<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel, branch linux-2.6.36.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>kernel/smp.c: fix smp_call_function_many() SMP race</title>
<updated>2011-02-17T22:47:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Anton Blanchard</name>
<email>anton@samba.org</email>
</author>
<published>2011-01-20T22:44:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=44c73d2ededd2deed83d74163cf49f60910f0f95'/>
<id>44c73d2ededd2deed83d74163cf49f60910f0f95</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6dc19899958e420a931274b94019e267e2396d3e upstream.

I noticed a failure where we hit the following WARN_ON in
generic_smp_call_function_interrupt:

                if (!cpumask_test_and_clear_cpu(cpu, data-&gt;cpumask))
                        continue;

                data-&gt;csd.func(data-&gt;csd.info);

                refs = atomic_dec_return(&amp;data-&gt;refs);
                WARN_ON(refs &lt; 0);      &lt;-------------------------

We atomically tested and cleared our bit in the cpumask, and yet the
number of cpus left (ie refs) was 0.  How can this be?

It turns out commit 54fdade1c3332391948ec43530c02c4794a38172
("generic-ipi: make struct call_function_data lockless") is at fault.  It
removes locking from smp_call_function_many and in doing so creates a
rather complicated race.

The problem comes about because:

 - The smp_call_function_many interrupt handler walks call_function.queue
   without any locking.
 - We reuse a percpu data structure in smp_call_function_many.
 - We do not wait for any RCU grace period before starting the next
   smp_call_function_many.

Imagine a scenario where CPU A does two smp_call_functions back to back,
and CPU B does an smp_call_function in between.  We concentrate on how CPU
C handles the calls:

CPU A            CPU B                  CPU C              CPU D

smp_call_function
                                        smp_call_function_interrupt
                                            walks
					call_function.queue sees
					data from CPU A on list

                 smp_call_function

                                        smp_call_function_interrupt
                                            walks

                                        call_function.queue sees
                                          (stale) CPU A on list
							   smp_call_function int
							   clears last ref on A
							   list_del_rcu, unlock
smp_call_function reuses
percpu *data A
                                         data-&gt;cpumask sees and
                                         clears bit in cpumask
                                         might be using old or new fn!
                                         decrements refs below 0

set data-&gt;refs (too late!)

The important thing to note is since the interrupt handler walks a
potentially stale call_function.queue without any locking, then another
cpu can view the percpu *data structure at any time, even when the owner
is in the process of initialising it.

The following test case hits the WARN_ON 100% of the time on my PowerPC
box (having 128 threads does help :)

#include &lt;linux/module.h&gt;
#include &lt;linux/init.h&gt;

#define ITERATIONS 100

static void do_nothing_ipi(void *dummy)
{
}

static void do_ipis(struct work_struct *dummy)
{
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i &lt; ITERATIONS; i++)
		smp_call_function(do_nothing_ipi, NULL, 1);

	printk(KERN_DEBUG "cpu %d finished\n", smp_processor_id());
}

static struct work_struct work[NR_CPUS];

static int __init testcase_init(void)
{
	int cpu;

	for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
		INIT_WORK(&amp;work[cpu], do_ipis);
		schedule_work_on(cpu, &amp;work[cpu]);
	}

	return 0;
}

static void __exit testcase_exit(void)
{
}

module_init(testcase_init)
module_exit(testcase_exit)
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Anton Blanchard");

I tried to fix it by ordering the read and the write of -&gt;cpumask and
-&gt;refs.  In doing so I missed a critical case but Paul McKenney was able
to spot my bug thankfully :) To ensure we arent viewing previous
iterations the interrupt handler needs to read -&gt;refs then -&gt;cpumask then
-&gt;refs _again_.

Thanks to Milton Miller and Paul McKenney for helping to debug this issue.

[miltonm@bga.com: add WARN_ON and BUG_ON, remove extra read of refs before initial read of mask that doesn't help (also noted by Peter Zijlstra), adjust comments, hopefully clarify scenario ]
[miltonm@bga.com: remove excess tests]
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard &lt;anton@samba.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Milton Miller &lt;miltonm@bga.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6dc19899958e420a931274b94019e267e2396d3e upstream.

I noticed a failure where we hit the following WARN_ON in
generic_smp_call_function_interrupt:

                if (!cpumask_test_and_clear_cpu(cpu, data-&gt;cpumask))
                        continue;

                data-&gt;csd.func(data-&gt;csd.info);

                refs = atomic_dec_return(&amp;data-&gt;refs);
                WARN_ON(refs &lt; 0);      &lt;-------------------------

We atomically tested and cleared our bit in the cpumask, and yet the
number of cpus left (ie refs) was 0.  How can this be?

It turns out commit 54fdade1c3332391948ec43530c02c4794a38172
("generic-ipi: make struct call_function_data lockless") is at fault.  It
removes locking from smp_call_function_many and in doing so creates a
rather complicated race.

The problem comes about because:

 - The smp_call_function_many interrupt handler walks call_function.queue
   without any locking.
 - We reuse a percpu data structure in smp_call_function_many.
 - We do not wait for any RCU grace period before starting the next
   smp_call_function_many.

Imagine a scenario where CPU A does two smp_call_functions back to back,
and CPU B does an smp_call_function in between.  We concentrate on how CPU
C handles the calls:

CPU A            CPU B                  CPU C              CPU D

smp_call_function
                                        smp_call_function_interrupt
                                            walks
					call_function.queue sees
					data from CPU A on list

                 smp_call_function

                                        smp_call_function_interrupt
                                            walks

                                        call_function.queue sees
                                          (stale) CPU A on list
							   smp_call_function int
							   clears last ref on A
							   list_del_rcu, unlock
smp_call_function reuses
percpu *data A
                                         data-&gt;cpumask sees and
                                         clears bit in cpumask
                                         might be using old or new fn!
                                         decrements refs below 0

set data-&gt;refs (too late!)

The important thing to note is since the interrupt handler walks a
potentially stale call_function.queue without any locking, then another
cpu can view the percpu *data structure at any time, even when the owner
is in the process of initialising it.

The following test case hits the WARN_ON 100% of the time on my PowerPC
box (having 128 threads does help :)

#include &lt;linux/module.h&gt;
#include &lt;linux/init.h&gt;

#define ITERATIONS 100

static void do_nothing_ipi(void *dummy)
{
}

static void do_ipis(struct work_struct *dummy)
{
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i &lt; ITERATIONS; i++)
		smp_call_function(do_nothing_ipi, NULL, 1);

	printk(KERN_DEBUG "cpu %d finished\n", smp_processor_id());
}

static struct work_struct work[NR_CPUS];

static int __init testcase_init(void)
{
	int cpu;

	for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
		INIT_WORK(&amp;work[cpu], do_ipis);
		schedule_work_on(cpu, &amp;work[cpu]);
	}

	return 0;
}

static void __exit testcase_exit(void)
{
}

module_init(testcase_init)
module_exit(testcase_exit)
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Anton Blanchard");

I tried to fix it by ordering the read and the write of -&gt;cpumask and
-&gt;refs.  In doing so I missed a critical case but Paul McKenney was able
to spot my bug thankfully :) To ensure we arent viewing previous
iterations the interrupt handler needs to read -&gt;refs then -&gt;cpumask then
-&gt;refs _again_.

Thanks to Milton Miller and Paul McKenney for helping to debug this issue.

[miltonm@bga.com: add WARN_ON and BUG_ON, remove extra read of refs before initial read of mask that doesn't help (also noted by Peter Zijlstra), adjust comments, hopefully clarify scenario ]
[miltonm@bga.com: remove excess tests]
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard &lt;anton@samba.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Milton Miller &lt;miltonm@bga.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>watchdog: Don't change watchdog state on read of sysctl</title>
<updated>2011-02-17T22:47:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marcin Slusarz</name>
<email>marcin.slusarz@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-01-28T16:00:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=91bbb90c3b953b03fae72a22ae7a0713a48b3dba'/>
<id>91bbb90c3b953b03fae72a22ae7a0713a48b3dba</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9ffdc6c37df131f89d52001e0ef03091b158826f upstream.

Signed-off-by: Marcin Slusarz &lt;marcin.slusarz@gmail.com&gt;
[ add {}'s to fix a warning ]
Signed-off-by: Don Zickus &lt;dzickus@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
LKML-Reference: &lt;1296230433-6261-3-git-send-email-dzickus@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9ffdc6c37df131f89d52001e0ef03091b158826f upstream.

Signed-off-by: Marcin Slusarz &lt;marcin.slusarz@gmail.com&gt;
[ add {}'s to fix a warning ]
Signed-off-by: Don Zickus &lt;dzickus@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
LKML-Reference: &lt;1296230433-6261-3-git-send-email-dzickus@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>watchdog: Fix sysctl consistency</title>
<updated>2011-02-17T22:47:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marcin Slusarz</name>
<email>marcin.slusarz@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-01-28T16:00:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=615563d11619a5df5c95577236888434c78e54a9'/>
<id>615563d11619a5df5c95577236888434c78e54a9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 397357666de6b5b6adb5fa99f9758ec8cf30ac34 upstream.

If it was not possible to enable watchdog for any cpu, switch
watchdog_enabled back to 0, because it's visible via
kernel.watchdog sysctl.

Signed-off-by: Marcin Slusarz &lt;marcin.slusarz@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Don Zickus &lt;dzickus@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
LKML-Reference: &lt;1296230433-6261-2-git-send-email-dzickus@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 397357666de6b5b6adb5fa99f9758ec8cf30ac34 upstream.

If it was not possible to enable watchdog for any cpu, switch
watchdog_enabled back to 0, because it's visible via
kernel.watchdog sysctl.

Signed-off-by: Marcin Slusarz &lt;marcin.slusarz@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Don Zickus &lt;dzickus@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
LKML-Reference: &lt;1296230433-6261-2-git-send-email-dzickus@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix prlimit64 for suid/sgid processes</title>
<updated>2011-02-17T22:47:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kacper Kornet</name>
<email>kornet@camk.edu.pl</email>
</author>
<published>2011-01-28T23:21:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ceb615bfeb0a612b13a7d58b4e09194b92e85fbb'/>
<id>ceb615bfeb0a612b13a7d58b4e09194b92e85fbb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit aa5bd67dcfdf9af34c7fa36ebc87d4e1f7e91873 upstream.

Since check_prlimit_permission always fails in the case of SUID/GUID
processes, such processes are not able to read or set their own limits.
This commit changes this by assuming that process can always read/change
its own limits.

Signed-off-by: Kacper Kornet &lt;kornet@camk.edu.pl&gt;
Acked-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit aa5bd67dcfdf9af34c7fa36ebc87d4e1f7e91873 upstream.

Since check_prlimit_permission always fails in the case of SUID/GUID
processes, such processes are not able to read or set their own limits.
This commit changes this by assuming that process can always read/change
its own limits.

Signed-off-by: Kacper Kornet &lt;kornet@camk.edu.pl&gt;
Acked-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ptrace: use safer wake up on ptrace_detach()</title>
<updated>2011-02-17T22:47:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2011-02-10T23:01:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c17b0a7e854bd2a6f24405f4a9476f1cc1c3e7df'/>
<id>c17b0a7e854bd2a6f24405f4a9476f1cc1c3e7df</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 01e05e9a90b8f4c3997ae0537e87720eb475e532 upstream.

The wake_up_process() call in ptrace_detach() is spurious and not
interlocked with the tracee state.  IOW, the tracee could be running or
sleeping in any place in the kernel by the time wake_up_process() is
called.  This can lead to the tracee waking up unexpectedly which can be
dangerous.

The wake_up is spurious and should be removed but for now reduce its
toxicity by only waking up if the tracee is in TRACED or STOPPED state.

This bug can possibly be used as an attack vector.  I don't think it
will take too much effort to come up with an attack which triggers oops
somewhere.  Most sleeps are wrapped in condition test loops and should
be safe but we have quite a number of places where sleep and wakeup
conditions are expected to be interlocked.  Although the window of
opportunity is tiny, ptrace can be used by non-privileged users and with
some loading the window can definitely be extended and exploited.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Roland McGrath &lt;roland@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 01e05e9a90b8f4c3997ae0537e87720eb475e532 upstream.

The wake_up_process() call in ptrace_detach() is spurious and not
interlocked with the tracee state.  IOW, the tracee could be running or
sleeping in any place in the kernel by the time wake_up_process() is
called.  This can lead to the tracee waking up unexpectedly which can be
dangerous.

The wake_up is spurious and should be removed but for now reduce its
toxicity by only waking up if the tracee is in TRACED or STOPPED state.

This bug can possibly be used as an attack vector.  I don't think it
will take too much effort to come up with an attack which triggers oops
somewhere.  Most sleeps are wrapped in condition test loops and should
be safe but we have quite a number of places where sleep and wakeup
conditions are expected to be interlocked.  Although the window of
opportunity is tiny, ptrace can be used by non-privileged users and with
some loading the window can definitely be extended and exploited.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Roland McGrath &lt;roland@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>posix-cpu-timers: workaround to suppress the problems with mt exec</title>
<updated>2011-01-07T21:58:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-05T15:53:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2a71e215aa15cab942a814904e108d72dc86cfbb'/>
<id>2a71e215aa15cab942a814904e108d72dc86cfbb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e0a70217107e6f9844628120412cb27bb4cea194 upstream.

posix-cpu-timers.c correctly assumes that the dying process does
posix_cpu_timers_exit_group() and removes all !CPUCLOCK_PERTHREAD
timers from signal-&gt;cpu_timers list.

But, it also assumes that timer-&gt;it.cpu.task is always the group
leader, and thus the dead -&gt;task means the dead thread group.

This is obviously not true after de_thread() changes the leader.
After that almost every posix_cpu_timer_ method has problems.

It is not simple to fix this bug correctly. First of all, I think
that timer-&gt;it.cpu should use struct pid instead of task_struct.
Also, the locking should be reworked completely. In particular,
tasklist_lock should not be used at all. This all needs a lot of
nontrivial and hard-to-test changes.

Change __exit_signal() to do posix_cpu_timers_exit_group() when
the old leader dies during exec. This is not the fix, just the
temporary hack to hide the problem for 2.6.37 and stable. IOW,
this is obviously wrong but this is what we currently have anyway:
cpu timers do not work after mt exec.

In theory this change adds another race. The exiting leader can
detach the timers which were attached to the new leader. However,
the window between de_thread() and release_task() is small, we
can pretend that sys_timer_create() was called before de_thread().

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e0a70217107e6f9844628120412cb27bb4cea194 upstream.

posix-cpu-timers.c correctly assumes that the dying process does
posix_cpu_timers_exit_group() and removes all !CPUCLOCK_PERTHREAD
timers from signal-&gt;cpu_timers list.

But, it also assumes that timer-&gt;it.cpu.task is always the group
leader, and thus the dead -&gt;task means the dead thread group.

This is obviously not true after de_thread() changes the leader.
After that almost every posix_cpu_timer_ method has problems.

It is not simple to fix this bug correctly. First of all, I think
that timer-&gt;it.cpu should use struct pid instead of task_struct.
Also, the locking should be reworked completely. In particular,
tasklist_lock should not be used at all. This all needs a lot of
nontrivial and hard-to-test changes.

Change __exit_signal() to do posix_cpu_timers_exit_group() when
the old leader dies during exec. This is not the fix, just the
temporary hack to hide the problem for 2.6.37 and stable. IOW,
this is obviously wrong but this is what we currently have anyway:
cpu timers do not work after mt exec.

In theory this change adds another race. The exiting leader can
detach the timers which were attached to the new leader. However,
the window between de_thread() and release_task() is small, we
can pretend that sys_timer_create() was called before de_thread().

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization</title>
<updated>2011-01-07T21:58:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mike Galbraith</name>
<email>efault@gmx.de</email>
</author>
<published>2010-12-08T10:05:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9f4bd59e7ba7ccbd873b7af3b377f7b3b163d2ff'/>
<id>9f4bd59e7ba7ccbd873b7af3b377f7b3b163d2ff</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64 upstream.

idle_balance() drops/retakes rq-&gt;lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched().  Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.

Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set.  Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().

Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg &lt;bbb.lst@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Yong Zhang &lt;yong.zhang0@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
LKML-Reference: &lt;1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64 upstream.

idle_balance() drops/retakes rq-&gt;lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched().  Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.

Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set.  Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().

Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg &lt;bbb.lst@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Yong Zhang &lt;yong.zhang0@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
LKML-Reference: &lt;1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>watchdog: Improve initialisation error message and documentation</title>
<updated>2011-01-07T21:58:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Hutchings</name>
<email>ben@decadent.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2011-01-02T23:02:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=36bd931c61a97d5b8f9bc3ded62c4e43b22c34ff'/>
<id>36bd931c61a97d5b8f9bc3ded62c4e43b22c34ff</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 551423748a4eba55f2eb0fc250d757986471f187 upstream.

The error message 'NMI watchdog failed to create perf event...'
does not make it clear that this is a fatal error for the
watchdog.  It also currently prints the error value as a
pointer, rather than extracting the error code with PTR_ERR().
Fix that.

Add a note to the description of the 'nowatchdog' kernel
parameter to associate it with this message.

Reported-by: Cesare Leonardi &lt;celeonar@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Cc: 599368@bugs.debian.org
Cc: 608138@bugs.debian.org
Cc: Don Zickus &lt;dzickus@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
LKML-Reference: &lt;1294009362.3167.126.camel@localhost&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 551423748a4eba55f2eb0fc250d757986471f187 upstream.

The error message 'NMI watchdog failed to create perf event...'
does not make it clear that this is a fatal error for the
watchdog.  It also currently prints the error value as a
pointer, rather than extracting the error code with PTR_ERR().
Fix that.

Add a note to the description of the 'nowatchdog' kernel
parameter to associate it with this message.

Reported-by: Cesare Leonardi &lt;celeonar@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Cc: 599368@bugs.debian.org
Cc: 608138@bugs.debian.org
Cc: Don Zickus &lt;dzickus@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
LKML-Reference: &lt;1294009362.3167.126.camel@localhost&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fix freeing user_struct in user cache</title>
<updated>2011-01-07T21:58:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hillf Danton</name>
<email>dhillf@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-12-29T13:55:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c9009e7208be5a127d302a63602af1a6f15b17d9'/>
<id>c9009e7208be5a127d302a63602af1a6f15b17d9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4ef9e11d6867f88951e30db910fa015300e31871 upstream.

When racing on adding into user cache, the new allocated from mm slab
is freed without putting user namespace.

Since the user namespace is already operated by getting, putting has
to be issued.

Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton &lt;dhillf@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4ef9e11d6867f88951e30db910fa015300e31871 upstream.

When racing on adding into user cache, the new allocated from mm slab
is freed without putting user namespace.

Since the user namespace is already operated by getting, putting has
to be issued.

Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton &lt;dhillf@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Fix panic when lseek() called on "trace" opened for writing</title>
<updated>2011-01-07T21:58:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Slava Pestov</name>
<email>slavapestov@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-24T23:13:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3ee6c4cf578834e96653b821054cc7fa7246affc'/>
<id>3ee6c4cf578834e96653b821054cc7fa7246affc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 364829b1263b44aa60383824e4c1289d83d78ca7 upstream.

The file_ops struct for the "trace" special file defined llseek as seq_lseek().
However, if the file was opened for writing only, seq_open() was not called,
and the seek would dereference a null pointer, file-&gt;private_data.

This patch introduces a new wrapper for seq_lseek() which checks if the file
descriptor is opened for reading first. If not, it does nothing.

Signed-off-by: Slava Pestov &lt;slavapestov@google.com&gt;
LKML-Reference: &lt;1290640396-24179-1-git-send-email-slavapestov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 364829b1263b44aa60383824e4c1289d83d78ca7 upstream.

The file_ops struct for the "trace" special file defined llseek as seq_lseek().
However, if the file was opened for writing only, seq_open() was not called,
and the seek would dereference a null pointer, file-&gt;private_data.

This patch introduces a new wrapper for seq_lseek() which checks if the file
descriptor is opened for reading first. If not, it does nothing.

Signed-off-by: Slava Pestov &lt;slavapestov@google.com&gt;
LKML-Reference: &lt;1290640396-24179-1-git-send-email-slavapestov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
