linux-stable.git/kernel, branch linux-5.5.y

tracing: Fix the race between registering 'snapshot' event trigger and triggering 'snapshot' operation

2020-04-21T07:06:40+00:00

commit 0bbe7f719985efd9adb3454679ecef0984cb6800 upstream.

Traced event can trigger 'snapshot' operation(i.e. calls snapshot_trigger()
or snapshot_count_trigger()) when register_snapshot_trigger() has completed
registration but doesn't allocate buffer for 'snapshot' event trigger.  In
the rare case, 'snapshot' operation always detects the lack of allocated
buffer so make register_snapshot_trigger() allocate buffer first.

trigger-snapshot.tc in kselftest reproduces the issue on slow vm:
-----------------------------------------------------------
cat trace
...
ftracetest-3028  [002] ....   236.784290: sched_process_fork: comm=ftracetest pid=3028 child_comm=ftracetest child_pid=3036
     <...>-2875  [003] ....   240.460335: tracing_snapshot_instance_cond: *** SNAPSHOT NOT ALLOCATED ***
     <...>-2875  [003] ....   240.460338: tracing_snapshot_instance_cond: *** stopping trace here!   ***
-----------------------------------------------------------

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200414015145.66236-1-yangx.jy@cn.fujitsu.com

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 93e31ffbf417a ("tracing: Add 'snapshot' event trigger command")
Signed-off-by: Xiao Yang 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: Fix tnum constraints for 32-bit comparisons

2020-04-17T14:12:20+00:00

[ Upstream commit 604dca5e3af1db98bd123b7bfc02b017af99e3a0 ]

The BPF verifier tried to track values based on 32-bit comparisons by
(ab)using the tnum state via 581738a681b6 ("bpf: Provide better register
bounds after jmp32 instructions"). The idea is that after a check like
this:

    if ((u32)r0 > 3)
      exit

We can't meaningfully constrain the arithmetic-range-based tracking, but
we can update the tnum state to (value=0,mask=0xffff'ffff'0000'0003).
However, the implementation from 581738a681b6 didn't compute the tnum
constraint based on the fixed operand, but instead derives it from the
arithmetic-range-based tracking. This means that after the following
sequence of operations:

    if (r0 >= 0x1'0000'0001)
      exit
    if ((u32)r0 > 7)
      exit

The verifier assumed that the lower half of r0 is in the range (0, 0)
and apply the tnum constraint (value=0,mask=0xffff'ffff'0000'0000) thus
causing the overall tnum to be (value=0,mask=0x1'0000'0000), which was
incorrect. Provide a fixed implementation.

Fixes: 581738a681b6 ("bpf: Provide better register bounds after jmp32 instructions")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200330160324.15259-3-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

perf/core: Remove 'struct sched_in_data'

2020-04-17T14:12:19+00:00

[ Upstream commit 2c2366c7548ecee65adfd264517ddf50f9e2d029 ]

We can deduce the ctx and cpuctx from the event, no need to pass them
along. Remove the structure and pass in can_add_hw directly.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

perf/core: Fix event cgroup tracking

2020-04-17T14:12:19+00:00

[ Upstream commit 33238c50451596be86db1505ab65fee5172844d0 ]

Song reports that installing cgroup events is broken since:

  db0503e4f675 ("perf/core: Optimize perf_install_in_event()")

The problem being that cgroup events try to track cpuctx->cgrp even
for disabled events, which is pointless and actively harmful since the
above commit. Rework the code to have explicit enable/disable hooks
for cgroup events, such that we can limit cgroup tracking to active
events.

More specifically, since the above commit disabled events are no
longer added to their context from the 'right' CPU, and we can't
access things like the current cgroup for a remote CPU.

Cc:  # v5.5+
Fixes: db0503e4f675 ("perf/core: Optimize perf_install_in_event()")
Reported-by: Song Liu 
Tested-by: Song Liu 
Reviewed-by: Song Liu 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200318193337.GB20760@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

perf/core: Unify {pinned,flexible}_sched_in()

2020-04-17T14:12:19+00:00

[ Upstream commit ab6f824cfdf7363b5e529621cbc72ae6519c78d1 ]

Less is more; unify the two very nearly identical function.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

kmod: make request_module() return an error when autoloading is disabled

2020-04-17T14:12:16+00:00

commit d7d27cfc5cf0766a26a8f56868c5ad5434735126 upstream.

Patch series "module autoloading fixes and cleanups", v5.

This series fixes a bug where request_module() was reporting success to
kernel code when module autoloading had been completely disabled via
'echo > /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe'.

It also addresses the issues raised on the original thread
(https://lkml.kernel.org/lkml/20200310223731.126894-1-ebiggers@kernel.org/T/#u)
bydocumenting the modprobe sysctl, adding a self-test for the empty path
case, and downgrading a user-reachable WARN_ONCE().

This patch (of 4):

It's long been possible to disable kernel module autoloading completely
(while still allowing manual module insertion) by setting
/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe to the empty string.

This can be preferable to setting it to a nonexistent file since it
avoids the overhead of an attempted execve(), avoids potential
deadlocks, and avoids the call to security_kernel_module_request() and
thus on SELinux-based systems eliminates the need to write SELinux rules
to dontaudit module_request.

However, when module autoloading is disabled in this way,
request_module() returns 0.  This is broken because callers expect 0 to
mean that the module was successfully loaded.

Apparently this was never noticed because this method of disabling
module autoloading isn't used much, and also most callers don't use the
return value of request_module() since it's always necessary to check
whether the module registered its functionality or not anyway.

But improperly returning 0 can indeed confuse a few callers, for example
get_fs_type() in fs/filesystems.c where it causes a WARNING to be hit:

	if (!fs && (request_module("fs-%.*s", len, name) == 0)) {
		fs = __get_fs_type(name, len);
		WARN_ONCE(!fs, "request_module fs-%.*s succeeded, but still no fs?\n", len, name);
	}

This is easily reproduced with:

	echo > /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe
	mount -t NONEXISTENT none /

It causes:

	request_module fs-NONEXISTENT succeeded, but still no fs?
	WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1106 at fs/filesystems.c:275 get_fs_type+0xd6/0xf0
	[...]

This should actually use pr_warn_once() rather than WARN_ONCE(), since
it's also user-reachable if userspace immediately unloads the module.
Regardless, request_module() should correctly return an error when it
fails.  So let's make it return -ENOENT, which matches the error when
the modprobe binary doesn't exist.

I've also sent patches to document and test this case.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook 
Reviewed-by: Jessica Yu 
Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain 
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep 
Cc: Ben Hutchings 
Cc: Josh Triplett 
Cc: 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200310223731.126894-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200312202552.241885-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ftrace/kprobe: Show the maxactive number on kprobe_events

2020-04-17T14:12:16+00:00

commit 6a13a0d7b4d1171ef9b80ad69abc37e1daa941b3 upstream.

Show maxactive parameter on kprobe_events.
This allows user to save the current configuration and
restore it without losing maxactive parameter.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4762764a-6df7-bc93-ed60-e336146dce1f@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/158503528846.22706.5549974121212526020.stgit@devnote2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 696ced4fb1d76 ("tracing/kprobes: expose maxactive for kretprobe in kprobe_events")
Reported-by: Taeung Song 
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu 
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sched/core: Remove duplicate assignment in sched_tick_remote()

2020-04-17T14:12:10+00:00

commit 82e0516ce3a147365a5dd2a9bedd5ba43a18663d upstream.

A redundant "curr = rq->curr" was added; remove it.

Fixes: ebc0f83c78a2 ("timers/nohz: Update NOHZ load in remote tick")
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1580776558-12882-1-git-send-email-swood@redhat.com
Cc: Guenter Roeck 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

signal: Extend exec_id to 64bits

2020-04-17T14:12:05+00:00

commit d1e7fd6462ca9fc76650fbe6ca800e35b24267da upstream.

Replace the 32bit exec_id with a 64bit exec_id to make it impossible
to wrap the exec_id counter.  With care an attacker can cause exec_id
wrap and send arbitrary signals to a newly exec'd parent.  This
bypasses the signal sending checks if the parent changes their
credentials during exec.

The severity of this problem can been seen that in my limited testing
of a 32bit exec_id it can take as little as 19s to exec 65536 times.
Which means that it can take as little as 14 days to wrap a 32bit
exec_id.  Adam Zabrocki has succeeded wrapping the self_exe_id in 7
days.  Even my slower timing is in the uptime of a typical server.
Which means self_exec_id is simply a speed bump today, and if exec
gets noticably faster self_exec_id won't even be a speed bump.

Extending self_exec_id to 64bits introduces a problem on 32bit
architectures where reading self_exec_id is no longer atomic and can
take two read instructions.  Which means that is is possible to hit
a window where the read value of exec_id does not match the written
value.  So with very lucky timing after this change this still
remains expoiltable.

I have updated the update of exec_id on exec to use WRITE_ONCE
and the read of exec_id in do_notify_parent to use READ_ONCE
to make it clear that there is no locking between these two
locations.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20200324215049.GA3710@pi3.com.pl
Fixes: 2.3.23pre2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

genirq/debugfs: Add missing sanity checks to interrupt injection

2020-04-17T14:12:03+00:00

commit a740a423c36932695b01a3e920f697bc55b05fec upstream.

Interrupts cannot be injected when the interrupt is not activated and when
a replay is already in progress.

Fixes: 536e2e34bd00 ("genirq/debugfs: Triggering of interrupts from userspace")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200306130623.500019114@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman