linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v5.4.41

coredump: fix crash when umh is disabled

2020-05-14T05:58:27+00:00

commit 3740d93e37902b31159a82da2d5c8812ed825404 upstream.

Commit 64e90a8acb859 ("Introduce STATIC_USERMODEHELPER to mediate
call_usermodehelper()") added the optiont to disable all
call_usermodehelper() calls by setting STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to
an empty string. When this is done, and crashdump is triggered, it
will crash on null pointer dereference, since we make assumptions
over what call_usermodehelper_exec() did.

This has been reported by Sergey when one triggers a a coredump
with the following configuration:

```
CONFIG_STATIC_USERMODEHELPER=y
CONFIG_STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH=""
kernel.core_pattern = |/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-coredump %P %u %g %s %t %c %h %e
```

The way disabling the umh was designed was that call_usermodehelper_exec()
would just return early, without an error. But coredump assumes
certain variables are set up for us when this happens, and calls
ile_start_write(cprm.file) with a NULL file.

[    2.819676] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020
[    2.819859] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[    2.820035] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[    2.820188] PGD 0 P4D 0
[    2.820305] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[    2.820436] CPU: 2 PID: 89 Comm: a Not tainted 5.7.0-rc1+ #7
[    2.820680] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20190711_202441-buildvm-armv7-10.arm.fedoraproject.org-2.fc31 04/01/2014
[    2.821150] RIP: 0010:do_coredump+0xd80/0x1060
[    2.821385] Code: e8 95 11 ed ff 48 c7 c6 cc a7 b4 81 48 8d bd 28 ff
ff ff 89 c2 e8 70 f1 ff ff 41 89 c2 85 c0 0f 84 72 f7 ff ff e9 b4 fe ff
ff <48> 8b 57 20 0f b7 02 66 25 00 f0 66 3d 00 8
0 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 44
[    2.822014] RSP: 0000:ffffc9000029bcb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[    2.822339] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88803f860000 RCX: 000000000000000a
[    2.822746] RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000000000000282 RDI: 0000000000000000
[    2.823141] RBP: ffffc9000029bde8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc9000029bc00
[    2.823508] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff88803dec90be R12: ffffffff81c39da0
[    2.823902] R13: ffff88803de84400 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[    2.824285] FS:  00007fee08183540(0000) GS:ffff88803e480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    2.824767] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    2.825111] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000003f856005 CR4: 0000000000060ea0
[    2.825479] Call Trace:
[    2.825790]  get_signal+0x11e/0x720
[    2.826087]  do_signal+0x1d/0x670
[    2.826361]  ? force_sig_info_to_task+0xc1/0xf0
[    2.826691]  ? force_sig_fault+0x3c/0x40
[    2.826996]  ? do_trap+0xc9/0x100
[    2.827179]  exit_to_usermode_loop+0x49/0x90
[    2.827359]  prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x77/0xb0
[    2.827559]  ? invalid_op+0xa/0x30
[    2.827747]  ret_from_intr+0x20/0x20
[    2.827921] RIP: 0033:0x55e2c76d2129
[    2.828107] Code: 2d ff ff ff e8 68 ff ff ff 5d c6 05 18 2f 00 00 01
c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 e9 7b ff ff ff 55 48 89
e5 <0f> 0b b8 00 00 00 00 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 0
0 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40
[    2.828603] RSP: 002b:00007fffeba5e080 EFLAGS: 00010246
[    2.828801] RAX: 000055e2c76d2125 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fee0817c718
[    2.829034] RDX: 00007fffeba5e188 RSI: 00007fffeba5e178 RDI: 0000000000000001
[    2.829257] RBP: 00007fffeba5e080 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fee08193c00
[    2.829482] R10: 0000000000000009 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000055e2c76d2040
[    2.829727] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[    2.829964] CR2: 0000000000000020
[    2.830149] ---[ end trace ceed83d8c68a1bf1 ]---
```

Cc:  # v4.11+
Fixes: 64e90a8acb85 ("Introduce STATIC_USERMODEHELPER to mediate call_usermodehelper()")
BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199795
Reported-by: Tony Vroon 
Reported-by: Sergey Kvachonok 
Tested-by: Sergei Trofimovich 
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200416162859.26518-1-mcgrof@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tracing: Add a vmalloc_sync_mappings() for safe measure

2020-05-14T05:58:25+00:00

commit 11f5efc3ab66284f7aaacc926e9351d658e2577b upstream.

x86_64 lazily maps in the vmalloc pages, and the way this works with per_cpu
areas can be complex, to say the least. Mappings may happen at boot up, and
if nothing synchronizes the page tables, those page mappings may not be
synced till they are used. This causes issues for anything that might touch
one of those mappings in the path of the page fault handler. When one of
those unmapped mappings is touched in the page fault handler, it will cause
another page fault, which in turn will cause a page fault, and leave us in
a loop of page faults.

Commit 763802b53a42 ("x86/mm: split vmalloc_sync_all()") split
vmalloc_sync_all() into vmalloc_sync_unmappings() and
vmalloc_sync_mappings(), as on system exit, it did not need to do a full
sync on x86_64 (although it still needed to be done on x86_32). By chance,
the vmalloc_sync_all() would synchronize the page mappings done at boot up
and prevent the per cpu area from being a problem for tracing in the page
fault handler. But when that synchronization in the exit of a task became a
nop, it caused the problem to appear.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200429054857.66e8e333@oasis.local.home

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 737223fbca3b1 ("tracing: Consolidate buffer allocation code")
Reported-by: "Tzvetomir Stoyanov (VMware)" 
Suggested-by: Joerg Roedel 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tracing/kprobes: Fix a double initialization typo

2020-05-14T05:58:18+00:00

[ Upstream commit dcbd21c9fca5e954fd4e3d91884907eb6d47187e ]

Fix a typo that resulted in an unnecessary double
initialization to addr.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/158779374968.6082.2337484008464939919.stgit@devnote2

Cc: Tom Zanussi 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c7411a1a126f ("tracing/kprobe: Check whether the non-suffixed symbol is notrace")
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

tracing: Fix memory leaks in trace_events_hist.c

2020-05-10T08:31:28+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9da73974eb9c965dd9989befb593b8c8da9e4bdc ]

kmemleak report 1:
    [<9092c50b>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x138/0x270
    [<05a2c9ed>] create_field_var+0xcf/0x180
    [<528a2d68>] action_create+0xe2/0xc80
    [<63f50b61>] event_hist_trigger_func+0x15b5/0x1920
    [<28ea5d3d>] trigger_process_regex+0x7b/0xc0
    [<3138e86f>] event_trigger_write+0x4d/0xb0
    [] __vfs_write+0x30/0x200
    [<4f424a0d>] vfs_write+0x96/0x1b0
    [] ksys_write+0x53/0xc0
    [<3717101a>] __ia32_sys_write+0x15/0x20
    [] do_fast_syscall_32+0x70/0x250
    [<46e2629c>] entry_SYSENTER_32+0xaf/0x102

This is because save_vars[] of struct hist_trigger_data are
not destroyed

kmemleak report 2:
    [<9092c50b>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x138/0x270
    [<6e5e97c5>] create_var+0x3c/0x110
    [] create_field_var+0xaf/0x180
    [<528a2d68>] action_create+0xe2/0xc80
    [<63f50b61>] event_hist_trigger_func+0x15b5/0x1920
    [<28ea5d3d>] trigger_process_regex+0x7b/0xc0
    [<3138e86f>] event_trigger_write+0x4d/0xb0
    [] __vfs_write+0x30/0x200
    [<4f424a0d>] vfs_write+0x96/0x1b0
    [] ksys_write+0x53/0xc0
    [<3717101a>] __ia32_sys_write+0x15/0x20
    [] do_fast_syscall_32+0x70/0x250
    [<46e2629c>] entry_SYSENTER_32+0xaf/0x102

struct hist_field allocated through create_var() do not initialize
"ref" field to 1. The code in __destroy_hist_field() does not destroy
object if "ref" is initialized to zero, the condition
if (--hist_field->ref > 1) always passes since unsigned int wraps.

kmemleak report 3:
    [] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x139/0x2b0
    [] kstrdup+0x27/0x50
    [<39d70006>] init_var_ref+0x58/0xd0
    [<8ca76370>] create_var_ref+0x89/0xe0
    [] action_create+0x38f/0xc80
    [<7c146821>] event_hist_trigger_func+0x15b5/0x1920
    [<07de3f61>] trigger_process_regex+0x7b/0xc0
    [] event_trigger_write+0x4d/0xb0
    [<19bf1512>] __vfs_write+0x30/0x200
    [<64ce4d27>] vfs_write+0x96/0x1b0
    [] ksys_write+0x53/0xc0
    [<7d4230cd>] __ia32_sys_write+0x15/0x20
    [<8eadca00>] do_fast_syscall_32+0x70/0x250
    [<235cf985>] entry_SYSENTER_32+0xaf/0x102

hist_fields (system & event_name) are not freed

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200422061503.GA5151@cosmos

Signed-off-by: Vamshi K Sthambamkadi 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

PM: hibernate: Freeze kernel threads in software_resume()

2020-05-06T06:15:09+00:00

commit 2351f8d295ed63393190e39c2f7c1fee1a80578f upstream.

Currently the kernel threads are not frozen in software_resume(), so
between dpm_suspend_start(PMSG_QUIESCE) and resume_target_kernel(),
system_freezable_power_efficient_wq can still try to submit SCSI
commands and this can cause a panic since the low level SCSI driver
(e.g. hv_storvsc) has quiesced the SCSI adapter and can not accept
any SCSI commands: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/4/10/47

At first I posted a fix (https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/4/21/1318) trying
to resolve the issue from hv_storvsc, but with the help of
Bart Van Assche, I realized it's better to fix software_resume(),
since this looks like a generic issue, not only pertaining to SCSI.

Cc: All applicable 
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui 
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

signal: check sig before setting info in kill_pid_usb_asyncio

2020-05-02T06:48:55+00:00

[ Upstream commit eaec2b0bd30690575c581eebffae64bfb7f684ac ]

In kill_pid_usb_asyncio, if signal is not valid, we do not need to
set info struct.

Signed-off-by: Zhiqiang Liu 
Acked-by: Christian Brauner 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f525fd08-1cf7-fb09-d20c-4359145eb940@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

perf/core: fix parent pid/tid in task exit events

2020-05-02T06:48:52+00:00

commit f3bed55e850926614b9898fe982f66d2541a36a5 upstream.

Current logic yields the child task as the parent.

Before:
$ perf record bash -c "perf list > /dev/null"
$ perf script -D |grep 'FORK\|EXIT'
4387036190981094 0x5a70 [0x30]: PERF_RECORD_FORK(10472:10472):(10470:10470)
4387036606207580 0xf050 [0x30]: PERF_RECORD_EXIT(10472:10472):(10472:10472)
4387036607103839 0x17150 [0x30]: PERF_RECORD_EXIT(10470:10470):(10470:10470)
                                                   ^
  Note the repeated values here -------------------/

After:
383281514043 0x9d8 [0x30]: PERF_RECORD_FORK(2268:2268):(2266:2266)
383442003996 0x2180 [0x30]: PERF_RECORD_EXIT(2268:2268):(2266:2266)
383451297778 0xb70 [0x30]: PERF_RECORD_EXIT(2266:2266):(2265:2265)

Fixes: 94d5d1b2d891 ("perf_counter: Report the cloning task as parent on perf_counter_fork()")
Reported-by: KP Singh 
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200417182842.12522-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sched/core: Fix reset-on-fork from RT with uclamp

2020-05-02T06:48:52+00:00

commit eaf5a92ebde5bca3bb2565616115bd6d579486cd upstream.

uclamp_fork() resets the uclamp values to their default when the
reset-on-fork flag is set. It also checks whether the task has a RT
policy, and sets its uclamp.min to 1024 accordingly. However, during
reset-on-fork, the task's policy is lowered to SCHED_NORMAL right after,
hence leading to an erroneous uclamp.min setting for the new task if it
was forked from RT.

Fix this by removing the unnecessary check on rt_task() in
uclamp_fork() as this doesn't make sense if the reset-on-fork flag is
set.

Fixes: 1a00d999971c ("sched/uclamp: Set default clamps for RT tasks")
Reported-by: Chitti Babu Theegala 
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Reviewed-by: Patrick Bellasi 
Reviewed-by: Dietmar Eggemann 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200416085956.217587-1-qperret@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

cpumap: Avoid warning when CONFIG_DEBUG_PER_CPU_MAPS is enabled

2020-05-02T06:48:51+00:00

commit bc23d0e3f717ced21fbfacab3ab887d55e5ba367 upstream.

When the kernel is built with CONFIG_DEBUG_PER_CPU_MAPS, the cpumap code
can trigger a spurious warning if CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is also set. This
happens because in this configuration, NR_CPUS can be larger than
nr_cpumask_bits, so the initial check in cpu_map_alloc() is not sufficient
to guard against hitting the warning in cpumask_check().

Fix this by explicitly checking the supplied key against the
nr_cpumask_bits variable before calling cpu_possible().

Fixes: 6710e1126934 ("bpf: introduce new bpf cpu map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP")
Reported-by: Xiumei Mu 
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Tested-by: Xiumei Mu 
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer 
Acked-by: Song Liu 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200416083120.453718-1-toke@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: Forbid XADD on spilled pointers for unprivileged users

2020-05-02T06:48:46+00:00

commit 6e7e63cbb023976d828cdb22422606bf77baa8a9 upstream.

When check_xadd() verifies an XADD operation on a pointer to a stack slot
containing a spilled pointer, check_stack_read() verifies that the read,
which is part of XADD, is valid. However, since the placeholder value -1 is
passed as `value_regno`, check_stack_read() can only return a binary
decision and can't return the type of the value that was read. The intent
here is to verify whether the value read from the stack slot may be used as
a SCALAR_VALUE; but since check_stack_read() doesn't check the type, and
the type information is lost when check_stack_read() returns, this is not
enforced, and a malicious user can abuse XADD to leak spilled kernel
pointers.

Fix it by letting check_stack_read() verify that the value is usable as a
SCALAR_VALUE if no type information is passed to the caller.

To be able to use __is_pointer_value() in check_stack_read(), move it up.

Fix up the expected unprivileged error message for a BPF selftest that,
until now, assumed that unprivileged users can use XADD on stack-spilled
pointers. This also gives us a test for the behavior introduced in this
patch for free.

In theory, this could also be fixed by forbidding XADD on stack spills
entirely, since XADD is a locked operation (for operations on memory with
concurrency) and there can't be any concurrency on the BPF stack; but
Alexei has said that he wants to keep XADD on stack slots working to avoid
changes to the test suite [1].

The following BPF program demonstrates how to leak a BPF map pointer as an
unprivileged user using this bug:

    // r7 = map_pointer
    BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_7, small_map),
    // r8 = launder(map_pointer)
    BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, BPF_REG_7, -8),
    BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 0),
    ((struct bpf_insn) {
      .code  = BPF_STX | BPF_DW | BPF_XADD,
      .dst_reg = BPF_REG_FP,
      .src_reg = BPF_REG_1,
      .off = -8
    }),
    BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_FP, -8),

    // store r8 into map
    BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_ARG1, BPF_REG_7),
    BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_ARG2, BPF_REG_FP),
    BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_ARG2, -4),
    BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_ARG2, 0, 0),
    BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
    BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
    BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
    BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_8, 0),

    BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
    BPF_EXIT_INSN()

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200416211116.qxqcza5vo2ddnkdq@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com/

Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200417000007.10734-1-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman