linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v6.1.8

exit: Use READ_ONCE() for all oops/warn limit reads

2023-01-24T06:24:41+00:00

commit 7535b832c6399b5ebfc5b53af5c51dd915ee2538 upstream.

Use a temporary variable to take full advantage of READ_ONCE() behavior.
Without this, the report (and even the test) might be out of sync with
the initial test.

Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y5x7GXeluFmZ8E0E@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Fixes: 9fc9e278a5c0 ("panic: Introduce warn_limit")
Fixes: d4ccd54d28d3 ("exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops")
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Jann Horn 
Cc: Arnd Bergmann 
Cc: Petr Mladek 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Luis Chamberlain 
Cc: Marco Elver 
Cc: tangmeng 
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 
Cc: Tiezhu Yang 
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs

2023-01-24T06:24:41+00:00

commit 8b05aa26336113c4cea25f1c333ee8cd4fc212a6 upstream.

Since Warn count is now tracked and is a fairly interesting signal, add
the entry /sys/kernel/warn_count to expose it to userspace.

Cc: Petr Mladek 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: tangmeng 
Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" 
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 
Cc: Tiezhu Yang 
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain 
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-6-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

panic: Introduce warn_limit

2023-01-24T06:24:41+00:00

commit 9fc9e278a5c0b708eeffaf47d6eb0c82aa74ed78 upstream.

Like oops_limit, add warn_limit for limiting the number of warnings when
panic_on_warn is not set.

Cc: Jonathan Corbet 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Baolin Wang 
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" 
Cc: Eric Biggers 
Cc: Huang Ying 
Cc: Petr Mladek 
Cc: tangmeng 
Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" 
Cc: Tiezhu Yang 
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain 
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-5-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

panic: Consolidate open-coded panic_on_warn checks

2023-01-24T06:24:41+00:00

commit 79cc1ba7badf9e7a12af99695a557e9ce27ee967 upstream.

Several run-time checkers (KASAN, UBSAN, KFENCE, KCSAN, sched) roll
their own warnings, and each check "panic_on_warn". Consolidate this
into a single function so that future instrumentation can be added in
a single location.

Cc: Marco Elver 
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Juri Lelli 
Cc: Vincent Guittot 
Cc: Dietmar Eggemann 
Cc: Steven Rostedt 
Cc: Ben Segall 
Cc: Mel Gorman 
Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira 
Cc: Valentin Schneider 
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin 
Cc: Alexander Potapenko 
Cc: Andrey Konovalov 
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: David Gow 
Cc: tangmeng 
Cc: Jann Horn 
Cc: Shuah Khan 
Cc: Petr Mladek 
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" 
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 
Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" 
Cc: Tiezhu Yang 
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain 
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver 
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-4-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

exit: Allow oops_limit to be disabled

2023-01-24T06:24:41+00:00

commit de92f65719cd672f4b48397540b9f9eff67eca40 upstream.

In preparation for keeping oops_limit logic in sync with warn_limit,
have oops_limit == 0 disable checking the Oops counter.

Cc: Jann Horn 
Cc: Jonathan Corbet 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Baolin Wang 
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" 
Cc: Eric Biggers 
Cc: Huang Ying 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Arnd Bergmann 
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

exit: Expose "oops_count" to sysfs

2023-01-24T06:24:41+00:00

commit 9db89b41117024f80b38b15954017fb293133364 upstream.

Since Oops count is now tracked and is a fairly interesting signal, add
the entry /sys/kernel/oops_count to expose it to userspace.

Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Jann Horn 
Cc: Arnd Bergmann 
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain 
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-3-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops

2023-01-24T06:24:41+00:00

commit d4ccd54d28d3c8598e2354acc13e28c060961dbb upstream.

Many Linux systems are configured to not panic on oops; but allowing an
attacker to oops the system **really** often can make even bugs that look
completely unexploitable exploitable (like NULL dereferences and such) if
each crash elevates a refcount by one or a lock is taken in read mode, and
this causes a counter to eventually overflow.

The most interesting counters for this are 32 bits wide (like open-coded
refcounts that don't use refcount_t). (The ldsem reader count on 32-bit
platforms is just 16 bits, but probably nobody cares about 32-bit platforms
that much nowadays.)

So let's panic the system if the kernel is constantly oopsing.

The speed of oopsing 2^32 times probably depends on several factors, like
how long the stack trace is and which unwinder you're using; an empirically
important one is whether your console is showing a graphical environment or
a text console that oopses will be printed to.
In a quick single-threaded benchmark, it looks like oopsing in a vfork()
child with a very short stack trace only takes ~510 microseconds per run
when a graphical console is active; but switching to a text console that
oopses are printed to slows it down around 87x, to ~45 milliseconds per
run.
(Adding more threads makes this faster, but the actual oops printing
happens under &die_lock on x86, so you can maybe speed this up by a factor
of around 2 and then any further improvement gets eaten up by lock
contention.)

It looks like it would take around 8-12 days to overflow a 32-bit counter
with repeated oopsing on a multi-core X86 system running a graphical
environment; both me (in an X86 VM) and Seth (with a distro kernel on
normal hardware in a standard configuration) got numbers in that ballpark.

12 days aren't *that* short on a desktop system, and you'd likely need much
longer on a typical server system (assuming that people don't run graphical
desktop environments on their servers), and this is a *very* noisy and
violent approach to exploiting the kernel; and it also seems to take orders
of magnitude longer on some machines, probably because stuff like EFI
pstore will slow it down a ton if that's active.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221107201317.324457-1-jannh@google.com
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain 
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-2-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

panic: Separate sysctl logic from CONFIG_SMP

2023-01-24T06:24:41+00:00

commit 9360d035a579d95d1e76c471061b9065b18a0eb1 upstream.

In preparation for adding more sysctls directly in kernel/panic.c, split
CONFIG_SMP from the logic that adds sysctls.

Cc: Petr Mladek 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: tangmeng 
Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" 
Cc: Tiezhu Yang 
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain 
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-1-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: restore the ebpf program ID for BPF_AUDIT_UNLOAD and PERF_BPF_EVENT_PROG_UNLOAD

2023-01-24T06:24:37+00:00

commit ef01f4e25c1760920e2c94f1c232350277ace69b upstream.

When changing the ebpf program put() routines to support being called
from within IRQ context the program ID was reset to zero prior to
calling the perf event and audit UNLOAD record generators, which
resulted in problems as the ebpf program ID was bogus (always zero).
This patch addresses this problem by removing an unnecessary call to
bpf_prog_free_id() in __bpf_prog_offload_destroy() and adjusting
__bpf_prog_put() to only call bpf_prog_free_id() after audit and perf
have finished their bpf program unload tasks in
bpf_prog_put_deferred().  For the record, no one can determine, or
remember, why it was necessary to free the program ID, and remove it
from the IDR, prior to executing bpf_prog_put_deferred();
regardless, both Stanislav and Alexei agree that the approach in this
patch should be safe.

It is worth noting that when moving the bpf_prog_free_id() call, the
do_idr_lock parameter was forced to true as the ebpf devs determined
this was the correct as the do_idr_lock should always be true.  The
do_idr_lock parameter will be removed in a follow-up patch, but it
was kept here to keep the patch small in an effort to ease any stable
backports.

I also modified the bpf_audit_prog() logic used to associate the
AUDIT_BPF record with other associated records, e.g. @ctx != NULL.
Instead of keying off the operation, it now keys off the execution
context, e.g. '!in_irg && !irqs_disabled()', which is much more
appropriate and should help better connect the UNLOAD operations with
the associated audit state (other audit records).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d809e134be7a ("bpf: Prepare bpf_prog_put() to be called from irq context.")
Reported-by: Burn Alting 
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa 
Suggested-by: Stanislav Fomichev 
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore 
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230106154400.74211-1-paul@paul-moore.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

prlimit: do_prlimit needs to have a speculation check

2023-01-24T06:24:34+00:00

commit 739790605705ddcf18f21782b9c99ad7d53a8c11 upstream.

do_prlimit() adds the user-controlled resource value to a pointer that
will subsequently be dereferenced.  In order to help prevent this
codepath from being used as a spectre "gadget" a barrier needs to be
added after checking the range.

Reported-by: Jordy Zomer 
Tested-by: Jordy Zomer 
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman