<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v5.4.82</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Remove WARN_ON in start_thread()</title>
<updated>2020-12-08T09:40:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasily Averin</name>
<email>vvs@virtuozzo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-18T12:05:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=07434172c58b4b8aa8c3af5fad1ae32df4c6494f'/>
<id>07434172c58b4b8aa8c3af5fad1ae32df4c6494f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 310e3a4b5a4fc718a72201c1e4cf5c64ac6f5442 upstream.

This patch reverts commit 978defee11a5 ("tracing: Do a WARN_ON()
 if start_thread() in hwlat is called when thread exists")

.start hook can be legally called several times if according
tracer is stopped

screen window 1
[root@localhost ~]# echo 1 &gt; /sys/kernel/tracing/events/kmem/kfree/enable
[root@localhost ~]# echo 1 &gt; /sys/kernel/tracing/options/pause-on-trace
[root@localhost ~]# less -F /sys/kernel/tracing/trace

screen window 2
[root@localhost ~]# cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/tracing_on
0
[root@localhost ~]# echo hwlat &gt;  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer
[root@localhost ~]# echo 1 &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/tracing_on
[root@localhost ~]# cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/tracing_on
0
[root@localhost ~]# echo 2 &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/tracing_on

triggers warning in dmesg:
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1403 at kernel/trace/trace_hwlat.c:371 hwlat_tracer_start+0xc9/0xd0

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/bd4d3e70-400d-9c82-7b73-a2d695e86b58@virtuozzo.com

Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 978defee11a5 ("tracing: Do a WARN_ON() if start_thread() in hwlat is called when thread exists")
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin &lt;vvs@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 310e3a4b5a4fc718a72201c1e4cf5c64ac6f5442 upstream.

This patch reverts commit 978defee11a5 ("tracing: Do a WARN_ON()
 if start_thread() in hwlat is called when thread exists")

.start hook can be legally called several times if according
tracer is stopped

screen window 1
[root@localhost ~]# echo 1 &gt; /sys/kernel/tracing/events/kmem/kfree/enable
[root@localhost ~]# echo 1 &gt; /sys/kernel/tracing/options/pause-on-trace
[root@localhost ~]# less -F /sys/kernel/tracing/trace

screen window 2
[root@localhost ~]# cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/tracing_on
0
[root@localhost ~]# echo hwlat &gt;  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer
[root@localhost ~]# echo 1 &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/tracing_on
[root@localhost ~]# cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/tracing_on
0
[root@localhost ~]# echo 2 &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/tracing_on

triggers warning in dmesg:
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1403 at kernel/trace/trace_hwlat.c:371 hwlat_tracer_start+0xc9/0xd0

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/bd4d3e70-400d-9c82-7b73-a2d695e86b58@virtuozzo.com

Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 978defee11a5 ("tracing: Do a WARN_ON() if start_thread() in hwlat is called when thread exists")
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin &lt;vvs@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/fair: Fix unthrottle_cfs_rq() for leaf_cfs_rq list</title>
<updated>2020-12-08T09:40:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vincent Guittot</name>
<email>vincent.guittot@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-03T00:44:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=294de8933adbdda78acaa3935971d26bb6de745e'/>
<id>294de8933adbdda78acaa3935971d26bb6de745e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 39f23ce07b9355d05a64ae303ce20d1c4b92b957 ]

Although not exactly identical, unthrottle_cfs_rq() and enqueue_task_fair()
are quite close and follow the same sequence for enqueuing an entity in the
cfs hierarchy. Modify unthrottle_cfs_rq() to use the same pattern as
enqueue_task_fair(). This fixes a problem already faced with the latter and
add an optimization in the last for_each_sched_entity loop.

Fixes: fe61468b2cb (sched/fair: Fix enqueue_task_fair warning)
Reported-by Tao Zhou &lt;zohooouoto@zoho.com.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vincent Guittot &lt;vincent.guittot@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Phil Auld &lt;pauld@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ben Segall &lt;bsegall@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200513135528.4742-1-vincent.guittot@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 39f23ce07b9355d05a64ae303ce20d1c4b92b957 ]

Although not exactly identical, unthrottle_cfs_rq() and enqueue_task_fair()
are quite close and follow the same sequence for enqueuing an entity in the
cfs hierarchy. Modify unthrottle_cfs_rq() to use the same pattern as
enqueue_task_fair(). This fixes a problem already faced with the latter and
add an optimization in the last for_each_sched_entity loop.

Fixes: fe61468b2cb (sched/fair: Fix enqueue_task_fair warning)
Reported-by Tao Zhou &lt;zohooouoto@zoho.com.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vincent Guittot &lt;vincent.guittot@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Phil Auld &lt;pauld@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ben Segall &lt;bsegall@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200513135528.4742-1-vincent.guittot@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/fair: Fix overutilized update in enqueue_task_fair()</title>
<updated>2020-11-24T12:29:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Quentin Perret</name>
<email>qperret@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-12T11:12:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a88f08e78249f5979101684a3afd4aff5dec59e7'/>
<id>a88f08e78249f5979101684a3afd4aff5dec59e7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8e1ac4299a6e8726de42310d9c1379f188140c71 upstream.

enqueue_task_fair() attempts to skip the overutilized update for new
tasks as their util_avg is not accurate yet. However, the flag we check
to do so is overwritten earlier on in the function, which makes the
condition pretty much a nop.

Fix this by saving the flag early on.

Fixes: 2802bf3cd936 ("sched/fair: Add over-utilization/tipping point indicator")
Reported-by: Rick Yiu &lt;rickyiu@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret &lt;qperret@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Vincent Guittot &lt;vincent.guittot@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider &lt;valentin.schneider@arm.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112111201.2081902-1-qperret@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8e1ac4299a6e8726de42310d9c1379f188140c71 upstream.

enqueue_task_fair() attempts to skip the overutilized update for new
tasks as their util_avg is not accurate yet. However, the flag we check
to do so is overwritten earlier on in the function, which makes the
condition pretty much a nop.

Fix this by saving the flag early on.

Fixes: 2802bf3cd936 ("sched/fair: Add over-utilization/tipping point indicator")
Reported-by: Rick Yiu &lt;rickyiu@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret &lt;qperret@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Vincent Guittot &lt;vincent.guittot@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider &lt;valentin.schneider@arm.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112111201.2081902-1-qperret@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>seccomp: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability</title>
<updated>2020-11-24T12:29:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mickaël Salaün</name>
<email>mic@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-30T12:38:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=09652ebd0dc1a4fd0069410261eea55bd8f6df6c'/>
<id>09652ebd0dc1a4fd0069410261eea55bd8f6df6c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fb14528e443646dd3fd02df4437fcf5265b66baa upstream.

Replace the use of security_capable(current_cred(), ...) with
ns_capable_noaudit() which set PF_SUPERPRIV.

Since commit 98f368e9e263 ("kernel: Add noaudit variant of
ns_capable()"), a new ns_capable_noaudit() helper is available.  Let's
use it!

Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: Will Drewry &lt;wad@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e2cfabdfd075 ("seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201030123849.770769-3-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit fb14528e443646dd3fd02df4437fcf5265b66baa upstream.

Replace the use of security_capable(current_cred(), ...) with
ns_capable_noaudit() which set PF_SUPERPRIV.

Since commit 98f368e9e263 ("kernel: Add noaudit variant of
ns_capable()"), a new ns_capable_noaudit() helper is available.  Let's
use it!

Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: Will Drewry &lt;wad@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e2cfabdfd075 ("seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201030123849.770769-3-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ptrace: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability</title>
<updated>2020-11-24T12:29:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mickaël Salaün</name>
<email>mic@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-30T12:38:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fa9ccc177754a608f93bc9ca972f96da8850233f'/>
<id>fa9ccc177754a608f93bc9ca972f96da8850233f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cf23705244c947151179f929774fabf71e239eee upstream.

Commit 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing
/proc/pid/stat") replaced the use of ns_capable() with
has_ns_capability{,_noaudit}() which doesn't set PF_SUPERPRIV.

Commit 6b3ad6649a4c ("ptrace: reintroduce usage of subjective credentials in
ptrace_has_cap()") replaced has_ns_capability{,_noaudit}() with
security_capable(), which doesn't set PF_SUPERPRIV neither.

Since commit 98f368e9e263 ("kernel: Add noaudit variant of ns_capable()"), a
new ns_capable_noaudit() helper is available.  Let's use it!

As a result, the signature of ptrace_has_cap() is restored to its original one.

Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 6b3ad6649a4c ("ptrace: reintroduce usage of subjective credentials in ptrace_has_cap()")
Fixes: 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201030123849.770769-2-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit cf23705244c947151179f929774fabf71e239eee upstream.

Commit 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing
/proc/pid/stat") replaced the use of ns_capable() with
has_ns_capability{,_noaudit}() which doesn't set PF_SUPERPRIV.

Commit 6b3ad6649a4c ("ptrace: reintroduce usage of subjective credentials in
ptrace_has_cap()") replaced has_ns_capability{,_noaudit}() with
security_capable(), which doesn't set PF_SUPERPRIV neither.

Since commit 98f368e9e263 ("kernel: Add noaudit variant of ns_capable()"), a
new ns_capable_noaudit() helper is available.  Let's use it!

As a result, the signature of ptrace_has_cap() is restored to its original one.

Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 6b3ad6649a4c ("ptrace: reintroduce usage of subjective credentials in ptrace_has_cap()")
Fixes: 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201030123849.770769-2-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fail_function: Remove a redundant mutex unlock</title>
<updated>2020-11-24T12:29:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Luo Meng</name>
<email>luomeng12@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-18T13:49:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=989d275ac5928ba00ac4d40bcbd4c281b8ab7c24'/>
<id>989d275ac5928ba00ac4d40bcbd4c281b8ab7c24</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2801a5da5b25b7af9dd2addd19b2315c02d17b64 ]

Fix a mutex_unlock() issue where before copy_from_user() is
not called mutex_locked.

Fixes: 4b1a29a7f542 ("error-injection: Support fault injection framework")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot &lt;hulkci@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luo Meng &lt;luomeng12@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/160570737118.263807.8358435412898356284.stgit@devnote2
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2801a5da5b25b7af9dd2addd19b2315c02d17b64 ]

Fix a mutex_unlock() issue where before copy_from_user() is
not called mutex_locked.

Fixes: 4b1a29a7f542 ("error-injection: Support fault injection framework")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot &lt;hulkci@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luo Meng &lt;luomeng12@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/160570737118.263807.8358435412898356284.stgit@devnote2
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: smp: Tell RCU about CPUs that fail to come online</title>
<updated>2020-11-24T12:29:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Will Deacon</name>
<email>will@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-06T10:25:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=54d11983c29cf78a354c01cbb6551c68dfc25e64'/>
<id>54d11983c29cf78a354c01cbb6551c68dfc25e64</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 04e613ded8c26489b3e0f9101b44462f780d1a35 ]

Commit ce3d31ad3cac ("arm64/smp: Move rcu_cpu_starting() earlier") ensured
that RCU is informed early about incoming CPUs that might end up calling
into printk() before they are online. However, if such a CPU fails the
early CPU feature compatibility checks in check_local_cpu_capabilities(),
then it will be powered off or parked without informing RCU, leading to
an endless stream of stalls:

  | rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
  | rcu:	2-O...: (0 ticks this GP) idle=002/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=0/0 fqs=2593
  | (detected by 0, t=5252 jiffies, g=9317, q=136)
  | Task dump for CPU 2:
  | task:swapper/2       state:R  running task     stack:    0 pid:    0 ppid:     1 flags:0x00000028
  | Call trace:
  | ret_from_fork+0x0/0x30

Ensure that the dying CPU invokes rcu_report_dead() prior to being powered
off or parked.

Cc: Qian Cai &lt;cai@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Qian Cai &lt;cai@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201105222242.GA8842@willie-the-truck
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201106103602.9849-3-will@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 04e613ded8c26489b3e0f9101b44462f780d1a35 ]

Commit ce3d31ad3cac ("arm64/smp: Move rcu_cpu_starting() earlier") ensured
that RCU is informed early about incoming CPUs that might end up calling
into printk() before they are online. However, if such a CPU fails the
early CPU feature compatibility checks in check_local_cpu_capabilities(),
then it will be powered off or parked without informing RCU, leading to
an endless stream of stalls:

  | rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
  | rcu:	2-O...: (0 ticks this GP) idle=002/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=0/0 fqs=2593
  | (detected by 0, t=5252 jiffies, g=9317, q=136)
  | Task dump for CPU 2:
  | task:swapper/2       state:R  running task     stack:    0 pid:    0 ppid:     1 flags:0x00000028
  | Call trace:
  | ret_from_fork+0x0/0x30

Ensure that the dying CPU invokes rcu_report_dead() prior to being powered
off or parked.

Cc: Qian Cai &lt;cai@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Qian Cai &lt;cai@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201105222242.GA8842@willie-the-truck
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201106103602.9849-3-will@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Fix race in the perf_mmap_close() function</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Olsa</name>
<email>jolsa@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-16T11:53:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c5cf5c7b585c7f48195892e44b76237010c0747a'/>
<id>c5cf5c7b585c7f48195892e44b76237010c0747a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f91072ed1b7283b13ca57fcfbece5a3b92726143 upstream.

There's a possible race in perf_mmap_close() when checking ring buffer's
mmap_count refcount value. The problem is that the mmap_count check is
not atomic because we call atomic_dec() and atomic_read() separately.

  perf_mmap_close:
  ...
   atomic_dec(&amp;rb-&gt;mmap_count);
   ...
   if (atomic_read(&amp;rb-&gt;mmap_count))
      goto out_put;

   &lt;ring buffer detach&gt;
   free_uid

out_put:
  ring_buffer_put(rb); /* could be last */

The race can happen when we have two (or more) events sharing same ring
buffer and they go through atomic_dec() and then they both see 0 as refcount
value later in atomic_read(). Then both will go on and execute code which
is meant to be run just once.

The code that detaches ring buffer is probably fine to be executed more
than once, but the problem is in calling free_uid(), which will later on
demonstrate in related crashes and refcount warnings, like:

  refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
  ...
  RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x6d/0xf
  ...
  Call Trace:
  prepare_creds+0x190/0x1e0
  copy_creds+0x35/0x172
  copy_process+0x471/0x1a80
  _do_fork+0x83/0x3a0
  __do_sys_wait4+0x83/0x90
  __do_sys_clone+0x85/0xa0
  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Using atomic decrease and check instead of separated calls.

Tested-by: Michael Petlan &lt;mpetlan@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Wade Mealing &lt;wmealing@redhat.com&gt;
Fixes: 9bb5d40cd93c ("perf: Fix mmap() accounting hole");
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916115311.GE2301783@krava
[sudip: used ring_buffer]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee &lt;sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f91072ed1b7283b13ca57fcfbece5a3b92726143 upstream.

There's a possible race in perf_mmap_close() when checking ring buffer's
mmap_count refcount value. The problem is that the mmap_count check is
not atomic because we call atomic_dec() and atomic_read() separately.

  perf_mmap_close:
  ...
   atomic_dec(&amp;rb-&gt;mmap_count);
   ...
   if (atomic_read(&amp;rb-&gt;mmap_count))
      goto out_put;

   &lt;ring buffer detach&gt;
   free_uid

out_put:
  ring_buffer_put(rb); /* could be last */

The race can happen when we have two (or more) events sharing same ring
buffer and they go through atomic_dec() and then they both see 0 as refcount
value later in atomic_read(). Then both will go on and execute code which
is meant to be run just once.

The code that detaches ring buffer is probably fine to be executed more
than once, but the problem is in calling free_uid(), which will later on
demonstrate in related crashes and refcount warnings, like:

  refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
  ...
  RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x6d/0xf
  ...
  Call Trace:
  prepare_creds+0x190/0x1e0
  copy_creds+0x35/0x172
  copy_process+0x471/0x1a80
  _do_fork+0x83/0x3a0
  __do_sys_wait4+0x83/0x90
  __do_sys_clone+0x85/0xa0
  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Using atomic decrease and check instead of separated calls.

Tested-by: Michael Petlan &lt;mpetlan@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Wade Mealing &lt;wmealing@redhat.com&gt;
Fixes: 9bb5d40cd93c ("perf: Fix mmap() accounting hole");
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916115311.GE2301783@krava
[sudip: used ring_buffer]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee &lt;sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>swiotlb: fix "x86: Don't panic if can not alloc buffer for swiotlb"</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefano Stabellini</name>
<email>stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-27T00:02:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=98901bff58d93e63980abe0c461633004f7954f8'/>
<id>98901bff58d93e63980abe0c461633004f7954f8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e9696d259d0fb5d239e8c28ca41089838ea76d13 upstream.

kernel/dma/swiotlb.c:swiotlb_init gets called first and tries to
allocate a buffer for the swiotlb. It does so by calling

  memblock_alloc_low(PAGE_ALIGN(bytes), PAGE_SIZE);

If the allocation must fail, no_iotlb_memory is set.

Later during initialization swiotlb-xen comes in
(drivers/xen/swiotlb-xen.c:xen_swiotlb_init) and given that io_tlb_start
is != 0, it thinks the memory is ready to use when actually it is not.

When the swiotlb is actually needed, swiotlb_tbl_map_single gets called
and since no_iotlb_memory is set the kernel panics.

Instead, if swiotlb-xen.c:xen_swiotlb_init knew the swiotlb hadn't been
initialized, it would do the initialization itself, which might still
succeed.

Fix the panic by setting io_tlb_start to 0 on swiotlb initialization
failure, and also by setting no_iotlb_memory to false on swiotlb
initialization success.

Fixes: ac2cbab21f31 ("x86: Don't panic if can not alloc buffer for swiotlb")

Reported-by: Elliott Mitchell &lt;ehem+xen@m5p.com&gt;
Tested-by: Elliott Mitchell &lt;ehem+xen@m5p.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e9696d259d0fb5d239e8c28ca41089838ea76d13 upstream.

kernel/dma/swiotlb.c:swiotlb_init gets called first and tries to
allocate a buffer for the swiotlb. It does so by calling

  memblock_alloc_low(PAGE_ALIGN(bytes), PAGE_SIZE);

If the allocation must fail, no_iotlb_memory is set.

Later during initialization swiotlb-xen comes in
(drivers/xen/swiotlb-xen.c:xen_swiotlb_init) and given that io_tlb_start
is != 0, it thinks the memory is ready to use when actually it is not.

When the swiotlb is actually needed, swiotlb_tbl_map_single gets called
and since no_iotlb_memory is set the kernel panics.

Instead, if swiotlb-xen.c:xen_swiotlb_init knew the swiotlb hadn't been
initialized, it would do the initialization itself, which might still
succeed.

Fix the panic by setting io_tlb_start to 0 on swiotlb initialization
failure, and also by setting no_iotlb_memory to false on swiotlb
initialization success.

Fixes: ac2cbab21f31 ("x86: Don't panic if can not alloc buffer for swiotlb")

Reported-by: Elliott Mitchell &lt;ehem+xen@m5p.com&gt;
Tested-by: Elliott Mitchell &lt;ehem+xen@m5p.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>don't dump the threads that had been already exiting when zapped.</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-28T20:39:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=974e3a7002a0c4adb921b8b92656463ae795b61c'/>
<id>974e3a7002a0c4adb921b8b92656463ae795b61c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 77f6ab8b7768cf5e6bdd0e72499270a0671506ee upstream.

Coredump logics needs to report not only the registers of the dumping
thread, but (since 2.5.43) those of other threads getting killed.

Doing that might require extra state saved on the stack in asm glue at
kernel entry; signal delivery logics does that (we need to be able to
save sigcontext there, at the very least) and so does seccomp.

That covers all callers of do_coredump().  Secondary threads get hit with
SIGKILL and caught as soon as they reach exit_mm(), which normally happens
in signal delivery, so those are also fine most of the time.  Unfortunately,
it is possible to end up with secondary zapped when it has already entered
exit(2) (or, worse yet, is oopsing).  In those cases we reach exit_mm()
when mm-&gt;core_state is already set, but the stack contents is not what
we would have in signal delivery.

At least on two architectures (alpha and m68k) it leads to infoleaks - we
end up with a chunk of kernel stack written into coredump, with the contents
consisting of normal C stack frames of the call chain leading to exit_mm()
instead of the expected copy of userland registers.  In case of alpha we
leak 312 bytes of stack.  Other architectures (including the regset-using
ones) might have similar problems - the normal user of regsets is ptrace
and the state of tracee at the time of such calls is special in the same
way signal delivery is.

Note that had the zapper gotten to the exiting thread slightly later,
it wouldn't have been included into coredump anyway - we skip the threads
that have already cleared their -&gt;mm.  So let's pretend that zapper always
loses the race.  IOW, have exit_mm() only insert into the dumper list if
we'd gotten there from handling a fatal signal[*]

As the result, the callers of do_exit() that have *not* gone through get_signal()
are not seen by coredump logics as secondary threads.  Which excludes voluntary
exit()/oopsen/traps/etc.  The dumper thread itself is unaffected by that,
so seccomp is fine.

[*] originally I intended to add a new flag in tsk-&gt;flags, but ebiederman pointed
out that PF_SIGNALED is already doing just what we need.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d89f3847def4 ("[PATCH] thread-aware coredumps, 2.5.43-C3")
History-tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 77f6ab8b7768cf5e6bdd0e72499270a0671506ee upstream.

Coredump logics needs to report not only the registers of the dumping
thread, but (since 2.5.43) those of other threads getting killed.

Doing that might require extra state saved on the stack in asm glue at
kernel entry; signal delivery logics does that (we need to be able to
save sigcontext there, at the very least) and so does seccomp.

That covers all callers of do_coredump().  Secondary threads get hit with
SIGKILL and caught as soon as they reach exit_mm(), which normally happens
in signal delivery, so those are also fine most of the time.  Unfortunately,
it is possible to end up with secondary zapped when it has already entered
exit(2) (or, worse yet, is oopsing).  In those cases we reach exit_mm()
when mm-&gt;core_state is already set, but the stack contents is not what
we would have in signal delivery.

At least on two architectures (alpha and m68k) it leads to infoleaks - we
end up with a chunk of kernel stack written into coredump, with the contents
consisting of normal C stack frames of the call chain leading to exit_mm()
instead of the expected copy of userland registers.  In case of alpha we
leak 312 bytes of stack.  Other architectures (including the regset-using
ones) might have similar problems - the normal user of regsets is ptrace
and the state of tracee at the time of such calls is special in the same
way signal delivery is.

Note that had the zapper gotten to the exiting thread slightly later,
it wouldn't have been included into coredump anyway - we skip the threads
that have already cleared their -&gt;mm.  So let's pretend that zapper always
loses the race.  IOW, have exit_mm() only insert into the dumper list if
we'd gotten there from handling a fatal signal[*]

As the result, the callers of do_exit() that have *not* gone through get_signal()
are not seen by coredump logics as secondary threads.  Which excludes voluntary
exit()/oopsen/traps/etc.  The dumper thread itself is unaffected by that,
so seccomp is fine.

[*] originally I intended to add a new flag in tsk-&gt;flags, but ebiederman pointed
out that PF_SIGNALED is already doing just what we need.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d89f3847def4 ("[PATCH] thread-aware coredumps, 2.5.43-C3")
History-tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
