<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v5.4.78</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Fix race in the perf_mmap_close() function</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Olsa</name>
<email>jolsa@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-16T11:53:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c5cf5c7b585c7f48195892e44b76237010c0747a'/>
<id>c5cf5c7b585c7f48195892e44b76237010c0747a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f91072ed1b7283b13ca57fcfbece5a3b92726143 upstream.

There's a possible race in perf_mmap_close() when checking ring buffer's
mmap_count refcount value. The problem is that the mmap_count check is
not atomic because we call atomic_dec() and atomic_read() separately.

  perf_mmap_close:
  ...
   atomic_dec(&amp;rb-&gt;mmap_count);
   ...
   if (atomic_read(&amp;rb-&gt;mmap_count))
      goto out_put;

   &lt;ring buffer detach&gt;
   free_uid

out_put:
  ring_buffer_put(rb); /* could be last */

The race can happen when we have two (or more) events sharing same ring
buffer and they go through atomic_dec() and then they both see 0 as refcount
value later in atomic_read(). Then both will go on and execute code which
is meant to be run just once.

The code that detaches ring buffer is probably fine to be executed more
than once, but the problem is in calling free_uid(), which will later on
demonstrate in related crashes and refcount warnings, like:

  refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
  ...
  RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x6d/0xf
  ...
  Call Trace:
  prepare_creds+0x190/0x1e0
  copy_creds+0x35/0x172
  copy_process+0x471/0x1a80
  _do_fork+0x83/0x3a0
  __do_sys_wait4+0x83/0x90
  __do_sys_clone+0x85/0xa0
  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Using atomic decrease and check instead of separated calls.

Tested-by: Michael Petlan &lt;mpetlan@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Wade Mealing &lt;wmealing@redhat.com&gt;
Fixes: 9bb5d40cd93c ("perf: Fix mmap() accounting hole");
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916115311.GE2301783@krava
[sudip: used ring_buffer]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee &lt;sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f91072ed1b7283b13ca57fcfbece5a3b92726143 upstream.

There's a possible race in perf_mmap_close() when checking ring buffer's
mmap_count refcount value. The problem is that the mmap_count check is
not atomic because we call atomic_dec() and atomic_read() separately.

  perf_mmap_close:
  ...
   atomic_dec(&amp;rb-&gt;mmap_count);
   ...
   if (atomic_read(&amp;rb-&gt;mmap_count))
      goto out_put;

   &lt;ring buffer detach&gt;
   free_uid

out_put:
  ring_buffer_put(rb); /* could be last */

The race can happen when we have two (or more) events sharing same ring
buffer and they go through atomic_dec() and then they both see 0 as refcount
value later in atomic_read(). Then both will go on and execute code which
is meant to be run just once.

The code that detaches ring buffer is probably fine to be executed more
than once, but the problem is in calling free_uid(), which will later on
demonstrate in related crashes and refcount warnings, like:

  refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
  ...
  RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x6d/0xf
  ...
  Call Trace:
  prepare_creds+0x190/0x1e0
  copy_creds+0x35/0x172
  copy_process+0x471/0x1a80
  _do_fork+0x83/0x3a0
  __do_sys_wait4+0x83/0x90
  __do_sys_clone+0x85/0xa0
  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Using atomic decrease and check instead of separated calls.

Tested-by: Michael Petlan &lt;mpetlan@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Wade Mealing &lt;wmealing@redhat.com&gt;
Fixes: 9bb5d40cd93c ("perf: Fix mmap() accounting hole");
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916115311.GE2301783@krava
[sudip: used ring_buffer]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee &lt;sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>swiotlb: fix "x86: Don't panic if can not alloc buffer for swiotlb"</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefano Stabellini</name>
<email>stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-27T00:02:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=98901bff58d93e63980abe0c461633004f7954f8'/>
<id>98901bff58d93e63980abe0c461633004f7954f8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e9696d259d0fb5d239e8c28ca41089838ea76d13 upstream.

kernel/dma/swiotlb.c:swiotlb_init gets called first and tries to
allocate a buffer for the swiotlb. It does so by calling

  memblock_alloc_low(PAGE_ALIGN(bytes), PAGE_SIZE);

If the allocation must fail, no_iotlb_memory is set.

Later during initialization swiotlb-xen comes in
(drivers/xen/swiotlb-xen.c:xen_swiotlb_init) and given that io_tlb_start
is != 0, it thinks the memory is ready to use when actually it is not.

When the swiotlb is actually needed, swiotlb_tbl_map_single gets called
and since no_iotlb_memory is set the kernel panics.

Instead, if swiotlb-xen.c:xen_swiotlb_init knew the swiotlb hadn't been
initialized, it would do the initialization itself, which might still
succeed.

Fix the panic by setting io_tlb_start to 0 on swiotlb initialization
failure, and also by setting no_iotlb_memory to false on swiotlb
initialization success.

Fixes: ac2cbab21f31 ("x86: Don't panic if can not alloc buffer for swiotlb")

Reported-by: Elliott Mitchell &lt;ehem+xen@m5p.com&gt;
Tested-by: Elliott Mitchell &lt;ehem+xen@m5p.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e9696d259d0fb5d239e8c28ca41089838ea76d13 upstream.

kernel/dma/swiotlb.c:swiotlb_init gets called first and tries to
allocate a buffer for the swiotlb. It does so by calling

  memblock_alloc_low(PAGE_ALIGN(bytes), PAGE_SIZE);

If the allocation must fail, no_iotlb_memory is set.

Later during initialization swiotlb-xen comes in
(drivers/xen/swiotlb-xen.c:xen_swiotlb_init) and given that io_tlb_start
is != 0, it thinks the memory is ready to use when actually it is not.

When the swiotlb is actually needed, swiotlb_tbl_map_single gets called
and since no_iotlb_memory is set the kernel panics.

Instead, if swiotlb-xen.c:xen_swiotlb_init knew the swiotlb hadn't been
initialized, it would do the initialization itself, which might still
succeed.

Fix the panic by setting io_tlb_start to 0 on swiotlb initialization
failure, and also by setting no_iotlb_memory to false on swiotlb
initialization success.

Fixes: ac2cbab21f31 ("x86: Don't panic if can not alloc buffer for swiotlb")

Reported-by: Elliott Mitchell &lt;ehem+xen@m5p.com&gt;
Tested-by: Elliott Mitchell &lt;ehem+xen@m5p.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>don't dump the threads that had been already exiting when zapped.</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-28T20:39:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=974e3a7002a0c4adb921b8b92656463ae795b61c'/>
<id>974e3a7002a0c4adb921b8b92656463ae795b61c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 77f6ab8b7768cf5e6bdd0e72499270a0671506ee upstream.

Coredump logics needs to report not only the registers of the dumping
thread, but (since 2.5.43) those of other threads getting killed.

Doing that might require extra state saved on the stack in asm glue at
kernel entry; signal delivery logics does that (we need to be able to
save sigcontext there, at the very least) and so does seccomp.

That covers all callers of do_coredump().  Secondary threads get hit with
SIGKILL and caught as soon as they reach exit_mm(), which normally happens
in signal delivery, so those are also fine most of the time.  Unfortunately,
it is possible to end up with secondary zapped when it has already entered
exit(2) (or, worse yet, is oopsing).  In those cases we reach exit_mm()
when mm-&gt;core_state is already set, but the stack contents is not what
we would have in signal delivery.

At least on two architectures (alpha and m68k) it leads to infoleaks - we
end up with a chunk of kernel stack written into coredump, with the contents
consisting of normal C stack frames of the call chain leading to exit_mm()
instead of the expected copy of userland registers.  In case of alpha we
leak 312 bytes of stack.  Other architectures (including the regset-using
ones) might have similar problems - the normal user of regsets is ptrace
and the state of tracee at the time of such calls is special in the same
way signal delivery is.

Note that had the zapper gotten to the exiting thread slightly later,
it wouldn't have been included into coredump anyway - we skip the threads
that have already cleared their -&gt;mm.  So let's pretend that zapper always
loses the race.  IOW, have exit_mm() only insert into the dumper list if
we'd gotten there from handling a fatal signal[*]

As the result, the callers of do_exit() that have *not* gone through get_signal()
are not seen by coredump logics as secondary threads.  Which excludes voluntary
exit()/oopsen/traps/etc.  The dumper thread itself is unaffected by that,
so seccomp is fine.

[*] originally I intended to add a new flag in tsk-&gt;flags, but ebiederman pointed
out that PF_SIGNALED is already doing just what we need.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d89f3847def4 ("[PATCH] thread-aware coredumps, 2.5.43-C3")
History-tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 77f6ab8b7768cf5e6bdd0e72499270a0671506ee upstream.

Coredump logics needs to report not only the registers of the dumping
thread, but (since 2.5.43) those of other threads getting killed.

Doing that might require extra state saved on the stack in asm glue at
kernel entry; signal delivery logics does that (we need to be able to
save sigcontext there, at the very least) and so does seccomp.

That covers all callers of do_coredump().  Secondary threads get hit with
SIGKILL and caught as soon as they reach exit_mm(), which normally happens
in signal delivery, so those are also fine most of the time.  Unfortunately,
it is possible to end up with secondary zapped when it has already entered
exit(2) (or, worse yet, is oopsing).  In those cases we reach exit_mm()
when mm-&gt;core_state is already set, but the stack contents is not what
we would have in signal delivery.

At least on two architectures (alpha and m68k) it leads to infoleaks - we
end up with a chunk of kernel stack written into coredump, with the contents
consisting of normal C stack frames of the call chain leading to exit_mm()
instead of the expected copy of userland registers.  In case of alpha we
leak 312 bytes of stack.  Other architectures (including the regset-using
ones) might have similar problems - the normal user of regsets is ptrace
and the state of tracee at the time of such calls is special in the same
way signal delivery is.

Note that had the zapper gotten to the exiting thread slightly later,
it wouldn't have been included into coredump anyway - we skip the threads
that have already cleared their -&gt;mm.  So let's pretend that zapper always
loses the race.  IOW, have exit_mm() only insert into the dumper list if
we'd gotten there from handling a fatal signal[*]

As the result, the callers of do_exit() that have *not* gone through get_signal()
are not seen by coredump logics as secondary threads.  Which excludes voluntary
exit()/oopsen/traps/etc.  The dumper thread itself is unaffected by that,
so seccomp is fine.

[*] originally I intended to add a new flag in tsk-&gt;flags, but ebiederman pointed
out that PF_SIGNALED is already doing just what we need.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d89f3847def4 ("[PATCH] thread-aware coredumps, 2.5.43-C3")
History-tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>reboot: fix overflow parsing reboot cpu number</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matteo Croce</name>
<email>mcroce@microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-14T06:52:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ac18b128cfd6965306666efd9084d65b8192c00d'/>
<id>ac18b128cfd6965306666efd9084d65b8192c00d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit df5b0ab3e08a156701b537809914b339b0daa526 upstream.

Limit the CPU number to num_possible_cpus(), because setting it to a
value lower than INT_MAX but higher than NR_CPUS produces the following
error on reboot and shutdown:

    BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff90ab1bb0
    #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
    #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
    PGD 1c09067 P4D 1c09067 PUD 1c0a063 PMD 0
    Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
    CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 5.9.0-rc8-kvm #110
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
    RIP: 0010:migrate_to_reboot_cpu+0xe/0x60
    Code: ea ea 00 48 89 fa 48 c7 c7 30 57 f1 81 e9 fa ef ff ff 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 53 8b 1d d5 ea ea 00 e8 14 33 fe ff 89 da &lt;48&gt; 0f a3 15 ea fc bd 00 48 89 d0 73 29 89 c2 c1 e8 06 65 48 8b 3c
    RSP: 0018:ffffc90000013e08 EFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: ffff88801f0a0000 RBX: 0000000077359400 RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000077359400 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffffffff81c199e0
    RBP: ffffffff81c1e3c0 R08: ffff88801f41f000 R09: ffffffff81c1e348
    R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 00007f32bedf8830 R14: 00000000fee1dead R15: 0000000000000000
    FS:  00007f32bedf8980(0000) GS:ffff88801f480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: ffffffff90ab1bb0 CR3: 000000001d057000 CR4: 00000000000006a0
    DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
    DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
    Call Trace:
      __do_sys_reboot.cold+0x34/0x5b
      do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40

Fixes: 1b3a5d02ee07 ("reboot: move arch/x86 reboot= handling to generic kernel")
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce &lt;mcroce@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Fabian Frederick &lt;fabf@skynet.be&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Pavel Tatashin &lt;pasha.tatashin@soleen.com&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Robin Holt &lt;robinmholt@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201103214025.116799-3-mcroce@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit df5b0ab3e08a156701b537809914b339b0daa526 upstream.

Limit the CPU number to num_possible_cpus(), because setting it to a
value lower than INT_MAX but higher than NR_CPUS produces the following
error on reboot and shutdown:

    BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff90ab1bb0
    #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
    #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
    PGD 1c09067 P4D 1c09067 PUD 1c0a063 PMD 0
    Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
    CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 5.9.0-rc8-kvm #110
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
    RIP: 0010:migrate_to_reboot_cpu+0xe/0x60
    Code: ea ea 00 48 89 fa 48 c7 c7 30 57 f1 81 e9 fa ef ff ff 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 53 8b 1d d5 ea ea 00 e8 14 33 fe ff 89 da &lt;48&gt; 0f a3 15 ea fc bd 00 48 89 d0 73 29 89 c2 c1 e8 06 65 48 8b 3c
    RSP: 0018:ffffc90000013e08 EFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: ffff88801f0a0000 RBX: 0000000077359400 RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000077359400 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffffffff81c199e0
    RBP: ffffffff81c1e3c0 R08: ffff88801f41f000 R09: ffffffff81c1e348
    R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 00007f32bedf8830 R14: 00000000fee1dead R15: 0000000000000000
    FS:  00007f32bedf8980(0000) GS:ffff88801f480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: ffffffff90ab1bb0 CR3: 000000001d057000 CR4: 00000000000006a0
    DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
    DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
    Call Trace:
      __do_sys_reboot.cold+0x34/0x5b
      do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40

Fixes: 1b3a5d02ee07 ("reboot: move arch/x86 reboot= handling to generic kernel")
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce &lt;mcroce@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Fabian Frederick &lt;fabf@skynet.be&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Pavel Tatashin &lt;pasha.tatashin@soleen.com&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Robin Holt &lt;robinmholt@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201103214025.116799-3-mcroce@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "kernel/reboot.c: convert simple_strtoul to kstrtoint"</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matteo Croce</name>
<email>mcroce@microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-14T06:52:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fa6265f8fb9e6981842b94efb715740d1b469b21'/>
<id>fa6265f8fb9e6981842b94efb715740d1b469b21</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8b92c4ff4423aa9900cf838d3294fcade4dbda35 upstream.

Patch series "fix parsing of reboot= cmdline", v3.

The parsing of the reboot= cmdline has two major errors:

 - a missing bound check can crash the system on reboot

 - parsing of the cpu number only works if specified last

Fix both.

This patch (of 2):

This reverts commit 616feab753972b97.

kstrtoint() and simple_strtoul() have a subtle difference which makes
them non interchangeable: if a non digit character is found amid the
parsing, the former will return an error, while the latter will just
stop parsing, e.g.  simple_strtoul("123xyx") = 123.

The kernel cmdline reboot= argument allows to specify the CPU used for
rebooting, with the syntax `s####` among the other flags, e.g.
"reboot=warm,s31,force", so if this flag is not the last given, it's
silently ignored as well as the subsequent ones.

Fixes: 616feab75397 ("kernel/reboot.c: convert simple_strtoul to kstrtoint")
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce &lt;mcroce@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Pavel Tatashin &lt;pasha.tatashin@soleen.com&gt;
Cc: Robin Holt &lt;robinmholt@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Fabian Frederick &lt;fabf@skynet.be&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201103214025.116799-2-mcroce@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8b92c4ff4423aa9900cf838d3294fcade4dbda35 upstream.

Patch series "fix parsing of reboot= cmdline", v3.

The parsing of the reboot= cmdline has two major errors:

 - a missing bound check can crash the system on reboot

 - parsing of the cpu number only works if specified last

Fix both.

This patch (of 2):

This reverts commit 616feab753972b97.

kstrtoint() and simple_strtoul() have a subtle difference which makes
them non interchangeable: if a non digit character is found amid the
parsing, the former will return an error, while the latter will just
stop parsing, e.g.  simple_strtoul("123xyx") = 123.

The kernel cmdline reboot= argument allows to specify the CPU used for
rebooting, with the syntax `s####` among the other flags, e.g.
"reboot=warm,s31,force", so if this flag is not the last given, it's
silently ignored as well as the subsequent ones.

Fixes: 616feab75397 ("kernel/reboot.c: convert simple_strtoul to kstrtoint")
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce &lt;mcroce@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Pavel Tatashin &lt;pasha.tatashin@soleen.com&gt;
Cc: Robin Holt &lt;robinmholt@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Fabian Frederick &lt;fabf@skynet.be&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201103214025.116799-2-mcroce@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Don't enable IRQs unconditionally in put_pi_state()</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-06T08:52:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2192d905df0d540f6f3240046bcb06c53bcf5016'/>
<id>2192d905df0d540f6f3240046bcb06c53bcf5016</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1e106aa3509b86738769775969822ffc1ec21bf4 upstream.

The exit_pi_state_list() function calls put_pi_state() with IRQs disabled
and is not expecting that IRQs will be enabled inside the function.

Use the _irqsave() variant so that IRQs are restored to the original state
instead of being enabled unconditionally.

Fixes: 153fbd1226fb ("futex: Fix more put_pi_state() vs. exit_pi_state_list() races")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201106085205.GA1159983@mwanda
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1e106aa3509b86738769775969822ffc1ec21bf4 upstream.

The exit_pi_state_list() function calls put_pi_state() with IRQs disabled
and is not expecting that IRQs will be enabled inside the function.

Use the _irqsave() variant so that IRQs are restored to the original state
instead of being enabled unconditionally.

Fixes: 153fbd1226fb ("futex: Fix more put_pi_state() vs. exit_pi_state_list() races")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201106085205.GA1159983@mwanda
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Fix get_recursion_context()</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-30T11:49:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=09b0d47b7952b9fb60f9285c3f9c0db87cee50c8'/>
<id>09b0d47b7952b9fb60f9285c3f9c0db87cee50c8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ce0f17fc93f63ee91428af10b7b2ddef38cd19e5 ]

One should use in_serving_softirq() to detect SoftIRQ context.

Fixes: 96f6d4444302 ("perf_counter: avoid recursion")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201030151955.120572175@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ce0f17fc93f63ee91428af10b7b2ddef38cd19e5 ]

One should use in_serving_softirq() to detect SoftIRQ context.

Fixes: 96f6d4444302 ("perf_counter: avoid recursion")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201030151955.120572175@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Zero-fill re-used per-cpu map element</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Verbeiren</name>
<email>david.verbeiren@tessares.net</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-04T11:23:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c602ad2b52dcbca5af08e5137bd5575c039b52e3'/>
<id>c602ad2b52dcbca5af08e5137bd5575c039b52e3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d3bec0138bfbe58606fc1d6f57a4cdc1a20218db ]

Zero-fill element values for all other cpus than current, just as
when not using prealloc. This is the only way the bpf program can
ensure known initial values for all cpus ('onallcpus' cannot be
set when coming from the bpf program).

The scenario is: bpf program inserts some elements in a per-cpu
map, then deletes some (or userspace does). When later adding
new elements using bpf_map_update_elem(), the bpf program can
only set the value of the new elements for the current cpu.
When prealloc is enabled, previously deleted elements are re-used.
Without the fix, values for other cpus remain whatever they were
when the re-used entry was previously freed.

A selftest is added to validate correct operation in above
scenario as well as in case of LRU per-cpu map element re-use.

Fixes: 6c9059817432 ("bpf: pre-allocate hash map elements")
Signed-off-by: David Verbeiren &lt;david.verbeiren@tessares.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Matthieu Baerts &lt;matthieu.baerts@tessares.net&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201104112332.15191-1-david.verbeiren@tessares.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d3bec0138bfbe58606fc1d6f57a4cdc1a20218db ]

Zero-fill element values for all other cpus than current, just as
when not using prealloc. This is the only way the bpf program can
ensure known initial values for all cpus ('onallcpus' cannot be
set when coming from the bpf program).

The scenario is: bpf program inserts some elements in a per-cpu
map, then deletes some (or userspace does). When later adding
new elements using bpf_map_update_elem(), the bpf program can
only set the value of the new elements for the current cpu.
When prealloc is enabled, previously deleted elements are re-used.
Without the fix, values for other cpus remain whatever they were
when the re-used entry was previously freed.

A selftest is added to validate correct operation in above
scenario as well as in case of LRU per-cpu map element re-use.

Fixes: 6c9059817432 ("bpf: pre-allocate hash map elements")
Signed-off-by: David Verbeiren &lt;david.verbeiren@tessares.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Matthieu Baerts &lt;matthieu.baerts@tessares.net&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201104112332.15191-1-david.verbeiren@tessares.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Don't rely on GCC __attribute__((optimize)) to disable GCSE</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ardb@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-28T17:15:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d2e61c5202e63fd591023525965a7379ba493385'/>
<id>d2e61c5202e63fd591023525965a7379ba493385</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 080b6f40763565f65ebb9540219c71ce885cf568 ]

Commit 3193c0836 ("bpf: Disable GCC -fgcse optimization for
___bpf_prog_run()") introduced a __no_fgcse macro that expands to a
function scope __attribute__((optimize("-fno-gcse"))), to disable a
GCC specific optimization that was causing trouble on x86 builds, and
was not expected to have any positive effect in the first place.

However, as the GCC manual documents, __attribute__((optimize))
is not for production use, and results in all other optimization
options to be forgotten for the function in question. This can
cause all kinds of trouble, but in one particular reported case,
it causes -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables to be disregarded,
resulting in .eh_frame info to be emitted for the function.

This reverts commit 3193c0836, and instead, it disables the -fgcse
optimization for the entire source file, but only when building for
X86 using GCC with CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON disabled. Note that the
original commit states that CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n triggers the issue,
whereas CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y performs better without the optimization,
so it is kept disabled in both cases.

Fixes: 3193c0836f20 ("bpf: Disable GCC -fgcse optimization for ___bpf_prog_run()")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert+renesas@glider.be&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAMuHMdUg0WJHEcq6to0-eODpXPOywLot6UD2=GFHpzoj_hCoBQ@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201028171506.15682-2-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 080b6f40763565f65ebb9540219c71ce885cf568 ]

Commit 3193c0836 ("bpf: Disable GCC -fgcse optimization for
___bpf_prog_run()") introduced a __no_fgcse macro that expands to a
function scope __attribute__((optimize("-fno-gcse"))), to disable a
GCC specific optimization that was causing trouble on x86 builds, and
was not expected to have any positive effect in the first place.

However, as the GCC manual documents, __attribute__((optimize))
is not for production use, and results in all other optimization
options to be forgotten for the function in question. This can
cause all kinds of trouble, but in one particular reported case,
it causes -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables to be disregarded,
resulting in .eh_frame info to be emitted for the function.

This reverts commit 3193c0836, and instead, it disables the -fgcse
optimization for the entire source file, but only when building for
X86 using GCC with CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON disabled. Note that the
original commit states that CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n triggers the issue,
whereas CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y performs better without the optimization,
so it is kept disabled in both cases.

Fixes: 3193c0836f20 ("bpf: Disable GCC -fgcse optimization for ___bpf_prog_run()")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert+renesas@glider.be&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAMuHMdUg0WJHEcq6to0-eODpXPOywLot6UD2=GFHpzoj_hCoBQ@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201028171506.15682-2-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tick/common: Touch watchdog in tick_unfreeze() on all CPUs</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chunyan Zhang</name>
<email>zhang.lyra@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-10T08:39:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=58953e87343dff07041c1cad1fd710805c4eec24'/>
<id>58953e87343dff07041c1cad1fd710805c4eec24</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5167c506d62dd9ffab73eba23c79b0a8845c9fe1 upstream.

Suspend to IDLE invokes tick_unfreeze() on resume. tick_unfreeze() on the
first resuming CPU resumes timekeeping, which also has the side effect of
resetting the softlockup watchdog on this CPU.

But on the secondary CPUs the watchdog is not reset in the resume /
unfreeze() path, which can result in false softlockup warnings on those
CPUs depending on the time spent in suspend.

Prevent this by clearing the softlock watchdog in the unfreeze path also
on the secondary resuming CPUs.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Chunyan Zhang &lt;chunyan.zhang@unisoc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200110083902.27276-1-chunyan.zhang@unisoc.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5167c506d62dd9ffab73eba23c79b0a8845c9fe1 upstream.

Suspend to IDLE invokes tick_unfreeze() on resume. tick_unfreeze() on the
first resuming CPU resumes timekeeping, which also has the side effect of
resetting the softlockup watchdog on this CPU.

But on the secondary CPUs the watchdog is not reset in the resume /
unfreeze() path, which can result in false softlockup warnings on those
CPUs depending on the time spent in suspend.

Prevent this by clearing the softlock watchdog in the unfreeze path also
on the secondary resuming CPUs.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Chunyan Zhang &lt;chunyan.zhang@unisoc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200110083902.27276-1-chunyan.zhang@unisoc.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
