<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel, branch linux-5.10.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Fix group leader use-after-free after sibling detach</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:27:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Aditya Chillara</name>
<email>aditya.chillara@oss.qualcomm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-21T11:33:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8f867c0e8da4c2303d91adf45acb6b1820966c27'/>
<id>8f867c0e8da4c2303d91adf45acb6b1820966c27</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 42c5ca1f0a288a52878bd72a5595b08261057438 ]

perf_group_detach() handles leader and sibling detach differently. When the
group leader is detached, all siblings are promoted to singleton events and
their group_leader pointer is reset to themselves. When a sibling is
detached, it is removed from the leader's sibling_list, but its
group_leader pointer is left pointing at the old leader.

That is harmless when the sibling is being closed and freed immediately, as
in the DETACH_DEAD path. It is not safe when the sibling is detached but
kept alive, such as during CPU hotplug with DETACH_GROUP. In that case the
sibling is removed from the context, while its file descriptor can still
keep it alive.

A typical failing sequence is:

  - A group contains leader L and sibling S.
  - CPU hot-unplug detaches S with DETACH_GROUP, removing it from
    L-&gt;sibling_list but leaving S-&gt;group_leader == L.
  - L is later closed and freed.
  - A PERF_IOC_FLAG_GROUP ioctl on S follows S-&gt;group_leader and
    dereferences the freed leader.

This was reproduced by running the perf event fuzzer, CPU hotplug, and a
stress workload concurrently:

  Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 006b6b6b6b6b6cdb
  CPU: 2 PID: 12489 Comm: perf_fuzzer 6.18.7 PREEMPT
  pc : perf_ioctl+0x34c/0xc68
  x20: ffffff89a3fa2c70 x8 : 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b
  Code: 943c4a0e 340047a0 f9404a94 f9411e88 (f940b908)
  Call trace:
  perf_ioctl+0x34c/0xc68 (P)
  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa0/0xf4
  invoke_syscall+0x58/0xe4
  el0_svc_common+0xa8/0xdc
  do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
  el0_svc+0x40/0xc0
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xdc
  el0t_64_sync+0x1c4/0x1c8

The fault happened in perf_ioctl(), where perf_event_for_each() follows
the stale group_leader pointer and perf_event_for_each_child() then
dereferences the freed leader's context.

Fix the use-after-free by promoting the detached sibling to a singleton.
Also fix __event_disable() cgroup accounting and event state change.

Fixes: 8a49542c0554 ("perf_events: Fix races in group composition")
Assisted-by: PatchWise:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Aditya Chillara &lt;aditya.chillara@oss.qualcomm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi &lt;dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807-fix-group-leader-uaf-v3-1-b0c2310c9a0d@oss.qualcomm.com
[ Adjusted context for 5.10's older APIs, keeping `event_sched_out()`'s 3-arg form and dropping the DETACH_EXIT/REVOKE/DEAD handling that doesn't exist there. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 42c5ca1f0a288a52878bd72a5595b08261057438 ]

perf_group_detach() handles leader and sibling detach differently. When the
group leader is detached, all siblings are promoted to singleton events and
their group_leader pointer is reset to themselves. When a sibling is
detached, it is removed from the leader's sibling_list, but its
group_leader pointer is left pointing at the old leader.

That is harmless when the sibling is being closed and freed immediately, as
in the DETACH_DEAD path. It is not safe when the sibling is detached but
kept alive, such as during CPU hotplug with DETACH_GROUP. In that case the
sibling is removed from the context, while its file descriptor can still
keep it alive.

A typical failing sequence is:

  - A group contains leader L and sibling S.
  - CPU hot-unplug detaches S with DETACH_GROUP, removing it from
    L-&gt;sibling_list but leaving S-&gt;group_leader == L.
  - L is later closed and freed.
  - A PERF_IOC_FLAG_GROUP ioctl on S follows S-&gt;group_leader and
    dereferences the freed leader.

This was reproduced by running the perf event fuzzer, CPU hotplug, and a
stress workload concurrently:

  Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 006b6b6b6b6b6cdb
  CPU: 2 PID: 12489 Comm: perf_fuzzer 6.18.7 PREEMPT
  pc : perf_ioctl+0x34c/0xc68
  x20: ffffff89a3fa2c70 x8 : 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b
  Code: 943c4a0e 340047a0 f9404a94 f9411e88 (f940b908)
  Call trace:
  perf_ioctl+0x34c/0xc68 (P)
  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa0/0xf4
  invoke_syscall+0x58/0xe4
  el0_svc_common+0xa8/0xdc
  do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
  el0_svc+0x40/0xc0
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xdc
  el0t_64_sync+0x1c4/0x1c8

The fault happened in perf_ioctl(), where perf_event_for_each() follows
the stale group_leader pointer and perf_event_for_each_child() then
dereferences the freed leader's context.

Fix the use-after-free by promoting the detached sibling to a singleton.
Also fix __event_disable() cgroup accounting and event state change.

Fixes: 8a49542c0554 ("perf_events: Fix races in group composition")
Assisted-by: PatchWise:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Aditya Chillara &lt;aditya.chillara@oss.qualcomm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi &lt;dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807-fix-group-leader-uaf-v3-1-b0c2310c9a0d@oss.qualcomm.com
[ Adjusted context for 5.10's older APIs, keeping `event_sched_out()`'s 3-arg form and dropping the DETACH_EXIT/REVOKE/DEAD handling that doesn't exist there. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Fix dangling cgroup pointer in cpuctx</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:27:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yeoreum Yun</name>
<email>yeoreum.yun@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-21T11:33:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ae1fd7bd43dfc3ff3a48ffe51c6765875c047d77'/>
<id>ae1fd7bd43dfc3ff3a48ffe51c6765875c047d77</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3b7a34aebbdf2a4b7295205bf0c654294283ec82 ]

Commit a3c3c6667("perf/core: Fix child_total_time_enabled accounting
bug at task exit") moves the event-&gt;state update to before
list_del_event(). This makes the event-&gt;state test in list_del_event()
always false; never calling perf_cgroup_event_disable().

As a result, cpuctx-&gt;cgrp won't be cleared properly; causing havoc.

Fixes: a3c3c6667("perf/core: Fix child_total_time_enabled accounting bug at task exit")
Signed-off-by: Yeoreum Yun &lt;yeoreum.yun@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Tested-by: David Wang &lt;00107082@163.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aD2TspKH%2F7yvfYoO@e129823.arm.com/
Stable-dep-of: 42c5ca1f0a28 ("perf/core: Fix group leader use-after-free after sibling detach")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3b7a34aebbdf2a4b7295205bf0c654294283ec82 ]

Commit a3c3c6667("perf/core: Fix child_total_time_enabled accounting
bug at task exit") moves the event-&gt;state update to before
list_del_event(). This makes the event-&gt;state test in list_del_event()
always false; never calling perf_cgroup_event_disable().

As a result, cpuctx-&gt;cgrp won't be cleared properly; causing havoc.

Fixes: a3c3c6667("perf/core: Fix child_total_time_enabled accounting bug at task exit")
Signed-off-by: Yeoreum Yun &lt;yeoreum.yun@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Tested-by: David Wang &lt;00107082@163.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aD2TspKH%2F7yvfYoO@e129823.arm.com/
Stable-dep-of: 42c5ca1f0a28 ("perf/core: Fix group leader use-after-free after sibling detach")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Fix cgroup state vs ERROR</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:27:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-21T11:33:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5339b4ac9f5ac766c0dfaa49f08bec8ba119d181'/>
<id>5339b4ac9f5ac766c0dfaa49f08bec8ba119d181</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 61988e36dc5457cdff7ae7927e8d9ad1419ee998 ]

While chasing down a missing perf_cgroup_event_disable() elsewhere,
Leo Yan found that both perf_put_aux_event() and
perf_remove_sibling_event() were also missing one.

Specifically, the rule is that events that switch to OFF,ERROR need to
call perf_cgroup_event_disable().

Unify the disable paths to ensure this.

Fixes: ab43762ef010 ("perf: Allow normal events to output AUX data")
Fixes: 9f0c4fa111dc ("perf/core: Add a new PERF_EV_CAP_SIBLING event capability")
Reported-by: Leo Yan &lt;leo.yan@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250605123343.GD35970@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Stable-dep-of: 42c5ca1f0a28 ("perf/core: Fix group leader use-after-free after sibling detach")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 61988e36dc5457cdff7ae7927e8d9ad1419ee998 ]

While chasing down a missing perf_cgroup_event_disable() elsewhere,
Leo Yan found that both perf_put_aux_event() and
perf_remove_sibling_event() were also missing one.

Specifically, the rule is that events that switch to OFF,ERROR need to
call perf_cgroup_event_disable().

Unify the disable paths to ensure this.

Fixes: ab43762ef010 ("perf: Allow normal events to output AUX data")
Fixes: 9f0c4fa111dc ("perf/core: Add a new PERF_EV_CAP_SIBLING event capability")
Reported-by: Leo Yan &lt;leo.yan@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250605123343.GD35970@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Stable-dep-of: 42c5ca1f0a28 ("perf/core: Fix group leader use-after-free after sibling detach")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ring-buffer: Use current_context for safe per-CPU buffer swap</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:16:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tengda Wu</name>
<email>wutengda@huaweicloud.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-03T00:56:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=26662bc8fced1d668fa1aa146eda085bfc67bd0b'/>
<id>26662bc8fced1d668fa1aa146eda085bfc67bd0b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f27bdc43077e4fcb5557dfc315ee8d91e741f483 ]

The ring_buffer_swap_cpu() function currently checks the per-CPU
committing counter to determine if a buffer is actively being written to
before performing the swap. However, there exists a race window where
this check can be bypassed:

    ring_buffer_lock_reserve
        cpu_buffer = buffer-&gt;buffers[cpu];       // cpu_buffer_a
        rb_reserve_next_event
            rb_start_commit // inc committing
            if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer-&gt;buffer) != buffer)) {...}
            __rb_reserve_next
                rb_move_tail
                    rb_end_commit(cpu_buffer);   // dec committing =&gt; 0
                    /* interrupt hits here, successfully swaps! */
                    local_inc(&amp;cpu_buffer-&gt;committing);

    ring_buffer_unlock_commit
        cpu_buffer = buffer-&gt;buffers[cpu];      // cpu_buffer_b
        rb_commit
            rb_end_commit
            RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, !local_read(&amp;cpu_buffer-&gt;committing))
                                                // triggers warning

The committing counter can temporarily drop to 0 during a single write
operation (within rb_move_tail), creating a window where swap can
succeed even though the write is still in progress. This leads to
inconsistent buffer state and triggers the RB_WARN_ON in rb_commit().

Replace the committing counter check with current_context checks, which
are set at the entry of ring_buffer_lock_reserve() and remain valid
throughout the entire write operation, providing a reliable indicator of
buffer busy state during swap.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4239c38fe0b3 ("ring-buffer: Process commits whenever moving to a new page.")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260803005640.2445666-2-wutengda@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu &lt;wutengda@huaweicloud.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f27bdc43077e4fcb5557dfc315ee8d91e741f483 ]

The ring_buffer_swap_cpu() function currently checks the per-CPU
committing counter to determine if a buffer is actively being written to
before performing the swap. However, there exists a race window where
this check can be bypassed:

    ring_buffer_lock_reserve
        cpu_buffer = buffer-&gt;buffers[cpu];       // cpu_buffer_a
        rb_reserve_next_event
            rb_start_commit // inc committing
            if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer-&gt;buffer) != buffer)) {...}
            __rb_reserve_next
                rb_move_tail
                    rb_end_commit(cpu_buffer);   // dec committing =&gt; 0
                    /* interrupt hits here, successfully swaps! */
                    local_inc(&amp;cpu_buffer-&gt;committing);

    ring_buffer_unlock_commit
        cpu_buffer = buffer-&gt;buffers[cpu];      // cpu_buffer_b
        rb_commit
            rb_end_commit
            RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, !local_read(&amp;cpu_buffer-&gt;committing))
                                                // triggers warning

The committing counter can temporarily drop to 0 during a single write
operation (within rb_move_tail), creating a window where swap can
succeed even though the write is still in progress. This leads to
inconsistent buffer state and triggers the RB_WARN_ON in rb_commit().

Replace the committing counter check with current_context checks, which
are set at the entry of ring_buffer_lock_reserve() and remain valid
throughout the entire write operation, providing a reliable indicator of
buffer busy state during swap.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4239c38fe0b3 ("ring-buffer: Process commits whenever moving to a new page.")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260803005640.2445666-2-wutengda@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu &lt;wutengda@huaweicloud.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ring-buffer: Remove jump to out label in ring_buffer_swap_cpu()</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:16:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-27T18:57:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a146a86ad6a5f2f012b13ac4acf99941d25e5f1d'/>
<id>a146a86ad6a5f2f012b13ac4acf99941d25e5f1d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f115d2b70bff2665f67fa8e8dc5ed9452b696c44 ]

The function ring_buffer_swap_cpu() has a bunch of jumps to the label out
that simply returns "ret". There's no reason to jump to a label that
simply returns a value. Just return directly from there.

This goes back to almost the beginning when commit 8aabee573dff
("ring-buffer: remove unneeded get_online_cpus") was introduced. That
commit removed a put_online_cpus() from that label, but never updated all
the jumps to it that now no longer needed to do anything but return a
value.

Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250527145753.6b45d840@gandalf.local.home
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: f27bdc43077e ("ring-buffer: Use current_context for safe per-CPU buffer swap")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f115d2b70bff2665f67fa8e8dc5ed9452b696c44 ]

The function ring_buffer_swap_cpu() has a bunch of jumps to the label out
that simply returns "ret". There's no reason to jump to a label that
simply returns a value. Just return directly from there.

This goes back to almost the beginning when commit 8aabee573dff
("ring-buffer: remove unneeded get_online_cpus") was introduced. That
commit removed a put_online_cpus() from that label, but never updated all
the jumps to it that now no longer needed to do anything but return a
value.

Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250527145753.6b45d840@gandalf.local.home
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: f27bdc43077e ("ring-buffer: Use current_context for safe per-CPU buffer swap")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/psi: Shut down rtpoll_timer in psi_cgroup_free()</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:16:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-19T11:14:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4addb102154b7cf6e2310ccbe20c3c08619e520d'/>
<id>4addb102154b7cf6e2310ccbe20c3c08619e520d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5457025fa8ca3c0d2732109513de839e3e797190 ]

psi_schedule_rtpoll_work() is called locklessly from the scheduler hotpath
and can race psi_trigger_destroy() taking down the last rtpoll trigger under
rtpoll_trigger_lock:

  psi_schedule_rtpoll_work()        psi_trigger_destroy()

  rcu_read_lock();
  task = rcu_dereference(rtpoll_task);
                                    rcu_assign_pointer(rtpoll_task, NULL);
                                    timer_delete(&amp;rtpoll_timer);
  mod_timer(&amp;rtpoll_timer, ...);
  rcu_read_unlock();
                                    synchronize_rcu();
                                    kthread_stop(task_to_destroy);

The group can then be freed with the re-armed timer still pending, and
poll_timer_fn() runs on freed memory.

461daba06bdc ("psi: eliminate kthread_worker from psi trigger scheduling
mechanism") deleted the timer synchronously after the synchronize_rcu(),
which prevented this but raced trigger creation instead: the deletion could
cancel the timer that a new trigger set armed during the grace period and,
as creation also reinitialized the timer at the time, corrupt it.
8f91efd870ea ("psi: Fix race between psi_trigger_create/destroy") moved the
initialization into group_init() and the deletion into the locked section,
trading the creation races for the window above.

Neither placement in the destruction path works. A pending timer firing
while the group is alive is harmless though. poll_timer_fn() just wakes the
rtpoll waitqueue and doesn't re-arm itself. Bind the timer to the group's
lifetime instead and shut it down in psi_cgroup_free(). Nothing can arm it
by then. timer_shutdown_sync() because the timer is never armed again.

Fixes: 8f91efd870ea ("psi: Fix race between psi_trigger_create/destroy")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Reported-by: Sashiko AI &lt;sashiko-bot@kernel.org&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260711000434.36C4A1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Tested-by: Matt Fleming &lt;mfleming@cloudflare.com&gt;
Acked-by: Suren Baghdasaryan &lt;surenb@google.com&gt;
[ Adapted `cgroup-&gt;psi-&gt;` to embedded `cgroup-&gt;psi.`, `rtpoll_timer` to `poll_timer`, and `timer_shutdown_sync()` to `timer_delete_sync()`. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5457025fa8ca3c0d2732109513de839e3e797190 ]

psi_schedule_rtpoll_work() is called locklessly from the scheduler hotpath
and can race psi_trigger_destroy() taking down the last rtpoll trigger under
rtpoll_trigger_lock:

  psi_schedule_rtpoll_work()        psi_trigger_destroy()

  rcu_read_lock();
  task = rcu_dereference(rtpoll_task);
                                    rcu_assign_pointer(rtpoll_task, NULL);
                                    timer_delete(&amp;rtpoll_timer);
  mod_timer(&amp;rtpoll_timer, ...);
  rcu_read_unlock();
                                    synchronize_rcu();
                                    kthread_stop(task_to_destroy);

The group can then be freed with the re-armed timer still pending, and
poll_timer_fn() runs on freed memory.

461daba06bdc ("psi: eliminate kthread_worker from psi trigger scheduling
mechanism") deleted the timer synchronously after the synchronize_rcu(),
which prevented this but raced trigger creation instead: the deletion could
cancel the timer that a new trigger set armed during the grace period and,
as creation also reinitialized the timer at the time, corrupt it.
8f91efd870ea ("psi: Fix race between psi_trigger_create/destroy") moved the
initialization into group_init() and the deletion into the locked section,
trading the creation races for the window above.

Neither placement in the destruction path works. A pending timer firing
while the group is alive is harmless though. poll_timer_fn() just wakes the
rtpoll waitqueue and doesn't re-arm itself. Bind the timer to the group's
lifetime instead and shut it down in psi_cgroup_free(). Nothing can arm it
by then. timer_shutdown_sync() because the timer is never armed again.

Fixes: 8f91efd870ea ("psi: Fix race between psi_trigger_create/destroy")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Reported-by: Sashiko AI &lt;sashiko-bot@kernel.org&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260711000434.36C4A1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Tested-by: Matt Fleming &lt;mfleming@cloudflare.com&gt;
Acked-by: Suren Baghdasaryan &lt;surenb@google.com&gt;
[ Adapted `cgroup-&gt;psi-&gt;` to embedded `cgroup-&gt;psi.`, `rtpoll_timer` to `poll_timer`, and `timer_shutdown_sync()` to `timer_delete_sync()`. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ftrace: Add global mutex to serialize trace_parser access</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:16:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tengda Wu</name>
<email>wutengda@huaweicloud.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-09T13:54:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a29bc20ea5f0cb79c6287f2c6182c5eeb8e6c01f'/>
<id>a29bc20ea5f0cb79c6287f2c6182c5eeb8e6c01f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7720b63bcef3f54c7fe288774b720a227d54a306 ]

In ftrace, the trace_parser structure is allocated and initialized when
a trace file is opened, and is subsequently used across write and release
handlers to parse user input.

The affected handler paths and their specific functions are:
  - Open paths: ftrace_regex_open(), ftrace_graph_open()
  - Write paths: ftrace_regex_write(), ftrace_graph_write()
  - Release paths: ftrace_regex_release(), ftrace_graph_release()

If userspace opens a trace file descriptor and shares it across multiple
threads, concurrent write calls will race on the parser's internal state,
specifically the 'idx', 'cont', and 'buffer' fields, leading to corrupted
input or undefined behavior.

Fix this by adding a global mutex, parser_lock, to serialize all access
to trace_parser across write and release paths, preventing concurrent
corruption of parser state.

Fixes: e704eff3ff51 ("ftrace: Have set_graph_function handle multiple functions in one write")
Fixes: 689fd8b65d66 ("tracing: trace parser support for function and graph")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260725024721.1983675-1-wutengda@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu &lt;wutengda@huaweicloud.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 7720b63bcef3f54c7fe288774b720a227d54a306 ]

In ftrace, the trace_parser structure is allocated and initialized when
a trace file is opened, and is subsequently used across write and release
handlers to parse user input.

The affected handler paths and their specific functions are:
  - Open paths: ftrace_regex_open(), ftrace_graph_open()
  - Write paths: ftrace_regex_write(), ftrace_graph_write()
  - Release paths: ftrace_regex_release(), ftrace_graph_release()

If userspace opens a trace file descriptor and shares it across multiple
threads, concurrent write calls will race on the parser's internal state,
specifically the 'idx', 'cont', and 'buffer' fields, leading to corrupted
input or undefined behavior.

Fix this by adding a global mutex, parser_lock, to serialize all access
to trace_parser across write and release paths, preventing concurrent
corruption of parser state.

Fixes: e704eff3ff51 ("ftrace: Have set_graph_function handle multiple functions in one write")
Fixes: 689fd8b65d66 ("tracing: trace parser support for function and graph")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260725024721.1983675-1-wutengda@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu &lt;wutengda@huaweicloud.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>taskstats: retain dead thread stats in TGID queries</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:16:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yiyang Chen</name>
<email>cyyzero16@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-26T13:35:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7418eaef93d3741053bcd3492d8f7d6b83b5db63'/>
<id>7418eaef93d3741053bcd3492d8f7d6b83b5db63</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b3e4fbb04220efc3bc022bcf31b5689d39c6b111 ]

Patch series "taskstats: fix TGID dead-thread stat retention", v3.

This series fixes a taskstats TGID aggregation bug where fields added in
the TGID query path were not preserved after thread exit, and adds a
kselftest covering the regression.

The first patch keeps the cached TGID aggregate used for dead threads in
step with the fields already accumulated for live threads, and also fixes
the final TGID exit notification emitted when group_dead is true.

The second patch adds a kselftest that verifies TGID CPU stats do not
regress after a worker thread exits and has been reaped.

This patch (of 2):

fill_stats_for_tgid() builds TGID stats from two sources: the cached
aggregate in signal-&gt;stats and a scan of the live threads in the group.

However, fill_tgid_exit() only accumulates delay accounting into
signal-&gt;stats.  This means that once a thread exits, TGID queries lose the
fields that fill_stats_for_tgid() adds for live threads.

This gap was introduced incrementally by two earlier changes that extended
fill_stats_for_tgid() but did not make the corresponding update to
fill_tgid_exit():

- commit 8c733420bdd5 ("taskstats: add e/u/stime for TGID command")
  added ac_etime, ac_utime, and ac_stime to the TGID query path.
- commit b663a79c1915 ("taskstats: add context-switch counters")
  added nvcsw and nivcsw to the TGID query path.

As a result, those fields were accounted for live threads in TGID queries,
but were dropped from the cached TGID aggregate after thread exit.  The
final TGID exit notification emitted when group_dead is true also copies
that cached aggregate, so it loses the same fields.

Factor the per-task TGID accumulation into tgid_stats_add_task() and use
it in both fill_stats_for_tgid() and fill_tgid_exit().  This keeps the
cached aggregate used for dead threads aligned with the live-thread
accumulation used by TGID queries.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/cover.1776094300.git.cyyzero16@gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/abd2a15d33343636ab5ba43d540bcfe508bd66c7.1776094300.git.cyyzero16@gmail.com
Fixes: 8c733420bdd5 ("taskstats: add e/u/stime for TGID command")
Fixes: b663a79c1915 ("taskstats: add context-switch counters")
Signed-off-by: Yiyang Chen &lt;cyyzero16@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Balbir Singh &lt;balbirs@nvidia.com&gt;
Cc: Dr. Thomas Orgis &lt;thomas.orgis@uni-hamburg.de&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Wang Yaxin &lt;wang.yaxin@zte.com.cn&gt;
Cc: Yang Yang &lt;yang.yang29@zte.com.cn&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b3e4fbb04220efc3bc022bcf31b5689d39c6b111 ]

Patch series "taskstats: fix TGID dead-thread stat retention", v3.

This series fixes a taskstats TGID aggregation bug where fields added in
the TGID query path were not preserved after thread exit, and adds a
kselftest covering the regression.

The first patch keeps the cached TGID aggregate used for dead threads in
step with the fields already accumulated for live threads, and also fixes
the final TGID exit notification emitted when group_dead is true.

The second patch adds a kselftest that verifies TGID CPU stats do not
regress after a worker thread exits and has been reaped.

This patch (of 2):

fill_stats_for_tgid() builds TGID stats from two sources: the cached
aggregate in signal-&gt;stats and a scan of the live threads in the group.

However, fill_tgid_exit() only accumulates delay accounting into
signal-&gt;stats.  This means that once a thread exits, TGID queries lose the
fields that fill_stats_for_tgid() adds for live threads.

This gap was introduced incrementally by two earlier changes that extended
fill_stats_for_tgid() but did not make the corresponding update to
fill_tgid_exit():

- commit 8c733420bdd5 ("taskstats: add e/u/stime for TGID command")
  added ac_etime, ac_utime, and ac_stime to the TGID query path.
- commit b663a79c1915 ("taskstats: add context-switch counters")
  added nvcsw and nivcsw to the TGID query path.

As a result, those fields were accounted for live threads in TGID queries,
but were dropped from the cached TGID aggregate after thread exit.  The
final TGID exit notification emitted when group_dead is true also copies
that cached aggregate, so it loses the same fields.

Factor the per-task TGID accumulation into tgid_stats_add_task() and use
it in both fill_stats_for_tgid() and fill_tgid_exit().  This keeps the
cached aggregate used for dead threads aligned with the live-thread
accumulation used by TGID queries.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/cover.1776094300.git.cyyzero16@gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/abd2a15d33343636ab5ba43d540bcfe508bd66c7.1776094300.git.cyyzero16@gmail.com
Fixes: 8c733420bdd5 ("taskstats: add e/u/stime for TGID command")
Fixes: b663a79c1915 ("taskstats: add context-switch counters")
Signed-off-by: Yiyang Chen &lt;cyyzero16@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Balbir Singh &lt;balbirs@nvidia.com&gt;
Cc: Dr. Thomas Orgis &lt;thomas.orgis@uni-hamburg.de&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Wang Yaxin &lt;wang.yaxin@zte.com.cn&gt;
Cc: Yang Yang &lt;yang.yang29@zte.com.cn&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>taskstats: fill_stats_for_tgid: use for_each_thread()</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:16:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-26T13:35:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fec4e0c57c2165c6ecf89c35efec57c525fc7625'/>
<id>fec4e0c57c2165c6ecf89c35efec57c525fc7625</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ed5378a387fd7c382497f2abcf4605e030b64044 ]

do/while_each_thread should be avoided when possible.

Plus I _think_ this change allows to avoid lock_task_sighand() but I am
not sure, I forgot everything about taskstats.  In any case, this code
does not look right in that the same thread can be accounted twice:
taskstats_exit() can account the exiting thread in signal-&gt;stats and drop
-&gt;siglock but this thread is still on the thread-group list, so
lock_task_sighand() can't help.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230909214951.GA24274@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: b3e4fbb04220 ("taskstats: retain dead thread stats in TGID queries")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ed5378a387fd7c382497f2abcf4605e030b64044 ]

do/while_each_thread should be avoided when possible.

Plus I _think_ this change allows to avoid lock_task_sighand() but I am
not sure, I forgot everything about taskstats.  In any case, this code
does not look right in that the same thread can be accounted twice:
taskstats_exit() can account the exiting thread in signal-&gt;stats and drop
-&gt;siglock but this thread is still on the thread-group list, so
lock_task_sighand() can't help.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230909214951.GA24274@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: b3e4fbb04220 ("taskstats: retain dead thread stats in TGID queries")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit: fix recursive locking deadlock in audit_dupe_exe()</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:16:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ricardo Robaina</name>
<email>rrobaina@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-22T13:55:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6114c3f21eb2ae175401736da744b684705e7ed9'/>
<id>6114c3f21eb2ae175401736da744b684705e7ed9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 81905b5acbe77284734438df3fbec1158e6429a3 ]

A deadlock occurs in the audit subsystem when duplicating
executable-related rules.

When a file is moved (e.g., via do_renameat2()), the VFS layer locks
the parent directory (I_MUTEX_PARENT), which synchronously triggers an
fsnotify_move event. If an existing executable audit rule matches the
file being moved, the audit subsystem catches this event and calls
audit_dupe_exe() to duplicate the watch and update the rule. Then,
audit_alloc_mark() would call kern_path_parent() to resolve the path,
leading to a blind attempt to acquire the exact same I_MUTEX_PARENT lock
already held by the task, resulting in the following recursive locking
deadlock:

 ============================================
 WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
 6.12.0-55.27.1.el10_0.x86_64+debug #1 Not tainted
 --------------------------------------------
 mv/5099 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff888132845358 (&amp;inode-&gt;i_sb-&gt;s_type-&gt;i_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3},
 at: __kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffff888132846b58 (&amp;inode-&gt;i_sb-&gt;s_type-&gt;i_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3},
 at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0

 other info that might help us debug this:
  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0
        ----
   lock(&amp;inode-&gt;i_sb-&gt;s_type-&gt;i_mutex_dir_key/1);
   lock(&amp;inode-&gt;i_sb-&gt;s_type-&gt;i_mutex_dir_key/1);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

  May be due to missing lock nesting notation

  6 locks held by mv/5099:
  #0: ffff888112a9c440 (sb_writers#13)
  at: do_renameat2+0x34c/0xbc0
  #1: ffff888112a9c790 (&amp;type-&gt;s_vfs_rename_key#3)
  at: do_renameat2+0x415/0xbc0
  #2: ffff888132846b58 (&amp;inode-&gt;i_sb-&gt;s_type-&gt;i_mutex_dir_key/1)
  at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0
  #3: ffff888132845358 (&amp;inode-&gt;i_sb-&gt;s_type-&gt;i_mutex_dir_key/5)
  at: lock_two_directories+0x175/0x2b0
  #4: ffffffffb3a1fb10 (&amp;fsnotify_mark_srcu)
  at: fsnotify+0x454/0x28a0
  #5: ffffffffaf886230 (audit_filter_mutex)
  at: audit_update_watch+0x36/0x11e0

 stack backtrace:
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0
  print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xbd/0xca
  validate_chain+0x83a/0xf00
  __lock_acquire+0xcac/0x1d20
  lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x360
  down_write_nested+0x9f/0x230
  __kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0
  kern_path_locked+0x26/0x40
  audit_alloc_mark+0xfb/0x4f0
  audit_dupe_exe+0x6c/0xe0
  audit_dupe_rule+0x6c2/0xc00
  audit_update_watch+0x4cc/0x11e0
  audit_watch_handle_event+0x12c/0x1b0
  send_to_group+0x5d0/0x8b0
  fsnotify+0x615/0x28a0
  fsnotify_move+0x1d8/0x630
  vfs_rename+0xdcd/0x1df0
  do_renameat2+0x9d4/0xbc0
  __x64_sys_renameat+0x192/0x260
  do_syscall_64+0x92/0x180
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
 RIP: 0033:0x7f0491fe8c4e
 Code: 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 15 c1 e1 16 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff
 c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 08 01 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt;
 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 0a c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 15 89
 RSP: 002b:00007ffc7210bf38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000108
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f0491fe8c4e
 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 00007ffc7210e6c8 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
 R10: 00005575eb2dae2a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005575eb2dae2a
 R13: 00007ffc7210e6c8 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 00000000ffffff9c
  &lt;/TASK&gt;

The aforementioned deadlock can be consistently reproduced by running
the script below:

 audit-dupe-exe-deadlock.sh
 --------------------------
 #!/bin/bash
 auditctl -D
 mkdir -p /tmp/foo
 touch /tmp/file
 auditctl -a always,exit -F exe=/tmp/file -F path=/tmp/file -S all -k dr
 mv /tmp/file /tmp/foo/file
 rm -Rf /tmp/foo

This patch fixes the issue by introducing struct audit_watch_ctx to pass
the fsnotify event context down to audit_alloc_mark(). By utilizing the
already-resolved directory inode provided by the event, we bypass the
kern_path_parent() path resolution entirely, safely avoiding the
recursive lock. Furthermore, it explicitly allows duplicate fsnotify
marks (allow_dups = 1) during the rename update, allowing the new rule's
mark to safely coexist with the old rule's mark until the old rule is
freed.

P.S.: This issue was identified and reproduced during a comprehensive
code coverage analysis of the audit subsystem. The full report is
available at the link below:

https://people.redhat.com/rrobaina/audit-code-coverage-analysis.pdf

P.P.S: With the permission of both Ricardo and Nathan, I've squashed a
fixup patch from Nathan that addresses a compile time error when
CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL=n.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 34d99af52ad4 ("audit: implement audit by executable")
Acked-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;nathan@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Robaina &lt;rrobaina@redhat.com&gt;
[PM: move link metadata into the msg, apply fix from NC]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 81905b5acbe77284734438df3fbec1158e6429a3 ]

A deadlock occurs in the audit subsystem when duplicating
executable-related rules.

When a file is moved (e.g., via do_renameat2()), the VFS layer locks
the parent directory (I_MUTEX_PARENT), which synchronously triggers an
fsnotify_move event. If an existing executable audit rule matches the
file being moved, the audit subsystem catches this event and calls
audit_dupe_exe() to duplicate the watch and update the rule. Then,
audit_alloc_mark() would call kern_path_parent() to resolve the path,
leading to a blind attempt to acquire the exact same I_MUTEX_PARENT lock
already held by the task, resulting in the following recursive locking
deadlock:

 ============================================
 WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
 6.12.0-55.27.1.el10_0.x86_64+debug #1 Not tainted
 --------------------------------------------
 mv/5099 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff888132845358 (&amp;inode-&gt;i_sb-&gt;s_type-&gt;i_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3},
 at: __kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffff888132846b58 (&amp;inode-&gt;i_sb-&gt;s_type-&gt;i_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3},
 at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0

 other info that might help us debug this:
  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0
        ----
   lock(&amp;inode-&gt;i_sb-&gt;s_type-&gt;i_mutex_dir_key/1);
   lock(&amp;inode-&gt;i_sb-&gt;s_type-&gt;i_mutex_dir_key/1);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

  May be due to missing lock nesting notation

  6 locks held by mv/5099:
  #0: ffff888112a9c440 (sb_writers#13)
  at: do_renameat2+0x34c/0xbc0
  #1: ffff888112a9c790 (&amp;type-&gt;s_vfs_rename_key#3)
  at: do_renameat2+0x415/0xbc0
  #2: ffff888132846b58 (&amp;inode-&gt;i_sb-&gt;s_type-&gt;i_mutex_dir_key/1)
  at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0
  #3: ffff888132845358 (&amp;inode-&gt;i_sb-&gt;s_type-&gt;i_mutex_dir_key/5)
  at: lock_two_directories+0x175/0x2b0
  #4: ffffffffb3a1fb10 (&amp;fsnotify_mark_srcu)
  at: fsnotify+0x454/0x28a0
  #5: ffffffffaf886230 (audit_filter_mutex)
  at: audit_update_watch+0x36/0x11e0

 stack backtrace:
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0
  print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xbd/0xca
  validate_chain+0x83a/0xf00
  __lock_acquire+0xcac/0x1d20
  lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x360
  down_write_nested+0x9f/0x230
  __kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0
  kern_path_locked+0x26/0x40
  audit_alloc_mark+0xfb/0x4f0
  audit_dupe_exe+0x6c/0xe0
  audit_dupe_rule+0x6c2/0xc00
  audit_update_watch+0x4cc/0x11e0
  audit_watch_handle_event+0x12c/0x1b0
  send_to_group+0x5d0/0x8b0
  fsnotify+0x615/0x28a0
  fsnotify_move+0x1d8/0x630
  vfs_rename+0xdcd/0x1df0
  do_renameat2+0x9d4/0xbc0
  __x64_sys_renameat+0x192/0x260
  do_syscall_64+0x92/0x180
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
 RIP: 0033:0x7f0491fe8c4e
 Code: 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 15 c1 e1 16 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff
 c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 08 01 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt;
 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 0a c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 15 89
 RSP: 002b:00007ffc7210bf38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000108
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f0491fe8c4e
 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 00007ffc7210e6c8 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
 R10: 00005575eb2dae2a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005575eb2dae2a
 R13: 00007ffc7210e6c8 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 00000000ffffff9c
  &lt;/TASK&gt;

The aforementioned deadlock can be consistently reproduced by running
the script below:

 audit-dupe-exe-deadlock.sh
 --------------------------
 #!/bin/bash
 auditctl -D
 mkdir -p /tmp/foo
 touch /tmp/file
 auditctl -a always,exit -F exe=/tmp/file -F path=/tmp/file -S all -k dr
 mv /tmp/file /tmp/foo/file
 rm -Rf /tmp/foo

This patch fixes the issue by introducing struct audit_watch_ctx to pass
the fsnotify event context down to audit_alloc_mark(). By utilizing the
already-resolved directory inode provided by the event, we bypass the
kern_path_parent() path resolution entirely, safely avoiding the
recursive lock. Furthermore, it explicitly allows duplicate fsnotify
marks (allow_dups = 1) during the rename update, allowing the new rule's
mark to safely coexist with the old rule's mark until the old rule is
freed.

P.S.: This issue was identified and reproduced during a comprehensive
code coverage analysis of the audit subsystem. The full report is
available at the link below:

https://people.redhat.com/rrobaina/audit-code-coverage-analysis.pdf

P.P.S: With the permission of both Ricardo and Nathan, I've squashed a
fixup patch from Nathan that addresses a compile time error when
CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL=n.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 34d99af52ad4 ("audit: implement audit by executable")
Acked-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;nathan@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Robaina &lt;rrobaina@redhat.com&gt;
[PM: move link metadata into the msg, apply fix from NC]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
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</entry>
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