linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v5.10.76 Linux kernel stable tree tracing: Have all levels of checks prevent recursion 2021-10-27T07:56:56+00:00 Steven Rostedt (VMware) rostedt@goodmis.org 2021-10-18T19:44:12+00:00 021b6d11e590bbb2b8f243b699204b48ea3857f4 commit ed65df63a39a3f6ed04f7258de8b6789e5021c18 upstream. While writing an email explaining the "bit = 0" logic for a discussion on making ftrace_test_recursion_trylock() disable preemption, I discovered a path that makes the "not do the logic if bit is zero" unsafe. The recursion logic is done in hot paths like the function tracer. Thus, any code executed causes noticeable overhead. Thus, tricks are done to try to limit the amount of code executed. This included the recursion testing logic. Having recursion testing is important, as there are many paths that can end up in an infinite recursion cycle when tracing every function in the kernel. Thus protection is needed to prevent that from happening. Because it is OK to recurse due to different running context levels (e.g. an interrupt preempts a trace, and then a trace occurs in the interrupt handler), a set of bits are used to know which context one is in (normal, softirq, irq and NMI). If a recursion occurs in the same level, it is prevented*. Then there are infrastructure levels of recursion as well. When more than one callback is attached to the same function to trace, it calls a loop function to iterate over all the callbacks. Both the callbacks and the loop function have recursion protection. The callbacks use the "ftrace_test_recursion_trylock()" which has a "function" set of context bits to test, and the loop function calls the internal trace_test_and_set_recursion() directly, with an "internal" set of bits. If an architecture does not implement all the features supported by ftrace then the callbacks are never called directly, and the loop function is called instead, which will implement the features of ftrace. Since both the loop function and the callbacks do recursion protection, it was seemed unnecessary to do it in both locations. Thus, a trick was made to have the internal set of recursion bits at a more significant bit location than the function bits. Then, if any of the higher bits were set, the logic of the function bits could be skipped, as any new recursion would first have to go through the loop function. This is true for architectures that do not support all the ftrace features, because all functions being traced must first go through the loop function before going to the callbacks. But this is not true for architectures that support all the ftrace features. That's because the loop function could be called due to two callbacks attached to the same function, but then a recursion function inside the callback could be called that does not share any other callback, and it will be called directly. i.e. traced_function_1: [ more than one callback tracing it ] call loop_func loop_func: trace_recursion set internal bit call callback callback: trace_recursion [ skipped because internal bit is set, return 0 ] call traced_function_2 traced_function_2: [ only traced by above callback ] call callback callback: trace_recursion [ skipped because internal bit is set, return 0 ] call traced_function_2 [ wash, rinse, repeat, BOOM! out of shampoo! ] Thus, the "bit == 0 skip" trick is not safe, unless the loop function is call for all functions. Since we want to encourage architectures to implement all ftrace features, having them slow down due to this extra logic may encourage the maintainers to update to the latest ftrace features. And because this logic is only safe for them, remove it completely. [*] There is on layer of recursion that is allowed, and that is to allow for the transition between interrupt context (normal -> softirq -> irq -> NMI), because a trace may occur before the context update is visible to the trace recursion logic. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/609b565a-ed6e-a1da-f025-166691b5d994@linux.alibaba.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211018154412.09fcad3c@gandalf.local.home Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Cc: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org> Cc: =?utf-8?b?546L6LSH?= <yun.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: edc15cafcbfa3 ("tracing: Avoid unnecessary multiple recursion checks") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit ed65df63a39a3f6ed04f7258de8b6789e5021c18 upstream.

While writing an email explaining the "bit = 0" logic for a discussion on
making ftrace_test_recursion_trylock() disable preemption, I discovered a
path that makes the "not do the logic if bit is zero" unsafe.

The recursion logic is done in hot paths like the function tracer. Thus,
any code executed causes noticeable overhead. Thus, tricks are done to try
to limit the amount of code executed. This included the recursion testing
logic.

Having recursion testing is important, as there are many paths that can
end up in an infinite recursion cycle when tracing every function in the
kernel. Thus protection is needed to prevent that from happening.

Because it is OK to recurse due to different running context levels (e.g.
an interrupt preempts a trace, and then a trace occurs in the interrupt
handler), a set of bits are used to know which context one is in (normal,
softirq, irq and NMI). If a recursion occurs in the same level, it is
prevented*.

Then there are infrastructure levels of recursion as well. When more than
one callback is attached to the same function to trace, it calls a loop
function to iterate over all the callbacks. Both the callbacks and the
loop function have recursion protection. The callbacks use the
"ftrace_test_recursion_trylock()" which has a "function" set of context
bits to test, and the loop function calls the internal
trace_test_and_set_recursion() directly, with an "internal" set of bits.

If an architecture does not implement all the features supported by ftrace
then the callbacks are never called directly, and the loop function is
called instead, which will implement the features of ftrace.

Since both the loop function and the callbacks do recursion protection, it
was seemed unnecessary to do it in both locations. Thus, a trick was made
to have the internal set of recursion bits at a more significant bit
location than the function bits. Then, if any of the higher bits were set,
the logic of the function bits could be skipped, as any new recursion
would first have to go through the loop function.

This is true for architectures that do not support all the ftrace
features, because all functions being traced must first go through the
loop function before going to the callbacks. But this is not true for
architectures that support all the ftrace features. That's because the
loop function could be called due to two callbacks attached to the same
function, but then a recursion function inside the callback could be
called that does not share any other callback, and it will be called
directly.

i.e.

 traced_function_1: [ more than one callback tracing it ]
   call loop_func

 loop_func:
   trace_recursion set internal bit
   call callback

 callback:
   trace_recursion [ skipped because internal bit is set, return 0 ]
   call traced_function_2

 traced_function_2: [ only traced by above callback ]
   call callback

 callback:
   trace_recursion [ skipped because internal bit is set, return 0 ]
   call traced_function_2

 [ wash, rinse, repeat, BOOM! out of shampoo! ]

Thus, the "bit == 0 skip" trick is not safe, unless the loop function is
call for all functions.

Since we want to encourage architectures to implement all ftrace features,
having them slow down due to this extra logic may encourage the
maintainers to update to the latest ftrace features. And because this
logic is only safe for them, remove it completely.

 [*] There is on layer of recursion that is allowed, and that is to allow
     for the transition between interrupt context (normal -> softirq ->
     irq -> NMI), because a trace may occur before the context update is
     visible to the trace recursion logic.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/609b565a-ed6e-a1da-f025-166691b5d994@linux.alibaba.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211018154412.09fcad3c@gandalf.local.home

Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Cc: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org>
Cc: =?utf-8?b?546L6LSH?= <yun.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: edc15cafcbfa3 ("tracing: Avoid unnecessary multiple recursion checks")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
sched/scs: Reset the shadow stack when idle_task_exit 2021-10-27T07:56:55+00:00 Woody Lin woodylin@google.com 2021-10-12T08:35:21+00:00 96fe5061291d9e9734abf6bb187ef7532824522d [ Upstream commit 63acd42c0d4942f74710b11c38602fb14dea7320 ] Commit f1a0a376ca0c ("sched/core: Initialize the idle task with preemption disabled") removed the init_idle() call from idle_thread_get(). This was the sole call-path on hotplug that resets the Shadow Call Stack (scs) Stack Pointer (sp). Not resetting the scs-sp leads to scs overflow after enough hotplug cycles. Therefore add an explicit scs_task_reset() to the hotplug code to make sure the scs-sp does get reset on hotplug. Fixes: f1a0a376ca0c ("sched/core: Initialize the idle task with preemption disabled") Signed-off-by: Woody Lin <woodylin@google.com> [peterz: Changelog] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211012083521.973587-1-woodylin@google.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 63acd42c0d4942f74710b11c38602fb14dea7320 ]

Commit f1a0a376ca0c ("sched/core: Initialize the idle task with
preemption disabled") removed the init_idle() call from
idle_thread_get(). This was the sole call-path on hotplug that resets
the Shadow Call Stack (scs) Stack Pointer (sp).

Not resetting the scs-sp leads to scs overflow after enough hotplug
cycles. Therefore add an explicit scs_task_reset() to the hotplug code
to make sure the scs-sp does get reset on hotplug.

Fixes: f1a0a376ca0c ("sched/core: Initialize the idle task with preemption disabled")
Signed-off-by: Woody Lin <woodylin@google.com>
[peterz: Changelog]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211012083521.973587-1-woodylin@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
audit: fix possible null-pointer dereference in audit_filter_rules 2021-10-27T07:56:52+00:00 Gaosheng Cui cuigaosheng1@huawei.com 2021-10-16T07:23:50+00:00 16802fa4c33eb1a8efb23f1e93365190e4047d05 commit 6e3ee990c90494561921c756481d0e2125d8b895 upstream. Fix possible null-pointer dereference in audit_filter_rules. audit_filter_rules() error: we previously assumed 'ctx' could be null Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: bf361231c295 ("audit: add saddr_fam filter field") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 6e3ee990c90494561921c756481d0e2125d8b895 upstream.

Fix  possible null-pointer dereference in audit_filter_rules.

audit_filter_rules() error: we previously assumed 'ctx' could be null

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: bf361231c295 ("audit: add saddr_fam filter field")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
dma-debug: fix sg checks in debug_dma_map_sg() 2021-10-27T07:56:47+00:00 Gerald Schaefer gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com 2021-10-06T20:19:43+00:00 39afed394cc62365d54b02e091668bd68c3a5299 [ Upstream commit 293d92cbbd2418ca2ba43fed07f1b92e884d1c77 ] The following warning occurred sporadically on s390: DMA-API: nvme 0006:00:00.0: device driver maps memory from kernel text or rodata [addr=0000000048cc5e2f] [len=131072] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 825 at kernel/dma/debug.c:1083 check_for_illegal_area+0xa8/0x138 It is a false-positive warning, due to broken logic in debug_dma_map_sg(). check_for_illegal_area() checks for overlay of sg elements with kernel text or rodata. It is called with sg_dma_len(s) instead of s->length as parameter. After the call to ->map_sg(), sg_dma_len() will contain the length of possibly combined sg elements in the DMA address space, and not the individual sg element length, which would be s->length. The check will then use the physical start address of an sg element, and add the DMA length for the overlap check, which could result in the false warning, because the DMA length can be larger than the actual single sg element length. In addition, the call to check_for_illegal_area() happens in the iteration over mapped_ents, which will not include all individual sg elements if any of them were combined in ->map_sg(). Fix this by using s->length instead of sg_dma_len(s). Also put the call to check_for_illegal_area() in a separate loop, iterating over all the individual sg elements ("nents" instead of "mapped_ents"). While at it, as suggested by Robin Murphy, also move check_for_stack() inside the new loop, as it is similarly concerned with validating the individual sg elements. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210705185252.4074653-1-gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com Fixes: 884d05970bfb ("dma-debug: use sg_dma_len accessor") Signed-off-by: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 293d92cbbd2418ca2ba43fed07f1b92e884d1c77 ]

The following warning occurred sporadically on s390:
DMA-API: nvme 0006:00:00.0: device driver maps memory from kernel text or rodata [addr=0000000048cc5e2f] [len=131072]
WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 825 at kernel/dma/debug.c:1083 check_for_illegal_area+0xa8/0x138

It is a false-positive warning, due to broken logic in debug_dma_map_sg().
check_for_illegal_area() checks for overlay of sg elements with kernel text
or rodata. It is called with sg_dma_len(s) instead of s->length as
parameter. After the call to ->map_sg(), sg_dma_len() will contain the
length of possibly combined sg elements in the DMA address space, and not
the individual sg element length, which would be s->length.

The check will then use the physical start address of an sg element, and
add the DMA length for the overlap check, which could result in the false
warning, because the DMA length can be larger than the actual single sg
element length.

In addition, the call to check_for_illegal_area() happens in the iteration
over mapped_ents, which will not include all individual sg elements if
any of them were combined in ->map_sg().

Fix this by using s->length instead of sg_dma_len(s). Also put the call to
check_for_illegal_area() in a separate loop, iterating over all the
individual sg elements ("nents" instead of "mapped_ents").

While at it, as suggested by Robin Murphy, also move check_for_stack()
inside the new loop, as it is similarly concerned with validating the
individual sg elements.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210705185252.4074653-1-gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com
Fixes: 884d05970bfb ("dma-debug: use sg_dma_len accessor")
Signed-off-by: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
perf/core: fix userpage->time_enabled of inactive events 2021-10-17T08:43:33+00:00 Song Liu songliubraving@fb.com 2021-09-29T19:43:13+00:00 bdae2a08343613782be6c5be97b6c3a1ebccbfff [ Upstream commit f792565326825ed806626da50c6f9a928f1079c1 ] Users of rdpmc rely on the mmapped user page to calculate accurate time_enabled. Currently, userpage->time_enabled is only updated when the event is added to the pmu. As a result, inactive event (due to counter multiplexing) does not have accurate userpage->time_enabled. This can be reproduced with something like: /* open 20 task perf_event "cycles", to create multiplexing */ fd = perf_event_open(); /* open task perf_event "cycles" */ userpage = mmap(fd); /* use mmap and rdmpc */ while (true) { time_enabled_mmap = xxx; /* use logic in perf_event_mmap_page */ time_enabled_read = read(fd).time_enabled; if (time_enabled_mmap > time_enabled_read) BUG(); } Fix this by updating userpage for inactive events in merge_sched_in. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reported-and-tested-by: Lucian Grijincu <lucian@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210929194313.2398474-1-songliubraving@fb.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit f792565326825ed806626da50c6f9a928f1079c1 ]

Users of rdpmc rely on the mmapped user page to calculate accurate
time_enabled. Currently, userpage->time_enabled is only updated when the
event is added to the pmu. As a result, inactive event (due to counter
multiplexing) does not have accurate userpage->time_enabled. This can
be reproduced with something like:

   /* open 20 task perf_event "cycles", to create multiplexing */

   fd = perf_event_open();  /* open task perf_event "cycles" */
   userpage = mmap(fd);     /* use mmap and rdmpc */

   while (true) {
     time_enabled_mmap = xxx; /* use logic in perf_event_mmap_page */
     time_enabled_read = read(fd).time_enabled;
     if (time_enabled_mmap > time_enabled_read)
         BUG();
   }

Fix this by updating userpage for inactive events in merge_sched_in.

Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reported-and-tested-by: Lucian Grijincu <lucian@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210929194313.2398474-1-songliubraving@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
bpf: Fix integer overflow in prealloc_elems_and_freelist() 2021-10-13T08:04:26+00:00 Tatsuhiko Yasumatsu th.yasumatsu@gmail.com 2021-09-30T13:55:45+00:00 064faa8e8a9b50f5010c5aa5740e06d477677a89 [ Upstream commit 30e29a9a2bc6a4888335a6ede968b75cd329657a ] In prealloc_elems_and_freelist(), the multiplication to calculate the size passed to bpf_map_area_alloc() could lead to an integer overflow. As a result, out-of-bounds write could occur in pcpu_freelist_populate() as reported by KASAN: [...] [ 16.968613] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100 [ 16.969408] Write of size 8 at addr ffff888104fc6ea0 by task crash/78 [ 16.970038] [ 16.970195] CPU: 0 PID: 78 Comm: crash Not tainted 5.15.0-rc2+ #1 [ 16.970878] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 [ 16.972026] Call Trace: [ 16.972306] dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44 [ 16.972687] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x140 [ 16.973297] ? pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100 [ 16.973777] ? pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100 [ 16.974257] kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b [ 16.974681] ? pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100 [ 16.975190] pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100 [ 16.975669] stack_map_alloc+0x209/0x2a0 [ 16.976106] __sys_bpf+0xd83/0x2ce0 [...] The possibility of this overflow was originally discussed in [0], but was overlooked. Fix the integer overflow by changing elem_size to u64 from u32. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/728b238e-a481-eb50-98e9-b0f430ab01e7@gmail.com/ Fixes: 557c0c6e7df8 ("bpf: convert stackmap to pre-allocation") Signed-off-by: Tatsuhiko Yasumatsu <th.yasumatsu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210930135545.173698-1-th.yasumatsu@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 30e29a9a2bc6a4888335a6ede968b75cd329657a ]

In prealloc_elems_and_freelist(), the multiplication to calculate the
size passed to bpf_map_area_alloc() could lead to an integer overflow.
As a result, out-of-bounds write could occur in pcpu_freelist_populate()
as reported by KASAN:

[...]
[   16.968613] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100
[   16.969408] Write of size 8 at addr ffff888104fc6ea0 by task crash/78
[   16.970038]
[   16.970195] CPU: 0 PID: 78 Comm: crash Not tainted 5.15.0-rc2+ #1
[   16.970878] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[   16.972026] Call Trace:
[   16.972306]  dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
[   16.972687]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x140
[   16.973297]  ? pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100
[   16.973777]  ? pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100
[   16.974257]  kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
[   16.974681]  ? pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100
[   16.975190]  pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100
[   16.975669]  stack_map_alloc+0x209/0x2a0
[   16.976106]  __sys_bpf+0xd83/0x2ce0
[...]

The possibility of this overflow was originally discussed in [0], but
was overlooked.

Fix the integer overflow by changing elem_size to u64 from u32.

  [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/728b238e-a481-eb50-98e9-b0f430ab01e7@gmail.com/

Fixes: 557c0c6e7df8 ("bpf: convert stackmap to pre-allocation")
Signed-off-by: Tatsuhiko Yasumatsu <th.yasumatsu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210930135545.173698-1-th.yasumatsu@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
bpf: Exempt CAP_BPF from checks against bpf_jit_limit 2021-10-06T13:55:55+00:00 Lorenz Bauer lmb@cloudflare.com 2021-09-22T11:11:52+00:00 59efda5073abb4fff2ce8c90ca9c2d25882e84a4 [ Upstream commit 8a98ae12fbefdb583a7696de719a1d57e5e940a2 ] When introducing CAP_BPF, bpf_jit_charge_modmem() was not changed to treat programs with CAP_BPF as privileged for the purpose of JIT memory allocation. This means that a program without CAP_BPF can block a program with CAP_BPF from loading a program. Fix this by checking bpf_capable() in bpf_jit_charge_modmem(). Fixes: 2c78ee898d8f ("bpf: Implement CAP_BPF") Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210922111153.19843-1-lmb@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 8a98ae12fbefdb583a7696de719a1d57e5e940a2 ]

When introducing CAP_BPF, bpf_jit_charge_modmem() was not changed to treat
programs with CAP_BPF as privileged for the purpose of JIT memory allocation.
This means that a program without CAP_BPF can block a program with CAP_BPF
from loading a program.

Fix this by checking bpf_capable() in bpf_jit_charge_modmem().

Fixes: 2c78ee898d8f ("bpf: Implement CAP_BPF")
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210922111153.19843-1-lmb@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
bpf: Handle return value of BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS prog 2021-10-06T13:55:50+00:00 Hou Tao houtao1@huawei.com 2021-09-14T02:33:51+00:00 d93f65586c59a555dc4ef2fe365d32457bef0fde [ Upstream commit 356ed64991c6847a0c4f2e8fa3b1133f7a14f1fc ] Currently if a function ptr in struct_ops has a return value, its caller will get a random return value from it, because the return value of related BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS prog is just dropped. So adding a new flag BPF_TRAMP_F_RET_FENTRY_RET to tell bpf trampoline to save and return the return value of struct_ops prog if ret_size of the function ptr is greater than 0. Also restricting the flag to be used alone. Fixes: 85d33df357b6 ("bpf: Introduce BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS") Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210914023351.3664499-1-houtao1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 356ed64991c6847a0c4f2e8fa3b1133f7a14f1fc ]

Currently if a function ptr in struct_ops has a return value, its
caller will get a random return value from it, because the return
value of related BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS prog is just dropped.

So adding a new flag BPF_TRAMP_F_RET_FENTRY_RET to tell bpf trampoline
to save and return the return value of struct_ops prog if ret_size of
the function ptr is greater than 0. Also restricting the flag to be
used alone.

Fixes: 85d33df357b6 ("bpf: Introduce BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS")
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210914023351.3664499-1-houtao1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
KVM: rseq: Update rseq when processing NOTIFY_RESUME on xfer to KVM guest 2021-10-06T13:55:49+00:00 Sean Christopherson seanjc@google.com 2021-09-01T20:30:26+00:00 249e5e5a501ee69b26d55b68f863671396e62f7f commit 8646e53633f314e4d746a988240d3b951a92f94a upstream. Invoke rseq's NOTIFY_RESUME handler when processing the flag prior to transferring to a KVM guest, which is roughly equivalent to an exit to userspace and processes many of the same pending actions. While the task cannot be in an rseq critical section as the KVM path is reachable only by via ioctl(KVM_RUN), the side effects that apply to rseq outside of a critical section still apply, e.g. the current CPU needs to be updated if the task is migrated. Clearing TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME without informing rseq can lead to segfaults and other badness in userspace VMMs that use rseq in combination with KVM, e.g. due to the CPU ID being stale after task migration. Fixes: 72c3c0fe54a3 ("x86/kvm: Use generic xfer to guest work function") Reported-by: Peter Foley <pefoley@google.com> Bisected-by: Doug Evans <dje@google.com> Acked-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210901203030.1292304-2-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> [sean: Resolve benign conflict due to unrelated access_ok() check in 5.10] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 8646e53633f314e4d746a988240d3b951a92f94a upstream.

Invoke rseq's NOTIFY_RESUME handler when processing the flag prior to
transferring to a KVM guest, which is roughly equivalent to an exit to
userspace and processes many of the same pending actions.  While the task
cannot be in an rseq critical section as the KVM path is reachable only
by via ioctl(KVM_RUN), the side effects that apply to rseq outside of a
critical section still apply, e.g. the current CPU needs to be updated if
the task is migrated.

Clearing TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME without informing rseq can lead to segfaults
and other badness in userspace VMMs that use rseq in combination with KVM,
e.g. due to the CPU ID being stale after task migration.

Fixes: 72c3c0fe54a3 ("x86/kvm: Use generic xfer to guest work function")
Reported-by: Peter Foley <pefoley@google.com>
Bisected-by: Doug Evans <dje@google.com>
Acked-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210901203030.1292304-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[sean: Resolve benign conflict due to unrelated access_ok() check in 5.10]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
cpufreq: schedutil: Use kobject release() method to free sugov_tunables 2021-10-06T13:55:45+00:00 Kevin Hao haokexin@gmail.com 2021-08-05T07:29:17+00:00 a7d4fc84404d45d72f4490417e8cc3efa4af93f1 [ Upstream commit e5c6b312ce3cc97e90ea159446e6bfa06645364d ] The struct sugov_tunables is protected by the kobject, so we can't free it directly. Otherwise we would get a call trace like this: ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x30 WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 720 at lib/debugobjects.c:505 debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100 Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 720 Comm: a.sh Tainted: G W 5.14.0-rc1-next-20210715-yocto-standard+ #507 Hardware name: Marvell OcteonTX CN96XX board (DT) pstate: 40400009 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100 lr : debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100 sp : ffff80001ecaf910 x29: ffff80001ecaf910 x28: ffff00011b10b8d0 x27: ffff800011043d80 x26: ffff00011a8f0000 x25: ffff800013cb3ff0 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: ffff80001142aa68 x22: ffff800011043d80 x21: ffff00010de46f20 x20: ffff800013c0c520 x19: ffff800011d8f5b0 x18: 0000000000000010 x17: 6e6968207473696c x16: 5f72656d6974203a x15: 6570797420746365 x14: 6a626f2029302065 x13: 303378302f307830 x12: 2b6e665f72656d69 x11: ffff8000124b1560 x10: ffff800012331520 x9 : ffff8000100ca6b0 x8 : 000000000017ffe8 x7 : c0000000fffeffff x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : ffff800011d8c000 x4 : ffff800011d8c740 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff0001108301c0 x1 : ab3c90eedf9c0f00 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100 __debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x1c0/0x230 debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x20/0x88 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x154/0x1c8 kfree+0x114/0x5d0 sugov_exit+0xbc/0xc0 cpufreq_exit_governor+0x44/0x90 cpufreq_set_policy+0x268/0x4a8 store_scaling_governor+0xe0/0x128 store+0xc0/0xf0 sysfs_kf_write+0x54/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x128/0x1c0 new_sync_write+0xf0/0x190 vfs_write+0x2d4/0x478 ksys_write+0x74/0x100 __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x30 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x54/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x64/0x158 el0_svc+0x2c/0xb0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c irq event stamp: 5518 hardirqs last enabled at (5517): [<ffff8000100cbd7c>] console_unlock+0x554/0x6c8 hardirqs last disabled at (5518): [<ffff800010fc0638>] el1_dbg+0x28/0xa0 softirqs last enabled at (5504): [<ffff8000100106e0>] __do_softirq+0x4d0/0x6c0 softirqs last disabled at (5483): [<ffff800010049548>] irq_exit+0x1b0/0x1b8 So split the original sugov_tunables_free() into two functions, sugov_clear_global_tunables() is just used to clear the global_tunables and the new sugov_tunables_free() is used as kobj_type::release to release the sugov_tunables safely. Fixes: 9bdcb44e391d ("cpufreq: schedutil: New governor based on scheduler utilization data") Cc: 4.7+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.7+ Signed-off-by: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit e5c6b312ce3cc97e90ea159446e6bfa06645364d ]

The struct sugov_tunables is protected by the kobject, so we can't free
it directly. Otherwise we would get a call trace like this:
  ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x30
  WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 720 at lib/debugobjects.c:505 debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 3 PID: 720 Comm: a.sh Tainted: G        W         5.14.0-rc1-next-20210715-yocto-standard+ #507
  Hardware name: Marvell OcteonTX CN96XX board (DT)
  pstate: 40400009 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
  pc : debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
  lr : debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
  sp : ffff80001ecaf910
  x29: ffff80001ecaf910 x28: ffff00011b10b8d0 x27: ffff800011043d80
  x26: ffff00011a8f0000 x25: ffff800013cb3ff0 x24: 0000000000000000
  x23: ffff80001142aa68 x22: ffff800011043d80 x21: ffff00010de46f20
  x20: ffff800013c0c520 x19: ffff800011d8f5b0 x18: 0000000000000010
  x17: 6e6968207473696c x16: 5f72656d6974203a x15: 6570797420746365
  x14: 6a626f2029302065 x13: 303378302f307830 x12: 2b6e665f72656d69
  x11: ffff8000124b1560 x10: ffff800012331520 x9 : ffff8000100ca6b0
  x8 : 000000000017ffe8 x7 : c0000000fffeffff x6 : 0000000000000001
  x5 : ffff800011d8c000 x4 : ffff800011d8c740 x3 : 0000000000000000
  x2 : ffff0001108301c0 x1 : ab3c90eedf9c0f00 x0 : 0000000000000000
  Call trace:
   debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
   __debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x1c0/0x230
   debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x20/0x88
   slab_free_freelist_hook+0x154/0x1c8
   kfree+0x114/0x5d0
   sugov_exit+0xbc/0xc0
   cpufreq_exit_governor+0x44/0x90
   cpufreq_set_policy+0x268/0x4a8
   store_scaling_governor+0xe0/0x128
   store+0xc0/0xf0
   sysfs_kf_write+0x54/0x80
   kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x128/0x1c0
   new_sync_write+0xf0/0x190
   vfs_write+0x2d4/0x478
   ksys_write+0x74/0x100
   __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x30
   invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x54/0xe0
   do_el0_svc+0x64/0x158
   el0_svc+0x2c/0xb0
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
   el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
  irq event stamp: 5518
  hardirqs last  enabled at (5517): [<ffff8000100cbd7c>] console_unlock+0x554/0x6c8
  hardirqs last disabled at (5518): [<ffff800010fc0638>] el1_dbg+0x28/0xa0
  softirqs last  enabled at (5504): [<ffff8000100106e0>] __do_softirq+0x4d0/0x6c0
  softirqs last disabled at (5483): [<ffff800010049548>] irq_exit+0x1b0/0x1b8

So split the original sugov_tunables_free() into two functions,
sugov_clear_global_tunables() is just used to clear the global_tunables
and the new sugov_tunables_free() is used as kobj_type::release to
release the sugov_tunables safely.

Fixes: 9bdcb44e391d ("cpufreq: schedutil: New governor based on scheduler utilization data")
Cc: 4.7+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.7+
Signed-off-by: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>