<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v4.19.47</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>rcuperf: Fix cleanup path for invalid perf_type strings</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:46:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul E. McKenney</name>
<email>paulmck@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-21T17:26:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=506b28fb998280c6b704945893520c97f7311a1c'/>
<id>506b28fb998280c6b704945893520c97f7311a1c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ad092c027713a68a34168942a5ef422e42e039f4 ]

If the specified rcuperf.perf_type is not in the rcu_perf_init()
function's perf_ops[] array, rcuperf prints some console messages and
then invokes rcu_perf_cleanup() to set state so that a future torture
test can run.  However, rcu_perf_cleanup() also attempts to end the
test that didn't actually start, and in doing so relies on the value
of cur_ops, a value that is not particularly relevant in this case.
This can result in confusing output or even follow-on failures due to
attempts to use facilities that have not been properly initialized.

This commit therefore sets the value of cur_ops to NULL in this case and
inserts a check near the beginning of rcu_perf_cleanup(), thus avoiding
relying on an irrelevant cur_ops value.

Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ad092c027713a68a34168942a5ef422e42e039f4 ]

If the specified rcuperf.perf_type is not in the rcu_perf_init()
function's perf_ops[] array, rcuperf prints some console messages and
then invokes rcu_perf_cleanup() to set state so that a future torture
test can run.  However, rcu_perf_cleanup() also attempts to end the
test that didn't actually start, and in doing so relies on the value
of cur_ops, a value that is not particularly relevant in this case.
This can result in confusing output or even follow-on failures due to
attempts to use facilities that have not been properly initialized.

This commit therefore sets the value of cur_ops to NULL in this case and
inserts a check near the beginning of rcu_perf_cleanup(), thus avoiding
relying on an irrelevant cur_ops value.

Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rcutorture: Fix cleanup path for invalid torture_type strings</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:46:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul E. McKenney</name>
<email>paulmck@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-21T16:27:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=aa7919e37fee531f6027a3b67f102f9c9fde03bb'/>
<id>aa7919e37fee531f6027a3b67f102f9c9fde03bb</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b813afae7ab6a5e91b4e16cc567331d9c2ae1f04 ]

If the specified rcutorture.torture_type is not in the rcu_torture_init()
function's torture_ops[] array, rcutorture prints some console messages
and then invokes rcu_torture_cleanup() to set state so that a future
torture test can run.  However, rcu_torture_cleanup() also attempts to
end the test that didn't actually start, and in doing so relies on the
value of cur_ops, a value that is not particularly relevant in this case.
This can result in confusing output or even follow-on failures due to
attempts to use facilities that have not been properly initialized.

This commit therefore sets the value of cur_ops to NULL in this case
and inserts a check near the beginning of rcu_torture_cleanup(),
thus avoiding relying on an irrelevant cur_ops value.

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;rong.a.chen@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b813afae7ab6a5e91b4e16cc567331d9c2ae1f04 ]

If the specified rcutorture.torture_type is not in the rcu_torture_init()
function's torture_ops[] array, rcutorture prints some console messages
and then invokes rcu_torture_cleanup() to set state so that a future
torture test can run.  However, rcu_torture_cleanup() also attempts to
end the test that didn't actually start, and in doing so relies on the
value of cur_ops, a value that is not particularly relevant in this case.
This can result in confusing output or even follow-on failures due to
attempts to use facilities that have not been properly initialized.

This commit therefore sets the value of cur_ops to NULL in this case
and inserts a check near the beginning of rcu_torture_cleanup(),
thus avoiding relying on an irrelevant cur_ops value.

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;rong.a.chen@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>timekeeping: Force upper bound for setting CLOCK_REALTIME</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:46:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-23T10:36:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=dc0f37b780e97d45c580a7141f6ac06b1ea5ba07'/>
<id>dc0f37b780e97d45c580a7141f6ac06b1ea5ba07</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7a8e61f8478639072d402a26789055a4a4de8f77 ]

Several people reported testing failures after setting CLOCK_REALTIME close
to the limits of the kernel internal representation in nanoseconds,
i.e. year 2262.

The failures are exposed in subsequent operations, i.e. when arming timers
or when the advancing CLOCK_MONOTONIC makes the calculation of
CLOCK_REALTIME overflow into negative space.

Now people start to paper over the underlying problem by clamping
calculations to the valid range, but that's just wrong because such
workarounds will prevent detection of real issues as well.

It is reasonable to force an upper bound for the various methods of setting
CLOCK_REALTIME. Year 2262 is the absolute upper bound. Assume a maximum
uptime of 30 years which is plenty enough even for esoteric embedded
systems. That results in an upper bound of year 2232 for setting the time.

Once that limit is reached in reality this limit is only a small part of
the problem space. But until then this stops people from trying to paper
over the problem at the wrong places.

Reported-by: Xiongfeng Wang &lt;wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com&gt;
Reported-by: Hongbo Yao &lt;yaohongbo@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Boyd &lt;sboyd@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Miroslav Lichvar &lt;mlichvar@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Richard Cochran &lt;richardcochran@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1903231125480.2157@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 7a8e61f8478639072d402a26789055a4a4de8f77 ]

Several people reported testing failures after setting CLOCK_REALTIME close
to the limits of the kernel internal representation in nanoseconds,
i.e. year 2262.

The failures are exposed in subsequent operations, i.e. when arming timers
or when the advancing CLOCK_MONOTONIC makes the calculation of
CLOCK_REALTIME overflow into negative space.

Now people start to paper over the underlying problem by clamping
calculations to the valid range, but that's just wrong because such
workarounds will prevent detection of real issues as well.

It is reasonable to force an upper bound for the various methods of setting
CLOCK_REALTIME. Year 2262 is the absolute upper bound. Assume a maximum
uptime of 30 years which is plenty enough even for esoteric embedded
systems. That results in an upper bound of year 2232 for setting the time.

Once that limit is reached in reality this limit is only a small part of
the problem space. But until then this stops people from trying to paper
over the problem at the wrong places.

Reported-by: Xiongfeng Wang &lt;wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com&gt;
Reported-by: Hongbo Yao &lt;yaohongbo@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Boyd &lt;sboyd@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Miroslav Lichvar &lt;mlichvar@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Richard Cochran &lt;richardcochran@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1903231125480.2157@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/uaccess, ftrace: Fix ftrace_likely_update() vs. SMAP</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:46:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-07T10:09:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1a3188d737ceb922166d8fe78a5fc4f89907e31b'/>
<id>1a3188d737ceb922166d8fe78a5fc4f89907e31b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4a6c91fbdef846ec7250b82f2eeeb87ac5f18cf9 ]

For CONFIG_TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING=y the likely/unlikely things get
overloaded and generate callouts to this code, and thus also when
AC=1.

Make it safe.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4a6c91fbdef846ec7250b82f2eeeb87ac5f18cf9 ]

For CONFIG_TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING=y the likely/unlikely things get
overloaded and generate callouts to this code, and thus also when
AC=1.

Make it safe.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>irq_work: Do not raise an IPI when queueing work on the local CPU</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:46:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Piggin</name>
<email>npiggin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-09T09:34:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=afee27f3825399a346a8dd94849c0e644dae3374'/>
<id>afee27f3825399a346a8dd94849c0e644dae3374</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 471ba0e686cb13752bc1ff3216c54b69a2d250ea ]

The QEMU PowerPC/PSeries machine model was not expecting a self-IPI,
and it may be a bit surprising thing to do, so have irq_work_queue_on
do local queueing when target is the current CPU.

Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Reported-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;frederic@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: =?UTF-8?q?C=C3=A9dric=20Le=20Goater?= &lt;clg@kaod.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Suraj Jitindar Singh &lt;sjitindarsingh@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190409093403.20994-1-npiggin@gmail.com
[ Simplified the preprocessor comments.
  Fixed unbalanced curly brackets pointed out by Thomas. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 471ba0e686cb13752bc1ff3216c54b69a2d250ea ]

The QEMU PowerPC/PSeries machine model was not expecting a self-IPI,
and it may be a bit surprising thing to do, so have irq_work_queue_on
do local queueing when target is the current CPU.

Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Reported-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin &lt;npiggin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;frederic@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: =?UTF-8?q?C=C3=A9dric=20Le=20Goater?= &lt;clg@kaod.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Suraj Jitindar Singh &lt;sjitindarsingh@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190409093403.20994-1-npiggin@gmail.com
[ Simplified the preprocessor comments.
  Fixed unbalanced curly brackets pointed out by Thomas. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/core: Handle overflow in cpu_shares_write_u64</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:46:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konstantin Khlebnikov</name>
<email>khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-27T08:10:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=355673f80835c9ddfa58b0aa18b48433394bba87'/>
<id>355673f80835c9ddfa58b0aa18b48433394bba87</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5b61d50ab4ef590f5e1d4df15cd2cea5f5715308 ]

Bit shift in scale_load() could overflow shares. This patch saturates
it to MAX_SHARES like following sched_group_set_shares().

Example:

 # echo 9223372036854776832 &gt; cpu.shares
 # cat cpu.shares

Before patch: 1024
After pattch: 262144

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155125501891.293431.3345233332801109696.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5b61d50ab4ef590f5e1d4df15cd2cea5f5715308 ]

Bit shift in scale_load() could overflow shares. This patch saturates
it to MAX_SHARES like following sched_group_set_shares().

Example:

 # echo 9223372036854776832 &gt; cpu.shares
 # cat cpu.shares

Before patch: 1024
After pattch: 262144

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155125501891.293431.3345233332801109696.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/rt: Check integer overflow at usec to nsec conversion</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:46:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konstantin Khlebnikov</name>
<email>khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-27T08:10:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7053046e350f04cfabf9b2c08e1f0e9da33e7ad4'/>
<id>7053046e350f04cfabf9b2c08e1f0e9da33e7ad4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1a010e29cfa00fee2888fd2fd4983f848cbafb58 ]

Example of unhandled overflows:

 # echo 18446744073709651 &gt; cpu.rt_runtime_us
 # cat cpu.rt_runtime_us
 99

 # echo 18446744073709900 &gt; cpu.rt_period_us
 # cat cpu.rt_period_us
 348

After this patch they will fail with -EINVAL.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155125501739.293431.5252197504404771496.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1a010e29cfa00fee2888fd2fd4983f848cbafb58 ]

Example of unhandled overflows:

 # echo 18446744073709651 &gt; cpu.rt_runtime_us
 # cat cpu.rt_runtime_us
 99

 # echo 18446744073709900 &gt; cpu.rt_period_us
 # cat cpu.rt_period_us
 348

After this patch they will fail with -EINVAL.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155125501739.293431.5252197504404771496.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/core: Check quota and period overflow at usec to nsec conversion</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:46:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Konstantin Khlebnikov</name>
<email>khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-27T08:10:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=925275d0cc5d3710a4c06b043d5563015595616b'/>
<id>925275d0cc5d3710a4c06b043d5563015595616b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1a8b4540db732ca16c9e43ac7c08b1b8f0b252d8 ]

Large values could overflow u64 and pass following sanity checks.

 # echo 18446744073750000 &gt; cpu.cfs_period_us
 # cat cpu.cfs_period_us
 40448

 # echo 18446744073750000 &gt; cpu.cfs_quota_us
 # cat cpu.cfs_quota_us
 40448

After this patch they will fail with -EINVAL.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155125502079.293431.3947497929372138600.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1a8b4540db732ca16c9e43ac7c08b1b8f0b252d8 ]

Large values could overflow u64 and pass following sanity checks.

 # echo 18446744073750000 &gt; cpu.cfs_period_us
 # cat cpu.cfs_period_us
 40448

 # echo 18446744073750000 &gt; cpu.cfs_quota_us
 # cat cpu.cfs_quota_us
 40448

After this patch they will fail with -EINVAL.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov &lt;khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155125502079.293431.3947497929372138600.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cgroup: protect cgroup-&gt;nr_(dying_)descendants by css_set_lock</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:46:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roman Gushchin</name>
<email>guro@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-19T17:03:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4e4d5cea79a7ec06844981b1db87d431bddcf50b'/>
<id>4e4d5cea79a7ec06844981b1db87d431bddcf50b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4dcabece4c3a9f9522127be12cc12cc120399b2f ]

The number of descendant cgroups and the number of dying
descendant cgroups are currently synchronized using the cgroup_mutex.

The number of descendant cgroups will be required by the cgroup v2
freezer, which will use it to determine if a cgroup is frozen
(depending on total number of descendants and number of frozen
descendants). It's not always acceptable to grab the cgroup_mutex,
especially from quite hot paths (e.g. exit()).

To avoid this, let's additionally synchronize these counters using
the css_set_lock.

So, it's safe to read these counters with either cgroup_mutex or
css_set_lock locked, and for changing both locks should be acquired.

Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin &lt;guro@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4dcabece4c3a9f9522127be12cc12cc120399b2f ]

The number of descendant cgroups and the number of dying
descendant cgroups are currently synchronized using the cgroup_mutex.

The number of descendant cgroups will be required by the cgroup v2
freezer, which will use it to determine if a cgroup is frozen
(depending on total number of descendants and number of frozen
descendants). It's not always acceptable to grab the cgroup_mutex,
especially from quite hot paths (e.g. exit()).

To avoid this, let's additionally synchronize these counters using
the css_set_lock.

So, it's safe to read these counters with either cgroup_mutex or
css_set_lock locked, and for changing both locks should be acquired.

Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin &lt;guro@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit: fix a memory leak bug</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:46:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wenwen Wang</name>
<email>wang6495@umn.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-20T01:49:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6c21fa849a5abbceb6b7b6db053adfe5fb5193f5'/>
<id>6c21fa849a5abbceb6b7b6db053adfe5fb5193f5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 70c4cf17e445264453bc5323db3e50aa0ac9e81f ]

In audit_rule_change(), audit_data_to_entry() is firstly invoked to
translate the payload data to the kernel's rule representation. In
audit_data_to_entry(), depending on the audit field type, an audit tree may
be created in audit_make_tree(), which eventually invokes kmalloc() to
allocate the tree.  Since this tree is a temporary tree, it will be then
freed in the following execution, e.g., audit_add_rule() if the message
type is AUDIT_ADD_RULE or audit_del_rule() if the message type is
AUDIT_DEL_RULE. However, if the message type is neither AUDIT_ADD_RULE nor
AUDIT_DEL_RULE, i.e., the default case of the switch statement, this
temporary tree is not freed.

To fix this issue, only allocate the tree when the type is AUDIT_ADD_RULE
or AUDIT_DEL_RULE.

Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang &lt;wang6495@umn.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 70c4cf17e445264453bc5323db3e50aa0ac9e81f ]

In audit_rule_change(), audit_data_to_entry() is firstly invoked to
translate the payload data to the kernel's rule representation. In
audit_data_to_entry(), depending on the audit field type, an audit tree may
be created in audit_make_tree(), which eventually invokes kmalloc() to
allocate the tree.  Since this tree is a temporary tree, it will be then
freed in the following execution, e.g., audit_add_rule() if the message
type is AUDIT_ADD_RULE or audit_del_rule() if the message type is
AUDIT_DEL_RULE. However, if the message type is neither AUDIT_ADD_RULE nor
AUDIT_DEL_RULE, i.e., the default case of the switch statement, this
temporary tree is not freed.

To fix this issue, only allocate the tree when the type is AUDIT_ADD_RULE
or AUDIT_DEL_RULE.

Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang &lt;wang6495@umn.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
