linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v3.16.80

tracing: Get trace_array reference for available_tracers files

2019-12-19T15:58:27+00:00

commit 194c2c74f5532e62c218adeb8e2b683119503907 upstream.

As instances may have different tracers available, we need to look at the
trace_array descriptor that shows the list of the available tracers for the
instance. But there's a race between opening the file and an admin
deleting the instance. The trace_array_get() needs to be called before
accessing the trace_array.

Fixes: 607e2ea167e56 ("tracing: Set up infrastructure to allow tracers for instances")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

sched/fair: Scale bandwidth quota and period without losing quota/period ratio precision

2019-12-19T15:58:17+00:00

commit 4929a4e6faa0f13289a67cae98139e727f0d4a97 upstream.

The quota/period ratio is used to ensure a child task group won't get
more bandwidth than the parent task group, and is calculated as:

  normalized_cfs_quota() = [(quota_us << 20) / period_us]

If the quota/period ratio was changed during this scaling due to
precision loss, it will cause inconsistency between parent and child
task groups.

See below example:

A userspace container manager (kubelet) does three operations:

 1) Create a parent cgroup, set quota to 1,000us and period to 10,000us.
 2) Create a few children cgroups.
 3) Set quota to 1,000us and period to 10,000us on a child cgroup.

These operations are expected to succeed. However, if the scaling of
147/128 happens before step 3, quota and period of the parent cgroup
will be changed:

  new_quota: 1148437ns,   1148us
 new_period: 11484375ns, 11484us

And when step 3 comes in, the ratio of the child cgroup will be
104857, which will be larger than the parent cgroup ratio (104821),
and will fail.

Scaling them by a factor of 2 will fix the problem.

Tested-by: Phil Auld 
Signed-off-by: Xuewei Zhang 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Acked-by: Phil Auld 
Cc: Anton Blanchard 
Cc: Ben Segall 
Cc: Dietmar Eggemann 
Cc: Juri Lelli 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Mel Gorman 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Steven Rostedt 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Vincent Guittot 
Fixes: 2e8e19226398 ("sched/fair: Limit sched_cfs_period_timer() loop to avoid hard lockup")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191004001243.140897-1-xueweiz@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

panic: ensure preemption is disabled during panic()

2019-12-19T15:58:13+00:00

commit 20bb759a66be52cf4a9ddd17fddaf509e11490cd upstream.

Calling 'panic()' on a kernel with CONFIG_PREEMPT=y can leave the
calling CPU in an infinite loop, but with interrupts and preemption
enabled.  From this state, userspace can continue to be scheduled,
despite the system being "dead" as far as the kernel is concerned.

This is easily reproducible on arm64 when booting with "nosmp" on the
command line; a couple of shell scripts print out a periodic "Ping"
message whilst another triggers a crash by writing to
/proc/sysrq-trigger:

  | sysrq: Trigger a crash
  | Kernel panic - not syncing: sysrq triggered crash
  | CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 5.2.15 #1
  | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  | Call trace:
  |  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x148
  |  show_stack+0x14/0x20
  |  dump_stack+0xa0/0xc4
  |  panic+0x140/0x32c
  |  sysrq_handle_reboot+0x0/0x20
  |  __handle_sysrq+0x124/0x190
  |  write_sysrq_trigger+0x64/0x88
  |  proc_reg_write+0x60/0xa8
  |  __vfs_write+0x18/0x40
  |  vfs_write+0xa4/0x1b8
  |  ksys_write+0x64/0xf0
  |  __arm64_sys_write+0x14/0x20
  |  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xb0/0x168
  |  el0_svc_handler+0x28/0x78
  |  el0_svc+0x8/0xc
  | Kernel Offset: disabled
  | CPU features: 0x0002,24002004
  | Memory Limit: none
  | ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: sysrq triggered crash ]---
  |  Ping 2!
  |  Ping 1!
  |  Ping 1!
  |  Ping 2!

The issue can also be triggered on x86 kernels if CONFIG_SMP=n,
otherwise local interrupts are disabled in 'smp_send_stop()'.

Disable preemption in 'panic()' before re-enabling interrupts.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191002123538.22609-1-will@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/BX1W47JXPMR8.58IYW53H6M5N@dragonstone
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon 
Reported-by: Xogium 
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: Russell King 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Petr Mladek 
Cc: Feng Tang 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

tick: broadcast-hrtimer: Fix a race in bc_set_next

2019-12-19T15:57:49+00:00

commit b9023b91dd020ad7e093baa5122b6968c48cc9e0 upstream.

When a cpu requests broadcasting, before starting the tick broadcast
hrtimer, bc_set_next() checks if the timer callback (bc_handler) is active
using hrtimer_try_to_cancel(). But hrtimer_try_to_cancel() does not provide
the required synchronization when the callback is active on other core.

The callback could have already executed tick_handle_oneshot_broadcast()
and could have also returned. But still there is a small time window where
the hrtimer_try_to_cancel() returns -1. In that case bc_set_next() returns
without doing anything, but the next_event of the tick broadcast clock
device is already set to a timeout value.

In the race condition diagram below, CPU #1 is running the timer callback
and CPU #2 is entering idle state and so calls bc_set_next().

In the worst case, the next_event will contain an expiry time, but the
hrtimer will not be started which happens when the racing callback returns
HRTIMER_NORESTART. The hrtimer might never recover if all further requests
from the CPUs to subscribe to tick broadcast have timeout greater than the
next_event of tick broadcast clock device. This leads to cascading of
failures and finally noticed as rcu stall warnings

Here is a depiction of the race condition

CPU #1 (Running timer callback)                   CPU #2 (Enter idle
                                                  and subscribe to
                                                  tick broadcast)
---------------------                             ---------------------

__run_hrtimer()                                   tick_broadcast_enter()

  bc_handler()                                      __tick_broadcast_oneshot_control()

    tick_handle_oneshot_broadcast()

      raw_spin_lock(&tick_broadcast_lock);

      dev->next_event = KTIME_MAX;                  //wait for tick_broadcast_lock
      //next_event for tick broadcast clock
      set to KTIME_MAX since no other cores
      subscribed to tick broadcasting

      raw_spin_unlock(&tick_broadcast_lock);

    if (dev->next_event == KTIME_MAX)
      return HRTIMER_NORESTART
    // callback function exits without
       restarting the hrtimer                      //tick_broadcast_lock acquired
                                                   raw_spin_lock(&tick_broadcast_lock);

                                                   tick_broadcast_set_event()

                                                     clockevents_program_event()

                                                       dev->next_event = expires;

                                                       bc_set_next()

                                                         hrtimer_try_to_cancel()
                                                         //returns -1 since the timer
                                                         callback is active. Exits without
                                                         restarting the timer
  cpu_base->running = NULL;

The comment that hrtimer cannot be armed from within the callback is
wrong. It is fine to start the hrtimer from within the callback. Also it is
safe to start the hrtimer from the enter/exit idle code while the broadcast
handler is active. The enter/exit idle code and the broadcast handler are
synchronized using tick_broadcast_lock. So there is no need for the
existing try to cancel logic. All this can be removed which will eliminate
the race condition as well.

Fixes: 5d1638acb9f6 ("tick: Introduce hrtimer based broadcast")
Originally-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Balasubramani Vivekanandan 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190926135101.12102-2-balasubramani_vivekanandan@mentor.com
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

tick: hrtimer-broadcast: Prevent endless restarting when broadcast device is unused

2019-12-19T15:57:49+00:00

commit 38d23a6cc16c02f7b0c920266053f340b5601735 upstream.

The hrtimer callback in the hrtimer's tick broadcast code sometimes
incorrectly ends up scheduling events at the current tick causing the
kernel to hang servicing the same hrtimer forever. This typically
happens when a device is swapped out by
tick_install_broadcast_device(), which replaces the event handler with
clock_events_handle_noop() and sets the device mode to
CLOCK_EVT_MODE_UNUSED. If the timer is scheduled when this happens,
the next_event field will not be updated and the hrtimer ends up being
restarted at the current tick. To prevent this from happening, only
try to restart the hrtimer if the broadcast clock event device is in
one of the active modes and try to cancel the timer when entering the
CLOCK_EVT_MODE_UNUSED mode.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Sandberg 
Tested-by: Catalin Marinas 
Acked-by: Mark Rutland 
Reviewed-by: Preeti U Murthy 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1429880765-5558-1-git-send-email-andreas.sandberg@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
[bwh: Backported to 3.16 as dependency of commit b9023b91dd02
 "tick: broadcast-hrtimer: Fix a race in bc_set_next"]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

tick: broadcast-hrtimer: Remove overly clever return value abuse

2019-12-19T15:57:48+00:00

commit b8a62f1ff0ccb18fdc25c6150d1cd394610f4753 upstream.

The assignment of bc_moved in the conditional construct relies on the
fact that in the case of hrtimer_start() invocation the return value
is always 0. It took me a while to understand it.

We want to get rid of the hrtimer_start() return value. Open code the
logic which makes it readable as well.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Preeti U Murthy 
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Viresh Kumar 
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti 
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150414203503.404751457@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
[bwh: Backported to 3.16 to ease backporting commit b9023b91dd02
 "tick: broadcast-hrtimer: Fix a race in bc_set_next"]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

hrtimer: Store cpu-number in struct hrtimer_cpu_base

2019-12-19T15:57:47+00:00

commit cddd02489f52ccf635ed65931214729a23b93cd6 upstream.

In lowres mode, hrtimers are serviced by the tick instead of a clock
event. Now it works well as long as the tick stays periodic but we
must also make sure that the hrtimers are serviced in dynticks mode.

Part of that job consist in kicking a dynticks hrtimer target in order
to make it reconsider the next tick to schedule to correctly handle the
hrtimer's expiring time. And that part isn't handled by the hrtimers
subsystem.

To prepare for fixing this, we need __hrtimer_start_range_ns() to be
able to resolve the CPU target associated to a hrtimer's object
'cpu_base' so that the kick can be centralized there.

So lets store it in the 'struct hrtimer_cpu_base' to resolve the CPU
without overhead. It is set once at CPU's online notification.

Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar 
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1403393357-2070-4-git-send-email-fweisbec@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
[bwh: Backported to 3.16 as dependency of commit b9023b91dd02
 "tick: broadcast-hrtimer: Fix a race in bc_set_next":
 - Adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

alarmtimer: Use EOPNOTSUPP instead of ENOTSUPP

2019-11-22T15:57:30+00:00

commit f18ddc13af981ce3c7b7f26925f099e7c6929aba upstream.

ENOTSUPP is not supposed to be returned to userspace. This was found on an
OpenPower machine, where the RTC does not support set_alarm.

On that system, a clock_nanosleep(CLOCK_REALTIME_ALARM, ...) results in
"524 Unknown error 524"

Replace it with EOPNOTSUPP which results in the expected "95 Operation not
supported" error.

Fixes: 1c6b39ad3f01 (alarmtimers: Return -ENOTSUPP if no RTC device is present)
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190903171802.28314-1-cascardo@canonical.com
[ pvorel: backport for v3.16, changes also in alarm_timer_{del,set}(), which
were removed in f2c45807d3992fe0f173f34af9c347d907c31686 in v4.13-rc1 ]
Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel 
Acked-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

genirq: Prevent NULL pointer dereference in resend_irqs()

2019-11-22T15:57:27+00:00

commit eddf3e9c7c7e4d0707c68d1bb22cc6ec8aef7d4a upstream.

The following crash was observed:

  Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158
  Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
  pc : resend_irqs+0x68/0xb0
  lr : resend_irqs+0x64/0xb0
  ...
  Call trace:
   resend_irqs+0x68/0xb0
   tasklet_action_common.isra.6+0x84/0x138
   tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
   __do_softirq+0x120/0x324
   run_ksoftirqd+0x44/0x60
   smpboot_thread_fn+0x1ac/0x1e8
   kthread+0x134/0x138
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

The reason for this is that the interrupt resend mechanism happens in soft
interrupt context, which is a asynchronous mechanism versus other
operations on interrupts. free_irq() does not take resend handling into
account. Thus, the irq descriptor might be already freed before the resend
tasklet is executed. resend_irqs() does not check the return value of the
interrupt descriptor lookup and derefences the return value
unconditionally.

  1):
  __setup_irq
    irq_startup
      check_irq_resend  // activate softirq to handle resend irq
  2):
  irq_domain_free_irqs
    irq_free_descs
      free_desc
        call_rcu(&desc->rcu, delayed_free_desc)
  3):
  __do_softirq
    tasklet_action
      resend_irqs
        desc = irq_to_desc(irq)
        desc->handle_irq(desc)  // desc is NULL --> Ooops

Fix this by adding a NULL pointer check in resend_irqs() before derefencing
the irq descriptor.

Fixes: a4633adcdbc1 ("[PATCH] genirq: add genirq sw IRQ-retrigger")
Signed-off-by: Yunfeng Ye 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Zhiqiang Liu 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1630ae13-5c8e-901e-de09-e740b6a426a7@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

sched/fair: Don't assign runtime for throttled cfs_rq

2019-11-22T15:57:26+00:00

commit 5e2d2cc2588bd3307ce3937acbc2ed03c830a861 upstream.

do_sched_cfs_period_timer() will refill cfs_b runtime and call
distribute_cfs_runtime to unthrottle cfs_rq, sometimes cfs_b->runtime
will allocate all quota to one cfs_rq incorrectly, then other cfs_rqs
attached to this cfs_b can't get runtime and will be throttled.

We find that one throttled cfs_rq has non-negative
cfs_rq->runtime_remaining and cause an unexpetced cast from s64 to u64
in snippet:

  distribute_cfs_runtime() {
    runtime = -cfs_rq->runtime_remaining + 1;
  }

The runtime here will change to a large number and consume all
cfs_b->runtime in this cfs_b period.

According to Ben Segall, the throttled cfs_rq can have
account_cfs_rq_runtime called on it because it is throttled before
idle_balance, and the idle_balance calls update_rq_clock to add time
that is accounted to the task.

This commit prevents cfs_rq to be assgined new runtime if it has been
throttled until that distribute_cfs_runtime is called.

Signed-off-by: Liangyan 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider 
Reviewed-by: Ben Segall 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: shanpeic@linux.alibaba.com
Cc: xlpang@linux.alibaba.com
Fixes: d3d9dc330236 ("sched: Throttle entities exceeding their allowed bandwidth")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190826121633.6538-1-liangyan.peng@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: Open-code SCHED_WARN_ON().]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings