linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v5.4.264

perf: Fix perf_event_validate_size()

2023-12-13T17:18:15+00:00

[ Upstream commit 382c27f4ed28f803b1f1473ac2d8db0afc795a1b ]

Budimir noted that perf_event_validate_size() only checks the size of
the newly added event, even though the sizes of all existing events
can also change due to not all events having the same read_format.

When we attach the new event, perf_group_attach(), we do re-compute
the size for all events.

Fixes: a723968c0ed3 ("perf: Fix u16 overflows")
Reported-by: Budimir Markovic 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

perf/core: Add a new read format to get a number of lost samples

2023-12-13T17:18:15+00:00

[ Upstream commit 119a784c81270eb88e573174ed2209225d646656 ]

Sometimes we want to know an accurate number of samples even if it's
lost.  Currenlty PERF_RECORD_LOST is generated for a ring-buffer which
might be shared with other events.  So it's hard to know per-event
lost count.

Add event->lost_samples field and PERF_FORMAT_LOST to retrieve it from
userspace.

Original-patch-by: Jiri Olsa 
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220616180623.1358843-1-namhyung@kernel.org
Stable-dep-of: 382c27f4ed28 ("perf: Fix perf_event_validate_size()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

tracing: Fix a possible race when disabling buffered events

2023-12-13T17:18:14+00:00

commit c0591b1cccf708a47bc465c62436d669a4213323 upstream.

Function trace_buffered_event_disable() is responsible for freeing pages
backing buffered events and this process can run concurrently with
trace_event_buffer_lock_reserve().

The following race is currently possible:

* Function trace_buffered_event_disable() is called on CPU 0. It
  increments trace_buffered_event_cnt on each CPU and waits via
  synchronize_rcu() for each user of trace_buffered_event to complete.

* After synchronize_rcu() is finished, function
  trace_buffered_event_disable() has the exclusive access to
  trace_buffered_event. All counters trace_buffered_event_cnt are at 1
  and all pointers trace_buffered_event are still valid.

* At this point, on a different CPU 1, the execution reaches
  trace_event_buffer_lock_reserve(). The function calls
  preempt_disable_notrace() and only now enters an RCU read-side
  critical section. The function proceeds and reads a still valid
  pointer from trace_buffered_event[CPU1] into the local variable
  "entry". However, it doesn't yet read trace_buffered_event_cnt[CPU1]
  which happens later.

* Function trace_buffered_event_disable() continues. It frees
  trace_buffered_event[CPU1] and decrements
  trace_buffered_event_cnt[CPU1] back to 0.

* Function trace_event_buffer_lock_reserve() continues. It reads and
  increments trace_buffered_event_cnt[CPU1] from 0 to 1. This makes it
  believe that it can use the "entry" that it already obtained but the
  pointer is now invalid and any access results in a use-after-free.

Fix the problem by making a second synchronize_rcu() call after all
trace_buffered_event values are set to NULL. This waits on all potential
users in trace_event_buffer_lock_reserve() that still read a previous
pointer from trace_buffered_event.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231127151248.7232-2-petr.pavlu@suse.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231205161736.19663-4-petr.pavlu@suse.com

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0fc1b09ff1ff ("tracing: Use temp buffer when filtering events")
Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tracing: Fix incomplete locking when disabling buffered events

2023-12-13T17:18:14+00:00

commit 7fed14f7ac9cf5e38c693836fe4a874720141845 upstream.

The following warning appears when using buffered events:

[  203.556451] WARNING: CPU: 53 PID: 10220 at kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3912 ring_buffer_discard_commit+0x2eb/0x420
[...]
[  203.670690] CPU: 53 PID: 10220 Comm: stress-ng-sysin Tainted: G            E      6.7.0-rc2-default #4 56e6d0fcf5581e6e51eaaecbdaec2a2338c80f3a
[  203.670704] Hardware name: Intel Corp. GROVEPORT/GROVEPORT, BIOS GVPRCRB1.86B.0016.D04.1705030402 05/03/2017
[  203.670709] RIP: 0010:ring_buffer_discard_commit+0x2eb/0x420
[  203.735721] Code: 4c 8b 4a 50 48 8b 42 48 49 39 c1 0f 84 b3 00 00 00 49 83 e8 01 75 b1 48 8b 42 10 f0 ff 40 08 0f 0b e9 fc fe ff ff f0 ff 47 08 <0f> 0b e9 77 fd ff ff 48 8b 42 10 f0 ff 40 08 0f 0b e9 f5 fe ff ff
[  203.735734] RSP: 0018:ffffb4ae4f7b7d80 EFLAGS: 00010202
[  203.735745] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffb4ae4f7b7de0 RCX: ffff8ac10662c000
[  203.735754] RDX: ffff8ac0c750be00 RSI: ffff8ac10662c000 RDI: ffff8ac0c004d400
[  203.781832] RBP: ffff8ac0c039cea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  203.781839] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
[  203.781842] R13: ffff8ac10662c000 R14: ffff8ac0c004d400 R15: ffff8ac10662c008
[  203.781846] FS:  00007f4cd8a67740(0000) GS:ffff8ad798880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  203.781851] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  203.781855] CR2: 0000559766a74028 CR3: 00000001804c4000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
[  203.781862] Call Trace:
[  203.781870]  
[  203.851949]  trace_event_buffer_commit+0x1ea/0x250
[  203.851967]  trace_event_raw_event_sys_enter+0x83/0xe0
[  203.851983]  syscall_trace_enter.isra.0+0x182/0x1a0
[  203.851990]  do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xe0
[  203.852075]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[  203.852090] RIP: 0033:0x7f4cd870fa77
[  203.982920] Code: 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 90 b8 89 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e9 43 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[  203.982932] RSP: 002b:00007fff99717dd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000089
[  203.982942] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000558ea1d7b6f0 RCX: 00007f4cd870fa77
[  203.982948] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fff99717de0 RDI: 0000558ea1d7b6f0
[  203.982957] RBP: 00007fff99717de0 R08: 00007fff997180e0 R09: 00007fff997180e0
[  203.982962] R10: 00007fff997180e0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff99717f40
[  204.049239] R13: 00007fff99718590 R14: 0000558e9f2127a8 R15: 00007fff997180b0
[  204.049256]  

For instance, it can be triggered by running these two commands in
parallel:

 $ while true; do
    echo hist:key=id.syscall:val=hitcount > \
      /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/raw_syscalls/sys_enter/trigger;
  done
 $ stress-ng --sysinfo $(nproc)

The warning indicates that the current ring_buffer_per_cpu is not in the
committing state. It happens because the active ring_buffer_event
doesn't actually come from the ring_buffer_per_cpu but is allocated from
trace_buffered_event.

The bug is in function trace_buffered_event_disable() where the
following normally happens:

* The code invokes disable_trace_buffered_event() via
  smp_call_function_many() and follows it by synchronize_rcu(). This
  increments the per-CPU variable trace_buffered_event_cnt on each
  target CPU and grants trace_buffered_event_disable() the exclusive
  access to the per-CPU variable trace_buffered_event.

* Maintenance is performed on trace_buffered_event, all per-CPU event
  buffers get freed.

* The code invokes enable_trace_buffered_event() via
  smp_call_function_many(). This decrements trace_buffered_event_cnt and
  releases the access to trace_buffered_event.

A problem is that smp_call_function_many() runs a given function on all
target CPUs except on the current one. The following can then occur:

* Task X executing trace_buffered_event_disable() runs on CPU 0.

* The control reaches synchronize_rcu() and the task gets rescheduled on
  another CPU 1.

* The RCU synchronization finishes. At this point,
  trace_buffered_event_disable() has the exclusive access to all
  trace_buffered_event variables except trace_buffered_event[CPU0]
  because trace_buffered_event_cnt[CPU0] is never incremented and if the
  buffer is currently unused, remains set to 0.

* A different task Y is scheduled on CPU 0 and hits a trace event. The
  code in trace_event_buffer_lock_reserve() sees that
  trace_buffered_event_cnt[CPU0] is set to 0 and decides the use the
  buffer provided by trace_buffered_event[CPU0].

* Task X continues its execution in trace_buffered_event_disable(). The
  code incorrectly frees the event buffer pointed by
  trace_buffered_event[CPU0] and resets the variable to NULL.

* Task Y writes event data to the now freed buffer and later detects the
  created inconsistency.

The issue is observable since commit dea499781a11 ("tracing: Fix warning
in trace_buffered_event_disable()") which moved the call of
trace_buffered_event_disable() in __ftrace_event_enable_disable()
earlier, prior to invoking call->class->reg(.. TRACE_REG_UNREGISTER ..).
The underlying problem in trace_buffered_event_disable() is however
present since the original implementation in commit 0fc1b09ff1ff
("tracing: Use temp buffer when filtering events").

Fix the problem by replacing the two smp_call_function_many() calls with
on_each_cpu_mask() which invokes a given callback on all CPUs.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231127151248.7232-2-petr.pavlu@suse.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231205161736.19663-2-petr.pavlu@suse.com

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0fc1b09ff1ff ("tracing: Use temp buffer when filtering events")
Fixes: dea499781a11 ("tracing: Fix warning in trace_buffered_event_disable()")
Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tracing: Always update snapshot buffer size

2023-12-13T17:18:14+00:00

commit 7be76461f302ec05cbd62b90b2a05c64299ca01f upstream.

It use to be that only the top level instance had a snapshot buffer (for
latency tracers like wakeup and irqsoff). The update of the ring buffer
size would check if the instance was the top level and if so, it would
also update the snapshot buffer as it needs to be the same as the main
buffer.

Now that lower level instances also has a snapshot buffer, they too need
to update their snapshot buffer sizes when the main buffer is changed,
otherwise the following can be triggered:

 # cd /sys/kernel/tracing
 # echo 1500 > buffer_size_kb
 # mkdir instances/foo
 # echo irqsoff > instances/foo/current_tracer
 # echo 1000 > instances/foo/buffer_size_kb

Produces:

 WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 856 at kernel/trace/trace.c:1938 update_max_tr_single.part.0+0x27d/0x320

Which is:

	ret = ring_buffer_swap_cpu(tr->max_buffer.buffer, tr->array_buffer.buffer, cpu);

	if (ret == -EBUSY) {
		[..]
	}

	WARN_ON_ONCE(ret && ret != -EAGAIN && ret != -EBUSY);  <== here

That's because ring_buffer_swap_cpu() has:

	int ret = -EINVAL;

	[..]

	/* At least make sure the two buffers are somewhat the same */
	if (cpu_buffer_a->nr_pages != cpu_buffer_b->nr_pages)
		goto out;

	[..]
 out:
	return ret;
 }

Instead, update all instances' snapshot buffer sizes when their main
buffer size is updated.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231205220010.454662151@goodmis.org

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu 
Cc: Mark Rutland 
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Fixes: 6d9b3fa5e7f6 ("tracing: Move tracing_max_latency into trace_array")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tracing: Fix a warning when allocating buffered events fails

2023-12-13T17:18:13+00:00

[ Upstream commit 34209fe83ef8404353f91ab4ea4035dbc9922d04 ]

Function trace_buffered_event_disable() produces an unexpected warning
when the previous call to trace_buffered_event_enable() fails to
allocate pages for buffered events.

The situation can occur as follows:

* The counter trace_buffered_event_ref is at 0.

* The soft mode gets enabled for some event and
  trace_buffered_event_enable() is called. The function increments
  trace_buffered_event_ref to 1 and starts allocating event pages.

* The allocation fails for some page and trace_buffered_event_disable()
  is called for cleanup.

* Function trace_buffered_event_disable() decrements
  trace_buffered_event_ref back to 0, recognizes that it was the last
  use of buffered events and frees all allocated pages.

* The control goes back to trace_buffered_event_enable() which returns.
  The caller of trace_buffered_event_enable() has no information that
  the function actually failed.

* Some time later, the soft mode is disabled for the same event.
  Function trace_buffered_event_disable() is called. It warns on
  "WARN_ON_ONCE(!trace_buffered_event_ref)" and returns.

Buffered events are just an optimization and can handle failures. Make
trace_buffered_event_enable() exit on the first failure and left any
cleanup later to when trace_buffered_event_disable() is called.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231127151248.7232-2-petr.pavlu@suse.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231205161736.19663-3-petr.pavlu@suse.com

Fixes: 0fc1b09ff1ff ("tracing: Use temp buffer when filtering events")
Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

hrtimers: Push pending hrtimers away from outgoing CPU earlier

2023-12-13T17:18:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit 5c0930ccaad5a74d74e8b18b648c5eb21ed2fe94 ]

2b8272ff4a70 ("cpu/hotplug: Prevent self deadlock on CPU hot-unplug")
solved the straight forward CPU hotplug deadlock vs. the scheduler
bandwidth timer. Yu discovered a more involved variant where a task which
has a bandwidth timer started on the outgoing CPU holds a lock and then
gets throttled. If the lock required by one of the CPU hotplug callbacks
the hotplug operation deadlocks because the unthrottling timer event is not
handled on the dying CPU and can only be recovered once the control CPU
reaches the hotplug state which pulls the pending hrtimers from the dead
CPU.

Solve this by pushing the hrtimers away from the dying CPU in the dying
callbacks. Nothing can queue a hrtimer on the dying CPU at that point because
all other CPUs spin in stop_machine() with interrupts disabled and once the
operation is finished the CPU is marked offline.

Reported-by: Yu Liao 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Tested-by: Liu Tie 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87a5rphara.ffs@tglx
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

tracing: Have trace_event_file have ref counters

2023-11-28T16:50:22+00:00

commit bb32500fb9b78215e4ef6ee8b4345c5f5d7eafb4 upstream.

The following can crash the kernel:

 # cd /sys/kernel/tracing
 # echo 'p:sched schedule' > kprobe_events
 # exec 5>>events/kprobes/sched/enable
 # > kprobe_events
 # exec 5>&-

The above commands:

 1. Change directory to the tracefs directory
 2. Create a kprobe event (doesn't matter what one)
 3. Open bash file descriptor 5 on the enable file of the kprobe event
 4. Delete the kprobe event (removes the files too)
 5. Close the bash file descriptor 5

The above causes a crash!

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028
 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
 PGD 0 P4D 0
 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
 CPU: 6 PID: 877 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.5.0-rc4-test-00008-g2c6b6b1029d4-dirty #186
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:tracing_release_file_tr+0xc/0x50

What happens here is that the kprobe event creates a trace_event_file
"file" descriptor that represents the file in tracefs to the event. It
maintains state of the event (is it enabled for the given instance?).
Opening the "enable" file gets a reference to the event "file" descriptor
via the open file descriptor. When the kprobe event is deleted, the file is
also deleted from the tracefs system which also frees the event "file"
descriptor.

But as the tracefs file is still opened by user space, it will not be
totally removed until the final dput() is called on it. But this is not
true with the event "file" descriptor that is already freed. If the user
does a write to or simply closes the file descriptor it will reference the
event "file" descriptor that was just freed, causing a use-after-free bug.

To solve this, add a ref count to the event "file" descriptor as well as a
new flag called "FREED". The "file" will not be freed until the last
reference is released. But the FREE flag will be set when the event is
removed to prevent any more modifications to that event from happening,
even if there's still a reference to the event "file" descriptor.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231031000031.1e705592@gandalf.local.home/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231031122453.7a48b923@gandalf.local.home

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Rutland 
Fixes: f5ca233e2e66d ("tracing: Increase trace array ref count on enable and filter files")
Reported-by: Beau Belgrave 
Tested-by: Beau Belgrave 
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kernel/reboot: emergency_restart: Set correct system_state

2023-11-28T16:50:19+00:00

commit 60466c067927abbcaff299845abd4b7069963139 upstream.

As the emergency restart does not call kernel_restart_prepare(), the
system_state stays in SYSTEM_RUNNING.

Since bae1d3a05a8b, this hinders i2c_in_atomic_xfer_mode() from becoming
active, and therefore might lead to avoidable warnings in the restart
handlers, e.g.:

[   12.667612] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:318 rcu_note_context_switch+0x33c/0x6b0
[   12.676926] Voluntary context switch within RCU read-side critical section!
...
[   12.742376]  schedule_timeout from wait_for_completion_timeout+0x90/0x114
[   12.749179]  wait_for_completion_timeout from tegra_i2c_wait_completion+0x40/0x70
...
[   12.994527]  atomic_notifier_call_chain from machine_restart+0x34/0x58
[   13.001050]  machine_restart from panic+0x2a8/0x32c

Avoid these by setting the correct system_state.

Fixes: bae1d3a05a8b ("i2c: core: remove use of in_atomic()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.2+
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Osipenko 
Tested-by: Nishanth Menon 
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Bara 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230327-tegra-pmic-reboot-v7-1-18699d5dcd76@skidata.com
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

PM: hibernate: Clean up sync_read handling in snapshot_write_next()

2023-11-28T16:50:19+00:00

commit d08970df1980476f27936e24d452550f3e9e92e1 upstream.

In snapshot_write_next(), sync_read is set and unset in three different
spots unnecessiarly. As a result there is a subtle bug where the first
page after the meta data has been loaded unconditionally sets sync_read
to 0. If this first PFN was actually a highmem page, then the returned
buffer will be the global "buffer," and the page needs to be loaded
synchronously.

That is, I'm not sure we can always assume the following to be safe:

	handle->buffer = get_buffer(&orig_bm, &ca);
	handle->sync_read = 0;

Because get_buffer() can call get_highmem_page_buffer() which can
return 'buffer'.

The easiest way to address this is just set sync_read before
snapshot_write_next() returns if handle->buffer == buffer.

Signed-off-by: Brian Geffon 
Fixes: 8357376d3df2 ("[PATCH] swsusp: Improve handling of highmem")
Cc: All applicable 
[ rjw: Subject and changelog edits ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman