linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v4.4.229

tracing: Fix event trigger to accept redundant spaces

2020-06-30T00:08:04+00:00

commit 6784beada631800f2c5afd567e5628c843362cee upstream.

Fix the event trigger to accept redundant spaces in
the trigger input.

For example, these return -EINVAL

echo " traceon" > events/ftrace/print/trigger
echo "traceon  if common_pid == 0" > events/ftrace/print/trigger
echo "disable_event:kmem:kmalloc " > events/ftrace/print/trigger

But these are hard to find what is wrong.

To fix this issue, use skip_spaces() to remove spaces
in front of actual tokens, and set NULL if there is no
token.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/159262476352.185015.5261566783045364186.stgit@devnote2

Cc: Tom Zanussi 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 85f2b08268c0 ("tracing: Add basic event trigger framework")
Reviewed-by: Tom Zanussi 
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

blktrace: break out of blktrace setup on concurrent calls

2020-06-30T00:08:02+00:00

[ Upstream commit 1b0b283648163dae2a214ca28ed5a99f62a77319 ]

We use one blktrace per request_queue, that means one per the entire
disk.  So we cannot run one blktrace on say /dev/vda and then /dev/vda1,
or just two calls on /dev/vda.

We check for concurrent setup only at the very end of the blktrace setup though.

If we try to run two concurrent blktraces on the same block device the
second one will fail, and the first one seems to go on. However when
one tries to kill the first one one will see things like this:

The kernel will show these:

```
debugfs: File 'dropped' in directory 'nvme1n1' already present!
debugfs: File 'msg' in directory 'nvme1n1' already present!
debugfs: File 'trace0' in directory 'nvme1n1' already present!
``

And userspace just sees this error message for the second call:

```
blktrace /dev/nvme1n1
BLKTRACESETUP(2) /dev/nvme1n1 failed: 5/Input/output error
```

The first userspace process #1 will also claim that the files
were taken underneath their nose as well. The files are taken
away form the first process given that when the second blktrace
fails, it will follow up with a BLKTRACESTOP and BLKTRACETEARDOWN.
This means that even if go-happy process #1 is waiting for blktrace
data, we *have* been asked to take teardown the blktrace.

This can easily be reproduced with break-blktrace [0] run_0005.sh test.

Just break out early if we know we're already going to fail, this will
prevent trying to create the files all over again, which we know still
exist.

[0] https://github.com/mcgrof/break-blktrace

Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain 
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara 
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche 
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

sched/core: Fix PI boosting between RT and DEADLINE tasks

2020-06-30T00:08:02+00:00

[ Upstream commit 740797ce3a124b7dd22b7fb832d87bc8fba1cf6f ]

syzbot reported the following warning:

 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6351 at kernel/sched/deadline.c:628
 enqueue_task_dl+0x22da/0x38a0 kernel/sched/deadline.c:1504

At deadline.c:628 we have:

 623 static inline void setup_new_dl_entity(struct sched_dl_entity *dl_se)
 624 {
 625 	struct dl_rq *dl_rq = dl_rq_of_se(dl_se);
 626 	struct rq *rq = rq_of_dl_rq(dl_rq);
 627
 628 	WARN_ON(dl_se->dl_boosted);
 629 	WARN_ON(dl_time_before(rq_clock(rq), dl_se->deadline));
        [...]
     }

Which means that setup_new_dl_entity() has been called on a task
currently boosted. This shouldn't happen though, as setup_new_dl_entity()
is only called when the 'dynamic' deadline of the new entity
is in the past w.r.t. rq_clock and boosted tasks shouldn't verify this
condition.

Digging through the PI code I noticed that what above might in fact happen
if an RT tasks blocks on an rt_mutex hold by a DEADLINE task. In the
first branch of boosting conditions we check only if a pi_task 'dynamic'
deadline is earlier than mutex holder's and in this case we set mutex
holder to be dl_boosted. However, since RT 'dynamic' deadlines are only
initialized if such tasks get boosted at some point (or if they become
DEADLINE of course), in general RT 'dynamic' deadlines are usually equal
to 0 and this verifies the aforementioned condition.

Fix it by checking that the potential donor task is actually (even if
temporary because in turn boosted) running at DEADLINE priority before
using its 'dynamic' deadline value.

Fixes: 2d3d891d3344 ("sched/deadline: Add SCHED_DEADLINE inheritance logic")
Reported-by: syzbot+119ba87189432ead09b4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Juri Lelli 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Reviewed-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira 
Tested-by: Daniel Wagner 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181119153201.GB2119@localhost.localdomain
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

kretprobe: Prevent triggering kretprobe from within kprobe_flush_task

2020-06-30T00:07:56+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9b38cc704e844e41d9cf74e647bff1d249512cb3 ]

Ziqian reported lockup when adding retprobe on _raw_spin_lock_irqsave.
My test was also able to trigger lockdep output:

 ============================================
 WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
 5.6.0-rc6+ #6 Not tainted
 --------------------------------------------
 sched-messaging/2767 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffffffff9a492798 (&(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock)){-.-.}, at: kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffffffff9a491a18 (&(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock)){-.-.}, at: kretprobe_trampoline+0x0/0x50

 other info that might help us debug this:
  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0
        ----
   lock(&(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock));
   lock(&(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock));

  *** DEADLOCK ***

  May be due to missing lock nesting notation

 1 lock held by sched-messaging/2767:
  #0: ffffffff9a491a18 (&(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock)){-.-.}, at: kretprobe_trampoline+0x0/0x50

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 3 PID: 2767 Comm: sched-messaging Not tainted 5.6.0-rc6+ #6
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x96/0xe0
  __lock_acquire.cold.57+0x173/0x2b7
  ? native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x42b/0x9e0
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x590/0x590
  ? __lock_acquire+0xf63/0x4030
  lock_acquire+0x15a/0x3d0
  ? kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0
  _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x36/0x70
  ? kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0
  kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0
  trampoline_handler+0xf8/0x940
  ? kprobe_fault_handler+0x380/0x380
  ? find_held_lock+0x3a/0x1c0
  kretprobe_trampoline+0x25/0x50
  ? lock_acquired+0x392/0xbc0
  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x70
  ? __get_valid_kprobe+0x1f0/0x1f0
  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3b/0x40
  ? finish_task_switch+0x4b9/0x6d0
  ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
  ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70

The code within the kretprobe handler checks for probe reentrancy,
so we won't trigger any _raw_spin_lock_irqsave probe in there.

The problem is in outside kprobe_flush_task, where we call:

  kprobe_flush_task
    kretprobe_table_lock
      raw_spin_lock_irqsave
        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave

where _raw_spin_lock_irqsave triggers the kretprobe and installs
kretprobe_trampoline handler on _raw_spin_lock_irqsave return.

The kretprobe_trampoline handler is then executed with already
locked kretprobe_table_locks, and first thing it does is to
lock kretprobe_table_locks ;-) the whole lockup path like:

  kprobe_flush_task
    kretprobe_table_lock
      raw_spin_lock_irqsave
        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave ---> probe triggered, kretprobe_trampoline installed

        ---> kretprobe_table_locks locked

        kretprobe_trampoline
          trampoline_handler
            kretprobe_hash_lock(current, &head, &flags);  <--- deadlock

Adding kprobe_busy_begin/end helpers that mark code with fake
probe installed to prevent triggering of another kprobe within
this code.

Using these helpers in kprobe_flush_task, so the probe recursion
protection check is hit and the probe is never set to prevent
above lockup.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/158927059835.27680.7011202830041561604.stgit@devnote2

Fixes: ef53d9c5e4da ("kprobes: improve kretprobe scalability with hashed locking")
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: "Gustavo A . R . Silva" 
Cc: Anders Roxell 
Cc: "Naveen N . Rao" 
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy 
Cc: David Miller 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: "Ziqian SUN (Zamir)" 
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

kprobes: Fix to protect kick_kprobe_optimizer() by kprobe_mutex

2020-06-30T00:07:56+00:00

[ Upstream commit 1a0aa991a6274161c95a844c58cfb801d681eb59 ]

In kprobe_optimizer() kick_kprobe_optimizer() is called
without kprobe_mutex, but this can race with other caller
which is protected by kprobe_mutex.

To fix that, expand kprobe_mutex protected area to protect
kick_kprobe_optimizer() call.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/158927057586.27680.5036330063955940456.stgit@devnote2

Fixes: cd7ebe2298ff ("kprobes: Use text_poke_smp_batch for optimizing")
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: "Gustavo A . R . Silva" 
Cc: Anders Roxell 
Cc: "Naveen N . Rao" 
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy 
Cc: David Miller 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Ziqian SUN 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

kernel/cpu_pm: Fix uninitted local in cpu_pm

2020-06-20T08:23:24+00:00

commit b5945214b76a1f22929481724ffd448000ede914 upstream.

cpu_pm_notify() is basically a wrapper of notifier_call_chain().
notifier_call_chain() doesn't initialize *nr_calls to 0 before it
starts incrementing it--presumably it's up to the callers to do this.

Unfortunately the callers of cpu_pm_notify() don't init *nr_calls.
This potentially means you could get too many or two few calls to
CPU_PM_ENTER_FAILED or CPU_CLUSTER_PM_ENTER_FAILED depending on the
luck of the stack.

Let's fix this.

Fixes: ab10023e0088 ("cpu_pm: Add cpu power management notifiers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki 
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd 
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200504104917.v6.3.I2d44fc0053d019f239527a4e5829416714b7e299@changeid
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kgdb: Prevent infinite recursive entries to the debugger

2020-06-20T08:23:19+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3ca676e4ca60d1834bb77535dafe24169cadacef ]

If we detect that we recursively entered the debugger we should hack
our I/O ops to NULL so that the panic() in the next line won't
actually cause another recursion into the debugger.  The first line of
kgdb_panic() will check this and return.

Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson 
Reviewed-by: Daniel Thompson 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200507130644.v4.6.I89de39f68736c9de610e6f241e68d8dbc44bc266@changeid
Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

sched/fair: Don't NUMA balance for kthreads

2020-06-20T08:23:15+00:00

[ Upstream commit 18f855e574d9799a0e7489f8ae6fd8447d0dd74a ]

Stefano reported a crash with using SQPOLL with io_uring:

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000003b0
  CPU: 2 PID: 1307 Comm: io_uring-sq Not tainted 5.7.0-rc7 #11
  RIP: 0010:task_numa_work+0x4f/0x2c0
  Call Trace:
   task_work_run+0x68/0xa0
   io_sq_thread+0x252/0x3d0
   kthread+0xf9/0x130
   ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

which is task_numa_work() oopsing on current->mm being NULL.

The task work is queued by task_tick_numa(), which checks if current->mm is
NULL at the time of the call. But this state isn't necessarily persistent,
if the kthread is using use_mm() to temporarily adopt the mm of a task.

Change the task_tick_numa() check to exclude kernel threads in general,
as it doesn't make sense to attempt ot balance for kthreads anyway.

Reported-by: Stefano Garzarella 
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/865de121-8190-5d30-ece5-3b097dc74431@kernel.dk
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

uprobes: ensure that uprobe->offset and ->ref_ctr_offset are properly aligned

2020-06-11T07:21:41+00:00

commit 013b2deba9a6b80ca02f4fafd7dedf875e9b4450 upstream.

uprobe_write_opcode() must not cross page boundary; prepare_uprobe()
relies on arch_uprobe_analyze_insn() which should validate "vaddr" but
some architectures (csky, s390, and sparc) don't do this.

We can remove the BUG_ON() check in prepare_uprobe() and validate the
offset early in __uprobe_register(). The new IS_ALIGNED() check matches
the alignment check in arch_prepare_kprobe() on supported architectures,
so I think that all insns must be aligned to UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE.

Another problem is __update_ref_ctr() which was wrong from the very
beginning, it can read/write outside of kmap'ed page unless "vaddr" is
aligned to sizeof(short), __uprobe_register() should check this too.

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds 
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju 
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger 
Tested-by: Sven Schnelle 
Cc: Steven Rostedt 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
[ check for ref_ctr_offset removed for backport - gregkh ]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

genirq/generic_pending: Do not lose pending affinity update

2020-06-03T06:12:14+00:00

commit a33a5d2d16cb84bea8d5f5510f3a41aa48b5c467 upstream.

The generic pending interrupt mechanism moves interrupts from the interrupt
handler on the original target CPU to the new destination CPU. This is
required for x86 and ia64 due to the way the interrupt delivery and
acknowledge works if the interrupts are not remapped.

However that update can fail for various reasons. Some of them are valid
reasons to discard the pending update, but the case, when the previous move
has not been fully cleaned up is not a legit reason to fail.

Check the return value of irq_do_set_affinity() for -EBUSY, which indicates
a pending cleanup, and rearm the pending move in the irq dexcriptor so it's
tried again when the next interrupt arrives.

Fixes: 996c591227d9 ("x86/irq: Plug vector cleanup race")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Tested-by: Song Liu 
Cc: Joerg Roedel 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Song Liu 
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mike Travis 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Tariq Toukan 
Cc: Guenter Roeck 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180604162224.386544292@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman