linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v3.12.23

net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages

2014-06-23T08:27:57+00:00

[ Upstream commit 90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e ]

It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.

To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls
with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls.
Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the
opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well.

Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski 
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking

2014-06-20T15:34:17+00:00

commit a3c54931199565930d6d84f4c3456f6440aefd41 upstream.

Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.

This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.

eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded
audit rules.  This bug has been around since before git.  Wow...

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski 
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid

2014-06-20T15:34:15+00:00

commit 23adbe12ef7d3d4195e80800ab36b37bee28cd03 upstream.

The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces.  For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.

This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.

Fixes CVE-2014-4014.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o 
Cc: Serge Hallyn 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Dave Chinner 
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

sched: Fix hotplug vs. set_cpus_allowed_ptr()

2014-06-20T15:34:01+00:00

commit 6acbfb96976fc3350e30d964acb1dbbdf876d55e upstream.

Lai found that:

  WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 13 at arch/x86/kernel/smp.c:124 native_smp_send_reschedule+0x2d/0x4b()
  ...
  migration_cpu_stop+0x1d/0x22

was caused by set_cpus_allowed_ptr() assuming that cpu_active_mask is
always a sub-set of cpu_online_mask.

This isn't true since 5fbd036b552f ("sched: Cleanup cpu_active madness").

So set active and online at the same time to avoid this particular
problem.

Fixes: 5fbd036b552f ("sched: Cleanup cpu_active madness")
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Cc: Gautham R. Shenoy 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Michael wang 
Cc: Paul Gortmaker 
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki 
Cc: Srivatsa S. Bhat 
Cc: Toshi Kani 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/53758B12.8060609@cn.fujitsu.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

perf: Fix race in removing an event

2014-06-20T15:33:52+00:00

commit 46ce0fe97a6be7532ce6126bb26ce89fed81528c upstream.

When removing a (sibling) event we do:

	raw_spin_lock_irq(&ctx->lock);
	perf_group_detach(event);
	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);

	

	perf_remove_from_context(event);
		raw_spin_lock_irq(&ctx->lock);
		...
		raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);

Now, assuming the event is a sibling, it will be 'unreachable' for
things like ctx_sched_out() because that iterates the
groups->siblings, and we just unhooked the sibling.

So, if during  we get ctx_sched_out(), it will miss the event
and not call event_sched_out() on it, leaving it programmed on the
PMU.

The subsequent perf_remove_from_context() call will find the ctx is
inactive and only call list_del_event() to remove the event from all
other lists.

Hereafter we can proceed to free the event; while still programmed!

Close this hole by moving perf_group_detach() inside the same
ctx->lock region(s) perf_remove_from_context() has.

The condition on inherited events only in __perf_event_exit_task() is
likely complete crap because non-inherited events are part of groups
too and we're tearing down just the same. But leave that for another
patch.

Most-likely-Fixes: e03a9a55b4e ("perf: Change close() semantics for group events")
Reported-by: Vince Weaver 
Tested-by: Vince Weaver 
Much-staring-at-traces-by: Vince Weaver 
Much-staring-at-traces-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140505093124.GN17778@laptop.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

perf: Limit perf_event_attr::sample_period to 63 bits

2014-06-20T15:33:52+00:00

commit 0819b2e30ccb93edf04876237b6205eef84ec8d2 upstream.

Vince reported that using a large sample_period (one with bit 63 set)
results in wreckage since while the sample_period is fundamentally
unsigned (negative periods don't make sense) the way we implement
things very much rely on signed logic.

So limit sample_period to 63 bits to avoid tripping over this.

Reported-by: Vince Weaver 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-p25fhunibl4y3qi0zuqmyf4b@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

perf: Prevent false warning in perf_swevent_add

2014-06-20T15:33:51+00:00

commit 39af6b1678afa5880dda7e375cf3f9d395087f6d upstream.

The perf cpu offline callback takes down all cpu context
events and releases swhash->swevent_hlist.

This could race with task context software event being just
scheduled on this cpu via perf_swevent_add while cpu hotplug
code already cleaned up event's data.

The race happens in the gap between the cpu notifier code
and the cpu being actually taken down. Note that only cpu
ctx events are terminated in the perf cpu hotplug code.

It's easily reproduced with:
  $ perf record -e faults perf bench sched pipe

while putting one of the cpus offline:
  # echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online

Console emits following warning:
  WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2845 at kernel/events/core.c:5672 perf_swevent_add+0x18d/0x1a0()
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 1 PID: 2845 Comm: sched-pipe Tainted: G        W    3.14.0+ #256
  Hardware name: Intel Corporation Montevina platform/To be filled by O.E.M., BIOS AMVACRB1.86C.0066.B00.0805070703 05/07/2008
   0000000000000009 ffff880077233ab8 ffffffff81665a23 0000000000200005
   0000000000000000 ffff880077233af8 ffffffff8104732c 0000000000000046
   ffff88007467c800 0000000000000002 ffff88007a9cf2a0 0000000000000001
  Call Trace:
   [] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7c
   [] warn_slowpath_common+0x8c/0xc0
   [] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
   [] perf_swevent_add+0x18d/0x1a0
   [] event_sched_in.isra.75+0x9e/0x1f0
   [] group_sched_in+0x6a/0x1f0
   [] ? sched_clock_local+0x25/0xa0
   [] ctx_sched_in+0x1f6/0x450
   [] perf_event_sched_in+0x6b/0xa0
   [] perf_event_context_sched_in+0x7b/0xc0
   [] __perf_event_task_sched_in+0x43e/0x460
   [] ? put_lock_stats.isra.18+0xe/0x30
   [] finish_task_switch+0xb8/0x100
   [] __schedule+0x30e/0xad0
   [] ? pipe_read+0x3e2/0x560
   [] ? preempt_schedule_irq+0x3e/0x70
   [] ? preempt_schedule_irq+0x3e/0x70
   [] preempt_schedule_irq+0x44/0x70
   [] retint_kernel+0x20/0x30
   [] ? lockdep_sys_exit+0x1a/0x90
   [] lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x35/0x67
   [] ? sysret_check+0x5/0x56

Fixing this by tracking the cpu hotplug state and displaying
the WARN only if current cpu is initialized properly.

Cc: Corey Ashford 
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Paul Mackerras 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1396861448-10097-1-git-send-email-jolsa@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

sched: Sanitize irq accounting madness

2014-06-20T15:33:51+00:00

commit 2d513868e2a33e1d5315490ef4c861ee65babd65 upstream.

Russell reported, that irqtime_account_idle_ticks() takes ages due to:

       for (i = 0; i < ticks; i++)
               irqtime_account_process_tick(current, 0, rq);

It's sad, that this code was written way _AFTER_ the NOHZ idle
functionality was available. I charge myself guitly for not paying
attention when that crap got merged with commit abb74cefa ("sched:
Export ns irqtimes through /proc/stat")

So instead of looping nr_ticks times just apply the whole thing at
once.

As a side note: The whole cputime_t vs. u64 business in that context
wants to be cleaned up as well. There is no point in having all these
back and forth conversions. Lets standardise on u64 nsec for all
kernel internal accounting and be done with it. Everything else does
not make sense at all for fine grained accounting. Frederic, can you
please take care of that?

Reported-by: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Venkatesh Pallipadi 
Cc: Shaun Ruffell 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.02.1405022307000.6261@ionos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

sched: Use CPUPRI_NR_PRIORITIES instead of MAX_RT_PRIO in cpupri check

2014-06-20T15:33:50+00:00

commit 6227cb00cc120f9a43ce8313bb0475ddabcb7d01 upstream.

The check at the beginning of cpupri_find() makes sure that the task_pri
variable does not exceed the cp->pri_to_cpu array length. But that length
is CPUPRI_NR_PRIORITIES not MAX_RT_PRIO, where it will miss the last two
priorities in that array.

As task_pri is computed from convert_prio() which should never be bigger
than CPUPRI_NR_PRIORITIES, if the check should cause a panic if it is
hit.

Reported-by: Mike Galbraith 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1397015410.5212.13.camel@marge.simpson.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust

2014-06-09T13:54:03+00:00

commit 54a217887a7b658e2650c3feff22756ab80c7339 upstream.

The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of
the TID value 0 in the user space futex.  We can get into the kernel
even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters bit
or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi path
or from user space just for fun.

The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case
that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space
address.  This can lead to state leakage and worse under some
circumstances.

Handle the cases explicit:

       Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID      | uODIED | ?

  [1]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | 0         | 0/1    | Valid
  [2]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | >0        | 0/1    | Valid

  [3]  Found  | NULL     | --        | Any       | 0/1    | Invalid

  [4]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | 0         | 1      | Valid
  [5]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | >0        | 1      | Invalid

  [6]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 1      | Valid

  [7]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | Any       | 0      | Invalid

  [8]  Found  | Found    | task      | ==taskTID | 0/1    | Valid
  [9]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 0      | Invalid
  [10] Found  | Found    | task      | !=taskTID | 0/1    | Invalid

 [1] Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We
     came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit.

 [2] Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching
     thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died.

 [3] Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex

 [4] Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space
     value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.

 [5] The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list()
     and exit_pi_state_list()

 [6] Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in
     the pi_state but cannot access the user space value.

 [7] pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set.

 [8] Owner and user space value match

 [9] There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0
     except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the
     FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4]

[10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
     TID out of sync.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Will Drewry 
Cc: Darren Hart 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby