linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v6.1.142 Linux kernel stable tree perf: Fix sample vs do_exit() 2025-06-27T10:07:41+00:00 Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org 2025-06-05T10:31:45+00:00 975ffddfa2e19823c719459d2364fcaa17673964 [ Upstream commit 4f6fc782128355931527cefe3eb45338abd8ab39 ] Baisheng Gao reported an ARM64 crash, which Mark decoded as being a synchronous external abort -- most likely due to trying to access MMIO in bad ways. The crash further shows perf trying to do a user stack sample while in exit_mmap()'s tlb_finish_mmu() -- i.e. while tearing down the address space it is trying to access. It turns out that we stop perf after we tear down the userspace mm; a receipie for disaster, since perf likes to access userspace for various reasons. Flip this order by moving up where we stop perf in do_exit(). Additionally, harden PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN and PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER to abort when the current task does not have an mm (exit_mm() makes sure to set current->mm = NULL; before commencing with the actual teardown). Such that CPU wide events don't trip on this same problem. Fixes: c5ebcedb566e ("perf: Add ability to attach user stack dump to sample") Reported-by: Baisheng Gao <baisheng.gao@unisoc.com> Suggested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250605110815.GQ39944@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 4f6fc782128355931527cefe3eb45338abd8ab39 ]

Baisheng Gao reported an ARM64 crash, which Mark decoded as being a
synchronous external abort -- most likely due to trying to access
MMIO in bad ways.

The crash further shows perf trying to do a user stack sample while in
exit_mmap()'s tlb_finish_mmu() -- i.e. while tearing down the address
space it is trying to access.

It turns out that we stop perf after we tear down the userspace mm; a
receipie for disaster, since perf likes to access userspace for
various reasons.

Flip this order by moving up where we stop perf in do_exit().

Additionally, harden PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN and PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER
to abort when the current task does not have an mm (exit_mm() makes
sure to set current->mm = NULL; before commencing with the actual
teardown). Such that CPU wide events don't trip on this same problem.

Fixes: c5ebcedb566e ("perf: Add ability to attach user stack dump to sample")
Reported-by: Baisheng Gao <baisheng.gao@unisoc.com>
Suggested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250605110815.GQ39944@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
bpf: Check rcu_read_lock_trace_held() in bpf_map_lookup_percpu_elem() 2025-06-27T10:07:32+00:00 Hou Tao houtao1@huawei.com 2025-05-26T06:25:34+00:00 2f8c69a72e8ad87b36b8052f789da3cc2b2e186c [ Upstream commit d4965578267e2e81f67c86e2608481e77e9c8569 ] bpf_map_lookup_percpu_elem() helper is also available for sleepable bpf program. When BPF JIT is disabled or under 32-bit host, bpf_map_lookup_percpu_elem() will not be inlined. Using it in a sleepable bpf program will trigger the warning in bpf_map_lookup_percpu_elem(), because the bpf program only holds rcu_read_lock_trace lock. Therefore, add the missed check. Reported-by: syzbot+dce5aae19ae4d6399986@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/000000000000176a130617420310@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250526062534.1105938-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit d4965578267e2e81f67c86e2608481e77e9c8569 ]

bpf_map_lookup_percpu_elem() helper is also available for sleepable bpf
program. When BPF JIT is disabled or under 32-bit host,
bpf_map_lookup_percpu_elem() will not be inlined. Using it in a
sleepable bpf program will trigger the warning in
bpf_map_lookup_percpu_elem(), because the bpf program only holds
rcu_read_lock_trace lock. Therefore, add the missed check.

Reported-by: syzbot+dce5aae19ae4d6399986@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/000000000000176a130617420310@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250526062534.1105938-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
clocksource: Fix the CPUs' choice in the watchdog per CPU verification 2025-06-27T10:07:31+00:00 Guilherme G. Piccoli gpiccoli@igalia.com 2025-03-23T17:36:24+00:00 c28421685ca06e18943eeb3ad2edac11c5d39a3f [ Upstream commit 08d7becc1a6b8c936e25d827becabfe3bff72a36 ] Right now, if the clocksource watchdog detects a clocksource skew, it might perform a per CPU check, for example in the TSC case on x86. In other words: supposing TSC is detected as unstable by the clocksource watchdog running at CPU1, as part of marking TSC unstable the kernel will also run a check of TSC readings on some CPUs to be sure it is synced between them all. But that check happens only on some CPUs, not all of them; this choice is based on the parameter "verify_n_cpus" and in some random cpumask calculation. So, the watchdog runs such per CPU checks on up to "verify_n_cpus" random CPUs among all online CPUs, with the risk of repeating CPUs (that aren't double checked) in the cpumask random calculation. But if "verify_n_cpus" > num_online_cpus(), it should skip the random calculation and just go ahead and check the clocksource sync between all online CPUs, without the risk of skipping some CPUs due to duplicity in the random cpumask calculation. Tests in a 4 CPU laptop with TSC skew detected led to some cases of the per CPU verification skipping some CPU even with verify_n_cpus=8, due to the duplicity on random cpumask generation. Skipping the randomization when the number of online CPUs is smaller than verify_n_cpus, solves that. Suggested-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@igalia.com> Signed-off-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@igalia.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250323173857.372390-1-gpiccoli@igalia.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 08d7becc1a6b8c936e25d827becabfe3bff72a36 ]

Right now, if the clocksource watchdog detects a clocksource skew, it might
perform a per CPU check, for example in the TSC case on x86.  In other
words: supposing TSC is detected as unstable by the clocksource watchdog
running at CPU1, as part of marking TSC unstable the kernel will also run a
check of TSC readings on some CPUs to be sure it is synced between them
all.

But that check happens only on some CPUs, not all of them; this choice is
based on the parameter "verify_n_cpus" and in some random cpumask
calculation. So, the watchdog runs such per CPU checks on up to
"verify_n_cpus" random CPUs among all online CPUs, with the risk of
repeating CPUs (that aren't double checked) in the cpumask random
calculation.

But if "verify_n_cpus" > num_online_cpus(), it should skip the random
calculation and just go ahead and check the clocksource sync between
all online CPUs, without the risk of skipping some CPUs due to
duplicity in the random cpumask calculation.

Tests in a 4 CPU laptop with TSC skew detected led to some cases of the per
CPU verification skipping some CPU even with verify_n_cpus=8, due to the
duplicity on random cpumask generation. Skipping the randomization when the
number of online CPUs is smaller than verify_n_cpus, solves that.

Suggested-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250323173857.372390-1-gpiccoli@igalia.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ftrace: Fix UAF when lookup kallsym after ftrace disabled 2025-06-27T10:07:30+00:00 Ye Bin yebin10@huawei.com 2025-05-29T11:19:54+00:00 03a162933c4a03b9f1a84f7d8482903c7e1e11bb commit f914b52c379c12288b7623bb814d0508dbe7481d upstream. The following issue happens with a buggy module: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc05d0218 PGD 1bd66f067 P4D 1bd66f067 PUD 1bd671067 PMD 101808067 PTE 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS RIP: 0010:sized_strscpy+0x81/0x2f0 RSP: 0018:ffff88812d76fa08 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffc0601010 RCX: dffffc0000000000 RDX: 0000000000000038 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88812608da2d RBP: 8080808080808080 R08: ffff88812608da2d R09: ffff88812608da68 R10: ffff88812608d82d R11: ffff88812608d810 R12: 0000000000000038 R13: ffff88812608da2d R14: ffffffffc05d0218 R15: fefefefefefefeff FS: 00007fef552de740(0000) GS:ffff8884251c7000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffc05d0218 CR3: 00000001146f0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ftrace_mod_get_kallsym+0x1ac/0x590 update_iter_mod+0x239/0x5b0 s_next+0x5b/0xa0 seq_read_iter+0x8c9/0x1070 seq_read+0x249/0x3b0 proc_reg_read+0x1b0/0x280 vfs_read+0x17f/0x920 ksys_read+0xf3/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x2e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The above issue may happen as follows: (1) Add kprobe tracepoint; (2) insmod test.ko; (3) Module triggers ftrace disabled; (4) rmmod test.ko; (5) cat /proc/kallsyms; --> Will trigger UAF as test.ko already removed; ftrace_mod_get_kallsym() ... strscpy(module_name, mod_map->mod->name, MODULE_NAME_LEN); ... The problem is when a module triggers an issue with ftrace and sets ftrace_disable. The ftrace_disable is set when an anomaly is discovered and to prevent any more damage, ftrace stops all text modification. The issue that happened was that the ftrace_disable stops more than just the text modification. When a module is loaded, its init functions can also be traced. Because kallsyms deletes the init functions after a module has loaded, ftrace saves them when the module is loaded and function tracing is enabled. This allows the output of the function trace to show the init function names instead of just their raw memory addresses. When a module is removed, ftrace_release_mod() is called, and if ftrace_disable is set, it just returns without doing anything more. The problem here is that it leaves the mod_list still around and if kallsyms is called, it will call into this code and access the module memory that has already been freed as it will return: strscpy(module_name, mod_map->mod->name, MODULE_NAME_LEN); Where the "mod" no longer exists and triggers a UAF bug. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250523135452.626d8dcd@gandalf.local.home/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: aba4b5c22cba ("ftrace: Save module init functions kallsyms symbols for tracing") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250529111955.2349189-2-yebin@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit f914b52c379c12288b7623bb814d0508dbe7481d upstream.

The following issue happens with a buggy module:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc05d0218
PGD 1bd66f067 P4D 1bd66f067 PUD 1bd671067 PMD 101808067 PTE 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
RIP: 0010:sized_strscpy+0x81/0x2f0
RSP: 0018:ffff88812d76fa08 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffc0601010 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000038 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88812608da2d
RBP: 8080808080808080 R08: ffff88812608da2d R09: ffff88812608da68
R10: ffff88812608d82d R11: ffff88812608d810 R12: 0000000000000038
R13: ffff88812608da2d R14: ffffffffc05d0218 R15: fefefefefefefeff
FS:  00007fef552de740(0000) GS:ffff8884251c7000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffc05d0218 CR3: 00000001146f0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ftrace_mod_get_kallsym+0x1ac/0x590
 update_iter_mod+0x239/0x5b0
 s_next+0x5b/0xa0
 seq_read_iter+0x8c9/0x1070
 seq_read+0x249/0x3b0
 proc_reg_read+0x1b0/0x280
 vfs_read+0x17f/0x920
 ksys_read+0xf3/0x1c0
 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x2e0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The above issue may happen as follows:
(1) Add kprobe tracepoint;
(2) insmod test.ko;
(3)  Module triggers ftrace disabled;
(4) rmmod test.ko;
(5) cat /proc/kallsyms; --> Will trigger UAF as test.ko already removed;
ftrace_mod_get_kallsym()
...
strscpy(module_name, mod_map->mod->name, MODULE_NAME_LEN);
...

The problem is when a module triggers an issue with ftrace and
sets ftrace_disable. The ftrace_disable is set when an anomaly is
discovered and to prevent any more damage, ftrace stops all text
modification. The issue that happened was that the ftrace_disable stops
more than just the text modification.

When a module is loaded, its init functions can also be traced. Because
kallsyms deletes the init functions after a module has loaded, ftrace
saves them when the module is loaded and function tracing is enabled. This
allows the output of the function trace to show the init function names
instead of just their raw memory addresses.

When a module is removed, ftrace_release_mod() is called, and if
ftrace_disable is set, it just returns without doing anything more. The
problem here is that it leaves the mod_list still around and if kallsyms
is called, it will call into this code and access the module memory that
has already been freed as it will return:

  strscpy(module_name, mod_map->mod->name, MODULE_NAME_LEN);

Where the "mod" no longer exists and triggers a UAF bug.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250523135452.626d8dcd@gandalf.local.home/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: aba4b5c22cba ("ftrace: Save module init functions kallsyms symbols for tracing")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250529111955.2349189-2-yebin@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
cgroup,freezer: fix incomplete freezing when attaching tasks 2025-06-27T10:07:28+00:00 Chen Ridong chenridong@huawei.com 2025-06-18T07:32:17+00:00 458854e2ed7174aea174c4aabf0cfa6ef7923001 commit 37fb58a7273726e59f9429c89ade5116083a213d upstream. An issue was found: # cd /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer/ # mkdir test # echo FROZEN > test/freezer.state # cat test/freezer.state FROZEN # sleep 1000 & [1] 863 # echo 863 > test/cgroup.procs # cat test/freezer.state FREEZING When tasks are migrated to a frozen cgroup, the freezer fails to immediately freeze the tasks, causing the cgroup to remain in the "FREEZING". The freeze_task() function is called before clearing the CGROUP_FROZEN flag. This causes the freezing() check to incorrectly return false, preventing __freeze_task() from being invoked for the migrated task. To fix this issue, clear the CGROUP_FROZEN state before calling freeze_task(). Fixes: f5d39b020809 ("freezer,sched: Rewrite core freezer logic") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.1+ Reported-by: Zhong Jiawei <zhongjiawei1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong <chenridong@huawei.com> Acked-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 37fb58a7273726e59f9429c89ade5116083a213d upstream.

An issue was found:

	# cd /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer/
	# mkdir test
	# echo FROZEN > test/freezer.state
	# cat test/freezer.state
	FROZEN
	# sleep 1000 &
	[1] 863
	# echo 863 > test/cgroup.procs
	# cat test/freezer.state
	FREEZING

When tasks are migrated to a frozen cgroup, the freezer fails to
immediately freeze the tasks, causing the cgroup to remain in the
"FREEZING".

The freeze_task() function is called before clearing the CGROUP_FROZEN
flag. This causes the freezing() check to incorrectly return false,
preventing __freeze_task() from being invoked for the migrated task.

To fix this issue, clear the CGROUP_FROZEN state before calling
freeze_task().

Fixes: f5d39b020809 ("freezer,sched: Rewrite core freezer logic")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.1+
Reported-by: Zhong Jiawei <zhongjiawei1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong <chenridong@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
posix-cpu-timers: fix race between handle_posix_cpu_timers() and posix_cpu_timer_del() 2025-06-27T10:07:24+00:00 Oleg Nesterov oleg@redhat.com 2025-06-13T17:26:50+00:00 764a7a5dfda23f69919441f2eac2a83e7db6e5bb commit f90fff1e152dedf52b932240ebbd670d83330eca upstream. If an exiting non-autoreaping task has already passed exit_notify() and calls handle_posix_cpu_timers() from IRQ, it can be reaped by its parent or debugger right after unlock_task_sighand(). If a concurrent posix_cpu_timer_del() runs at that moment, it won't be able to detect timer->it.cpu.firing != 0: cpu_timer_task_rcu() and/or lock_task_sighand() will fail. Add the tsk->exit_state check into run_posix_cpu_timers() to fix this. This fix is not needed if CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK=y, because exit_task_work() is called before exit_notify(). But the check still makes sense, task_work_add(&tsk->posix_cputimers_work.work) will fail anyway in this case. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Benoît Sevens <bsevens@google.com> Fixes: 0bdd2ed4138e ("sched: run_posix_cpu_timers: Don't check ->exit_state, use lock_task_sighand()") Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit f90fff1e152dedf52b932240ebbd670d83330eca upstream.

If an exiting non-autoreaping task has already passed exit_notify() and
calls handle_posix_cpu_timers() from IRQ, it can be reaped by its parent
or debugger right after unlock_task_sighand().

If a concurrent posix_cpu_timer_del() runs at that moment, it won't be
able to detect timer->it.cpu.firing != 0: cpu_timer_task_rcu() and/or
lock_task_sighand() will fail.

Add the tsk->exit_state check into run_posix_cpu_timers() to fix this.

This fix is not needed if CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK=y, because
exit_task_work() is called before exit_notify(). But the check still
makes sense, task_work_add(&tsk->posix_cputimers_work.work) will fail
anyway in this case.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Benoît Sevens <bsevens@google.com>
Fixes: 0bdd2ed4138e ("sched: run_posix_cpu_timers: Don't check ->exit_state, use lock_task_sighand()")
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
perf: Ensure bpf_perf_link path is properly serialized 2025-06-27T10:07:24+00:00 Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org 2025-01-17T09:54:50+00:00 b859b5f5c39b48e78e8176abfe6ffc17cacd1439 [ Upstream commit 7ed9138a72829d2035ecbd8dbd35b1bc3c137c40 ] Ravi reported that the bpf_perf_link_attach() usage of perf_event_set_bpf_prog() is not serialized by ctx->mutex, unlike the PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_BPF case. Reported-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250307193305.486326750@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 7ed9138a72829d2035ecbd8dbd35b1bc3c137c40 ]

Ravi reported that the bpf_perf_link_attach() usage of
perf_event_set_bpf_prog() is not serialized by ctx->mutex, unlike the
PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_BPF case.

Reported-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250307193305.486326750@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
bpf: Avoid __bpf_prog_ret0_warn when jit fails 2025-06-27T10:07:12+00:00 KaFai Wan mannkafai@gmail.com 2025-05-26T13:33:58+00:00 ef92b96530d1731d9ac167bc7c193c683cd78fff [ Upstream commit 86bc9c742426a16b52a10ef61f5b721aecca2344 ] syzkaller reported an issue: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 217 at kernel/bpf/core.c:2357 __bpf_prog_ret0_warn+0xa/0x20 kernel/bpf/core.c:2357 Modules linked in: CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/u32:6 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc4-syzkaller-00040-g8bac8898fe39 RIP: 0010:__bpf_prog_ret0_warn+0xa/0x20 kernel/bpf/core.c:2357 Call Trace: <TASK> bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:1316 [inline] __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:718 [inline] bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:725 [inline] cls_bpf_classify+0x74a/0x1110 net/sched/cls_bpf.c:105 ... When creating bpf program, 'fp->jit_requested' depends on bpf_jit_enable. This issue is triggered because of CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON is not set and bpf_jit_enable is set to 1, causing the arch to attempt JIT the prog, but jit failed due to FAULT_INJECTION. As a result, incorrectly treats the program as valid, when the program runs it calls `__bpf_prog_ret0_warn` and triggers the WARN_ON_ONCE(1). Reported-by: syzbot+0903f6d7f285e41cdf10@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/6816e34e.a70a0220.254cdc.002c.GAE@google.com Fixes: fa9dd599b4da ("bpf: get rid of pure_initcall dependency to enable jits") Signed-off-by: KaFai Wan <mannkafai@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250526133358.2594176-1-mannkafai@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 86bc9c742426a16b52a10ef61f5b721aecca2344 ]

syzkaller reported an issue:

WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 217 at kernel/bpf/core.c:2357 __bpf_prog_ret0_warn+0xa/0x20 kernel/bpf/core.c:2357
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/u32:6 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc4-syzkaller-00040-g8bac8898fe39
RIP: 0010:__bpf_prog_ret0_warn+0xa/0x20 kernel/bpf/core.c:2357
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:1316 [inline]
 __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:718 [inline]
 bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:725 [inline]
 cls_bpf_classify+0x74a/0x1110 net/sched/cls_bpf.c:105
 ...

When creating bpf program, 'fp->jit_requested' depends on bpf_jit_enable.
This issue is triggered because of CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON is not set
and bpf_jit_enable is set to 1, causing the arch to attempt JIT the prog,
but jit failed due to FAULT_INJECTION. As a result, incorrectly
treats the program as valid, when the program runs it calls
`__bpf_prog_ret0_warn` and triggers the WARN_ON_ONCE(1).

Reported-by: syzbot+0903f6d7f285e41cdf10@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/6816e34e.a70a0220.254cdc.002c.GAE@google.com
Fixes: fa9dd599b4da ("bpf: get rid of pure_initcall dependency to enable jits")
Signed-off-by: KaFai Wan <mannkafai@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250526133358.2594176-1-mannkafai@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
bpf: Fix WARN() in get_bpf_raw_tp_regs 2025-06-27T10:07:11+00:00 Tao Chen chen.dylane@linux.dev 2025-05-13T04:27:47+00:00 e167414beabb1e941fe563a96becc98627d5bdf6 [ Upstream commit 3880cdbed1c4607e378f58fa924c5d6df900d1d3 ] syzkaller reported an issue: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 5971 at kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1861 get_bpf_raw_tp_regs+0xa4/0x100 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1861 Modules linked in: CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 5971 Comm: syz-executor205 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5-syzkaller-00038-g707df3375124 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:get_bpf_raw_tp_regs+0xa4/0x100 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1861 RSP: 0018:ffffc90003636fa8 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: ffffffff81c6bc4c RDX: ffff888032efc880 RSI: ffffffff81c6bc83 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: ffff88806a730860 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000003 R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000004 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffc90003637008 R15: 0000000000000900 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880d6cdf000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f7baee09130 CR3: 0000000029f5a000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ____bpf_get_stack_raw_tp kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1934 [inline] bpf_get_stack_raw_tp+0x24/0x160 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1931 bpf_prog_ec3b2eefa702d8d3+0x43/0x47 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:1316 [inline] __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:718 [inline] bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:725 [inline] __bpf_trace_run kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2363 [inline] bpf_trace_run3+0x23f/0x5a0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2405 __bpf_trace_mmap_lock_acquire_returned+0xfc/0x140 include/trace/events/mmap_lock.h:47 __traceiter_mmap_lock_acquire_returned+0x79/0xc0 include/trace/events/mmap_lock.h:47 __do_trace_mmap_lock_acquire_returned include/trace/events/mmap_lock.h:47 [inline] trace_mmap_lock_acquire_returned include/trace/events/mmap_lock.h:47 [inline] __mmap_lock_do_trace_acquire_returned+0x138/0x1f0 mm/mmap_lock.c:35 __mmap_lock_trace_acquire_returned include/linux/mmap_lock.h:36 [inline] mmap_read_trylock include/linux/mmap_lock.h:204 [inline] stack_map_get_build_id_offset+0x535/0x6f0 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:157 __bpf_get_stack+0x307/0xa10 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:483 ____bpf_get_stack kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:499 [inline] bpf_get_stack+0x32/0x40 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:496 ____bpf_get_stack_raw_tp kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1941 [inline] bpf_get_stack_raw_tp+0x124/0x160 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1931 bpf_prog_ec3b2eefa702d8d3+0x43/0x47 Tracepoint like trace_mmap_lock_acquire_returned may cause nested call as the corner case show above, which will be resolved with more general method in the future. As a result, WARN_ON_ONCE will be triggered. As Alexei suggested, remove the WARN_ON_ONCE first. Fixes: 9594dc3c7e71 ("bpf: fix nested bpf tracepoints with per-cpu data") Reported-by: syzbot+45b0c89a0fc7ae8dbadc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250513042747.757042-1-chen.dylane@linux.dev Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/8bc2554d-1052-4922-8832-e0078a033e1d@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 3880cdbed1c4607e378f58fa924c5d6df900d1d3 ]

syzkaller reported an issue:

WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 5971 at kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1861 get_bpf_raw_tp_regs+0xa4/0x100 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1861
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 5971 Comm: syz-executor205 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5-syzkaller-00038-g707df3375124 #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:get_bpf_raw_tp_regs+0xa4/0x100 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1861
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003636fa8 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: ffffffff81c6bc4c
RDX: ffff888032efc880 RSI: ffffffff81c6bc83 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: ffff88806a730860 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffc90003637008 R15: 0000000000000900
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880d6cdf000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f7baee09130 CR3: 0000000029f5a000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ____bpf_get_stack_raw_tp kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1934 [inline]
 bpf_get_stack_raw_tp+0x24/0x160 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1931
 bpf_prog_ec3b2eefa702d8d3+0x43/0x47
 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:1316 [inline]
 __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:718 [inline]
 bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:725 [inline]
 __bpf_trace_run kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2363 [inline]
 bpf_trace_run3+0x23f/0x5a0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2405
 __bpf_trace_mmap_lock_acquire_returned+0xfc/0x140 include/trace/events/mmap_lock.h:47
 __traceiter_mmap_lock_acquire_returned+0x79/0xc0 include/trace/events/mmap_lock.h:47
 __do_trace_mmap_lock_acquire_returned include/trace/events/mmap_lock.h:47 [inline]
 trace_mmap_lock_acquire_returned include/trace/events/mmap_lock.h:47 [inline]
 __mmap_lock_do_trace_acquire_returned+0x138/0x1f0 mm/mmap_lock.c:35
 __mmap_lock_trace_acquire_returned include/linux/mmap_lock.h:36 [inline]
 mmap_read_trylock include/linux/mmap_lock.h:204 [inline]
 stack_map_get_build_id_offset+0x535/0x6f0 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:157
 __bpf_get_stack+0x307/0xa10 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:483
 ____bpf_get_stack kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:499 [inline]
 bpf_get_stack+0x32/0x40 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c:496
 ____bpf_get_stack_raw_tp kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1941 [inline]
 bpf_get_stack_raw_tp+0x124/0x160 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:1931
 bpf_prog_ec3b2eefa702d8d3+0x43/0x47

Tracepoint like trace_mmap_lock_acquire_returned may cause nested call
as the corner case show above, which will be resolved with more general
method in the future. As a result, WARN_ON_ONCE will be triggered. As
Alexei suggested, remove the WARN_ON_ONCE first.

Fixes: 9594dc3c7e71 ("bpf: fix nested bpf tracepoints with per-cpu data")
Reported-by: syzbot+45b0c89a0fc7ae8dbadc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250513042747.757042-1-chen.dylane@linux.dev

Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/8bc2554d-1052-4922-8832-e0078a033e1d@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
tracing: Fix error handling in event_trigger_parse() 2025-06-27T10:07:10+00:00 Miaoqian Lin linmq006@gmail.com 2025-05-07T14:53:07+00:00 f6007590cc7642c635bcf51a2cc0d83edb756dc3 [ Upstream commit c5dd28e7fb4f63475b50df4f58311df92939d011 ] According to trigger_data_alloc() doc, trigger_data_free() should be used to free an event_trigger_data object. This fixes a mismatch introduced when kzalloc was replaced with trigger_data_alloc without updating the corresponding deallocation calls. Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250507145455.944453325@goodmis.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250318112737.4174-1-linmq006@gmail.com Fixes: e1f187d09e11 ("tracing: Have existing event_command.parse() implementations use helpers") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin <linmq006@gmail.com> [ SDR: Changed event_trigger_alloc/free() to trigger_data_alloc/free() ] Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit c5dd28e7fb4f63475b50df4f58311df92939d011 ]

According to trigger_data_alloc() doc, trigger_data_free() should be
used to free an event_trigger_data object. This fixes a mismatch introduced
when kzalloc was replaced with trigger_data_alloc without updating
the corresponding deallocation calls.

Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250507145455.944453325@goodmis.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250318112737.4174-1-linmq006@gmail.com
Fixes: e1f187d09e11 ("tracing: Have existing event_command.parse() implementations use helpers")
Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin <linmq006@gmail.com>
[ SDR: Changed event_trigger_alloc/free() to trigger_data_alloc/free() ]
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>