<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v4.4.294</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>kprobes: Limit max data_size of the kretprobe instances</title>
<updated>2021-12-08T07:44:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Masami Hiramatsu</name>
<email>mhiramat@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-01T14:45:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fd923d7ca043932727a401111d37193342a1d76c'/>
<id>fd923d7ca043932727a401111d37193342a1d76c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6bbfa44116689469267f1a6e3d233b52114139d2 upstream.

The 'kprobe::data_size' is unsigned, thus it can not be negative.  But if
user sets it enough big number (e.g. (size_t)-8), the result of 'data_size
+ sizeof(struct kretprobe_instance)' becomes smaller than sizeof(struct
kretprobe_instance) or zero. In result, the kretprobe_instance are
allocated without enough memory, and kretprobe accesses outside of
allocated memory.

To avoid this issue, introduce a max limitation of the
kretprobe::data_size. 4KB per instance should be OK.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/163836995040.432120.10322772773821182925.stgit@devnote2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f47cd9b553aa ("kprobes: kretprobe user entry-handler")
Reported-by: zhangyue &lt;zhangyue1@kylinos.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6bbfa44116689469267f1a6e3d233b52114139d2 upstream.

The 'kprobe::data_size' is unsigned, thus it can not be negative.  But if
user sets it enough big number (e.g. (size_t)-8), the result of 'data_size
+ sizeof(struct kretprobe_instance)' becomes smaller than sizeof(struct
kretprobe_instance) or zero. In result, the kretprobe_instance are
allocated without enough memory, and kretprobe accesses outside of
allocated memory.

To avoid this issue, introduce a max limitation of the
kretprobe::data_size. 4KB per instance should be OK.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/163836995040.432120.10322772773821182925.stgit@devnote2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f47cd9b553aa ("kprobes: kretprobe user entry-handler")
Reported-by: zhangyue &lt;zhangyue1@kylinos.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Check pid filtering when creating events</title>
<updated>2021-12-08T07:44:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (VMware)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-26T18:35:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cad2eb4159d42ef590ff2c9c0d4045cdd05c9425'/>
<id>cad2eb4159d42ef590ff2c9c0d4045cdd05c9425</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6cb206508b621a9a0a2c35b60540e399225c8243 upstream.

When pid filtering is activated in an instance, all of the events trace
files for that instance has the PID_FILTER flag set. This determines
whether or not pid filtering needs to be done on the event, otherwise the
event is executed as normal.

If pid filtering is enabled when an event is created (via a dynamic event
or modules), its flag is not updated to reflect the current state, and the
events are not filtered properly.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3fdaf80f4a836 ("tracing: Implement event pid filtering")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6cb206508b621a9a0a2c35b60540e399225c8243 upstream.

When pid filtering is activated in an instance, all of the events trace
files for that instance has the PID_FILTER flag set. This determines
whether or not pid filtering needs to be done on the event, otherwise the
event is executed as normal.

If pid filtering is enabled when an event is created (via a dynamic event
or modules), its flag is not updated to reflect the current state, and the
events are not filtered properly.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3fdaf80f4a836 ("tracing: Implement event pid filtering")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/core: Mitigate race cpus_share_cache()/update_top_cache_domain()</title>
<updated>2021-11-26T10:58:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vincent Donnefort</name>
<email>vincent.donnefort@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-04T17:51:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=26efb10b1e2224af9b40f2a6917fbb53e4bd1387'/>
<id>26efb10b1e2224af9b40f2a6917fbb53e4bd1387</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 42dc938a590c96eeb429e1830123fef2366d9c80 ]

Nothing protects the access to the per_cpu variable sd_llc_id. When testing
the same CPU (i.e. this_cpu == that_cpu), a race condition exists with
update_top_cache_domain(). One scenario being:

              CPU1                            CPU2
  ==================================================================

  per_cpu(sd_llc_id, CPUX) =&gt; 0
                                    partition_sched_domains_locked()
      				      detach_destroy_domains()
  cpus_share_cache(CPUX, CPUX)          update_top_cache_domain(CPUX)
    per_cpu(sd_llc_id, CPUX) =&gt; 0
                                          per_cpu(sd_llc_id, CPUX) = CPUX
    per_cpu(sd_llc_id, CPUX) =&gt; CPUX
    return false

ttwu_queue_cond() wouldn't catch smp_processor_id() == cpu and the result
is a warning triggered from ttwu_queue_wakelist().

Avoid a such race in cpus_share_cache() by always returning true when
this_cpu == that_cpu.

Fixes: 518cd6234178 ("sched: Only queue remote wakeups when crossing cache boundaries")
Reported-by: Jing-Ting Wu &lt;jing-ting.wu@mediatek.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vincent Donnefort &lt;vincent.donnefort@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider &lt;valentin.schneider@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Vincent Guittot &lt;vincent.guittot@linaro.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211104175120.857087-1-vincent.donnefort@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 42dc938a590c96eeb429e1830123fef2366d9c80 ]

Nothing protects the access to the per_cpu variable sd_llc_id. When testing
the same CPU (i.e. this_cpu == that_cpu), a race condition exists with
update_top_cache_domain(). One scenario being:

              CPU1                            CPU2
  ==================================================================

  per_cpu(sd_llc_id, CPUX) =&gt; 0
                                    partition_sched_domains_locked()
      				      detach_destroy_domains()
  cpus_share_cache(CPUX, CPUX)          update_top_cache_domain(CPUX)
    per_cpu(sd_llc_id, CPUX) =&gt; 0
                                          per_cpu(sd_llc_id, CPUX) = CPUX
    per_cpu(sd_llc_id, CPUX) =&gt; CPUX
    return false

ttwu_queue_cond() wouldn't catch smp_processor_id() == cpu and the result
is a warning triggered from ttwu_queue_wakelist().

Avoid a such race in cpus_share_cache() by always returning true when
this_cpu == that_cpu.

Fixes: 518cd6234178 ("sched: Only queue remote wakeups when crossing cache boundaries")
Reported-by: Jing-Ting Wu &lt;jing-ting.wu@mediatek.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vincent Donnefort &lt;vincent.donnefort@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider &lt;valentin.schneider@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Vincent Guittot &lt;vincent.guittot@linaro.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211104175120.857087-1-vincent.donnefort@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PM: hibernate: Get block device exclusively in swsusp_check()</title>
<updated>2021-11-26T10:58:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ye Bin</name>
<email>yebin10@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-10-13T12:19:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e245b6ccaafb3c544b5b73133b254af44a53bc39'/>
<id>e245b6ccaafb3c544b5b73133b254af44a53bc39</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 39fbef4b0f77f9c89c8f014749ca533643a37c9f ]

The following kernel crash can be triggered:

[   89.266592] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   89.267427] kernel BUG at fs/buffer.c:3020!
[   89.268264] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[   89.269116] CPU: 7 PID: 1750 Comm: kmmpd-loop0 Not tainted 5.10.0-862.14.0.6.x86_64-08610-gc932cda3cef4-dirty #20
[   89.273169] RIP: 0010:submit_bh_wbc.isra.0+0x538/0x6d0
[   89.277157] RSP: 0018:ffff888105ddfd08 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   89.278093] RAX: 0000000000000005 RBX: ffff888124231498 RCX: ffffffffb2772612
[   89.279332] RDX: 1ffff11024846293 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff888124231498
[   89.280591] RBP: ffff8881248cc000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1024846294
[   89.281851] R10: ffff88812423149f R11: ffffed1024846293 R12: 0000000000003800
[   89.283095] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881161f7000
[   89.284342] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88839b5c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   89.285711] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   89.286701] CR2: 00007f166ebc01a0 CR3: 0000000435c0e000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[   89.287919] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   89.289138] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   89.290368] Call Trace:
[   89.290842]  write_mmp_block+0x2ca/0x510
[   89.292218]  kmmpd+0x433/0x9a0
[   89.294902]  kthread+0x2dd/0x3e0
[   89.296268]  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[   89.296906] Modules linked in:

by running the following commands:

 1. mkfs.ext4 -O mmp  /dev/sda -b 1024
 2. mount /dev/sda /home/test
 3. echo "/dev/sda" &gt; /sys/power/resume

That happens because swsusp_check() calls set_blocksize() on the
target partition which confuses the file system:

       Thread1                       Thread2
mount /dev/sda /home/test
get s_mmp_bh  --&gt; has mapped flag
start kmmpd thread
				echo "/dev/sda" &gt; /sys/power/resume
				  resume_store
				    software_resume
				      swsusp_check
				        set_blocksize
					  truncate_inode_pages_range
					    truncate_cleanup_page
					      block_invalidatepage
					        discard_buffer --&gt; clean mapped flag
write_mmp_block
  submit_bh
    submit_bh_wbc
      BUG_ON(!buffer_mapped(bh))

To address this issue, modify swsusp_check() to open the target block
device with exclusive access.

Signed-off-by: Ye Bin &lt;yebin10@huawei.com&gt;
[ rjw: Subject and changelog edits ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 39fbef4b0f77f9c89c8f014749ca533643a37c9f ]

The following kernel crash can be triggered:

[   89.266592] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   89.267427] kernel BUG at fs/buffer.c:3020!
[   89.268264] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[   89.269116] CPU: 7 PID: 1750 Comm: kmmpd-loop0 Not tainted 5.10.0-862.14.0.6.x86_64-08610-gc932cda3cef4-dirty #20
[   89.273169] RIP: 0010:submit_bh_wbc.isra.0+0x538/0x6d0
[   89.277157] RSP: 0018:ffff888105ddfd08 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   89.278093] RAX: 0000000000000005 RBX: ffff888124231498 RCX: ffffffffb2772612
[   89.279332] RDX: 1ffff11024846293 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff888124231498
[   89.280591] RBP: ffff8881248cc000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1024846294
[   89.281851] R10: ffff88812423149f R11: ffffed1024846293 R12: 0000000000003800
[   89.283095] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881161f7000
[   89.284342] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88839b5c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   89.285711] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   89.286701] CR2: 00007f166ebc01a0 CR3: 0000000435c0e000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[   89.287919] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   89.289138] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   89.290368] Call Trace:
[   89.290842]  write_mmp_block+0x2ca/0x510
[   89.292218]  kmmpd+0x433/0x9a0
[   89.294902]  kthread+0x2dd/0x3e0
[   89.296268]  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[   89.296906] Modules linked in:

by running the following commands:

 1. mkfs.ext4 -O mmp  /dev/sda -b 1024
 2. mount /dev/sda /home/test
 3. echo "/dev/sda" &gt; /sys/power/resume

That happens because swsusp_check() calls set_blocksize() on the
target partition which confuses the file system:

       Thread1                       Thread2
mount /dev/sda /home/test
get s_mmp_bh  --&gt; has mapped flag
start kmmpd thread
				echo "/dev/sda" &gt; /sys/power/resume
				  resume_store
				    software_resume
				      swsusp_check
				        set_blocksize
					  truncate_inode_pages_range
					    truncate_cleanup_page
					      block_invalidatepage
					        discard_buffer --&gt; clean mapped flag
write_mmp_block
  submit_bh
    submit_bh_wbc
      BUG_ON(!buffer_mapped(bh))

To address this issue, modify swsusp_check() to open the target block
device with exclusive access.

Signed-off-by: Ye Bin &lt;yebin10@huawei.com&gt;
[ rjw: Subject and changelog edits ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>signal: Remove the bogus sigkill_pending in ptrace_stop</title>
<updated>2021-11-26T10:58:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-01T18:21:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3f8f7b4ef6d97ba0015e675fd46c329869712e7e'/>
<id>3f8f7b4ef6d97ba0015e675fd46c329869712e7e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7d613f9f72ec8f90ddefcae038fdae5adb8404b3 upstream.

The existence of sigkill_pending is a little silly as it is
functionally a duplicate of fatal_signal_pending that is used in
exactly one place.

Checking for pending fatal signals and returning early in ptrace_stop
is actively harmful.  It casues the ptrace_stop called by
ptrace_signal to return early before setting current-&gt;exit_code.
Later when ptrace_signal reads the signal number from
current-&gt;exit_code is undefined, making it unpredictable what will
happen.

Instead rely on the fact that schedule will not sleep if there is a
pending signal that can awaken a task.

Removing the explict sigkill_pending test fixes fixes ptrace_signal
when ptrace_stop does not stop because current-&gt;exit_code is always
set to to signr.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3d749b9e676b ("ptrace: simplify ptrace_stop()-&gt;sigkill_pending() path")
Fixes: 1a669c2f16d4 ("Add arch_ptrace_stop")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87pmsyx29t.fsf@disp2133
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7d613f9f72ec8f90ddefcae038fdae5adb8404b3 upstream.

The existence of sigkill_pending is a little silly as it is
functionally a duplicate of fatal_signal_pending that is used in
exactly one place.

Checking for pending fatal signals and returning early in ptrace_stop
is actively harmful.  It casues the ptrace_stop called by
ptrace_signal to return early before setting current-&gt;exit_code.
Later when ptrace_signal reads the signal number from
current-&gt;exit_code is undefined, making it unpredictable what will
happen.

Instead rely on the fact that schedule will not sleep if there is a
pending signal that can awaken a task.

Removing the explict sigkill_pending test fixes fixes ptrace_signal
when ptrace_stop does not stop because current-&gt;exit_code is always
set to to signr.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3d749b9e676b ("ptrace: simplify ptrace_stop()-&gt;sigkill_pending() path")
Fixes: 1a669c2f16d4 ("Add arch_ptrace_stop")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87pmsyx29t.fsf@disp2133
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>printk/console: Allow to disable console output by using console="" or console=null</title>
<updated>2021-11-12T12:17:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Petr Mladek</name>
<email>pmladek@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-11T13:54:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0181a55027a0ff6f4cccccaae1b0e48ebd0c066f'/>
<id>0181a55027a0ff6f4cccccaae1b0e48ebd0c066f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3cffa06aeef7ece30f6b5ac0ea51f264e8fea4d0 upstream.

The commit 48021f98130880dd74 ("printk: handle blank console arguments
passed in.") prevented crash caused by empty console= parameter value.

Unfortunately, this value is widely used on Chromebooks to disable
the console output. The above commit caused performance regression
because the messages were pushed on slow console even though nobody
was watching it.

Use ttynull driver explicitly for console="" and console=null
parameters. It has been created for exactly this purpose.

It causes that preferred_console is set. As a result, ttySX and ttyX
are not used as a fallback. And only ttynull console gets registered by
default.

It still allows to register other consoles either by additional console=
parameters or SPCR. It prevents regression because it worked this way even
before. Also it is a sane semantic. Preventing output on all consoles
should be done another way, for example, by introducing mute_console
parameter.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201006025935.GA597@jagdpanzerIV.localdomain
Suggested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Acked-by: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201111135450.11214-3-pmladek@suse.com
Cc: Yi Fan &lt;yfa@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3cffa06aeef7ece30f6b5ac0ea51f264e8fea4d0 upstream.

The commit 48021f98130880dd74 ("printk: handle blank console arguments
passed in.") prevented crash caused by empty console= parameter value.

Unfortunately, this value is widely used on Chromebooks to disable
the console output. The above commit caused performance regression
because the messages were pushed on slow console even though nobody
was watching it.

Use ttynull driver explicitly for console="" and console=null
parameters. It has been created for exactly this purpose.

It causes that preferred_console is set. As a result, ttySX and ttyX
are not used as a fallback. And only ttynull console gets registered by
default.

It still allows to register other consoles either by additional console=
parameters or SPCR. It prevents regression because it worked this way even
before. Also it is a sane semantic. Preventing output on all consoles
should be done another way, for example, by introducing mute_console
parameter.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201006025935.GA597@jagdpanzerIV.localdomain
Suggested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Acked-by: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201111135450.11214-3-pmladek@suse.com
Cc: Yi Fan &lt;yfa@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Have all levels of checks prevent recursion</title>
<updated>2021-10-27T07:32:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (VMware)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-10-18T19:44:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=77bd0fb6e20472c02707439b2ecc2080a5fe5046'/>
<id>77bd0fb6e20472c02707439b2ecc2080a5fe5046</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ed65df63a39a3f6ed04f7258de8b6789e5021c18 upstream.

While writing an email explaining the "bit = 0" logic for a discussion on
making ftrace_test_recursion_trylock() disable preemption, I discovered a
path that makes the "not do the logic if bit is zero" unsafe.

The recursion logic is done in hot paths like the function tracer. Thus,
any code executed causes noticeable overhead. Thus, tricks are done to try
to limit the amount of code executed. This included the recursion testing
logic.

Having recursion testing is important, as there are many paths that can
end up in an infinite recursion cycle when tracing every function in the
kernel. Thus protection is needed to prevent that from happening.

Because it is OK to recurse due to different running context levels (e.g.
an interrupt preempts a trace, and then a trace occurs in the interrupt
handler), a set of bits are used to know which context one is in (normal,
softirq, irq and NMI). If a recursion occurs in the same level, it is
prevented*.

Then there are infrastructure levels of recursion as well. When more than
one callback is attached to the same function to trace, it calls a loop
function to iterate over all the callbacks. Both the callbacks and the
loop function have recursion protection. The callbacks use the
"ftrace_test_recursion_trylock()" which has a "function" set of context
bits to test, and the loop function calls the internal
trace_test_and_set_recursion() directly, with an "internal" set of bits.

If an architecture does not implement all the features supported by ftrace
then the callbacks are never called directly, and the loop function is
called instead, which will implement the features of ftrace.

Since both the loop function and the callbacks do recursion protection, it
was seemed unnecessary to do it in both locations. Thus, a trick was made
to have the internal set of recursion bits at a more significant bit
location than the function bits. Then, if any of the higher bits were set,
the logic of the function bits could be skipped, as any new recursion
would first have to go through the loop function.

This is true for architectures that do not support all the ftrace
features, because all functions being traced must first go through the
loop function before going to the callbacks. But this is not true for
architectures that support all the ftrace features. That's because the
loop function could be called due to two callbacks attached to the same
function, but then a recursion function inside the callback could be
called that does not share any other callback, and it will be called
directly.

i.e.

 traced_function_1: [ more than one callback tracing it ]
   call loop_func

 loop_func:
   trace_recursion set internal bit
   call callback

 callback:
   trace_recursion [ skipped because internal bit is set, return 0 ]
   call traced_function_2

 traced_function_2: [ only traced by above callback ]
   call callback

 callback:
   trace_recursion [ skipped because internal bit is set, return 0 ]
   call traced_function_2

 [ wash, rinse, repeat, BOOM! out of shampoo! ]

Thus, the "bit == 0 skip" trick is not safe, unless the loop function is
call for all functions.

Since we want to encourage architectures to implement all ftrace features,
having them slow down due to this extra logic may encourage the
maintainers to update to the latest ftrace features. And because this
logic is only safe for them, remove it completely.

 [*] There is on layer of recursion that is allowed, and that is to allow
     for the transition between interrupt context (normal -&gt; softirq -&gt;
     irq -&gt; NMI), because a trace may occur before the context update is
     visible to the trace recursion logic.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/609b565a-ed6e-a1da-f025-166691b5d994@linux.alibaba.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211018154412.09fcad3c@gandalf.local.home

Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" &lt;James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com&gt;
Cc: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Walmsley &lt;paul.walmsley@sifive.com&gt;
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt &lt;palmer@dabbelt.com&gt;
Cc: Albert Ou &lt;aou@eecs.berkeley.edu&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jikos@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Joe Lawrence &lt;joe.lawrence@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jisheng Zhang &lt;jszhang@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: =?utf-8?b?546L6LSH?= &lt;yun.wang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: Guo Ren &lt;guoren@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: edc15cafcbfa3 ("tracing: Avoid unnecessary multiple recursion checks")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ed65df63a39a3f6ed04f7258de8b6789e5021c18 upstream.

While writing an email explaining the "bit = 0" logic for a discussion on
making ftrace_test_recursion_trylock() disable preemption, I discovered a
path that makes the "not do the logic if bit is zero" unsafe.

The recursion logic is done in hot paths like the function tracer. Thus,
any code executed causes noticeable overhead. Thus, tricks are done to try
to limit the amount of code executed. This included the recursion testing
logic.

Having recursion testing is important, as there are many paths that can
end up in an infinite recursion cycle when tracing every function in the
kernel. Thus protection is needed to prevent that from happening.

Because it is OK to recurse due to different running context levels (e.g.
an interrupt preempts a trace, and then a trace occurs in the interrupt
handler), a set of bits are used to know which context one is in (normal,
softirq, irq and NMI). If a recursion occurs in the same level, it is
prevented*.

Then there are infrastructure levels of recursion as well. When more than
one callback is attached to the same function to trace, it calls a loop
function to iterate over all the callbacks. Both the callbacks and the
loop function have recursion protection. The callbacks use the
"ftrace_test_recursion_trylock()" which has a "function" set of context
bits to test, and the loop function calls the internal
trace_test_and_set_recursion() directly, with an "internal" set of bits.

If an architecture does not implement all the features supported by ftrace
then the callbacks are never called directly, and the loop function is
called instead, which will implement the features of ftrace.

Since both the loop function and the callbacks do recursion protection, it
was seemed unnecessary to do it in both locations. Thus, a trick was made
to have the internal set of recursion bits at a more significant bit
location than the function bits. Then, if any of the higher bits were set,
the logic of the function bits could be skipped, as any new recursion
would first have to go through the loop function.

This is true for architectures that do not support all the ftrace
features, because all functions being traced must first go through the
loop function before going to the callbacks. But this is not true for
architectures that support all the ftrace features. That's because the
loop function could be called due to two callbacks attached to the same
function, but then a recursion function inside the callback could be
called that does not share any other callback, and it will be called
directly.

i.e.

 traced_function_1: [ more than one callback tracing it ]
   call loop_func

 loop_func:
   trace_recursion set internal bit
   call callback

 callback:
   trace_recursion [ skipped because internal bit is set, return 0 ]
   call traced_function_2

 traced_function_2: [ only traced by above callback ]
   call callback

 callback:
   trace_recursion [ skipped because internal bit is set, return 0 ]
   call traced_function_2

 [ wash, rinse, repeat, BOOM! out of shampoo! ]

Thus, the "bit == 0 skip" trick is not safe, unless the loop function is
call for all functions.

Since we want to encourage architectures to implement all ftrace features,
having them slow down due to this extra logic may encourage the
maintainers to update to the latest ftrace features. And because this
logic is only safe for them, remove it completely.

 [*] There is on layer of recursion that is allowed, and that is to allow
     for the transition between interrupt context (normal -&gt; softirq -&gt;
     irq -&gt; NMI), because a trace may occur before the context update is
     visible to the trace recursion logic.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/609b565a-ed6e-a1da-f025-166691b5d994@linux.alibaba.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211018154412.09fcad3c@gandalf.local.home

Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" &lt;James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com&gt;
Cc: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Walmsley &lt;paul.walmsley@sifive.com&gt;
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt &lt;palmer@dabbelt.com&gt;
Cc: Albert Ou &lt;aou@eecs.berkeley.edu&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jikos@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Joe Lawrence &lt;joe.lawrence@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jisheng Zhang &lt;jszhang@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: =?utf-8?b?546L6LSH?= &lt;yun.wang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: Guo Ren &lt;guoren@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: edc15cafcbfa3 ("tracing: Avoid unnecessary multiple recursion checks")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>blktrace: Fix uaf in blk_trace access after removing by sysfs</title>
<updated>2021-10-06T08:22:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhihao Cheng</name>
<email>chengzhihao1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-23T13:49:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=488da313edf3abea7f7733efe011c96b23740ab5'/>
<id>488da313edf3abea7f7733efe011c96b23740ab5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5afedf670caf30a2b5a52da96eb7eac7dee6a9c9 ]

There is an use-after-free problem triggered by following process:

      P1(sda)				P2(sdb)
			echo 0 &gt; /sys/block/sdb/trace/enable
			  blk_trace_remove_queue
			    synchronize_rcu
			    blk_trace_free
			      relay_close
rcu_read_lock
__blk_add_trace
  trace_note_tsk
  (Iterate running_trace_list)
			        relay_close_buf
				  relay_destroy_buf
				    kfree(buf)
    trace_note(sdb's bt)
      relay_reserve
        buf-&gt;offset &lt;- nullptr deference (use-after-free) !!!
rcu_read_unlock

[  502.714379] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address:
0000000000000010
[  502.715260] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  502.715903] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  502.716546] PGD 103984067 P4D 103984067 PUD 17592b067 PMD 0
[  502.717252] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  502.720308] RIP: 0010:trace_note.isra.0+0x86/0x360
[  502.732872] Call Trace:
[  502.733193]  __blk_add_trace.cold+0x137/0x1a3
[  502.733734]  blk_add_trace_rq+0x7b/0xd0
[  502.734207]  blk_add_trace_rq_issue+0x54/0xa0
[  502.734755]  blk_mq_start_request+0xde/0x1b0
[  502.735287]  scsi_queue_rq+0x528/0x1140
...
[  502.742704]  sg_new_write.isra.0+0x16e/0x3e0
[  502.747501]  sg_ioctl+0x466/0x1100

Reproduce method:
  ioctl(/dev/sda, BLKTRACESETUP, blk_user_trace_setup[buf_size=127])
  ioctl(/dev/sda, BLKTRACESTART)
  ioctl(/dev/sdb, BLKTRACESETUP, blk_user_trace_setup[buf_size=127])
  ioctl(/dev/sdb, BLKTRACESTART)

  echo 0 &gt; /sys/block/sdb/trace/enable &amp;
  // Add delay(mdelay/msleep) before kernel enters blk_trace_free()

  ioctl$SG_IO(/dev/sda, SG_IO, ...)
  // Enters trace_note_tsk() after blk_trace_free() returned
  // Use mdelay in rcu region rather than msleep(which may schedule out)

Remove blk_trace from running_list before calling blk_trace_free() by
sysfs if blk_trace is at Blktrace_running state.

Fixes: c71a896154119f ("blktrace: add ftrace plugin")
Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng &lt;chengzhihao1@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210923134921.109194-1-chengzhihao1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5afedf670caf30a2b5a52da96eb7eac7dee6a9c9 ]

There is an use-after-free problem triggered by following process:

      P1(sda)				P2(sdb)
			echo 0 &gt; /sys/block/sdb/trace/enable
			  blk_trace_remove_queue
			    synchronize_rcu
			    blk_trace_free
			      relay_close
rcu_read_lock
__blk_add_trace
  trace_note_tsk
  (Iterate running_trace_list)
			        relay_close_buf
				  relay_destroy_buf
				    kfree(buf)
    trace_note(sdb's bt)
      relay_reserve
        buf-&gt;offset &lt;- nullptr deference (use-after-free) !!!
rcu_read_unlock

[  502.714379] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address:
0000000000000010
[  502.715260] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  502.715903] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  502.716546] PGD 103984067 P4D 103984067 PUD 17592b067 PMD 0
[  502.717252] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  502.720308] RIP: 0010:trace_note.isra.0+0x86/0x360
[  502.732872] Call Trace:
[  502.733193]  __blk_add_trace.cold+0x137/0x1a3
[  502.733734]  blk_add_trace_rq+0x7b/0xd0
[  502.734207]  blk_add_trace_rq_issue+0x54/0xa0
[  502.734755]  blk_mq_start_request+0xde/0x1b0
[  502.735287]  scsi_queue_rq+0x528/0x1140
...
[  502.742704]  sg_new_write.isra.0+0x16e/0x3e0
[  502.747501]  sg_ioctl+0x466/0x1100

Reproduce method:
  ioctl(/dev/sda, BLKTRACESETUP, blk_user_trace_setup[buf_size=127])
  ioctl(/dev/sda, BLKTRACESTART)
  ioctl(/dev/sdb, BLKTRACESETUP, blk_user_trace_setup[buf_size=127])
  ioctl(/dev/sdb, BLKTRACESTART)

  echo 0 &gt; /sys/block/sdb/trace/enable &amp;
  // Add delay(mdelay/msleep) before kernel enters blk_trace_free()

  ioctl$SG_IO(/dev/sda, SG_IO, ...)
  // Enters trace_note_tsk() after blk_trace_free() returned
  // Use mdelay in rcu region rather than msleep(which may schedule out)

Remove blk_trace from running_list before calling blk_trace_free() by
sysfs if blk_trace is at Blktrace_running state.

Fixes: c71a896154119f ("blktrace: add ftrace plugin")
Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng &lt;chengzhihao1@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210923134921.109194-1-chengzhihao1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>profiling: fix shift-out-of-bounds bugs</title>
<updated>2021-09-26T11:33:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Skripkin</name>
<email>paskripkin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-08T02:58:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=270b31d3e3a1b66dc40810140da7fcc0734f02e6'/>
<id>270b31d3e3a1b66dc40810140da7fcc0734f02e6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2d186afd04d669fe9c48b994c41a7405a3c9f16d upstream.

Syzbot reported shift-out-of-bounds bug in profile_init().
The problem was in incorrect prof_shift. Since prof_shift value comes from
userspace we need to clamp this value into [0, BITS_PER_LONG -1]
boundaries.

Second possible shiht-out-of-bounds was found by Tetsuo:
sample_step local variable in read_profile() had "unsigned int" type,
but prof_shift allows to make a BITS_PER_LONG shift. So, to prevent
possible shiht-out-of-bounds sample_step type was changed to
"unsigned long".

Also, "unsigned short int" will be sufficient for storing
[0, BITS_PER_LONG] value, that's why there is no need for
"unsigned long" prof_shift.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210813140022.5011-1-paskripkin@gmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e68c89a9510c159d9684@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin &lt;paskripkin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2d186afd04d669fe9c48b994c41a7405a3c9f16d upstream.

Syzbot reported shift-out-of-bounds bug in profile_init().
The problem was in incorrect prof_shift. Since prof_shift value comes from
userspace we need to clamp this value into [0, BITS_PER_LONG -1]
boundaries.

Second possible shiht-out-of-bounds was found by Tetsuo:
sample_step local variable in read_profile() had "unsigned int" type,
but prof_shift allows to make a BITS_PER_LONG shift. So, to prevent
possible shiht-out-of-bounds sample_step type was changed to
"unsigned long".

Also, "unsigned short int" will be sufficient for storing
[0, BITS_PER_LONG] value, that's why there is no need for
"unsigned long" prof_shift.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210813140022.5011-1-paskripkin@gmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e68c89a9510c159d9684@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin &lt;paskripkin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>prctl: allow to setup brk for et_dyn executables</title>
<updated>2021-09-26T11:33:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cyrill Gorcunov</name>
<email>gorcunov@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-08T03:00:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=806df2502fb36d0068a3c18af1c9d2102ac912df'/>
<id>806df2502fb36d0068a3c18af1c9d2102ac912df</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e1fbbd073137a9d63279f6bf363151a938347640 upstream.

Keno Fischer reported that when a binray loaded via ld-linux-x the
prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP) doesn't allow to setup brk value because it lays
before mm:end_data.

For example a test program shows

 | # ~/t
 |
 | start_code      401000
 | end_code        401a15
 | start_stack     7ffce4577dd0
 | start_data	   403e10
 | end_data        40408c
 | start_brk	   b5b000
 | sbrk(0)         b5b000

and when executed via ld-linux

 | # /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 ~/t
 |
 | start_code      7fc25b0a4000
 | end_code        7fc25b0c4524
 | start_stack     7fffcc6b2400
 | start_data	   7fc25b0ce4c0
 | end_data        7fc25b0cff98
 | start_brk	   55555710c000
 | sbrk(0)         55555710c000

This of course prevent criu from restoring such programs.  Looking into
how kernel operates with brk/start_brk inside brk() syscall I don't see
any problem if we allow to setup brk/start_brk without checking for
end_data.  Even if someone pass some weird address here on a purpose then
the worst possible result will be an unexpected unmapping of existing vma
(own vma, since prctl works with the callers memory) but test for
RLIMIT_DATA is still valid and a user won't be able to gain more memory in
case of expanding VMAs via new values shipped with prctl call.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210121221207.GB2174@grain
Fixes: bbdc6076d2e5 ("binfmt_elf: move brk out of mmap when doing direct loader exec")
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Keno Fischer &lt;keno@juliacomputing.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Safonov &lt;0x7f454c46@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Kirill Tkhai &lt;ktkhai@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Pavel Tikhomirov &lt;ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Mikhalitsyn &lt;alexander.mikhalitsyn@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
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commit e1fbbd073137a9d63279f6bf363151a938347640 upstream.

Keno Fischer reported that when a binray loaded via ld-linux-x the
prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP) doesn't allow to setup brk value because it lays
before mm:end_data.

For example a test program shows

 | # ~/t
 |
 | start_code      401000
 | end_code        401a15
 | start_stack     7ffce4577dd0
 | start_data	   403e10
 | end_data        40408c
 | start_brk	   b5b000
 | sbrk(0)         b5b000

and when executed via ld-linux

 | # /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 ~/t
 |
 | start_code      7fc25b0a4000
 | end_code        7fc25b0c4524
 | start_stack     7fffcc6b2400
 | start_data	   7fc25b0ce4c0
 | end_data        7fc25b0cff98
 | start_brk	   55555710c000
 | sbrk(0)         55555710c000

This of course prevent criu from restoring such programs.  Looking into
how kernel operates with brk/start_brk inside brk() syscall I don't see
any problem if we allow to setup brk/start_brk without checking for
end_data.  Even if someone pass some weird address here on a purpose then
the worst possible result will be an unexpected unmapping of existing vma
(own vma, since prctl works with the callers memory) but test for
RLIMIT_DATA is still valid and a user won't be able to gain more memory in
case of expanding VMAs via new values shipped with prctl call.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210121221207.GB2174@grain
Fixes: bbdc6076d2e5 ("binfmt_elf: move brk out of mmap when doing direct loader exec")
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Keno Fischer &lt;keno@juliacomputing.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Safonov &lt;0x7f454c46@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Kirill Tkhai &lt;ktkhai@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Pavel Tikhomirov &lt;ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Mikhalitsyn &lt;alexander.mikhalitsyn@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
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