linux-stable.git/kernel, branch v3.12.22

futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust

2014-06-09T13:54:03+00:00

commit 54a217887a7b658e2650c3feff22756ab80c7339 upstream.

The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of
the TID value 0 in the user space futex.  We can get into the kernel
even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters bit
or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi path
or from user space just for fun.

The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case
that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space
address.  This can lead to state leakage and worse under some
circumstances.

Handle the cases explicit:

       Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID      | uODIED | ?

  [1]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | 0         | 0/1    | Valid
  [2]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | >0        | 0/1    | Valid

  [3]  Found  | NULL     | --        | Any       | 0/1    | Invalid

  [4]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | 0         | 1      | Valid
  [5]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | >0        | 1      | Invalid

  [6]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 1      | Valid

  [7]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | Any       | 0      | Invalid

  [8]  Found  | Found    | task      | ==taskTID | 0/1    | Valid
  [9]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 0      | Invalid
  [10] Found  | Found    | task      | !=taskTID | 0/1    | Invalid

 [1] Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We
     came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit.

 [2] Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching
     thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died.

 [3] Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex

 [4] Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space
     value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.

 [5] The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list()
     and exit_pi_state_list()

 [6] Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in
     the pi_state but cannot access the user space value.

 [7] pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set.

 [8] Owner and user space value match

 [9] There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0
     except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the
     FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4]

[10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
     TID out of sync.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Will Drewry 
Cc: Darren Hart 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

futex: Always cleanup owner tid in unlock_pi

2014-06-09T13:54:02+00:00

commit 13fbca4c6ecd96ec1a1cfa2e4f2ce191fe928a5e upstream.

If the owner died bit is set at futex_unlock_pi, we currently do not
cleanup the user space futex.  So the owner TID of the current owner
(the unlocker) persists.  That's observable inconsistant state,
especially when the ownership of the pi state got transferred.

Clean it up unconditionally.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Will Drewry 
Cc: Darren Hart 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic()

2014-06-09T13:54:02+00:00

commit b3eaa9fc5cd0a4d74b18f6b8dc617aeaf1873270 upstream.

We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue
user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side
acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel
associated to the real owner.

Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state.  If
it has, return -EINVAL.  The state is corrupted already, so no point in
cleaning it up.  Subsequent calls will fail as well.  Not our problem.

[ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try
  	restoring the already corrupted user space state. ]

Signed-off-by: Darren Hart 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Will Drewry 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)

2014-06-09T13:54:01+00:00

commit e9c243a5a6de0be8e584c604d353412584b592f8 upstream.

If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call.  If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.

This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")

[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
  	different depending on the mapping ]

Fixes CVE-2014-3153.

Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry 
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

powerpc, kexec: Fix "Processor X is stuck" issue during kexec from ST mode

2014-06-09T13:53:57+00:00

commit 011e4b02f1da156ac7fea28a9da878f3c23af739 upstream.

If we try to perform a kexec when the machine is in ST (Single-Threaded) mode
(ppc64_cpu --smt=off), the kexec operation doesn't succeed properly, and we
get the following messages during boot:

[    0.089866] POWER8 performance monitor hardware support registered
[    0.089985] power8-pmu: PMAO restore workaround active.
[    5.095419] Processor 1 is stuck.
[   10.097933] Processor 2 is stuck.
[   15.100480] Processor 3 is stuck.
[   20.102982] Processor 4 is stuck.
[   25.105489] Processor 5 is stuck.
[   30.108005] Processor 6 is stuck.
[   35.110518] Processor 7 is stuck.
[   40.113369] Processor 9 is stuck.
[   45.115879] Processor 10 is stuck.
[   50.118389] Processor 11 is stuck.
[   55.120904] Processor 12 is stuck.
[   60.123425] Processor 13 is stuck.
[   65.125970] Processor 14 is stuck.
[   70.128495] Processor 15 is stuck.
[   75.131316] Processor 17 is stuck.

Note that only the sibling threads are stuck, while the primary threads (0, 8,
16 etc) boot just fine. Looking closer at the previous step of kexec, we observe
that kexec tries to wakeup (bring online) the sibling threads of all the cores,
before performing kexec:

[ 9464.131231] Starting new kernel
[ 9464.148507] kexec: Waking offline cpu 1.
[ 9464.148552] kexec: Waking offline cpu 2.
[ 9464.148600] kexec: Waking offline cpu 3.
[ 9464.148636] kexec: Waking offline cpu 4.
[ 9464.148671] kexec: Waking offline cpu 5.
[ 9464.148708] kexec: Waking offline cpu 6.
[ 9464.148743] kexec: Waking offline cpu 7.
[ 9464.148779] kexec: Waking offline cpu 9.
[ 9464.148815] kexec: Waking offline cpu 10.
[ 9464.148851] kexec: Waking offline cpu 11.
[ 9464.148887] kexec: Waking offline cpu 12.
[ 9464.148922] kexec: Waking offline cpu 13.
[ 9464.148958] kexec: Waking offline cpu 14.
[ 9464.148994] kexec: Waking offline cpu 15.
[ 9464.149030] kexec: Waking offline cpu 17.

Instrumenting this piece of code revealed that the cpu_up() operation actually
fails with -EBUSY. Thus, only the primary threads of all the cores are online
during kexec, and hence this is a sure-shot receipe for disaster, as explained
in commit e8e5c2155b (powerpc/kexec: Fix orphaned offline CPUs across kexec),
as well as in the comment above wake_offline_cpus().

It turns out that cpu_up() was returning -EBUSY because the variable
'cpu_hotplug_disabled' was set to 1; and this disabling of CPU hotplug was done
by migrate_to_reboot_cpu() inside kernel_kexec().

Now, migrate_to_reboot_cpu() was originally written with the assumption that
any further code will not need to perform CPU hotplug, since we are anyway in
the reboot path. However, kexec is clearly not such a case, since we depend on
onlining CPUs, atleast on powerpc.

So re-enable cpu-hotplug after returning from migrate_to_reboot_cpu() in the
kexec path, to fix this regression in kexec on powerpc.

Also, wrap the cpu_up() in powerpc kexec code within a WARN_ON(), so that we
can catch such issues more easily in the future.

Fixes: c97102ba963 (kexec: migrate to reboot cpu)
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat 
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

workqueue: make rescuer_thread() empty wq->maydays list before exiting

2014-06-09T13:53:36+00:00

commit 4d595b866d2c653dc90a492b9973a834eabfa354 upstream.

After a @pwq is scheduled for emergency execution, other workers may
consume the affectd work items before the rescuer gets to them.  This
means that a workqueue many have pwqs queued on @wq->maydays list
while not having any work item pending or in-flight.  If
destroy_workqueue() executes in such condition, the rescuer may exit
without emptying @wq->maydays.

This currently doesn't cause any actual harm.  destroy_workqueue() can
safely destroy all the involved data structures whether @wq->maydays
is populated or not as nobody access the list once the rescuer exits.

However, this is nasty and makes future development difficult.  Let's
update rescuer_thread() so that it empties @wq->maydays after seeing
should_stop to guarantee that the list is empty on rescuer exit.

tj: Updated comment and patch description.

Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan 
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

workqueue: fix a possible race condition between rescuer and pwq-release

2014-06-09T13:53:36+00:00

commit 77668c8b559e4fe2acf2a0749c7c83cde49a5025 upstream.

There is a race condition between rescuer_thread() and
pwq_unbound_release_workfn().

Even after a pwq is scheduled for rescue, the associated work items
may be consumed by any worker.  If all of them are consumed before the
rescuer gets to them and the pwq's base ref was put due to attribute
change, the pwq may be released while still being linked on
@wq->maydays list making the rescuer dereference already freed pwq
later.

Make send_mayday() pin the target pwq until the rescuer is done with
it.

tj: Updated comment and patch description.

Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan 
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

workqueue: fix bugs in wq_update_unbound_numa() failure path

2014-06-09T13:53:35+00:00

commit 77f300b198f93328c26191b52655ce1b62e202cf upstream.

wq_update_unbound_numa() failure path has the following two bugs.

- alloc_unbound_pwq() is called without holding wq->mutex; however, if
  the allocation fails, it jumps to out_unlock which tries to unlock
  wq->mutex.

- The function should switch to dfl_pwq on failure but didn't do so
  after alloc_unbound_pwq() failure.

Fix it by regrabbing wq->mutex and jumping to use_dfl_pwq on
alloc_unbound_pwq() failure.

Signed-off-by: Daeseok Youn 
Acked-by: Lai Jiangshan 
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo 
Fixes: 4c16bd327c74 ("workqueue: implement NUMA affinity for unbound workqueues")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

hrtimer: Set expiry time before switch_hrtimer_base()

2014-06-06T09:40:25+00:00

commit 84ea7fe37908254c3bd90910921f6e1045c1747a upstream.

switch_hrtimer_base() calls hrtimer_check_target() which ensures that
we do not migrate a timer to a remote cpu if the timer expires before
the current programmed expiry time on that remote cpu.

But __hrtimer_start_range_ns() calls switch_hrtimer_base() before the
new expiry time is set. So the sanity check in hrtimer_check_target()
is operating on stale or even uninitialized data.

Update expiry time before calling switch_hrtimer_base().

[ tglx: Rewrote changelog once again ]

Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar 
Cc: linaro-kernel@lists.linaro.org
Cc: linaro-networking@linaro.org
Cc: fweisbec@gmail.com
Cc: arvind.chauhan@arm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/81999e148745fc51bbcd0615823fbab9b2e87e23.1399882253.git.viresh.kumar@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

hrtimer: Prevent remote enqueue of leftmost timers

2014-06-06T09:40:25+00:00

commit 012a45e3f4af68e86d85cce060c6c2fed56498b2 upstream.

If a cpu is idle and starts an hrtimer which is not pinned on that
same cpu, the nohz code might target the timer to a different cpu.

In the case that we switch the cpu base of the timer we already have a
sanity check in place, which determines whether the timer is earlier
than the current leftmost timer on the target cpu. In that case we
enqueue the timer on the current cpu because we cannot reprogram the
clock event device on the target.

If the timers base is already the target CPU we do not have this
sanity check in place so we enqueue the timer as the leftmost timer in
the target cpus rb tree, but we cannot reprogram the clock event
device on the target cpu. So the timer expires late and subsequently
prevents the reprogramming of the target cpu clock event device until
the previously programmed event fires or a timer with an earlier
expiry time gets enqueued on the target cpu itself.

Add the same target check as we have for the switch base case and
start the timer on the current cpu if it would become the leftmost
timer on the target.

[ tglx: Rewrote subject and changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Leon Ma 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398847391-5994-1-git-send-email-xindong.ma@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby