer which will happen by chance.

The problem exists since commit 8d89835b0467 ("PM: suspend: Do not pause
cpuidle in the suspend-to-idle path"). There the cpuidle_pause() call which
in turn invoked a wakeup for all idle CPUs was moved to a later point in
the resume process. This might not be reached or reached very late because
it waits on a timer of a still suspended CPU.

Address this by kicking all CPUs out of idle after the control CPU returns
from swait() so that they resume their timers and restore consistent system
state.

Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218641
Fixes: 8d89835b0467 ("PM: suspend: Do not pause cpuidle in the suspend-to-idle path")
Signed-off-by: Anna-Maria Behnsen 
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Tested-by: Mario Limonciello 
Cc: 5.16+  # 5.16+
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Reviewed-by: Ulf Hansson 
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ring-buffer: Only update pages_touched when a new page is touched

2024-04-17T09:18:22+00:00

commit ffe3986fece696cf65e0ef99e74c75f848be8e30 upstream.

The "buffer_percent" logic that is used by the ring buffer splice code to
only wake up the tasks when there's no data after the buffer is filled to
the percentage of the "buffer_percent" file is dependent on three
variables that determine the amount of data that is in the ring buffer:

 1) pages_read - incremented whenever a new sub-buffer is consumed
 2) pages_lost - incremented every time a writer overwrites a sub-buffer
 3) pages_touched - incremented when a write goes to a new sub-buffer

The percentage is the calculation of:

  (pages_touched - (pages_lost + pages_read)) / nr_pages

Basically, the amount of data is the total number of sub-bufs that have been
touched, minus the number of sub-bufs lost and sub-bufs consumed. This is
divided by the total count to give the buffer percentage. When the
percentage is greater than the value in the "buffer_percent" file, it
wakes up splice readers waiting for that amount.

It was observed that over time, the amount read from the splice was
constantly decreasing the longer the trace was running. That is, if one
asked for 60%, it would read over 60% when it first starts tracing, but
then it would be woken up at under 60% and would slowly decrease the
amount of data read after being woken up, where the amount becomes much
less than the buffer percent.

This was due to an accounting of the pages_touched incrementation. This
value is incremented whenever a writer transfers to a new sub-buffer. But
the place where it was incremented was incorrect. If a writer overflowed
the current sub-buffer it would go to the next one. If it gets preempted
by an interrupt at that time, and the interrupt performs a trace, it too
will end up going to the next sub-buffer. But only one should increment
the counter. Unfortunately, that was not the case.

Change the cmpxchg() that does the real switch of the tail-page into a
try_cmpxchg(), and on success, perform the increment of pages_touched. This
will only increment the counter once for when the writer moves to a new
sub-buffer, and not when there's a race and is incremented for when a
writer and its preempting writer both move to the same new sub-buffer.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240409151309.0d0e5056@gandalf.local.home

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers 
Fixes: 2c2b0a78b3739 ("ring-buffer: Add percentage of ring buffer full to wake up reader")
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ring-buffer: use READ_ONCE() to read cpu_buffer->commit_page in concurrent environment

2024-04-13T11:05:15+00:00

[ Upstream commit f1e30cb6369251c03f63c564006f96a54197dcc4 ]

In function ring_buffer_iter_empty(), cpu_buffer->commit_page is read
while other threads may change it. It may cause the time_stamp that read
in the next line come from a different page. Use READ_ONCE() to avoid
having to reason about compiler optimizations now and in future.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/tencent_DFF7D3561A0686B5E8FC079150A02505180A@qq.com

Cc: Masami Hiramatsu 
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers 
Signed-off-by: linke li 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

dma-direct: Leak pages on dma_set_decrypted() failure

2024-04-13T11:04:59+00:00

[ Upstream commit b9fa16949d18e06bdf728a560f5c8af56d2bdcaf ]

On TDX it is possible for the untrusted host to cause
set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an
error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to
take care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared)
memory to the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security
issues.

DMA could free decrypted/shared pages if dma_set_decrypted() fails. This
should be a rare case. Just leak the pages in this case instead of
freeing them.

Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe 
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin