<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v4.4.3</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>modules: fix modparam async_probe request</title>
<updated>2016-02-25T20:01:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Luis R. Rodriguez</name>
<email>mcgrof@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-03T06:25:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e2f712dc927e3b9a981ecd86a64d944d0b140322'/>
<id>e2f712dc927e3b9a981ecd86a64d944d0b140322</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4355efbd80482a961cae849281a8ef866e53d55c upstream.

Commit f2411da746985 ("driver-core: add driver module
asynchronous probe support") added async probe support,
in two forms:

  * in-kernel driver specification annotation
  * generic async_probe module parameter (modprobe foo async_probe)

To support the generic kernel parameter parse_args() was
extended via commit ecc8617053e0 ("module: add extra
argument for parse_params() callback") however commit
failed to f2411da746985 failed to add the required argument.

This causes a crash then whenever async_probe generic
module parameter is used. This was overlooked when the
form in which in-kernel async probe support was reworked
a bit... Fix this as originally intended.

Cc: Hannes Reinecke &lt;hare@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov &lt;dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez &lt;mcgrof@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt; [minimized]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4355efbd80482a961cae849281a8ef866e53d55c upstream.

Commit f2411da746985 ("driver-core: add driver module
asynchronous probe support") added async probe support,
in two forms:

  * in-kernel driver specification annotation
  * generic async_probe module parameter (modprobe foo async_probe)

To support the generic kernel parameter parse_args() was
extended via commit ecc8617053e0 ("module: add extra
argument for parse_params() callback") however commit
failed to f2411da746985 failed to add the required argument.

This causes a crash then whenever async_probe generic
module parameter is used. This was overlooked when the
form in which in-kernel async probe support was reworked
a bit... Fix this as originally intended.

Cc: Hannes Reinecke &lt;hare@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov &lt;dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez &lt;mcgrof@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt; [minimized]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>module: wrapper for symbol name.</title>
<updated>2016-02-25T20:01:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rusty Russell</name>
<email>rusty@rustcorp.com.au</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-03T06:25:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a24d9a2fee9857a162ab18c9ad72aa6571ff4715'/>
<id>a24d9a2fee9857a162ab18c9ad72aa6571ff4715</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2e7bac536106236104e9e339531ff0fcdb7b8147 upstream.

This trivial wrapper adds clarity and makes the following patch
smaller.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2e7bac536106236104e9e339531ff0fcdb7b8147 upstream.

This trivial wrapper adds clarity and makes the following patch
smaller.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>itimers: Handle relative timers with CONFIG_TIME_LOW_RES proper</title>
<updated>2016-02-25T20:01:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-14T16:54:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=82e730baa9f7ba55cebe9365efde3e9f008d4376'/>
<id>82e730baa9f7ba55cebe9365efde3e9f008d4376</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 51cbb5242a41700a3f250ecfb48dcfb7e4375ea4 upstream.

As Helge reported for timerfd we have the same issue in itimers. We return
remaining time larger than the programmed relative time to user space in case
of CONFIG_TIME_LOW_RES=y. Use the proper function to adjust the extra time
added in hrtimer_start_range_ns().

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160114164159.528222587@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 51cbb5242a41700a3f250ecfb48dcfb7e4375ea4 upstream.

As Helge reported for timerfd we have the same issue in itimers. We return
remaining time larger than the programmed relative time to user space in case
of CONFIG_TIME_LOW_RES=y. Use the proper function to adjust the extra time
added in hrtimer_start_range_ns().

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160114164159.528222587@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>posix-timers: Handle relative timers with CONFIG_TIME_LOW_RES proper</title>
<updated>2016-02-25T20:01:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-14T16:54:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1c94da3e7480e3370945aad2b784343da9eb664f'/>
<id>1c94da3e7480e3370945aad2b784343da9eb664f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 572c39172684c3711e4a03c9a7380067e2b0661c upstream.

As Helge reported for timerfd we have the same issue in posix timers. We
return remaining time larger than the programmed relative time to user space
in case of CONFIG_TIME_LOW_RES=y. Use the proper function to adjust the extra
time added in hrtimer_start_range_ns().

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160114164159.450510905@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 572c39172684c3711e4a03c9a7380067e2b0661c upstream.

As Helge reported for timerfd we have the same issue in posix timers. We
return remaining time larger than the programmed relative time to user space
in case of CONFIG_TIME_LOW_RES=y. Use the proper function to adjust the extra
time added in hrtimer_start_range_ns().

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160114164159.450510905@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>prctl: take mmap sem for writing to protect against others</title>
<updated>2016-02-25T20:01:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mateusz Guzik</name>
<email>mguzik@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-20T23:01:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e5e99792b6474b38ef2dea33cbcd1dde5fd70330'/>
<id>e5e99792b6474b38ef2dea33cbcd1dde5fd70330</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ddf1d398e517e660207e2c807f76a90df543a217 upstream.

An unprivileged user can trigger an oops on a kernel with
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.

proc_pid_cmdline_read takes mmap_sem for reading and obtains args + env
start/end values. These get sanity checked as follows:
        BUG_ON(arg_start &gt; arg_end);
        BUG_ON(env_start &gt; env_end);

These can be changed by prctl_set_mm. Turns out also takes the semaphore for
reading, effectively rendering it useless. This results in:

  kernel BUG at fs/proc/base.c:240!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
  Modules linked in: virtio_net
  CPU: 0 PID: 925 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.4.0-rc8-next-20160105dupa+ #71
  Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
  task: ffff880077a68000 ti: ffff8800784d0000 task.ti: ffff8800784d0000
  RIP: proc_pid_cmdline_read+0x520/0x530
  RSP: 0018:ffff8800784d3db8  EFLAGS: 00010206
  RAX: ffff880077c5b6b0 RBX: ffff8800784d3f18 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00007f78e8857000 RDI: 0000000000000246
  RBP: ffff8800784d3e40 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: 0000000000000001
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000050
  R13: 00007f78e8857800 R14: ffff88006fcef000 R15: ffff880077c5b600
  FS:  00007f78e884a740(0000) GS:ffff88007b200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
  CR2: 00007f78e8361770 CR3: 00000000790a5000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
  Call Trace:
    __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
    vfs_read+0x82/0x130
    SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
    entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
  Code: 4c 8b 7d a8 eb e9 48 8b 9d 78 ff ff ff 4c 8b 7d 90 48 8b 03 48 39 45 a8 0f 87 f0 fe ff ff e9 d1 fe ff ff 4c 8b 7d 90 eb c6 0f 0b &lt;0f&gt; 0b 0f 0b 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00
  RIP   proc_pid_cmdline_read+0x520/0x530
  ---[ end trace 97882617ae9c6818 ]---

Turns out there are instances where the code just reads aformentioned
values without locking whatsoever - namely environ_read and get_cmdline.

Interestingly these functions look quite resilient against bogus values,
but I don't believe this should be relied upon.

The first patch gets rid of the oops bug by grabbing mmap_sem for
writing.

The second patch is optional and puts locking around aformentioned
consumers for safety.  Consumers of other fields don't seem to benefit
from similar treatment and are left untouched.

This patch (of 2):

The code was taking the semaphore for reading, which does not protect
against readers nor concurrent modifications.

The problem could cause a sanity checks to fail in procfs's cmdline
reader, resulting in an OOPS.

Note that some functions perform an unlocked read of various mm fields,
but they seem to be fine despite possible modificaton.

Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik &lt;mguzik@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jarod Wilson &lt;jarod@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Stancek &lt;jstancek@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Anshuman Khandual &lt;anshuman.linux@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ddf1d398e517e660207e2c807f76a90df543a217 upstream.

An unprivileged user can trigger an oops on a kernel with
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.

proc_pid_cmdline_read takes mmap_sem for reading and obtains args + env
start/end values. These get sanity checked as follows:
        BUG_ON(arg_start &gt; arg_end);
        BUG_ON(env_start &gt; env_end);

These can be changed by prctl_set_mm. Turns out also takes the semaphore for
reading, effectively rendering it useless. This results in:

  kernel BUG at fs/proc/base.c:240!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
  Modules linked in: virtio_net
  CPU: 0 PID: 925 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.4.0-rc8-next-20160105dupa+ #71
  Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
  task: ffff880077a68000 ti: ffff8800784d0000 task.ti: ffff8800784d0000
  RIP: proc_pid_cmdline_read+0x520/0x530
  RSP: 0018:ffff8800784d3db8  EFLAGS: 00010206
  RAX: ffff880077c5b6b0 RBX: ffff8800784d3f18 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00007f78e8857000 RDI: 0000000000000246
  RBP: ffff8800784d3e40 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: 0000000000000001
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000050
  R13: 00007f78e8857800 R14: ffff88006fcef000 R15: ffff880077c5b600
  FS:  00007f78e884a740(0000) GS:ffff88007b200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
  CR2: 00007f78e8361770 CR3: 00000000790a5000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
  Call Trace:
    __vfs_read+0x37/0x100
    vfs_read+0x82/0x130
    SyS_read+0x58/0xd0
    entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
  Code: 4c 8b 7d a8 eb e9 48 8b 9d 78 ff ff ff 4c 8b 7d 90 48 8b 03 48 39 45 a8 0f 87 f0 fe ff ff e9 d1 fe ff ff 4c 8b 7d 90 eb c6 0f 0b &lt;0f&gt; 0b 0f 0b 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00
  RIP   proc_pid_cmdline_read+0x520/0x530
  ---[ end trace 97882617ae9c6818 ]---

Turns out there are instances where the code just reads aformentioned
values without locking whatsoever - namely environ_read and get_cmdline.

Interestingly these functions look quite resilient against bogus values,
but I don't believe this should be relied upon.

The first patch gets rid of the oops bug by grabbing mmap_sem for
writing.

The second patch is optional and puts locking around aformentioned
consumers for safety.  Consumers of other fields don't seem to benefit
from similar treatment and are left untouched.

This patch (of 2):

The code was taking the semaphore for reading, which does not protect
against readers nor concurrent modifications.

The problem could cause a sanity checks to fail in procfs's cmdline
reader, resulting in an OOPS.

Note that some functions perform an unlocked read of various mm fields,
but they seem to be fine despite possible modificaton.

Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik &lt;mguzik@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jarod Wilson &lt;jarod@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Stancek &lt;jstancek@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Anshuman Khandual &lt;anshuman.linux@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Drop refcount if requeue_pi() acquired the rtmutex</title>
<updated>2016-02-25T20:01:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-19T20:07:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=acaf84251f8d49d0e7ee41d654f987dbd441f991'/>
<id>acaf84251f8d49d0e7ee41d654f987dbd441f991</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fb75a4282d0d9a3c7c44d940582c2d226cf3acfb upstream.

If the proxy lock in the requeue loop acquires the rtmutex for a
waiter then it acquired also refcount on the pi_state related to the
futex, but the waiter side does not drop the reference count.

Add the missing free_pi_state() call.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Darren Hart &lt;darren@dvhart.com&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dave@stgolabs.net&gt;
Cc: Bhuvanesh_Surachari@mentor.com
Cc: Andy Lowe &lt;Andy_Lowe@mentor.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151219200607.178132067@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit fb75a4282d0d9a3c7c44d940582c2d226cf3acfb upstream.

If the proxy lock in the requeue loop acquires the rtmutex for a
waiter then it acquired also refcount on the pi_state related to the
futex, but the waiter side does not drop the reference count.

Add the missing free_pi_state() call.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Darren Hart &lt;darren@dvhart.com&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dave@stgolabs.net&gt;
Cc: Bhuvanesh_Surachari@mentor.com
Cc: Andy Lowe &lt;Andy_Lowe@mentor.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151219200607.178132067@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>devm_memremap_release(): fix memremap'd addr handling</title>
<updated>2016-02-25T20:01:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Toshi Kani</name>
<email>toshi.kani@hpe.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-17T21:11:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=30066dcdf98a1474d71b3ce8a05f81e14a61a3bd'/>
<id>30066dcdf98a1474d71b3ce8a05f81e14a61a3bd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9273a8bbf58a15051e53a777389a502420ddc60e upstream.

The pmem driver calls devm_memremap() to map a persistent memory range.
When the pmem driver is unloaded, this memremap'd range is not released
so the kernel will leak a vma.

Fix devm_memremap_release() to handle a given memremap'd address
properly.

Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani &lt;toshi.kani@hpe.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Ross Zwisler &lt;ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9273a8bbf58a15051e53a777389a502420ddc60e upstream.

The pmem driver calls devm_memremap() to map a persistent memory range.
When the pmem driver is unloaded, this memremap'd range is not released
so the kernel will leak a vma.

Fix devm_memremap_release() to handle a given memremap'd address
properly.

Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani &lt;toshi.kani@hpe.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Ross Zwisler &lt;ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks</title>
<updated>2016-02-25T20:01:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jann@thejh.net</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-20T23:00:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=969624b7c1c8c9784651eb97431e6f2bbb7a024c'/>
<id>969624b7c1c8c9784651eb97431e6f2bbb7a024c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 upstream.

By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.

To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.

The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g.  by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.

While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.

In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:

 /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
     should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
     directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
     this scenario:
     lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -&gt; /root/foobar
     drwx------ root root /root
     drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
     -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret

Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jann@thejh.net&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 upstream.

By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.

To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.

The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g.  by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.

While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.

In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:

 /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
     should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
     directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
     this scenario:
     lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -&gt; /root/foobar
     drwx------ root root /root
     drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
     -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret

Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jann@thejh.net&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched: Fix crash in sched_init_numa()</title>
<updated>2016-02-17T20:31:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Raghavendra K T</name>
<email>raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-15T19:01:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a800cbddbc2042b042491867e96e2f3c5c0d3e3b'/>
<id>a800cbddbc2042b042491867e96e2f3c5c0d3e3b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9c03ee147193645be4c186d3688232fa438c57c7 upstream.

The following PowerPC commit:

  c118baf80256 ("arch/powerpc/mm/numa.c: do not allocate bootmem memory for non existing nodes")

avoids allocating bootmem memory for non existent nodes.

But when DEBUG_PER_CPU_MAPS=y is enabled, my powerNV system failed to boot
because in sched_init_numa(), cpumask_or() operation was done on
unallocated nodes.

Fix that by making cpumask_or() operation only on existing nodes.

[ Tested with and w/o DEBUG_PER_CPU_MAPS=y on x86 and PowerPC. ]

Reported-by: Jan Stancek &lt;jstancek@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jan Stancek &lt;jstancek@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Raghavendra K T &lt;raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;gkurz@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;grant.likely@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;nikunj@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;vdavydov@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;linux-mm@kvack.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: &lt;anton@samba.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1452884483-11676-1-git-send-email-raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9c03ee147193645be4c186d3688232fa438c57c7 upstream.

The following PowerPC commit:

  c118baf80256 ("arch/powerpc/mm/numa.c: do not allocate bootmem memory for non existing nodes")

avoids allocating bootmem memory for non existent nodes.

But when DEBUG_PER_CPU_MAPS=y is enabled, my powerNV system failed to boot
because in sched_init_numa(), cpumask_or() operation was done on
unallocated nodes.

Fix that by making cpumask_or() operation only on existing nodes.

[ Tested with and w/o DEBUG_PER_CPU_MAPS=y on x86 and PowerPC. ]

Reported-by: Jan Stancek &lt;jstancek@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jan Stancek &lt;jstancek@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Raghavendra K T &lt;raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;gkurz@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;grant.likely@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;nikunj@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;vdavydov@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;linux-mm@kvack.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: &lt;anton@samba.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1452884483-11676-1-git-send-email-raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hrtimer: Handle remaining time proper for TIME_LOW_RES</title>
<updated>2016-02-17T20:30:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-14T16:54:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=dd0d511548ea1ad8f233e9fa4a4acfb83af9bd29'/>
<id>dd0d511548ea1ad8f233e9fa4a4acfb83af9bd29</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 203cbf77de59fc8f13502dcfd11350c6d4a5c95f upstream.

If CONFIG_TIME_LOW_RES is enabled we add a jiffie to the relative timeout to
prevent short sleeps, but we do not account for that in interfaces which
retrieve the remaining time.

Helge observed that timerfd can return a remaining time larger than the
relative timeout. That's not expected and breaks userland test programs.

Store the information that the timer was armed relative and provide functions
to adjust the remaining time. To avoid bloating the hrtimer struct make state
a u8, which as a bonus results in better code on x86 at least.

Reported-and-tested-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160114164159.273328486@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 203cbf77de59fc8f13502dcfd11350c6d4a5c95f upstream.

If CONFIG_TIME_LOW_RES is enabled we add a jiffie to the relative timeout to
prevent short sleeps, but we do not account for that in interfaces which
retrieve the remaining time.

Helge observed that timerfd can return a remaining time larger than the
relative timeout. That's not expected and breaks userland test programs.

Store the information that the timer was armed relative and provide functions
to adjust the remaining time. To avoid bloating the hrtimer struct make state
a u8, which as a bonus results in better code on x86 at least.

Reported-and-tested-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160114164159.273328486@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
