<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v4.14.237</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Correct the length check which causes memory corruption</title>
<updated>2021-06-16T09:53:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Liangyan</name>
<email>liangyan.peng@linux.alibaba.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-07T12:57:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2d598902799886d67947406f26ee8e5fd2ca097f'/>
<id>2d598902799886d67947406f26ee8e5fd2ca097f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3e08a9f9760f4a70d633c328a76408e62d6f80a3 upstream.

We've suffered from severe kernel crashes due to memory corruption on
our production environment, like,

Call Trace:
[1640542.554277] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[1640542.554856] CPU: 17 PID: 26996 Comm: python Kdump: loaded Tainted:G
[1640542.556629] RIP: 0010:kmem_cache_alloc+0x90/0x190
[1640542.559074] RSP: 0018:ffffb16faa597df8 EFLAGS: 00010286
[1640542.559587] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000400200 RCX:
0000000006e931bf
[1640542.560323] RDX: 0000000006e931be RSI: 0000000000400200 RDI:
ffff9a45ff004300
[1640542.560996] RBP: 0000000000400200 R08: 0000000000023420 R09:
0000000000000000
[1640542.561670] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:
ffffffff9a20608d
[1640542.562366] R13: ffff9a45ff004300 R14: ffff9a45ff004300 R15:
696c662f65636976
[1640542.563128] FS:  00007f45d7c6f740(0000) GS:ffff9a45ff840000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[1640542.563937] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[1640542.564557] CR2: 00007f45d71311a0 CR3: 000000189d63e004 CR4:
00000000003606e0
[1640542.565279] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2:
0000000000000000
[1640542.566069] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7:
0000000000000400
[1640542.566742] Call Trace:
[1640542.567009]  anon_vma_clone+0x5d/0x170
[1640542.567417]  __split_vma+0x91/0x1a0
[1640542.567777]  do_munmap+0x2c6/0x320
[1640542.568128]  vm_munmap+0x54/0x70
[1640542.569990]  __x64_sys_munmap+0x22/0x30
[1640542.572005]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1b0
[1640542.573724]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[1640542.575642] RIP: 0033:0x7f45d6e61e27

James Wang has reproduced it stably on the latest 4.19 LTS.
After some debugging, we finally proved that it's due to ftrace
buffer out-of-bound access using a debug tool as follows:
[   86.775200] BUG: Out-of-bounds write at addr 0xffff88aefe8b7000
[   86.780806]  no_context+0xdf/0x3c0
[   86.784327]  __do_page_fault+0x252/0x470
[   86.788367]  do_page_fault+0x32/0x140
[   86.792145]  page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[   86.795576]  strncpy_from_unsafe+0x66/0xb0
[   86.799789]  fetch_memory_string+0x25/0x40
[   86.804002]  fetch_deref_string+0x51/0x60
[   86.808134]  kprobe_trace_func+0x32d/0x3a0
[   86.812347]  kprobe_dispatcher+0x45/0x50
[   86.816385]  kprobe_ftrace_handler+0x90/0xf0
[   86.820779]  ftrace_ops_assist_func+0xa1/0x140
[   86.825340]  0xffffffffc00750bf
[   86.828603]  do_sys_open+0x5/0x1f0
[   86.832124]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1b0
[   86.835900]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

commit b220c049d519 ("tracing: Check length before giving out
the filter buffer") adds length check to protect trace data
overflow introduced in 0fc1b09ff1ff, seems that this fix can't prevent
overflow entirely, the length check should also take the sizeof
entry-&gt;array[0] into account, since this array[0] is filled the
length of trace data and occupy addtional space and risk overflow.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210607125734.1770447-1-liangyan.peng@linux.alibaba.com

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Xunlei Pang &lt;xlpang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Fixes: b220c049d519 ("tracing: Check length before giving out the filter buffer")
Reviewed-by: Xunlei Pang &lt;xlpang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: yinbinbin &lt;yinbinbin@alibabacloud.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Wetp Zhang &lt;wetp.zy@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Tested-by: James Wang &lt;jnwang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Liangyan &lt;liangyan.peng@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3e08a9f9760f4a70d633c328a76408e62d6f80a3 upstream.

We've suffered from severe kernel crashes due to memory corruption on
our production environment, like,

Call Trace:
[1640542.554277] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[1640542.554856] CPU: 17 PID: 26996 Comm: python Kdump: loaded Tainted:G
[1640542.556629] RIP: 0010:kmem_cache_alloc+0x90/0x190
[1640542.559074] RSP: 0018:ffffb16faa597df8 EFLAGS: 00010286
[1640542.559587] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000400200 RCX:
0000000006e931bf
[1640542.560323] RDX: 0000000006e931be RSI: 0000000000400200 RDI:
ffff9a45ff004300
[1640542.560996] RBP: 0000000000400200 R08: 0000000000023420 R09:
0000000000000000
[1640542.561670] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:
ffffffff9a20608d
[1640542.562366] R13: ffff9a45ff004300 R14: ffff9a45ff004300 R15:
696c662f65636976
[1640542.563128] FS:  00007f45d7c6f740(0000) GS:ffff9a45ff840000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[1640542.563937] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[1640542.564557] CR2: 00007f45d71311a0 CR3: 000000189d63e004 CR4:
00000000003606e0
[1640542.565279] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2:
0000000000000000
[1640542.566069] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7:
0000000000000400
[1640542.566742] Call Trace:
[1640542.567009]  anon_vma_clone+0x5d/0x170
[1640542.567417]  __split_vma+0x91/0x1a0
[1640542.567777]  do_munmap+0x2c6/0x320
[1640542.568128]  vm_munmap+0x54/0x70
[1640542.569990]  __x64_sys_munmap+0x22/0x30
[1640542.572005]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1b0
[1640542.573724]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[1640542.575642] RIP: 0033:0x7f45d6e61e27

James Wang has reproduced it stably on the latest 4.19 LTS.
After some debugging, we finally proved that it's due to ftrace
buffer out-of-bound access using a debug tool as follows:
[   86.775200] BUG: Out-of-bounds write at addr 0xffff88aefe8b7000
[   86.780806]  no_context+0xdf/0x3c0
[   86.784327]  __do_page_fault+0x252/0x470
[   86.788367]  do_page_fault+0x32/0x140
[   86.792145]  page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[   86.795576]  strncpy_from_unsafe+0x66/0xb0
[   86.799789]  fetch_memory_string+0x25/0x40
[   86.804002]  fetch_deref_string+0x51/0x60
[   86.808134]  kprobe_trace_func+0x32d/0x3a0
[   86.812347]  kprobe_dispatcher+0x45/0x50
[   86.816385]  kprobe_ftrace_handler+0x90/0xf0
[   86.820779]  ftrace_ops_assist_func+0xa1/0x140
[   86.825340]  0xffffffffc00750bf
[   86.828603]  do_sys_open+0x5/0x1f0
[   86.832124]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1b0
[   86.835900]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

commit b220c049d519 ("tracing: Check length before giving out
the filter buffer") adds length check to protect trace data
overflow introduced in 0fc1b09ff1ff, seems that this fix can't prevent
overflow entirely, the length check should also take the sizeof
entry-&gt;array[0] into account, since this array[0] is filled the
length of trace data and occupy addtional space and risk overflow.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210607125734.1770447-1-liangyan.peng@linux.alibaba.com

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Xunlei Pang &lt;xlpang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Fixes: b220c049d519 ("tracing: Check length before giving out the filter buffer")
Reviewed-by: Xunlei Pang &lt;xlpang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: yinbinbin &lt;yinbinbin@alibabacloud.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Wetp Zhang &lt;wetp.zy@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Tested-by: James Wang &lt;jnwang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Liangyan &lt;liangyan.peng@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ftrace: Do not blindly read the ip address in ftrace_bug()</title>
<updated>2021-06-16T09:53:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (VMware)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-08T01:39:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=acf671ba79c1feccc3ec7cfdcffead4efcec49e7'/>
<id>acf671ba79c1feccc3ec7cfdcffead4efcec49e7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6c14133d2d3f768e0a35128faac8aa6ed4815051 upstream.

It was reported that a bug on arm64 caused a bad ip address to be used for
updating into a nop in ftrace_init(), but the error path (rightfully)
returned -EINVAL and not -EFAULT, as the bug caused more than one error to
occur. But because -EINVAL was returned, the ftrace_bug() tried to report
what was at the location of the ip address, and read it directly. This
caused the machine to panic, as the ip was not pointing to a valid memory
address.

Instead, read the ip address with copy_from_kernel_nofault() to safely
access the memory, and if it faults, report that the address faulted,
otherwise report what was in that location.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210607032329.28671-1-mark-pk.tsai@mediatek.com/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 05736a427f7e1 ("ftrace: warn on failure to disable mcount callers")
Reported-by: Mark-PK Tsai &lt;mark-pk.tsai@mediatek.com&gt;
Tested-by: Mark-PK Tsai &lt;mark-pk.tsai@mediatek.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6c14133d2d3f768e0a35128faac8aa6ed4815051 upstream.

It was reported that a bug on arm64 caused a bad ip address to be used for
updating into a nop in ftrace_init(), but the error path (rightfully)
returned -EINVAL and not -EFAULT, as the bug caused more than one error to
occur. But because -EINVAL was returned, the ftrace_bug() tried to report
what was at the location of the ip address, and read it directly. This
caused the machine to panic, as the ip was not pointing to a valid memory
address.

Instead, read the ip address with copy_from_kernel_nofault() to safely
access the memory, and if it faults, report that the address faulted,
otherwise report what was in that location.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210607032329.28671-1-mark-pk.tsai@mediatek.com/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 05736a427f7e1 ("ftrace: warn on failure to disable mcount callers")
Reported-by: Mark-PK Tsai &lt;mark-pk.tsai@mediatek.com&gt;
Tested-by: Mark-PK Tsai &lt;mark-pk.tsai@mediatek.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Fix data race between pin_count increment/decrement</title>
<updated>2021-06-16T09:53:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marco Elver</name>
<email>elver@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-27T10:47:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e0e5c5ea305d21a4f8a3f8ac0b1a47fc7591d492'/>
<id>e0e5c5ea305d21a4f8a3f8ac0b1a47fc7591d492</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6c605f8371159432ec61cbb1488dcf7ad24ad19a upstream.

KCSAN reports a data race between increment and decrement of pin_count:

  write to 0xffff888237c2d4e0 of 4 bytes by task 15740 on cpu 1:
   find_get_context		kernel/events/core.c:4617
   __do_sys_perf_event_open	kernel/events/core.c:12097 [inline]
   __se_sys_perf_event_open	kernel/events/core.c:11933
   ...
  read to 0xffff888237c2d4e0 of 4 bytes by task 15743 on cpu 0:
   perf_unpin_context		kernel/events/core.c:1525 [inline]
   __do_sys_perf_event_open	kernel/events/core.c:12328 [inline]
   __se_sys_perf_event_open	kernel/events/core.c:11933
   ...

Because neither read-modify-write here is atomic, this can lead to one
of the operations being lost, resulting in an inconsistent pin_count.
Fix it by adding the missing locking in the CPU-event case.

Fixes: fe4b04fa31a6 ("perf: Cure task_oncpu_function_call() races")
Reported-by: syzbot+142c9018f5962db69c7e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210527104711.2671610-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6c605f8371159432ec61cbb1488dcf7ad24ad19a upstream.

KCSAN reports a data race between increment and decrement of pin_count:

  write to 0xffff888237c2d4e0 of 4 bytes by task 15740 on cpu 1:
   find_get_context		kernel/events/core.c:4617
   __do_sys_perf_event_open	kernel/events/core.c:12097 [inline]
   __se_sys_perf_event_open	kernel/events/core.c:11933
   ...
  read to 0xffff888237c2d4e0 of 4 bytes by task 15743 on cpu 0:
   perf_unpin_context		kernel/events/core.c:1525 [inline]
   __do_sys_perf_event_open	kernel/events/core.c:12328 [inline]
   __se_sys_perf_event_open	kernel/events/core.c:11933
   ...

Because neither read-modify-write here is atomic, this can lead to one
of the operations being lost, resulting in an inconsistent pin_count.
Fix it by adding the missing locking in the CPU-event case.

Fixes: fe4b04fa31a6 ("perf: Cure task_oncpu_function_call() races")
Reported-by: syzbot+142c9018f5962db69c7e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210527104711.2671610-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cgroup1: don't allow '\n' in renaming</title>
<updated>2021-06-16T09:53:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Kuznetsov</name>
<email>wwfq@yandex-team.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-09T07:17:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d2625eba1e9653e3333c12158b4e8958ffdc0fe4'/>
<id>d2625eba1e9653e3333c12158b4e8958ffdc0fe4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b7e24eb1caa5f8da20d405d262dba67943aedc42 upstream.

cgroup_mkdir() have restriction on newline usage in names:
$ mkdir $'/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu/test\ntest2'
mkdir: cannot create directory
'/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu/test\ntest2': Invalid argument

But in cgroup1_rename() such check is missed.
This allows us to make /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/cgroup unparsable:
$ mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu/test
$ mv /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu/test $'/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu/test\ntest2'
$ echo $$ &gt; $'/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu/test\ntest2'
$ cat /proc/self/cgroup
11:pids:/
10:freezer:/
9:hugetlb:/
8:cpuset:/
7:blkio:/user.slice
6:memory:/user.slice
5:net_cls,net_prio:/
4:perf_event:/
3:devices:/user.slice
2:cpu,cpuacct:/test
test2
1:name=systemd:/
0::/

Signed-off-by: Alexander Kuznetsov &lt;wwfq@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Reported-by: Andrey Krasichkov &lt;buglloc@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Acked-by: Dmitry Yakunin &lt;zeil@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b7e24eb1caa5f8da20d405d262dba67943aedc42 upstream.

cgroup_mkdir() have restriction on newline usage in names:
$ mkdir $'/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu/test\ntest2'
mkdir: cannot create directory
'/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu/test\ntest2': Invalid argument

But in cgroup1_rename() such check is missed.
This allows us to make /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/cgroup unparsable:
$ mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu/test
$ mv /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu/test $'/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu/test\ntest2'
$ echo $$ &gt; $'/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu/test\ntest2'
$ cat /proc/self/cgroup
11:pids:/
10:freezer:/
9:hugetlb:/
8:cpuset:/
7:blkio:/user.slice
6:memory:/user.slice
5:net_cls,net_prio:/
4:perf_event:/
3:devices:/user.slice
2:cpu,cpuacct:/test
test2
1:name=systemd:/
0::/

Signed-off-by: Alexander Kuznetsov &lt;wwfq@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Reported-by: Andrey Krasichkov &lt;buglloc@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Acked-by: Dmitry Yakunin &lt;zeil@yandex-team.ru&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>wq: handle VM suspension in stall detection</title>
<updated>2021-06-16T09:53:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sergey Senozhatsky</name>
<email>senozhatsky@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-20T10:14:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ec32c8aee92a2750557c504eed3a04fe0500a725'/>
<id>ec32c8aee92a2750557c504eed3a04fe0500a725</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 940d71c6462e8151c78f28e4919aa8882ff2054e ]

If VCPU is suspended (VM suspend) in wq_watchdog_timer_fn() then
once this VCPU resumes it will see the new jiffies value, while it
may take a while before IRQ detects PVCLOCK_GUEST_STOPPED on this
VCPU and updates all the watchdogs via pvclock_touch_watchdogs().
There is a small chance of misreported WQ stalls in the meantime,
because new jiffies is time_after() old 'ts + thresh'.

wq_watchdog_timer_fn()
{
	for_each_pool(pool, pi) {
		if (time_after(jiffies, ts + thresh)) {
			pr_emerg("BUG: workqueue lockup - pool");
		}
	}
}

Save jiffies at the beginning of this function and use that value
for stall detection. If VM gets suspended then we continue using
"old" jiffies value and old WQ touch timestamps. If IRQ at some
point restarts the stall detection cycle (pvclock_touch_watchdogs())
then old jiffies will always be before new 'ts + thresh'.

Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;senozhatsky@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 940d71c6462e8151c78f28e4919aa8882ff2054e ]

If VCPU is suspended (VM suspend) in wq_watchdog_timer_fn() then
once this VCPU resumes it will see the new jiffies value, while it
may take a while before IRQ detects PVCLOCK_GUEST_STOPPED on this
VCPU and updates all the watchdogs via pvclock_touch_watchdogs().
There is a small chance of misreported WQ stalls in the meantime,
because new jiffies is time_after() old 'ts + thresh'.

wq_watchdog_timer_fn()
{
	for_each_pool(pool, pi) {
		if (time_after(jiffies, ts + thresh)) {
			pr_emerg("BUG: workqueue lockup - pool");
		}
	}
}

Save jiffies at the beginning of this function and use that value
for stall detection. If VM gets suspended then we continue using
"old" jiffies value and old WQ touch timestamps. If IRQ at some
point restarts the stall detection cycle (pvclock_touch_watchdogs())
then old jiffies will always be before new 'ts + thresh'.

Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;senozhatsky@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cgroup: disable controllers at parse time</title>
<updated>2021-06-16T09:53:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Shakeel Butt</name>
<email>shakeelb@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-12T20:19:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=455c38eb8b351d11602836791a7c44f84f4f758f'/>
<id>455c38eb8b351d11602836791a7c44f84f4f758f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 45e1ba40837ac2f6f4d4716bddb8d44bd7e4a251 ]

This patch effectively reverts the commit a3e72739b7a7 ("cgroup: fix
too early usage of static_branch_disable()"). The commit 6041186a3258
("init: initialize jump labels before command line option parsing") has
moved the jump_label_init() before parse_args() which has made the
commit a3e72739b7a7 unnecessary. On the other hand there are
consequences of disabling the controllers later as there are subsystems
doing the controller checks for different decisions. One such incident
is reported [1] regarding the memory controller and its impact on memory
reclaim code.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/921e53f3-4b13-aab8-4a9e-e83ff15371e4@nec.com

Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt &lt;shakeelb@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: NOMURA JUNICHI(野村　淳一) &lt;junichi.nomura@nec.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Jun'ichi Nomura &lt;junichi.nomura@nec.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 45e1ba40837ac2f6f4d4716bddb8d44bd7e4a251 ]

This patch effectively reverts the commit a3e72739b7a7 ("cgroup: fix
too early usage of static_branch_disable()"). The commit 6041186a3258
("init: initialize jump labels before command line option parsing") has
moved the jump_label_init() before parse_args() which has made the
commit a3e72739b7a7 unnecessary. On the other hand there are
consequences of disabling the controllers later as there are subsystems
doing the controller checks for different decisions. One such incident
is reported [1] regarding the memory controller and its impact on memory
reclaim code.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/921e53f3-4b13-aab8-4a9e-e83ff15371e4@nec.com

Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt &lt;shakeelb@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: NOMURA JUNICHI(野村　淳一) &lt;junichi.nomura@nec.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Jun'ichi Nomura &lt;junichi.nomura@nec.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/fair: Optimize select_idle_cpu</title>
<updated>2021-06-10T10:43:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cheng Jian</name>
<email>cj.chengjian@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-13T02:45:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7308b7bd678d408ee4c97ee78dd08d097ad45607'/>
<id>7308b7bd678d408ee4c97ee78dd08d097ad45607</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 60588bfa223ff675b95f866249f90616613fbe31 upstream.

select_idle_cpu() will scan the LLC domain for idle CPUs,
it's always expensive. so the next commit :

	1ad3aaf3fcd2 ("sched/core: Implement new approach to scale select_idle_cpu()")

introduces a way to limit how many CPUs we scan.

But it consume some CPUs out of 'nr' that are not allowed
for the task and thus waste our attempts. The function
always return nr_cpumask_bits, and we can't find a CPU
which our task is allowed to run.

Cpumask may be too big, similar to select_idle_core(), use
per_cpu_ptr 'select_idle_mask' to prevent stack overflow.

Fixes: 1ad3aaf3fcd2 ("sched/core: Implement new approach to scale select_idle_cpu()")
Signed-off-by: Cheng Jian &lt;cj.chengjian@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju &lt;srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Vincent Guittot &lt;vincent.guittot@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider &lt;valentin.schneider@arm.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191213024530.28052-1-cj.chengjian@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Wei &lt;yang.wei@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Tested-by: Yang Wei &lt;yang.wei@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 60588bfa223ff675b95f866249f90616613fbe31 upstream.

select_idle_cpu() will scan the LLC domain for idle CPUs,
it's always expensive. so the next commit :

	1ad3aaf3fcd2 ("sched/core: Implement new approach to scale select_idle_cpu()")

introduces a way to limit how many CPUs we scan.

But it consume some CPUs out of 'nr' that are not allowed
for the task and thus waste our attempts. The function
always return nr_cpumask_bits, and we can't find a CPU
which our task is allowed to run.

Cpumask may be too big, similar to select_idle_core(), use
per_cpu_ptr 'select_idle_mask' to prevent stack overflow.

Fixes: 1ad3aaf3fcd2 ("sched/core: Implement new approach to scale select_idle_cpu()")
Signed-off-by: Cheng Jian &lt;cj.chengjian@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju &lt;srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Vincent Guittot &lt;vincent.guittot@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider &lt;valentin.schneider@arm.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191213024530.28052-1-cj.chengjian@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Wei &lt;yang.wei@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Tested-by: Yang Wei &lt;yang.wei@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: No need to simulate speculative domain for immediates</title>
<updated>2021-06-10T10:43:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-31T18:25:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6a87d309fefaabc18f694bd6d52bb3160557e4a9'/>
<id>6a87d309fefaabc18f694bd6d52bb3160557e4a9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a7036191277f9fa68d92f2071ddc38c09b1e5ee5 upstream.

In 801c6058d14a ("bpf: Fix leakage of uninitialized bpf stack under
speculation") we replaced masking logic with direct loads of immediates
if the register is a known constant. Given in this case we do not apply
any masking, there is also no reason for the operation to be truncated
under the speculative domain.

Therefore, there is also zero reason for the verifier to branch-off and
simulate this case, it only needs to do it for unknown but bounded scalars.
As a side-effect, this also enables few test cases that were previously
rejected due to simulation under zero truncation.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk &lt;piotras@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a7036191277f9fa68d92f2071ddc38c09b1e5ee5 upstream.

In 801c6058d14a ("bpf: Fix leakage of uninitialized bpf stack under
speculation") we replaced masking logic with direct loads of immediates
if the register is a known constant. Given in this case we do not apply
any masking, there is also no reason for the operation to be truncated
under the speculative domain.

Therefore, there is also zero reason for the verifier to branch-off and
simulate this case, it only needs to do it for unknown but bounded scalars.
As a side-effect, this also enables few test cases that were previously
rejected due to simulation under zero truncation.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk &lt;piotras@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix mask direction swap upon off reg sign change</title>
<updated>2021-06-10T10:43:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-31T18:25:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1dcebba3e4bd071c6647cad6f4a135b639725beb'/>
<id>1dcebba3e4bd071c6647cad6f4a135b639725beb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bb01a1bba579b4b1c5566af24d95f1767859771e upstream.

Masking direction as indicated via mask_to_left is considered to be
calculated once and then used to derive pointer limits. Thus, this
needs to be placed into bpf_sanitize_info instead so we can pass it
to sanitize_ptr_alu() call after the pointer move. Piotr noticed a
corner case where the off reg causes masking direction change which
then results in an incorrect final aux-&gt;alu_limit.

Fixes: 7fedb63a8307 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask")
Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk &lt;piotras@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk &lt;piotras@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit bb01a1bba579b4b1c5566af24d95f1767859771e upstream.

Masking direction as indicated via mask_to_left is considered to be
calculated once and then used to derive pointer limits. Thus, this
needs to be placed into bpf_sanitize_info instead so we can pass it
to sanitize_ptr_alu() call after the pointer move. Piotr noticed a
corner case where the off reg causes masking direction change which
then results in an incorrect final aux-&gt;alu_limit.

Fixes: 7fedb63a8307 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask")
Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk &lt;piotras@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk &lt;piotras@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Wrap aux data inside bpf_sanitize_info container</title>
<updated>2021-06-10T10:43:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-31T18:25:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=73549ddbe5cd2ddc27617202b6e426aebd417514'/>
<id>73549ddbe5cd2ddc27617202b6e426aebd417514</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3d0220f6861d713213b015b582e9f21e5b28d2e0 upstream.

Add a container structure struct bpf_sanitize_info which holds
the current aux info, and update call-sites to sanitize_ptr_alu()
to pass it in. This is needed for passing in additional state
later on.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk &lt;piotras@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3d0220f6861d713213b015b582e9f21e5b28d2e0 upstream.

Add a container structure struct bpf_sanitize_info which holds
the current aux info, and update call-sites to sanitize_ptr_alu()
to pass it in. This is needed for passing in additional state
later on.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk &lt;piotras@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
