<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v4.9.94</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>sched/deadline: Use the revised wakeup rule for suspending constrained dl tasks</title>
<updated>2018-04-13T17:48:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Bristot de Oliveira</name>
<email>bristot@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-29T14:24:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0559ea3414d146426aa7e5a95584eee50b1cf967'/>
<id>0559ea3414d146426aa7e5a95584eee50b1cf967</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3effcb4247e74a51f5d8b775a1ee4abf87cc089a ]

We have been facing some problems with self-suspending constrained
deadline tasks. The main reason is that the original CBS was not
designed for such sort of tasks.

One problem reported by Xunlei Pang takes place when a task
suspends, and then is awakened before the deadline, but so close
to the deadline that its remaining runtime can cause the task
to have an absolute density higher than allowed. In such situation,
the original CBS assumes that the task is facing an early activation,
and so it replenishes the task and set another deadline, one deadline
in the future. This rule works fine for implicit deadline tasks.
Moreover, it allows the system to adapt the period of a task in which
the external event source suffered from a clock drift.

However, this opens the window for bandwidth leakage for constrained
deadline tasks. For instance, a task with the following parameters:

  runtime   = 5 ms
  deadline  = 7 ms
  [density] = 5 / 7 = 0.71
  period    = 1000 ms

If the task runs for 1 ms, and then suspends for another 1ms,
it will be awakened with the following parameters:

  remaining runtime = 4
  laxity = 5

presenting a absolute density of 4 / 5 = 0.80.

In this case, the original CBS would assume the task had an early
wakeup. Then, CBS will reset the runtime, and the absolute deadline will
be postponed by one relative deadline, allowing the task to run.

The problem is that, if the task runs this pattern forever, it will keep
receiving bandwidth, being able to run 1ms every 2ms. Following this
behavior, the task would be able to run 500 ms in 1 sec. Thus running
more than the 5 ms / 1 sec the admission control allowed it to run.

Trying to address the self-suspending case, Luca Abeni, Giuseppe
Lipari, and Juri Lelli [1] revisited the CBS in order to deal with
self-suspending tasks. In the new approach, rather than
replenishing/postponing the absolute deadline, the revised wakeup rule
adjusts the remaining runtime, reducing it to fit into the allowed
density.

A revised version of the idea is:

At a given time t, the maximum absolute density of a task cannot be
higher than its relative density, that is:

  runtime / (deadline - t) &lt;= dl_runtime / dl_deadline

Knowing the laxity of a task (deadline - t), it is possible to move
it to the other side of the equality, thus enabling to define max
remaining runtime a task can use within the absolute deadline, without
over-running the allowed density:

  runtime = (dl_runtime / dl_deadline) * (deadline - t)

For instance, in our previous example, the task could still run:

  runtime = ( 5 / 7 ) * 5
  runtime = 3.57 ms

Without causing damage for other deadline tasks. It is note worthy
that the laxity cannot be negative because that would cause a negative
runtime. Thus, this patch depends on the patch:

  df8eac8cafce ("sched/deadline: Throttle a constrained deadline task activated after the deadline")

Which throttles a constrained deadline task activated after the
deadline.

Finally, it is also possible to use the revised wakeup rule for
all other tasks, but that would require some more discussions
about pros and cons.

Reported-by: Xunlei Pang &lt;xpang@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira &lt;bristot@redhat.com&gt;
[peterz: replaced dl_is_constrained with dl_is_implicit]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Juri Lelli &lt;juri.lelli@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Luca Abeni &lt;luca.abeni@santannapisa.it&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Romulo Silva de Oliveira &lt;romulo.deoliveira@ufsc.br&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tommaso Cucinotta &lt;tommaso.cucinotta@sssup.it&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5c800ab3a74a168a84ee5f3f84d12a02e11383be.1495803804.git.bristot@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3effcb4247e74a51f5d8b775a1ee4abf87cc089a ]

We have been facing some problems with self-suspending constrained
deadline tasks. The main reason is that the original CBS was not
designed for such sort of tasks.

One problem reported by Xunlei Pang takes place when a task
suspends, and then is awakened before the deadline, but so close
to the deadline that its remaining runtime can cause the task
to have an absolute density higher than allowed. In such situation,
the original CBS assumes that the task is facing an early activation,
and so it replenishes the task and set another deadline, one deadline
in the future. This rule works fine for implicit deadline tasks.
Moreover, it allows the system to adapt the period of a task in which
the external event source suffered from a clock drift.

However, this opens the window for bandwidth leakage for constrained
deadline tasks. For instance, a task with the following parameters:

  runtime   = 5 ms
  deadline  = 7 ms
  [density] = 5 / 7 = 0.71
  period    = 1000 ms

If the task runs for 1 ms, and then suspends for another 1ms,
it will be awakened with the following parameters:

  remaining runtime = 4
  laxity = 5

presenting a absolute density of 4 / 5 = 0.80.

In this case, the original CBS would assume the task had an early
wakeup. Then, CBS will reset the runtime, and the absolute deadline will
be postponed by one relative deadline, allowing the task to run.

The problem is that, if the task runs this pattern forever, it will keep
receiving bandwidth, being able to run 1ms every 2ms. Following this
behavior, the task would be able to run 500 ms in 1 sec. Thus running
more than the 5 ms / 1 sec the admission control allowed it to run.

Trying to address the self-suspending case, Luca Abeni, Giuseppe
Lipari, and Juri Lelli [1] revisited the CBS in order to deal with
self-suspending tasks. In the new approach, rather than
replenishing/postponing the absolute deadline, the revised wakeup rule
adjusts the remaining runtime, reducing it to fit into the allowed
density.

A revised version of the idea is:

At a given time t, the maximum absolute density of a task cannot be
higher than its relative density, that is:

  runtime / (deadline - t) &lt;= dl_runtime / dl_deadline

Knowing the laxity of a task (deadline - t), it is possible to move
it to the other side of the equality, thus enabling to define max
remaining runtime a task can use within the absolute deadline, without
over-running the allowed density:

  runtime = (dl_runtime / dl_deadline) * (deadline - t)

For instance, in our previous example, the task could still run:

  runtime = ( 5 / 7 ) * 5
  runtime = 3.57 ms

Without causing damage for other deadline tasks. It is note worthy
that the laxity cannot be negative because that would cause a negative
runtime. Thus, this patch depends on the patch:

  df8eac8cafce ("sched/deadline: Throttle a constrained deadline task activated after the deadline")

Which throttles a constrained deadline task activated after the
deadline.

Finally, it is also possible to use the revised wakeup rule for
all other tasks, but that would require some more discussions
about pros and cons.

Reported-by: Xunlei Pang &lt;xpang@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira &lt;bristot@redhat.com&gt;
[peterz: replaced dl_is_constrained with dl_is_implicit]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Juri Lelli &lt;juri.lelli@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Luca Abeni &lt;luca.abeni@santannapisa.it&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Romulo Silva de Oliveira &lt;romulo.deoliveira@ufsc.br&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Tommaso Cucinotta &lt;tommaso.cucinotta@sssup.it&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5c800ab3a74a168a84ee5f3f84d12a02e11383be.1495803804.git.bristot@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Correct event creation with PERF_FORMAT_GROUP</title>
<updated>2018-04-13T17:48:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-30T09:45:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=50fe37e83e14a6848aaccf5ad707bf4de070d75d'/>
<id>50fe37e83e14a6848aaccf5ad707bf4de070d75d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ba5213ae6b88fb170c4771fef6553f759c7d8cdd ]

Andi was asking about PERF_FORMAT_GROUP vs inherited events, which led
to the discovery of a bug from commit:

  3dab77fb1bf8 ("perf: Rework/fix the whole read vs group stuff")

 -       PERF_SAMPLE_GROUP                       = 1U &lt;&lt; 4,
 +       PERF_SAMPLE_READ                        = 1U &lt;&lt; 4,

 -       if (attr-&gt;inherit &amp;&amp; (attr-&gt;sample_type &amp; PERF_SAMPLE_GROUP))
 +       if (attr-&gt;inherit &amp;&amp; (attr-&gt;read_format &amp; PERF_FORMAT_GROUP))

is a clear fail :/

While this changes user visible behaviour; it was previously possible
to create an inherited event with PERF_SAMPLE_READ; this is deemed
acceptible because its results were always incorrect.

Reported-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vince@deater.net&gt;
Fixes:  3dab77fb1bf8 ("perf: Rework/fix the whole read vs group stuff")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170530094512.dy2nljns2uq7qa3j@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ba5213ae6b88fb170c4771fef6553f759c7d8cdd ]

Andi was asking about PERF_FORMAT_GROUP vs inherited events, which led
to the discovery of a bug from commit:

  3dab77fb1bf8 ("perf: Rework/fix the whole read vs group stuff")

 -       PERF_SAMPLE_GROUP                       = 1U &lt;&lt; 4,
 +       PERF_SAMPLE_READ                        = 1U &lt;&lt; 4,

 -       if (attr-&gt;inherit &amp;&amp; (attr-&gt;sample_type &amp; PERF_SAMPLE_GROUP))
 +       if (attr-&gt;inherit &amp;&amp; (attr-&gt;read_format &amp; PERF_FORMAT_GROUP))

is a clear fail :/

While this changes user visible behaviour; it was previously possible
to create an inherited event with PERF_SAMPLE_READ; this is deemed
acceptible because its results were always incorrect.

Reported-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vince@deater.net&gt;
Fixes:  3dab77fb1bf8 ("perf: Rework/fix the whole read vs group stuff")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170530094512.dy2nljns2uq7qa3j@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpuhotplug: Link lock stacks for hotplug callbacks</title>
<updated>2018-04-13T17:48:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-24T08:15:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c198e227316337301f682c97c5880014b3aeb3aa'/>
<id>c198e227316337301f682c97c5880014b3aeb3aa</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 49dfe2a6779717d9c18395684ee31bdc98b22e53 ]

The CPU hotplug callbacks are not covered by lockdep versus the cpu hotplug
rwsem.

CPU0						CPU1
cpuhp_setup_state(STATE, startup, teardown);
 cpus_read_lock();
  invoke_callback_on_ap();
    kick_hotplug_thread(ap);
    wait_for_completion();			hotplug_thread_fn()
    						  lock(m);
						  do_stuff();
						  unlock(m);

Lockdep does not know about this dependency and will not trigger on the
following code sequence:

	  lock(m);
	  cpus_read_lock();

Add a lockdep map and connect the initiators lock chain with the hotplug
thread lock chain, so potential deadlocks can be detected.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Sebastian Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524081549.709375845@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 49dfe2a6779717d9c18395684ee31bdc98b22e53 ]

The CPU hotplug callbacks are not covered by lockdep versus the cpu hotplug
rwsem.

CPU0						CPU1
cpuhp_setup_state(STATE, startup, teardown);
 cpus_read_lock();
  invoke_callback_on_ap();
    kick_hotplug_thread(ap);
    wait_for_completion();			hotplug_thread_fn()
    						  lock(m);
						  do_stuff();
						  unlock(m);

Lockdep does not know about this dependency and will not trigger on the
following code sequence:

	  lock(m);
	  cpus_read_lock();

Add a lockdep map and connect the initiators lock chain with the hotplug
thread lock chain, so potential deadlocks can be detected.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Sebastian Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524081549.709375845@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/numa: Use down_read_trylock() for the mmap_sem</title>
<updated>2018-04-13T17:48:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlastimil Babka</name>
<email>vbabka@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-15T13:13:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a1e7a9e2e3c992574a19493566aff6580a2d5ad5'/>
<id>a1e7a9e2e3c992574a19493566aff6580a2d5ad5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8655d5497735b288f8a9b458bd22e7d1bf95bb61 ]

A customer has reported a soft-lockup when running an intensive
memory stress test, where the trace on multiple CPU's looks like this:

 RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff810c53fe&gt;]
  [&lt;ffffffff810c53fe&gt;] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x10e/0x190
...
 Call Trace:
  [&lt;ffffffff81182d07&gt;] queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x7/0xa
  [&lt;ffffffff811bc331&gt;] change_protection_range+0x3b1/0x930
  [&lt;ffffffff811d4be8&gt;] change_prot_numa+0x18/0x30
  [&lt;ffffffff810adefe&gt;] task_numa_work+0x1fe/0x310
  [&lt;ffffffff81098322&gt;] task_work_run+0x72/0x90

Further investigation showed that the lock contention here is pmd_lock().

The task_numa_work() function makes sure that only one thread is let to perform
the work in a single scan period (via cmpxchg), but if there's a thread with
mmap_sem locked for writing for several periods, multiple threads in
task_numa_work() can build up a convoy waiting for mmap_sem for read and then
all get unblocked at once.

This patch changes the down_read() to the trylock version, which prevents the
build up. For a workload experiencing mmap_sem contention, it's probably better
to postpone the NUMA balancing work anyway. This seems to have fixed the soft
lockups involving pmd_lock(), which is in line with the convoy theory.

Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@techsingularity.net&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170515131316.21909-1-vbabka@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8655d5497735b288f8a9b458bd22e7d1bf95bb61 ]

A customer has reported a soft-lockup when running an intensive
memory stress test, where the trace on multiple CPU's looks like this:

 RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff810c53fe&gt;]
  [&lt;ffffffff810c53fe&gt;] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x10e/0x190
...
 Call Trace:
  [&lt;ffffffff81182d07&gt;] queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x7/0xa
  [&lt;ffffffff811bc331&gt;] change_protection_range+0x3b1/0x930
  [&lt;ffffffff811d4be8&gt;] change_prot_numa+0x18/0x30
  [&lt;ffffffff810adefe&gt;] task_numa_work+0x1fe/0x310
  [&lt;ffffffff81098322&gt;] task_work_run+0x72/0x90

Further investigation showed that the lock contention here is pmd_lock().

The task_numa_work() function makes sure that only one thread is let to perform
the work in a single scan period (via cmpxchg), but if there's a thread with
mmap_sem locked for writing for several periods, multiple threads in
task_numa_work() can build up a convoy waiting for mmap_sem for read and then
all get unblocked at once.

This patch changes the down_read() to the trylock version, which prevents the
build up. For a workload experiencing mmap_sem contention, it's probably better
to postpone the NUMA balancing work anyway. This seems to have fixed the soft
lockups involving pmd_lock(), which is in line with the convoy theory.

Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@techsingularity.net&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170515131316.21909-1-vbabka@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Fix error handling in perf_event_alloc()</title>
<updated>2018-04-13T17:48:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-22T09:04:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f02bfec06f148d1aa2c08b8ecdc3afbc31ec0b6f'/>
<id>f02bfec06f148d1aa2c08b8ecdc3afbc31ec0b6f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 36cc2b9222b5106de34085c4dd8635ac67ef5cba ]

We don't set an error code here which means that perf_event_alloc()
returns ERR_PTR(0) (in other words NULL).  The callers are not expecting
that and would Oops.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Fixes: 375637bc5249 ("perf/core: Introduce address range filtering")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170522090418.hvs6icgpdo53wkn5@mwanda
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 36cc2b9222b5106de34085c4dd8635ac67ef5cba ]

We don't set an error code here which means that perf_event_alloc()
returns ERR_PTR(0) (in other words NULL).  The callers are not expecting
that and would Oops.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Fixes: 375637bc5249 ("perf/core: Introduce address range filtering")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170522090418.hvs6icgpdo53wkn5@mwanda
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/callchain: Force USER_DS when invoking perf_callchain_user()</title>
<updated>2018-04-13T17:47:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Will Deacon</name>
<email>will.deacon@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-09T17:00:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5daab7259a6ec50415c1dcfb1a3ef3302f9281f6'/>
<id>5daab7259a6ec50415c1dcfb1a3ef3302f9281f6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 88b0193d9418c00340e45e0a913a0813bc6c8c96 ]

Perf can generate and record a user callchain in response to a synchronous
request, such as a tracepoint firing. If this happens under set_fs(KERNEL_DS),
then we can end up walking the user stack (and dereferencing/saving whatever we
find there) without the protections usually afforded by checks such as
access_ok.

Rather than play whack-a-mole with each architecture's stack unwinding
implementation, fix the root of the problem by ensuring that we force USER_DS
when invoking perf_callchain_user from the perf core.

Reported-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 88b0193d9418c00340e45e0a913a0813bc6c8c96 ]

Perf can generate and record a user callchain in response to a synchronous
request, such as a tracepoint firing. If this happens under set_fs(KERNEL_DS),
then we can end up walking the user stack (and dereferencing/saving whatever we
find there) without the protections usually afforded by checks such as
access_ok.

Rather than play whack-a-mole with each architecture's stack unwinding
implementation, fix the root of the problem by ensuring that we force USER_DS
when invoking perf_callchain_user from the perf core.

Reported-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pidns: disable pid allocation if pid_ns_prepare_proc() is failed in alloc_pid()</title>
<updated>2018-04-13T17:47:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kirill Tkhai</name>
<email>ktkhai@virtuozzo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-08T22:56:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a2095be2ad9106ad92cfb906088ffc5831f0e74c'/>
<id>a2095be2ad9106ad92cfb906088ffc5831f0e74c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8896c23d2ef803f1883fea73117a435925c2b4c4 ]

alloc_pidmap() advances pid_namespace::last_pid.  When first pid
allocation fails, then next created process will have pid 2 and
pid_ns_prepare_proc() won't be called.  So, pid_namespace::proc_mnt will
never be initialized (not to mention that there won't be a child
reaper).

I saw crash stack of such case on kernel 3.10:

    BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
    IP: proc_flush_task+0x8f/0x1b0
    Call Trace:
        release_task+0x3f/0x490
        wait_consider_task.part.10+0x7ff/0xb00
        do_wait+0x11f/0x280
        SyS_wait4+0x7d/0x110

We may fix this by restore of last_pid in 0 or by prohibiting of futher
allocations.  Since there was a similar issue in Oleg Nesterov's commit
314a8ad0f18a ("pidns: fix free_pid() to handle the first fork failure").
and it was fixed via prohibiting allocation, let's follow this way, and
do the same.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/149201021004.4863.6762095011554287922.stgit@localhost.localdomain
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai &lt;ktkhai@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Andrei Vagin &lt;avagin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher &lt;agruenba@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@googlemail.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8896c23d2ef803f1883fea73117a435925c2b4c4 ]

alloc_pidmap() advances pid_namespace::last_pid.  When first pid
allocation fails, then next created process will have pid 2 and
pid_ns_prepare_proc() won't be called.  So, pid_namespace::proc_mnt will
never be initialized (not to mention that there won't be a child
reaper).

I saw crash stack of such case on kernel 3.10:

    BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
    IP: proc_flush_task+0x8f/0x1b0
    Call Trace:
        release_task+0x3f/0x490
        wait_consider_task.part.10+0x7ff/0xb00
        do_wait+0x11f/0x280
        SyS_wait4+0x7d/0x110

We may fix this by restore of last_pid in 0 or by prohibiting of futher
allocations.  Since there was a similar issue in Oleg Nesterov's commit
314a8ad0f18a ("pidns: fix free_pid() to handle the first fork failure").
and it was fixed via prohibiting allocation, let's follow this way, and
do the same.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/149201021004.4863.6762095011554287922.stgit@localhost.localdomain
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai &lt;ktkhai@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Andrei Vagin &lt;avagin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher &lt;agruenba@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@googlemail.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>module: extend 'rodata=off' boot cmdline parameter to module mappings</title>
<updated>2018-04-08T10:12:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>AKASHI Takahiro</name>
<email>takahiro.akashi@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-03T11:09:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7f9a93b30bcb7d78f09c86ed47aa86f7340e42e8'/>
<id>7f9a93b30bcb7d78f09c86ed47aa86f7340e42e8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 39290b389ea upstream.

The current "rodata=off" parameter disables read-only kernel mappings
under CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA:
    commit d2aa1acad22f ("mm/init: Add 'rodata=off' boot cmdline parameter
    to disable read-only kernel mappings")

This patch is a logical extension to module mappings ie. read-only mappings
at module loading can be disabled even if CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
(mainly for debug use). Please note, however, that it only affects RO/RW
permissions, keeping NX set.

This is the first step to make CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX mandatory
(always-on) in the future as CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA on x86 and arm64.

Suggested-by: and Acked-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro &lt;takahiro.akashi@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161114061505.15238-1-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu &lt;jeyu@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alex Shi &lt;alex.shi@linaro.org&gt; [v4.9 backport]
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt; [v4.9 backport]
Tested-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Greg Hackmann &lt;ghackmann@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 39290b389ea upstream.

The current "rodata=off" parameter disables read-only kernel mappings
under CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA:
    commit d2aa1acad22f ("mm/init: Add 'rodata=off' boot cmdline parameter
    to disable read-only kernel mappings")

This patch is a logical extension to module mappings ie. read-only mappings
at module loading can be disabled even if CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
(mainly for debug use). Please note, however, that it only affects RO/RW
permissions, keeping NX set.

This is the first step to make CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX mandatory
(always-on) in the future as CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA on x86 and arm64.

Suggested-by: and Acked-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro &lt;takahiro.akashi@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161114061505.15238-1-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu &lt;jeyu@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alex Shi &lt;alex.shi@linaro.org&gt; [v4.9 backport]
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt; [v4.9 backport]
Tested-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Greg Hackmann &lt;ghackmann@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>genirq: Use cpumask_available() for check of cpumask variable</title>
<updated>2018-04-08T10:12:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthias Kaehlcke</name>
<email>mka@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-12T18:20:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=02e3a7d445c30d56d825599a7dea67cdc2bd3288'/>
<id>02e3a7d445c30d56d825599a7dea67cdc2bd3288</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d170fe7dd992b313d4851ae5ab77ee7a51ed8c72 upstream.

This fixes the following clang warning when CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=n:

kernel/irq/manage.c:839:28: error: address of array
'desc-&gt;irq_common_data.affinity' will always evaluate to 'true'
[-Werror,-Wpointer-bool-conversion]

Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke &lt;mka@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Grant Grundler &lt;grundler@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
Cc: Greg Hackmann &lt;ghackmann@google.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Davidson &lt;md@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170412182030.83657-2-mka@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Nathan Chancellor &lt;natechancellor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d170fe7dd992b313d4851ae5ab77ee7a51ed8c72 upstream.

This fixes the following clang warning when CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=n:

kernel/irq/manage.c:839:28: error: address of array
'desc-&gt;irq_common_data.affinity' will always evaluate to 'true'
[-Werror,-Wpointer-bool-conversion]

Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke &lt;mka@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Grant Grundler &lt;grundler@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
Cc: Greg Hackmann &lt;ghackmann@google.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Davidson &lt;md@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170412182030.83657-2-mka@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Nathan Chancellor &lt;natechancellor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kprobes/x86: Fix to set RWX bits correctly before releasing trampoline</title>
<updated>2018-04-08T10:12:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Masami Hiramatsu</name>
<email>mhiramat@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-25T10:38:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fd2f070985ea0eefdd503efbb9a5b9275161b893'/>
<id>fd2f070985ea0eefdd503efbb9a5b9275161b893</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c93f5cf571e7795f97d49ef51b766cf25e328545 upstream.

Fix kprobes to set(recover) RWX bits correctly on trampoline
buffer before releasing it. Releasing readonly page to
module_memfree() crash the kernel.

Without this fix, if kprobes user register a bunch of kprobes
in function body (since kprobes on function entry usually
use ftrace) and unregister it, kernel hits a BUG and crash.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/149570868652.3518.14120169373590420503.stgit@devbox

Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: d0381c81c2f7 ("kprobes/x86: Set kprobes pages read-only")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c93f5cf571e7795f97d49ef51b766cf25e328545 upstream.

Fix kprobes to set(recover) RWX bits correctly on trampoline
buffer before releasing it. Releasing readonly page to
module_memfree() crash the kernel.

Without this fix, if kprobes user register a bunch of kprobes
in function body (since kprobes on function entry usually
use ftrace) and unregister it, kernel hits a BUG and crash.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/149570868652.3518.14120169373590420503.stgit@devbox

Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: d0381c81c2f7 ("kprobes/x86: Set kprobes pages read-only")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
