<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v4.9.119</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>fork: unconditionally clear stack on fork</title>
<updated>2018-08-09T10:18:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-20T21:55:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6a19e26f11fb4192ec92d1f22ae8a1c252ebc272'/>
<id>6a19e26f11fb4192ec92d1f22ae8a1c252ebc272</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e01e80634ecdde1dd113ac43b3adad21b47f3957 upstream.

One of the classes of kernel stack content leaks[1] is exposing the
contents of prior heap or stack contents when a new process stack is
allocated.  Normally, those stacks are not zeroed, and the old contents
remain in place.  In the face of stack content exposure flaws, those
contents can leak to userspace.

Fixing this will make the kernel no longer vulnerable to these flaws, as
the stack will be wiped each time a stack is assigned to a new process.
There's not a meaningful change in runtime performance; it almost looks
like it provides a benefit.

Performing back-to-back kernel builds before:
	Run times: 157.86 157.09 158.90 160.94 160.80
	Mean: 159.12
	Std Dev: 1.54

and after:
	Run times: 159.31 157.34 156.71 158.15 160.81
	Mean: 158.46
	Std Dev: 1.46

Instead of making this a build or runtime config, Andy Lutomirski
recommended this just be enabled by default.

[1] A noisy search for many kinds of stack content leaks can be seen here:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=linux+kernel+stack+leak

I did some more with perf and cycle counts on running 100,000 execs of
/bin/true.

before:
Cycles: 218858861551 218853036130 214727610969 227656844122 224980542841
Mean:  221015379122.60
Std Dev: 4662486552.47

after:
Cycles: 213868945060 213119275204 211820169456 224426673259 225489986348
Mean:  217745009865.40
Std Dev: 5935559279.99

It continues to look like it's faster, though the deviation is rather
wide, but I'm not sure what I could do that would be less noisy.  I'm
open to ideas!

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180221021659.GA37073@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@techsingularity.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[ Srivatsa: Backported to 4.9.y ]
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat &lt;srivatsa@csail.mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Srinidhi Rao &lt;srinidhir@vmware.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e01e80634ecdde1dd113ac43b3adad21b47f3957 upstream.

One of the classes of kernel stack content leaks[1] is exposing the
contents of prior heap or stack contents when a new process stack is
allocated.  Normally, those stacks are not zeroed, and the old contents
remain in place.  In the face of stack content exposure flaws, those
contents can leak to userspace.

Fixing this will make the kernel no longer vulnerable to these flaws, as
the stack will be wiped each time a stack is assigned to a new process.
There's not a meaningful change in runtime performance; it almost looks
like it provides a benefit.

Performing back-to-back kernel builds before:
	Run times: 157.86 157.09 158.90 160.94 160.80
	Mean: 159.12
	Std Dev: 1.54

and after:
	Run times: 159.31 157.34 156.71 158.15 160.81
	Mean: 158.46
	Std Dev: 1.46

Instead of making this a build or runtime config, Andy Lutomirski
recommended this just be enabled by default.

[1] A noisy search for many kinds of stack content leaks can be seen here:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=linux+kernel+stack+leak

I did some more with perf and cycle counts on running 100,000 execs of
/bin/true.

before:
Cycles: 218858861551 218853036130 214727610969 227656844122 224980542841
Mean:  221015379122.60
Std Dev: 4662486552.47

after:
Cycles: 213868945060 213119275204 211820169456 224426673259 225489986348
Mean:  217745009865.40
Std Dev: 5935559279.99

It continues to look like it's faster, though the deviation is rather
wide, but I'm not sure what I could do that would be less noisy.  I'm
open to ideas!

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180221021659.GA37073@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@techsingularity.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[ Srivatsa: Backported to 4.9.y ]
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat &lt;srivatsa@csail.mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Srinidhi Rao &lt;srinidhir@vmware.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kmemleak: clear stale pointers from task stacks</title>
<updated>2018-08-09T10:18:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konstantin Khlebnikov</name>
<email>khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-13T22:58:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=885b49b4f31fdec212e6c5e9ad0845fab266d3cf'/>
<id>885b49b4f31fdec212e6c5e9ad0845fab266d3cf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ca182551857cc2c1e6a2b7f1e72090a137a15008 upstream.

Kmemleak considers any pointers on task stacks as references.  This
patch clears newly allocated and reused vmap stacks.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/150728990124.744199.8403409836394318684.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[ Srivatsa: Backported to 4.9.y ]
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat &lt;srivatsa@csail.mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ca182551857cc2c1e6a2b7f1e72090a137a15008 upstream.

Kmemleak considers any pointers on task stacks as references.  This
patch clears newly allocated and reused vmap stacks.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/150728990124.744199.8403409836394318684.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[ Srivatsa: Backported to 4.9.y ]
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat &lt;srivatsa@csail.mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ring_buffer: tracing: Inherit the tracing setting to next ring buffer</title>
<updated>2018-08-09T10:17:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Masami Hiramatsu</name>
<email>mhiramat@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-13T16:28:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a26030a63e041c5d81df356d0f8a5d8e7bad25e3'/>
<id>a26030a63e041c5d81df356d0f8a5d8e7bad25e3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 73c8d8945505acdcbae137c2e00a1232e0be709f upstream.

Maintain the tracing on/off setting of the ring_buffer when switching
to the trace buffer snapshot.

Taking a snapshot is done by swapping the backup ring buffer
(max_tr_buffer). But since the tracing on/off setting is defined
by the ring buffer, when swapping it, the tracing on/off setting
can also be changed. This causes a strange result like below:

  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # cat tracing_on
  1
  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # echo 0 &gt; tracing_on
  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # cat tracing_on
  0
  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # echo 1 &gt; snapshot
  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # cat tracing_on
  1
  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # echo 1 &gt; snapshot
  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # cat tracing_on
  0

We don't touch tracing_on, but snapshot changes tracing_on
setting each time. This is an anomaly, because user doesn't know
that each "ring_buffer" stores its own tracing-enable state and
the snapshot is done by swapping ring buffers.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/153149929558.11274.11730609978254724394.stgit@devbox

Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;shuah@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Tom Zanussi &lt;tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Hiraku Toyooka &lt;hiraku.toyooka@cybertrust.co.jp&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: debdd57f5145 ("tracing: Make a snapshot feature available from userspace")
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
[ Updated commit log and comment in the code ]
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee &lt;sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 73c8d8945505acdcbae137c2e00a1232e0be709f upstream.

Maintain the tracing on/off setting of the ring_buffer when switching
to the trace buffer snapshot.

Taking a snapshot is done by swapping the backup ring buffer
(max_tr_buffer). But since the tracing on/off setting is defined
by the ring buffer, when swapping it, the tracing on/off setting
can also be changed. This causes a strange result like below:

  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # cat tracing_on
  1
  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # echo 0 &gt; tracing_on
  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # cat tracing_on
  0
  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # echo 1 &gt; snapshot
  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # cat tracing_on
  1
  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # echo 1 &gt; snapshot
  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # cat tracing_on
  0

We don't touch tracing_on, but snapshot changes tracing_on
setting each time. This is an anomaly, because user doesn't know
that each "ring_buffer" stores its own tracing-enable state and
the snapshot is done by swapping ring buffers.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/153149929558.11274.11730609978254724394.stgit@devbox

Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Shuah Khan &lt;shuah@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Tom Zanussi &lt;tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Hiraku Toyooka &lt;hiraku.toyooka@cybertrust.co.jp&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: debdd57f5145 ("tracing: Make a snapshot feature available from userspace")
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
[ Updated commit log and comment in the code ]
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee &lt;sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nohz: Fix local_timer_softirq_pending()</title>
<updated>2018-08-09T10:17:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Anna-Maria Gleixner</name>
<email>anna-maria@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-31T16:13:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f4a9db57e7dbf929f5262a01c4f5fa240ff79688'/>
<id>f4a9db57e7dbf929f5262a01c4f5fa240ff79688</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 80d20d35af1edd632a5e7a3b9c0ab7ceff92769e upstream.

local_timer_softirq_pending() checks whether the timer softirq is
pending with: local_softirq_pending() &amp; TIMER_SOFTIRQ.

This is wrong because TIMER_SOFTIRQ is the softirq number and not a
bitmask. So the test checks for the wrong bit.

Use BIT(TIMER_SOFTIRQ) instead.

Fixes: 5d62c183f9e9 ("nohz: Prevent a timer interrupt storm in tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick()")
Signed-off-by: Anna-Maria Gleixner &lt;anna-maria@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira &lt;bristot@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;frederic@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180731161358.29472-1-anna-maria@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 80d20d35af1edd632a5e7a3b9c0ab7ceff92769e upstream.

local_timer_softirq_pending() checks whether the timer softirq is
pending with: local_softirq_pending() &amp; TIMER_SOFTIRQ.

This is wrong because TIMER_SOFTIRQ is the softirq number and not a
bitmask. So the test checks for the wrong bit.

Use BIT(TIMER_SOFTIRQ) instead.

Fixes: 5d62c183f9e9 ("nohz: Prevent a timer interrupt storm in tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick()")
Signed-off-by: Anna-Maria Gleixner &lt;anna-maria@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira &lt;bristot@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;frederic@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180731161358.29472-1-anna-maria@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>genirq: Make force irq threading setup more robust</title>
<updated>2018-08-09T10:17:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-03T12:44:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=eecd08afb0d49eaf5efb54a5deffdf72ada40feb'/>
<id>eecd08afb0d49eaf5efb54a5deffdf72ada40feb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d1f0301b3333eef5efbfa1fe0f0edbea01863d5d upstream.

The support of force threading interrupts which are set up with both a
primary and a threaded handler wreckaged the setup of regular requested
threaded interrupts (primary handler == NULL).

The reason is that it does not check whether the primary handler is set to
the default handler which wakes the handler thread. Instead it replaces the
thread handler with the primary handler as it would do with force threaded
interrupts which have been requested via request_irq(). So both the primary
and the thread handler become the same which then triggers the warnon that
the thread handler tries to wakeup a not configured secondary thread.

Fortunately this only happens when the driver omits the IRQF_ONESHOT flag
when requesting the threaded interrupt, which is normaly caught by the
sanity checks when force irq threading is disabled.

Fix it by skipping the force threading setup when a regular threaded
interrupt is requested. As a consequence the interrupt request which lacks
the IRQ_ONESHOT flag is rejected correctly instead of silently wreckaging
it.

Fixes: 2a1d3ab8986d ("genirq: Handle force threading of irqs with primary and thread handler")
Reported-by: Kurt Kanzenbach &lt;kurt.kanzenbach@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Kurt Kanzenbach &lt;kurt.kanzenbach@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d1f0301b3333eef5efbfa1fe0f0edbea01863d5d upstream.

The support of force threading interrupts which are set up with both a
primary and a threaded handler wreckaged the setup of regular requested
threaded interrupts (primary handler == NULL).

The reason is that it does not check whether the primary handler is set to
the default handler which wakes the handler thread. Instead it replaces the
thread handler with the primary handler as it would do with force threaded
interrupts which have been requested via request_irq(). So both the primary
and the thread handler become the same which then triggers the warnon that
the thread handler tries to wakeup a not configured secondary thread.

Fortunately this only happens when the driver omits the IRQF_ONESHOT flag
when requesting the threaded interrupt, which is normaly caught by the
sanity checks when force irq threading is disabled.

Fix it by skipping the force threading setup when a regular threaded
interrupt is requested. As a consequence the interrupt request which lacks
the IRQ_ONESHOT flag is rejected correctly instead of silently wreckaging
it.

Fixes: 2a1d3ab8986d ("genirq: Handle force threading of irqs with primary and thread handler")
Reported-by: Kurt Kanzenbach &lt;kurt.kanzenbach@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Kurt Kanzenbach &lt;kurt.kanzenbach@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/wait: Remove the lockless swait_active() check in swake_up*()</title>
<updated>2018-08-06T14:23:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Boqun Feng</name>
<email>boqun.feng@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-15T04:18:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=047f9d6a5672be91225422169f85f54df1d10c2c'/>
<id>047f9d6a5672be91225422169f85f54df1d10c2c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 35a2897c2a306cca344ca5c0b43416707018f434 upstream.

Steven Rostedt reported a potential race in RCU core because of
swake_up():

        CPU0                            CPU1
        ----                            ----
                                __call_rcu_core() {

                                 spin_lock(rnp_root)
                                 need_wake = __rcu_start_gp() {
                                  rcu_start_gp_advanced() {
                                   gp_flags = FLAG_INIT
                                  }
                                 }

 rcu_gp_kthread() {
   swait_event_interruptible(wq,
        gp_flags &amp; FLAG_INIT) {
   spin_lock(q-&gt;lock)

                                *fetch wq-&gt;task_list here! *

   list_add(wq-&gt;task_list, q-&gt;task_list)
   spin_unlock(q-&gt;lock);

   *fetch old value of gp_flags here *

                                 spin_unlock(rnp_root)

                                 rcu_gp_kthread_wake() {
                                  swake_up(wq) {
                                   swait_active(wq) {
                                    list_empty(wq-&gt;task_list)

                                   } * return false *

  if (condition) * false *
    schedule();

In this case, a wakeup is missed, which could cause the rcu_gp_kthread
waits for a long time.

The reason of this is that we do a lockless swait_active() check in
swake_up(). To fix this, we can either 1) add a smp_mb() in swake_up()
before swait_active() to provide the proper order or 2) simply remove
the swait_active() in swake_up().

The solution 2 not only fixes this problem but also keeps the swait and
wait API as close as possible, as wake_up() doesn't provide a full
barrier and doesn't do a lockless check of the wait queue either.
Moreover, there are users already using swait_active() to do their quick
checks for the wait queues, so it make less sense that swake_up() and
swake_up_all() do this on their own.

This patch then removes the lockless swait_active() check in swake_up()
and swake_up_all().

Reported-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng &lt;boqun.feng@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Krister Johansen &lt;kjlx@templeofstupid.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170615041828.zk3a3sfyudm5p6nl@tardis
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: David Chen &lt;david.chen@nutanix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 35a2897c2a306cca344ca5c0b43416707018f434 upstream.

Steven Rostedt reported a potential race in RCU core because of
swake_up():

        CPU0                            CPU1
        ----                            ----
                                __call_rcu_core() {

                                 spin_lock(rnp_root)
                                 need_wake = __rcu_start_gp() {
                                  rcu_start_gp_advanced() {
                                   gp_flags = FLAG_INIT
                                  }
                                 }

 rcu_gp_kthread() {
   swait_event_interruptible(wq,
        gp_flags &amp; FLAG_INIT) {
   spin_lock(q-&gt;lock)

                                *fetch wq-&gt;task_list here! *

   list_add(wq-&gt;task_list, q-&gt;task_list)
   spin_unlock(q-&gt;lock);

   *fetch old value of gp_flags here *

                                 spin_unlock(rnp_root)

                                 rcu_gp_kthread_wake() {
                                  swake_up(wq) {
                                   swait_active(wq) {
                                    list_empty(wq-&gt;task_list)

                                   } * return false *

  if (condition) * false *
    schedule();

In this case, a wakeup is missed, which could cause the rcu_gp_kthread
waits for a long time.

The reason of this is that we do a lockless swait_active() check in
swake_up(). To fix this, we can either 1) add a smp_mb() in swake_up()
before swait_active() to provide the proper order or 2) simply remove
the swait_active() in swake_up().

The solution 2 not only fixes this problem but also keeps the swait and
wait API as close as possible, as wake_up() doesn't provide a full
barrier and doesn't do a lockless check of the wait queue either.
Moreover, there are users already using swait_active() to do their quick
checks for the wait queues, so it make less sense that swake_up() and
swake_up_all() do this on their own.

This patch then removes the lockless swait_active() check in swake_up()
and swake_up_all().

Reported-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng &lt;boqun.feng@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Krister Johansen &lt;kjlx@templeofstupid.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170615041828.zk3a3sfyudm5p6nl@tardis
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: David Chen &lt;david.chen@nutanix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit: allow not equal op for audit by executable</title>
<updated>2018-08-03T05:55:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnáček</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-09T08:00:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5f5e70d7ec14d2b194f06e7ebe7f9396b4cdbb5f'/>
<id>5f5e70d7ec14d2b194f06e7ebe7f9396b4cdbb5f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 23bcc480dac204c7dbdf49d96b2c918ed98223c2 ]

Current implementation of auditing by executable name only implements
the 'equal' operator. This patch extends it to also support the 'not
equal' operator.

See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/53

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 23bcc480dac204c7dbdf49d96b2c918ed98223c2 ]

Current implementation of auditing by executable name only implements
the 'equal' operator. This patch extends it to also support the 'not
equal' operator.

See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/53

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>stop_machine: Use raw spinlocks</title>
<updated>2018-08-03T05:55:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-23T19:16:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7d044d940faeb6a7e65a1d215415e425822f365c'/>
<id>7d044d940faeb6a7e65a1d215415e425822f365c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit de5b55c1d4e30740009864eb35ce4ed856aac01d ]

Use raw-locks in stop_machine() to allow locking in irq-off and
preempt-disabled regions on -RT. This also documents the possible locking
context in general.

[bigeasy: update patch description.]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180423191635.6014-1-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit de5b55c1d4e30740009864eb35ce4ed856aac01d ]

Use raw-locks in stop_machine() to allow locking in irq-off and
preempt-disabled regions on -RT. This also documents the possible locking
context in general.

[bigeasy: update patch description.]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180423191635.6014-1-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: fix references to free_bpf_prog_info() in comments</title>
<updated>2018-08-03T05:55:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jakub Kicinski</name>
<email>jakub.kicinski@netronome.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-04T01:37:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e31a06ec828ff8184cc2c1fbae49be783c3b4f11'/>
<id>e31a06ec828ff8184cc2c1fbae49be783c3b4f11</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ab7f5bf0928be2f148d000a6eaa6c0a36e74750e ]

Comments in the verifier refer to free_bpf_prog_info() which
seems to have never existed in tree.  Replace it with
free_used_maps().

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet &lt;quentin.monnet@netronome.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ab7f5bf0928be2f148d000a6eaa6c0a36e74750e ]

Comments in the verifier refer to free_bpf_prog_info() which
seems to have never existed in tree.  Replace it with
free_used_maps().

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet &lt;quentin.monnet@netronome.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kcov: ensure irq code sees a valid area</title>
<updated>2018-08-03T05:55:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-14T22:27:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=31ad104de6feb222500abe23a2cdbf08b6794c77'/>
<id>31ad104de6feb222500abe23a2cdbf08b6794c77</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c9484b986ef03492357fddd50afbdd02929cfa72 ]

Patch series "kcov: fix unexpected faults".

These patches fix a few issues where KCOV code could trigger recursive
faults, discovered while debugging a patch enabling KCOV for arch/arm:

* On CONFIG_PREEMPT kernels, there's a small race window where
  __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() can see a bogus kcov_area.

* Lazy faulting of the vmalloc area can cause mutual recursion between
  fault handling code and __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc().

* During the context switch, switching the mm can cause the kcov_area to
  be transiently unmapped.

These are prerequisites for enabling KCOV on arm, but the issues
themsevles are generic -- we just happen to avoid them by chance rather
than design on x86-64 and arm64.

This patch (of 3):

For kernels built with CONFIG_PREEMPT, some C code may execute before or
after the interrupt handler, while the hardirq count is zero.  In these
cases, in_task() can return true.

A task can be interrupted in the middle of a KCOV_DISABLE ioctl while it
resets the task's kcov data via kcov_task_init().  Instrumented code
executed during this period will call __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(), and as
in_task() returns true, will inspect t-&gt;kcov_mode before trying to write
to t-&gt;kcov_area.

In kcov_init_task() we update t-&gt;kcov_{mode,area,size} with plain stores,
which may be re-ordered, torn, etc.  Thus __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() may
see bogus values for any of these fields, and may attempt to write to
memory which is not mapped.

Let's avoid this by using WRITE_ONCE() to set t-&gt;kcov_mode, with a
barrier() to ensure this is ordered before we clear t-&gt;kov_{area,size}.
This ensures that any code execute while kcov_init_task() is preempted
will either see valid values for t-&gt;kcov_{area,size}, or will see that
t-&gt;kcov_mode is KCOV_MODE_DISABLED, and bail out without touching
t-&gt;kcov_area.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504135535.53744-2-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c9484b986ef03492357fddd50afbdd02929cfa72 ]

Patch series "kcov: fix unexpected faults".

These patches fix a few issues where KCOV code could trigger recursive
faults, discovered while debugging a patch enabling KCOV for arch/arm:

* On CONFIG_PREEMPT kernels, there's a small race window where
  __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() can see a bogus kcov_area.

* Lazy faulting of the vmalloc area can cause mutual recursion between
  fault handling code and __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc().

* During the context switch, switching the mm can cause the kcov_area to
  be transiently unmapped.

These are prerequisites for enabling KCOV on arm, but the issues
themsevles are generic -- we just happen to avoid them by chance rather
than design on x86-64 and arm64.

This patch (of 3):

For kernels built with CONFIG_PREEMPT, some C code may execute before or
after the interrupt handler, while the hardirq count is zero.  In these
cases, in_task() can return true.

A task can be interrupted in the middle of a KCOV_DISABLE ioctl while it
resets the task's kcov data via kcov_task_init().  Instrumented code
executed during this period will call __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(), and as
in_task() returns true, will inspect t-&gt;kcov_mode before trying to write
to t-&gt;kcov_area.

In kcov_init_task() we update t-&gt;kcov_{mode,area,size} with plain stores,
which may be re-ordered, torn, etc.  Thus __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() may
see bogus values for any of these fields, and may attempt to write to
memory which is not mapped.

Let's avoid this by using WRITE_ONCE() to set t-&gt;kcov_mode, with a
barrier() to ensure this is ordered before we clear t-&gt;kov_{area,size}.
This ensures that any code execute while kcov_init_task() is preempted
will either see valid values for t-&gt;kcov_{area,size}, or will see that
t-&gt;kcov_mode is KCOV_MODE_DISABLED, and bail out without touching
t-&gt;kcov_area.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504135535.53744-2-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
