linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v3.2.94

cpuset: PF_SPREAD_PAGE and PF_SPREAD_SLAB should be atomic flags

2017-10-12T14:27:22+00:00

commit 2ad654bc5e2b211e92f66da1d819e47d79a866f0 upstream.

When we change cpuset.memory_spread_{page,slab}, cpuset will flip
PF_SPREAD_{PAGE,SLAB} bit of tsk->flags for each task in that cpuset.
This should be done using atomic bitops, but currently we don't,
which is broken.

Tetsuo reported a hard-to-reproduce kernel crash on RHEL6, which happened
when one thread tried to clear PF_USED_MATH while at the same time another
thread tried to flip PF_SPREAD_PAGE/PF_SPREAD_SLAB. They both operate on
the same task.

Here's the full report:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/9/19/230

To fix this, we make PF_SPREAD_PAGE and PF_SPREAD_SLAB atomic flags.

v4:
- updated mm/slab.c. (Fengguang Wu)
- updated Documentation.

Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Miao Xie 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Fixes: 950592f7b991 ("cpusets: update tasks' page/slab spread flags in time")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa 
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li 
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo 
[lizf: Backported to 3.4:
 - adjust context
 - check current->flags & PF_MEMPOLICY rather than current->mempolicy]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

perf/core: Correct event creation with PERF_FORMAT_GROUP

2017-10-12T14:27:09+00:00

commit ba5213ae6b88fb170c4771fef6553f759c7d8cdd upstream.

Andi was asking about PERF_FORMAT_GROUP vs inherited events, which led
to the discovery of a bug from commit:

  3dab77fb1bf8 ("perf: Rework/fix the whole read vs group stuff")

 -       PERF_SAMPLE_GROUP                       = 1U << 4,
 +       PERF_SAMPLE_READ                        = 1U << 4,

 -       if (attr->inherit && (attr->sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_GROUP))
 +       if (attr->inherit && (attr->read_format & PERF_FORMAT_GROUP))

is a clear fail :/

While this changes user visible behaviour; it was previously possible
to create an inherited event with PERF_SAMPLE_READ; this is deemed
acceptible because its results were always incorrect.

Reported-by: Andi Kleen 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Alexander Shishkin 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Jiri Olsa 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Stephane Eranian 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Vince Weaver 
Fixes:  3dab77fb1bf8 ("perf: Rework/fix the whole read vs group stuff")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170530094512.dy2nljns2uq7qa3j@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

sched/topology: Fix building of overlapping sched-groups

2017-10-12T14:27:08+00:00

commit 0372dd2736e02672ac6e189c31f7d8c02ad543cd upstream.

When building the overlapping groups, we very obviously should start
with the previous domain of _this_ @cpu, not CPU-0.

This can be readily demonstrated with a topology like:

  node   0   1   2   3
    0:  10  20  30  20
    1:  20  10  20  30
    2:  30  20  10  20
    3:  20  30  20  10

Where (for example) CPU1 ends up generating the following nonsensical groups:

  [] CPU1 attaching sched-domain:
  []  domain 0: span 0-2 level NUMA
  []   groups: 1 2 0
  []   domain 1: span 0-3 level NUMA
  []    groups: 1-3 (cpu_capacity = 3072) 0-1,3 (cpu_capacity = 3072)

Where the fact that domain 1 doesn't include a group with span 0-2 is
the obvious fail.

With patch this looks like:

  [] CPU1 attaching sched-domain:
  []  domain 0: span 0-2 level NUMA
  []   groups: 1 0 2
  []   domain 1: span 0-3 level NUMA
  []    groups: 0-2 (cpu_capacity = 3072) 0,2-3 (cpu_capacity = 3072)

Debugged-by: Lauro Ramos Venancio 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Mike Galbraith 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e3589f6c81e4 ("sched: Allow for overlapping sched_domain spans")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks

2017-09-15T17:30:57+00:00

commit caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 upstream.

By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.

To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.

The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g.  by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.

While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.

In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:

 /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
     should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
     directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
     this scenario:
     lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
     drwx------ root root /root
     drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
     -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret

Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: Casey Schaufler 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: James Morris 
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" 
Cc: Andy Shevchenko 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Willy Tarreau 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Drop changes to kcmp, procfs map_files, procfs has_pid_permissions()
 - Keep using uid_t, gid_t and == operator for IDs
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

tracing/kprobes: Allow to create probe with a module name starting with a digit

2017-09-15T17:30:56+00:00

commit 9e52b32567126fe146f198971364f68d3bc5233f upstream.

Always try to parse an address, since kstrtoul() will safely fail when
given a symbol as input. If that fails (which will be the case for a
symbol), try to parse a symbol instead.

This allows creating a probe such as:

    p:probe/vlan_gro_receive 8021q:vlan_gro_receive+0

Which is necessary for this command to work:

    perf probe -m 8021q -a vlan_gro_receive

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/fd72d666f45b114e2c5b9cf7e27b91de1ec966f1.1498122881.git.sd@queasysnail.net

Fixes: 413d37d1e ("tracing: Add kprobe-based event tracer")
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu 
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) 
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: preserve the check that an addresses isn't used for
 a kretprobe]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

signal: Only reschedule timers on signals timers have sent

2017-09-15T17:30:54+00:00

commit 57db7e4a2d92c2d3dfbca4ef8057849b2682436b upstream.

Thomas Gleixner  wrote:
> The CRIU support added a 'feature' which allows a user space task to send
> arbitrary (kernel) signals to itself. The changelog says:
>
>   The kernel prevents sending of siginfo with positive si_code, because
>   these codes are reserved for kernel.  I think we can allow a task to
>   send such a siginfo to itself.  This operation should not be dangerous.
>
> Quite contrary to that claim, it turns out that it is outright dangerous
> for signals with info->si_code == SI_TIMER. The following code sequence in
> a user space task allows to crash the kernel:
>
>    id = timer_create(CLOCK_XXX, ..... signo = SIGX);
>    timer_set(id, ....);
>    info->si_signo = SIGX;
>    info->si_code = SI_TIMER:
>    info->_sifields._timer._tid = id;
>    info->_sifields._timer._sys_private = 2;
>    rt_[tg]sigqueueinfo(..., SIGX, info);
>    sigemptyset(&sigset);
>    sigaddset(&sigset, SIGX);
>    rt_sigtimedwait(sigset, info);
>
> For timers based on CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID, CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID this
> results in a kernel crash because sigwait() dequeues the signal and the
> dequeue code observes:
>
>   info->si_code == SI_TIMER && info->_sifields._timer._sys_private != 0
>
> which triggers the following callchain:
>
>  do_schedule_next_timer() -> posix_cpu_timer_schedule() -> arm_timer()
>
> arm_timer() executes a list_add() on the timer, which is already armed via
> the timer_set() syscall. That's a double list add which corrupts the posix
> cpu timer list. As a consequence the kernel crashes on the next operation
> touching the posix cpu timer list.
>
> Posix clocks which are internally implemented based on hrtimers are not
> affected by this because hrtimer_start() can handle already armed timers
> nicely, but it's a reliable way to trigger the WARN_ON() in
> hrtimer_forward(), which complains about calling that function on an
> already armed timer.

This problem has existed since the posix timer code was merged into
2.5.63. A few releases earlier in 2.5.60 ptrace gained the ability to
inject not just a signal (which linux has supported since 1.0) but the
full siginfo of a signal.

The core problem is that the code will reschedule in response to
signals getting dequeued not just for signals the timers sent but
for other signals that happen to a si_code of SI_TIMER.

Avoid this confusion by testing to see if the queued signal was
preallocated as all timer signals are preallocated, and so far
only the timer code preallocates signals.

Move the check for if a timer needs to be rescheduled up into
collect_signal where the preallocation check must be performed,
and pass the result back to dequeue_signal where the code reschedules
timers.   This makes it clear why the code cares about preallocated
timers.

Reported-by: Thomas Gleixner 
History Tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
Reference: 66dd34ad31e5 ("signal: allow to send any siginfo to itself")
Reference: 1669ce53e2ff ("Add PTRACE_GETSIGINFO and PTRACE_SETSIGINFO")
Fixes: db8b50ba75f2 ("[PATCH] POSIX clocks & timers")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

alarmtimer: Rate limit periodic intervals

2017-09-15T17:30:49+00:00

commit ff86bf0c65f14346bf2440534f9ba5ac232c39a0 upstream.

The alarmtimer code has another source of potentially rearming itself too
fast. Interval timers with a very samll interval have a similar CPU hog
effect as the previously fixed overflow issue.

The reason is that alarmtimers do not implement the normal protection
against this kind of problem which the other posix timer use:

  timer expires -> queue signal -> deliver signal -> rearm timer

This scheme brings the rearming under scheduler control and prevents
permanently firing timers which hog the CPU.

Bringing this scheme to the alarm timer code is a major overhaul because it
lacks all the necessary mechanisms completely.

So for a quick fix limit the interval to one jiffie. This is not
problematic in practice as alarmtimers are usually backed by an RTC for
suspend which have 1 second resolution. It could be therefor argued that
the resolution of this clock should be set to 1 second in general, but
that's outside the scope of this fix.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Kostya Serebryany 
Cc: syzkaller 
Cc: John Stultz 
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170530211655.896767100@linutronix.de
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Use ktime_to_ns()/ktime_set() as ktime_t is not scalar
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

alarmtimer: Prevent overflow of relative timers

2017-09-15T17:30:49+00:00

commit f4781e76f90df7aec400635d73ea4c35ee1d4765 upstream.

Andrey reported a alartimer related RCU stall while fuzzing the kernel with
syzkaller.

The reason for this is an overflow in ktime_add() which brings the
resulting time into negative space and causes immediate expiry of the
timer. The following rearm with a small interval does not bring the timer
back into positive space due to the same issue.

This results in a permanent firing alarmtimer which hogs the CPU.

Use ktime_add_safe() instead which detects the overflow and clamps the
result to KTIME_SEC_MAX.

Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Kostya Serebryany 
Cc: syzkaller 
Cc: John Stultz 
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170530211655.802921648@linutronix.de
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: drop change in alarm_start_relative()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

tracing/kprobes: Enforce kprobes teardown after testing

2017-09-15T17:30:44+00:00

commit 30e7d894c1478c88d50ce94ddcdbd7f9763d9cdd upstream.

Enabling the tracer selftest triggers occasionally the warning in
text_poke(), which warns when the to be modified page is not marked
reserved.

The reason is that the tracer selftest installs kprobes on functions marked
__init for testing. These probes are removed after the tests, but that
removal schedules the delayed kprobes_optimizer work, which will do the
actual text poke. If the work is executed after the init text is freed,
then the warning triggers. The bug can be reproduced reliably when the work
delay is increased.

Flush the optimizer work and wait for the optimizing/unoptimizing lists to
become empty before returning from the kprobes tracer selftest. That
ensures that all operations which were queued due to the probes removal
have completed.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170516094802.76a468bb@gandalf.local.home

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu 
Fixes: 6274de498 ("kprobes: Support delayed unoptimizing")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) 
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

padata: free correct variable

2017-08-26T01:13:59+00:00

commit 07a77929ba672d93642a56dc2255dd21e6e2290b upstream.

The author meant to free the variable that was just allocated, instead
of the one that failed to be allocated, but made a simple typo. This
patch rectifies that.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings