<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v3.16.50</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>perf: Avoid horrible stack usage</title>
<updated>2017-11-11T13:34:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra (Intel)</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-16T11:47:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=17b9e402f8864261628403985e0dfad96af9e459'/>
<id>17b9e402f8864261628403985e0dfad96af9e459</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 86038c5ea81b519a8a1fcfcd5e4599aab0cdd119 upstream.

Both Linus (most recent) and Steve (a while ago) reported that perf
related callbacks have massive stack bloat.

The problem is that software events need a pt_regs in order to
properly report the event location and unwind stack. And because we
could not assume one was present we allocated one on stack and filled
it with minimal bits required for operation.

Now, pt_regs is quite large, so this is undesirable. Furthermore it
turns out that most sites actually have a pt_regs pointer available,
making this even more onerous, as the stack space is pointless waste.

This patch addresses the problem by observing that software events
have well defined nesting semantics, therefore we can use static
per-cpu storage instead of on-stack.

Linus made the further observation that all but the scheduler callers
of perf_sw_event() have a pt_regs available, so we change the regular
perf_sw_event() to require a valid pt_regs (where it used to be
optional) and add perf_sw_event_sched() for the scheduler.

We have a scheduler specific call instead of a more generic _noregs()
like construct because we can assume non-recursion from the scheduler
and thereby simplify the code further (_noregs would have to put the
recursion context call inline in order to assertain which __perf_regs
element to use).

One last note on the implementation of perf_trace_buf_prepare(); we
allow .regs = NULL for those cases where we already have a pt_regs
pointer available and do not need another.

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Reported-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Javi Merino &lt;javi.merino@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Tom Zanussi &lt;tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Vaibhav Nagarnaik &lt;vnagarnaik@google.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141216115041.GW3337@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 86038c5ea81b519a8a1fcfcd5e4599aab0cdd119 upstream.

Both Linus (most recent) and Steve (a while ago) reported that perf
related callbacks have massive stack bloat.

The problem is that software events need a pt_regs in order to
properly report the event location and unwind stack. And because we
could not assume one was present we allocated one on stack and filled
it with minimal bits required for operation.

Now, pt_regs is quite large, so this is undesirable. Furthermore it
turns out that most sites actually have a pt_regs pointer available,
making this even more onerous, as the stack space is pointless waste.

This patch addresses the problem by observing that software events
have well defined nesting semantics, therefore we can use static
per-cpu storage instead of on-stack.

Linus made the further observation that all but the scheduler callers
of perf_sw_event() have a pt_regs available, so we change the regular
perf_sw_event() to require a valid pt_regs (where it used to be
optional) and add perf_sw_event_sched() for the scheduler.

We have a scheduler specific call instead of a more generic _noregs()
like construct because we can assume non-recursion from the scheduler
and thereby simplify the code further (_noregs would have to put the
recursion context call inline in order to assertain which __perf_regs
element to use).

One last note on the implementation of perf_trace_buf_prepare(); we
allow .regs = NULL for those cases where we already have a pt_regs
pointer available and do not need another.

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Reported-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Javi Merino &lt;javi.merino@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Tom Zanussi &lt;tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Vaibhav Nagarnaik &lt;vnagarnaik@google.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141216115041.GW3337@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Fix group {cpu,task} validation</title>
<updated>2017-11-11T13:33:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-22T14:41:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3d64999a2430985579000d116c1292916cd1144b'/>
<id>3d64999a2430985579000d116c1292916cd1144b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 64aee2a965cf2954a038b5522f11d2cd2f0f8f3e upstream.

Regardless of which events form a group, it does not make sense for the
events to target different tasks and/or CPUs, as this leaves the group
inconsistent and impossible to schedule. The core perf code assumes that
these are consistent across (successfully intialised) groups.

Core perf code only verifies this when moving SW events into a HW
context. Thus, we can violate this requirement for pure SW groups and
pure HW groups, unless the relevant PMU driver happens to perform this
verification itself. These mismatched groups subsequently wreak havoc
elsewhere.

For example, we handle watchpoints as SW events, and reserve watchpoint
HW on a per-CPU basis at pmu::event_init() time to ensure that any event
that is initialised is guaranteed to have a slot at pmu::add() time.
However, the core code only checks the group leader's cpu filter (via
event_filter_match()), and can thus install follower events onto CPUs
violating thier (mismatched) CPU filters, potentially installing them
into a CPU without sufficient reserved slots.

This can be triggered with the below test case, resulting in warnings
from arch backends.

  #define _GNU_SOURCE
  #include &lt;linux/hw_breakpoint.h&gt;
  #include &lt;linux/perf_event.h&gt;
  #include &lt;sched.h&gt;
  #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
  #include &lt;sys/prctl.h&gt;
  #include &lt;sys/syscall.h&gt;
  #include &lt;unistd.h&gt;

  static int perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, pid_t pid, int cpu,
			   int group_fd, unsigned long flags)
  {
	return syscall(__NR_perf_event_open, attr, pid, cpu, group_fd, flags);
  }

  char watched_char;

  struct perf_event_attr wp_attr = {
	.type = PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT,
	.bp_type = HW_BREAKPOINT_RW,
	.bp_addr = (unsigned long)&amp;watched_char,
	.bp_len = 1,
	.size = sizeof(wp_attr),
  };

  int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  {
	int leader, ret;
	cpu_set_t cpus;

	/*
	 * Force use of CPU0 to ensure our CPU0-bound events get scheduled.
	 */
	CPU_ZERO(&amp;cpus);
	CPU_SET(0, &amp;cpus);
	ret = sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(cpus), &amp;cpus);
	if (ret) {
		printf("Unable to set cpu affinity\n");
		return 1;
	}

	/* open leader event, bound to this task, CPU0 only */
	leader = perf_event_open(&amp;wp_attr, 0, 0, -1, 0);
	if (leader &lt; 0) {
		printf("Couldn't open leader: %d\n", leader);
		return 1;
	}

	/*
	 * Open a follower event that is bound to the same task, but a
	 * different CPU. This means that the group should never be possible to
	 * schedule.
	 */
	ret = perf_event_open(&amp;wp_attr, 0, 1, leader, 0);
	if (ret &lt; 0) {
		printf("Couldn't open mismatched follower: %d\n", ret);
		return 1;
	} else {
		printf("Opened leader/follower with mismastched CPUs\n");
	}

	/*
	 * Open as many independent events as we can, all bound to the same
	 * task, CPU0 only.
	 */
	do {
		ret = perf_event_open(&amp;wp_attr, 0, 0, -1, 0);
	} while (ret &gt;= 0);

	/*
	 * Force enable/disble all events to trigger the erronoeous
	 * installation of the follower event.
	 */
	printf("Opened all events. Toggling..\n");
	for (;;) {
		prctl(PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
		prctl(PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
	}

	return 0;
  }

Fix this by validating this requirement regardless of whether we're
moving events.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Zhou Chengming &lt;zhouchengming1@huawei.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498142498-15758-1-git-send-email-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 64aee2a965cf2954a038b5522f11d2cd2f0f8f3e upstream.

Regardless of which events form a group, it does not make sense for the
events to target different tasks and/or CPUs, as this leaves the group
inconsistent and impossible to schedule. The core perf code assumes that
these are consistent across (successfully intialised) groups.

Core perf code only verifies this when moving SW events into a HW
context. Thus, we can violate this requirement for pure SW groups and
pure HW groups, unless the relevant PMU driver happens to perform this
verification itself. These mismatched groups subsequently wreak havoc
elsewhere.

For example, we handle watchpoints as SW events, and reserve watchpoint
HW on a per-CPU basis at pmu::event_init() time to ensure that any event
that is initialised is guaranteed to have a slot at pmu::add() time.
However, the core code only checks the group leader's cpu filter (via
event_filter_match()), and can thus install follower events onto CPUs
violating thier (mismatched) CPU filters, potentially installing them
into a CPU without sufficient reserved slots.

This can be triggered with the below test case, resulting in warnings
from arch backends.

  #define _GNU_SOURCE
  #include &lt;linux/hw_breakpoint.h&gt;
  #include &lt;linux/perf_event.h&gt;
  #include &lt;sched.h&gt;
  #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
  #include &lt;sys/prctl.h&gt;
  #include &lt;sys/syscall.h&gt;
  #include &lt;unistd.h&gt;

  static int perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, pid_t pid, int cpu,
			   int group_fd, unsigned long flags)
  {
	return syscall(__NR_perf_event_open, attr, pid, cpu, group_fd, flags);
  }

  char watched_char;

  struct perf_event_attr wp_attr = {
	.type = PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT,
	.bp_type = HW_BREAKPOINT_RW,
	.bp_addr = (unsigned long)&amp;watched_char,
	.bp_len = 1,
	.size = sizeof(wp_attr),
  };

  int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  {
	int leader, ret;
	cpu_set_t cpus;

	/*
	 * Force use of CPU0 to ensure our CPU0-bound events get scheduled.
	 */
	CPU_ZERO(&amp;cpus);
	CPU_SET(0, &amp;cpus);
	ret = sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(cpus), &amp;cpus);
	if (ret) {
		printf("Unable to set cpu affinity\n");
		return 1;
	}

	/* open leader event, bound to this task, CPU0 only */
	leader = perf_event_open(&amp;wp_attr, 0, 0, -1, 0);
	if (leader &lt; 0) {
		printf("Couldn't open leader: %d\n", leader);
		return 1;
	}

	/*
	 * Open a follower event that is bound to the same task, but a
	 * different CPU. This means that the group should never be possible to
	 * schedule.
	 */
	ret = perf_event_open(&amp;wp_attr, 0, 1, leader, 0);
	if (ret &lt; 0) {
		printf("Couldn't open mismatched follower: %d\n", ret);
		return 1;
	} else {
		printf("Opened leader/follower with mismastched CPUs\n");
	}

	/*
	 * Open as many independent events as we can, all bound to the same
	 * task, CPU0 only.
	 */
	do {
		ret = perf_event_open(&amp;wp_attr, 0, 0, -1, 0);
	} while (ret &gt;= 0);

	/*
	 * Force enable/disble all events to trigger the erronoeous
	 * installation of the follower event.
	 */
	printf("Opened all events. Toggling..\n");
	for (;;) {
		prctl(PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
		prctl(PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
	}

	return 0;
  }

Fix this by validating this requirement regardless of whether we're
moving events.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Zhou Chengming &lt;zhouchengming1@huawei.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498142498-15758-1-git-send-email-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Fix freeing of filter in create_filter() when set_str is false</title>
<updated>2017-11-11T13:33:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt (VMware)</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-23T16:46:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=718554be5c541ce8ef5bdb6fa34c0574fcbe5039'/>
<id>718554be5c541ce8ef5bdb6fa34c0574fcbe5039</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8b0db1a5bdfcee0dbfa89607672598ae203c9045 upstream.

Performing the following task with kmemleak enabled:

 # cd /sys/kernel/tracing/events/irq/irq_handler_entry/
 # echo 'enable_event:kmem:kmalloc:3 if irq &gt;' &gt; trigger
 # echo 'enable_event:kmem:kmalloc:3 if irq &gt; 31' &gt; trigger
 # echo scan &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
 # cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
unreferenced object 0xffff8800b9290308 (size 32):
  comm "bash", pid 1114, jiffies 4294848451 (age 141.139s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [&lt;ffffffff81cef5aa&gt;] kmemleak_alloc+0x4a/0xa0
    [&lt;ffffffff81357938&gt;] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x158/0x290
    [&lt;ffffffff81261c09&gt;] create_filter_start.constprop.28+0x99/0x940
    [&lt;ffffffff812639c9&gt;] create_filter+0xa9/0x160
    [&lt;ffffffff81263bdc&gt;] create_event_filter+0xc/0x10
    [&lt;ffffffff812655e5&gt;] set_trigger_filter+0xe5/0x210
    [&lt;ffffffff812660c4&gt;] event_enable_trigger_func+0x324/0x490
    [&lt;ffffffff812652e2&gt;] event_trigger_write+0x1a2/0x260
    [&lt;ffffffff8138cf87&gt;] __vfs_write+0xd7/0x380
    [&lt;ffffffff8138f421&gt;] vfs_write+0x101/0x260
    [&lt;ffffffff8139187b&gt;] SyS_write+0xab/0x130
    [&lt;ffffffff81cfd501&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
    [&lt;ffffffffffffffff&gt;] 0xffffffffffffffff

The function create_filter() is passed a 'filterp' pointer that gets
allocated, and if "set_str" is true, it is up to the caller to free it, even
on error. The problem is that the pointer is not freed by create_filter()
when set_str is false. This is a bug, and it is not up to the caller to free
the filter on error if it doesn't care about the string.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1502705898-27571-2-git-send-email-chuhu@redhat.com

Fixes: 38b78eb85 ("tracing: Factorize filter creation")
Reported-by: Chunyu Hu &lt;chuhu@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Chunyu Hu &lt;chuhu@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8b0db1a5bdfcee0dbfa89607672598ae203c9045 upstream.

Performing the following task with kmemleak enabled:

 # cd /sys/kernel/tracing/events/irq/irq_handler_entry/
 # echo 'enable_event:kmem:kmalloc:3 if irq &gt;' &gt; trigger
 # echo 'enable_event:kmem:kmalloc:3 if irq &gt; 31' &gt; trigger
 # echo scan &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
 # cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
unreferenced object 0xffff8800b9290308 (size 32):
  comm "bash", pid 1114, jiffies 4294848451 (age 141.139s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [&lt;ffffffff81cef5aa&gt;] kmemleak_alloc+0x4a/0xa0
    [&lt;ffffffff81357938&gt;] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x158/0x290
    [&lt;ffffffff81261c09&gt;] create_filter_start.constprop.28+0x99/0x940
    [&lt;ffffffff812639c9&gt;] create_filter+0xa9/0x160
    [&lt;ffffffff81263bdc&gt;] create_event_filter+0xc/0x10
    [&lt;ffffffff812655e5&gt;] set_trigger_filter+0xe5/0x210
    [&lt;ffffffff812660c4&gt;] event_enable_trigger_func+0x324/0x490
    [&lt;ffffffff812652e2&gt;] event_trigger_write+0x1a2/0x260
    [&lt;ffffffff8138cf87&gt;] __vfs_write+0xd7/0x380
    [&lt;ffffffff8138f421&gt;] vfs_write+0x101/0x260
    [&lt;ffffffff8139187b&gt;] SyS_write+0xab/0x130
    [&lt;ffffffff81cfd501&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
    [&lt;ffffffffffffffff&gt;] 0xffffffffffffffff

The function create_filter() is passed a 'filterp' pointer that gets
allocated, and if "set_str" is true, it is up to the caller to free it, even
on error. The problem is that the pointer is not freed by create_filter()
when set_str is false. This is a bug, and it is not up to the caller to free
the filter on error if it doesn't care about the string.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1502705898-27571-2-git-send-email-chuhu@redhat.com

Fixes: 38b78eb85 ("tracing: Factorize filter creation")
Reported-by: Chunyu Hu &lt;chuhu@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Chunyu Hu &lt;chuhu@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit: Fix use after free in audit_remove_watch_rule()</title>
<updated>2017-11-11T13:33:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-15T11:00:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9301343bc8d20d23c951dad6495b334ea797b5be'/>
<id>9301343bc8d20d23c951dad6495b334ea797b5be</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d76036ab47eafa6ce52b69482e91ca3ba337d6d6 upstream.

audit_remove_watch_rule() drops watch's reference to parent but then
continues to work with it. That is not safe as parent can get freed once
we drop our reference. The following is a trivial reproducer:

mount -o loop image /mnt
touch /mnt/file
auditctl -w /mnt/file -p wax
umount /mnt
auditctl -D
&lt;crash in fsnotify_destroy_mark()&gt;

Grab our own reference in audit_remove_watch_rule() earlier to make sure
mark does not get freed under us.

Reported-by: Tony Jones &lt;tonyj@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Tested-by: Tony Jones &lt;tonyj@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d76036ab47eafa6ce52b69482e91ca3ba337d6d6 upstream.

audit_remove_watch_rule() drops watch's reference to parent but then
continues to work with it. That is not safe as parent can get freed once
we drop our reference. The following is a trivial reproducer:

mount -o loop image /mnt
touch /mnt/file
auditctl -w /mnt/file -p wax
umount /mnt
auditctl -D
&lt;crash in fsnotify_destroy_mark()&gt;

Grab our own reference in audit_remove_watch_rule() earlier to make sure
mark does not get freed under us.

Reported-by: Tony Jones &lt;tonyj@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Tested-by: Tony Jones &lt;tonyj@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: migrate: prevent racy access to tlb_flush_pending</title>
<updated>2017-11-11T13:33:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nadav Amit</name>
<email>nadav.amit@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-08-10T22:23:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7b590b41334c3bdaff71038b46a2ed81731573af'/>
<id>7b590b41334c3bdaff71038b46a2ed81731573af</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 16af97dc5a8975371a83d9e30a64038b48f40a2d upstream.

Patch series "fixes of TLB batching races", v6.

It turns out that Linux TLB batching mechanism suffers from various
races.  Races that are caused due to batching during reclamation were
recently handled by Mel and this patch-set deals with others.  The more
fundamental issue is that concurrent updates of the page-tables allow
for TLB flushes to be batched on one core, while another core changes
the page-tables.  This other core may assume a PTE change does not
require a flush based on the updated PTE value, while it is unaware that
TLB flushes are still pending.

This behavior affects KSM (which may result in memory corruption) and
MADV_FREE and MADV_DONTNEED (which may result in incorrect behavior).  A
proof-of-concept can easily produce the wrong behavior of MADV_DONTNEED.
Memory corruption in KSM is harder to produce in practice, but was
observed by hacking the kernel and adding a delay before flushing and
replacing the KSM page.

Finally, there is also one memory barrier missing, which may affect
architectures with weak memory model.

This patch (of 7):

Setting and clearing mm-&gt;tlb_flush_pending can be performed by multiple
threads, since mmap_sem may only be acquired for read in
task_numa_work().  If this happens, tlb_flush_pending might be cleared
while one of the threads still changes PTEs and batches TLB flushes.

This can lead to the same race between migration and
change_protection_range() that led to the introduction of
tlb_flush_pending.  The result of this race was data corruption, which
means that this patch also addresses a theoretically possible data
corruption.

An actual data corruption was not observed, yet the race was was
confirmed by adding assertion to check tlb_flush_pending is not set by
two threads, adding artificial latency in change_protection_range() and
using sysctl to reduce kernel.numa_balancing_scan_delay_ms.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170802000818.4760-2-namit@vmware.com
Fixes: 20841405940e ("mm: fix TLB flush race between migration, and
change_protection_range")
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit &lt;namit@vmware.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Minchan Kim &lt;minchan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jeff Dike &lt;jdike@addtoit.com&gt;
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@techsingularity.net&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Yoshinori Sato &lt;ysato@users.sourceforge.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Drop change to dump_mm()
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 16af97dc5a8975371a83d9e30a64038b48f40a2d upstream.

Patch series "fixes of TLB batching races", v6.

It turns out that Linux TLB batching mechanism suffers from various
races.  Races that are caused due to batching during reclamation were
recently handled by Mel and this patch-set deals with others.  The more
fundamental issue is that concurrent updates of the page-tables allow
for TLB flushes to be batched on one core, while another core changes
the page-tables.  This other core may assume a PTE change does not
require a flush based on the updated PTE value, while it is unaware that
TLB flushes are still pending.

This behavior affects KSM (which may result in memory corruption) and
MADV_FREE and MADV_DONTNEED (which may result in incorrect behavior).  A
proof-of-concept can easily produce the wrong behavior of MADV_DONTNEED.
Memory corruption in KSM is harder to produce in practice, but was
observed by hacking the kernel and adding a delay before flushing and
replacing the KSM page.

Finally, there is also one memory barrier missing, which may affect
architectures with weak memory model.

This patch (of 7):

Setting and clearing mm-&gt;tlb_flush_pending can be performed by multiple
threads, since mmap_sem may only be acquired for read in
task_numa_work().  If this happens, tlb_flush_pending might be cleared
while one of the threads still changes PTEs and batches TLB flushes.

This can lead to the same race between migration and
change_protection_range() that led to the introduction of
tlb_flush_pending.  The result of this race was data corruption, which
means that this patch also addresses a theoretically possible data
corruption.

An actual data corruption was not observed, yet the race was was
confirmed by adding assertion to check tlb_flush_pending is not set by
two threads, adding artificial latency in change_protection_range() and
using sysctl to reduce kernel.numa_balancing_scan_delay_ms.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170802000818.4760-2-namit@vmware.com
Fixes: 20841405940e ("mm: fix TLB flush race between migration, and
change_protection_range")
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit &lt;namit@vmware.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Minchan Kim &lt;minchan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jeff Dike &lt;jdike@addtoit.com&gt;
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@techsingularity.net&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Yoshinori Sato &lt;ysato@users.sourceforge.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Drop change to dump_mm()
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>workqueue: implicit ordered attribute should be overridable</title>
<updated>2017-11-11T13:33:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-23T12:36:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5b470a940f3c6dd918ef075e3b3c6094c4d4c437'/>
<id>5b470a940f3c6dd918ef075e3b3c6094c4d4c437</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0a94efb5acbb6980d7c9ab604372d93cd507e4d8 upstream.

5c0338c68706 ("workqueue: restore WQ_UNBOUND/max_active==1 to be
ordered") automatically enabled ordered attribute for unbound
workqueues w/ max_active == 1.  Because ordered workqueues reject
max_active and some attribute changes, this implicit ordered mode
broke cases where the user creates an unbound workqueue w/ max_active
== 1 and later explicitly changes the related attributes.

This patch distinguishes explicit and implicit ordered setting and
overrides from attribute changes if implict.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 5c0338c68706 ("workqueue: restore WQ_UNBOUND/max_active==1 to be ordered")
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0a94efb5acbb6980d7c9ab604372d93cd507e4d8 upstream.

5c0338c68706 ("workqueue: restore WQ_UNBOUND/max_active==1 to be
ordered") automatically enabled ordered attribute for unbound
workqueues w/ max_active == 1.  Because ordered workqueues reject
max_active and some attribute changes, this implicit ordered mode
broke cases where the user creates an unbound workqueue w/ max_active
== 1 and later explicitly changes the related attributes.

This patch distinguishes explicit and implicit ordered setting and
overrides from attribute changes if implict.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 5c0338c68706 ("workqueue: restore WQ_UNBOUND/max_active==1 to be ordered")
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Fix locking for children siblings group read</title>
<updated>2017-11-11T13:33:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Olsa</name>
<email>jolsa@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-20T14:14:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f9cb7d4772ef1eee1fd73efc14a9f978b9cfc5dc'/>
<id>f9cb7d4772ef1eee1fd73efc14a9f978b9cfc5dc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2aeb1883547626d82c597cce2c99f0b9c62e2425 upstream.

We're missing ctx lock when iterating children siblings
within the perf_read path for group reading. Following
race and crash can happen:

User space doing read syscall on event group leader:

T1:
  perf_read
    lock event-&gt;ctx-&gt;mutex
    perf_read_group
      lock leader-&gt;child_mutex
      __perf_read_group_add(child)
        list_for_each_entry(sub, &amp;leader-&gt;sibling_list, group_entry)

----&gt;   sub might be invalid at this point, because it could
        get removed via perf_event_exit_task_context in T2

Child exiting and cleaning up its events:

T2:
  perf_event_exit_task_context
    lock ctx-&gt;mutex
    list_for_each_entry_safe(child_event, next, &amp;child_ctx-&gt;event_list,...
      perf_event_exit_event(child)
        lock ctx-&gt;lock
        perf_group_detach(child)
        unlock ctx-&gt;lock

----&gt;   child is removed from sibling_list without any sync
        with T1 path above

        ...
        free_event(child)

Before the child is removed from the leader's child_list,
(and thus is omitted from perf_read_group processing), we
need to ensure that perf_read_group touches child's
siblings under its ctx-&gt;lock.

Peter further notes:

| One additional note; this bug got exposed by commit:
|
|   ba5213ae6b88 ("perf/core: Correct event creation with PERF_FORMAT_GROUP")
|
| which made it possible to actually trigger this code-path.

Tested-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: ba5213ae6b88 ("perf/core: Correct event creation with PERF_FORMAT_GROUP")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170720141455.2106-1-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2aeb1883547626d82c597cce2c99f0b9c62e2425 upstream.

We're missing ctx lock when iterating children siblings
within the perf_read path for group reading. Following
race and crash can happen:

User space doing read syscall on event group leader:

T1:
  perf_read
    lock event-&gt;ctx-&gt;mutex
    perf_read_group
      lock leader-&gt;child_mutex
      __perf_read_group_add(child)
        list_for_each_entry(sub, &amp;leader-&gt;sibling_list, group_entry)

----&gt;   sub might be invalid at this point, because it could
        get removed via perf_event_exit_task_context in T2

Child exiting and cleaning up its events:

T2:
  perf_event_exit_task_context
    lock ctx-&gt;mutex
    list_for_each_entry_safe(child_event, next, &amp;child_ctx-&gt;event_list,...
      perf_event_exit_event(child)
        lock ctx-&gt;lock
        perf_group_detach(child)
        unlock ctx-&gt;lock

----&gt;   child is removed from sibling_list without any sync
        with T1 path above

        ...
        free_event(child)

Before the child is removed from the leader's child_list,
(and thus is omitted from perf_read_group processing), we
need to ensure that perf_read_group touches child's
siblings under its ctx-&gt;lock.

Peter further notes:

| One additional note; this bug got exposed by commit:
|
|   ba5213ae6b88 ("perf/core: Correct event creation with PERF_FORMAT_GROUP")
|
| which made it possible to actually trigger this code-path.

Tested-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: ba5213ae6b88 ("perf/core: Correct event creation with PERF_FORMAT_GROUP")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170720141455.2106-1-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Invert perf_read_group() loops</title>
<updated>2017-11-11T13:33:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-04T03:07:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2bb3fde41e58571be15b4f064a6cf821b8cec848'/>
<id>2bb3fde41e58571be15b4f064a6cf821b8cec848</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fa8c269353d560b7c28119ad7617029f92e40b15 upstream.

In order to enable the use of perf_event_read(.group = true), we need
to invert the sibling-child loop nesting of perf_read_group().

Currently we iterate the child list for each sibling, this precludes
using group reads. Flip things around so we iterate each group for
each child.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
[ Made the patch compile and things. ]
Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu &lt;sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1441336073-22750-7-git-send-email-sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16 as a dependency of commit 2aeb18835476 ("perf/core: Fix
 locking for children siblings group read"):
 - Keep the function name perf_event_read_group()
 - Keep using perf_event_read_value()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit fa8c269353d560b7c28119ad7617029f92e40b15 upstream.

In order to enable the use of perf_event_read(.group = true), we need
to invert the sibling-child loop nesting of perf_read_group().

Currently we iterate the child list for each sibling, this precludes
using group reads. Flip things around so we iterate each group for
each child.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
[ Made the patch compile and things. ]
Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu &lt;sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1441336073-22750-7-git-send-email-sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16 as a dependency of commit 2aeb18835476 ("perf/core: Fix
 locking for children siblings group read"):
 - Keep the function name perf_event_read_group()
 - Keep using perf_event_read_value()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Fix kmemleak in instance_rmdir</title>
<updated>2017-11-11T13:33:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chunyu Hu</name>
<email>chuhu@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-20T10:36:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ea4b5c69bbf3482240305cce0e598720987a2e93'/>
<id>ea4b5c69bbf3482240305cce0e598720987a2e93</id>
<content type='text'>
commit db9108e054700c96322b0f0028546aa4e643cf0b upstream.

Hit the kmemleak when executing instance_rmdir, it forgot releasing
mem of tracing_cpumask. With this fix, the warn does not appear any
more.

unreferenced object 0xffff93a8dfaa7c18 (size 8):
  comm "mkdir", pid 1436, jiffies 4294763622 (age 9134.308s)
  hex dump (first 8 bytes):
    ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff                          ........
  backtrace:
    [&lt;ffffffff88b6567a&gt;] kmemleak_alloc+0x4a/0xa0
    [&lt;ffffffff8861ea41&gt;] __kmalloc_node+0xf1/0x280
    [&lt;ffffffff88b505d3&gt;] alloc_cpumask_var_node+0x23/0x30
    [&lt;ffffffff88b5060e&gt;] alloc_cpumask_var+0xe/0x10
    [&lt;ffffffff88571ab0&gt;] instance_mkdir+0x90/0x240
    [&lt;ffffffff886e5100&gt;] tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x40/0x70
    [&lt;ffffffff886565c9&gt;] vfs_mkdir+0x109/0x1b0
    [&lt;ffffffff8865b1d0&gt;] SyS_mkdir+0xd0/0x100
    [&lt;ffffffff88403857&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x67/0x150
    [&lt;ffffffff88b710e7&gt;] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
    [&lt;ffffffffffffffff&gt;] 0xffffffffffffffff

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1500546969-12594-1-git-send-email-chuhu@redhat.com

Fixes: ccfe9e42e451 ("tracing: Make tracing_cpumask available for all instances")
Signed-off-by: Chunyu Hu &lt;chuhu@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit db9108e054700c96322b0f0028546aa4e643cf0b upstream.

Hit the kmemleak when executing instance_rmdir, it forgot releasing
mem of tracing_cpumask. With this fix, the warn does not appear any
more.

unreferenced object 0xffff93a8dfaa7c18 (size 8):
  comm "mkdir", pid 1436, jiffies 4294763622 (age 9134.308s)
  hex dump (first 8 bytes):
    ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff                          ........
  backtrace:
    [&lt;ffffffff88b6567a&gt;] kmemleak_alloc+0x4a/0xa0
    [&lt;ffffffff8861ea41&gt;] __kmalloc_node+0xf1/0x280
    [&lt;ffffffff88b505d3&gt;] alloc_cpumask_var_node+0x23/0x30
    [&lt;ffffffff88b5060e&gt;] alloc_cpumask_var+0xe/0x10
    [&lt;ffffffff88571ab0&gt;] instance_mkdir+0x90/0x240
    [&lt;ffffffff886e5100&gt;] tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x40/0x70
    [&lt;ffffffff886565c9&gt;] vfs_mkdir+0x109/0x1b0
    [&lt;ffffffff8865b1d0&gt;] SyS_mkdir+0xd0/0x100
    [&lt;ffffffff88403857&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x67/0x150
    [&lt;ffffffff88b710e7&gt;] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
    [&lt;ffffffffffffffff&gt;] 0xffffffffffffffff

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1500546969-12594-1-git-send-email-chuhu@redhat.com

Fixes: ccfe9e42e451 ("tracing: Make tracing_cpumask available for all instances")
Signed-off-by: Chunyu Hu &lt;chuhu@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>workqueue: restore WQ_UNBOUND/max_active==1 to be ordered</title>
<updated>2017-11-11T13:33:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-18T22:41:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=90b9dd315e958cc60ff25006f6f811056c3e3bba'/>
<id>90b9dd315e958cc60ff25006f6f811056c3e3bba</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5c0338c68706be53b3dc472e4308961c36e4ece1 upstream.

The combination of WQ_UNBOUND and max_active == 1 used to imply
ordered execution.  After NUMA affinity 4c16bd327c74 ("workqueue:
implement NUMA affinity for unbound workqueues"), this is no longer
true due to per-node worker pools.

While the right way to create an ordered workqueue is
alloc_ordered_workqueue(), the documentation has been misleading for a
long time and people do use WQ_UNBOUND and max_active == 1 for ordered
workqueues which can lead to subtle bugs which are very difficult to
trigger.

It's unlikely that we'd see noticeable performance impact by enforcing
ordering on WQ_UNBOUND / max_active == 1 workqueues.  Let's
automatically set __WQ_ORDERED for those workqueues.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@infradead.org&gt;
Reported-by: Alexei Potashnik &lt;alexei@purestorage.com&gt;
Fixes: 4c16bd327c74 ("workqueue: implement NUMA affinity for unbound workqueues")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5c0338c68706be53b3dc472e4308961c36e4ece1 upstream.

The combination of WQ_UNBOUND and max_active == 1 used to imply
ordered execution.  After NUMA affinity 4c16bd327c74 ("workqueue:
implement NUMA affinity for unbound workqueues"), this is no longer
true due to per-node worker pools.

While the right way to create an ordered workqueue is
alloc_ordered_workqueue(), the documentation has been misleading for a
long time and people do use WQ_UNBOUND and max_active == 1 for ordered
workqueues which can lead to subtle bugs which are very difficult to
trigger.

It's unlikely that we'd see noticeable performance impact by enforcing
ordering on WQ_UNBOUND / max_active == 1 workqueues.  Let's
automatically set __WQ_ORDERED for those workqueues.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@infradead.org&gt;
Reported-by: Alexei Potashnik &lt;alexei@purestorage.com&gt;
Fixes: 4c16bd327c74 ("workqueue: implement NUMA affinity for unbound workqueues")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
