<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel/signal.c, branch v3.18.76</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>signal: protect SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE from unintentional clearing.</title>
<updated>2017-08-11T16:30:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jamie Iles</name>
<email>jamie.iles@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-11T00:57:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c398f3bb3ebaf25c149e12790a913d83b6d861b3'/>
<id>c398f3bb3ebaf25c149e12790a913d83b6d861b3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2d39b3cd34e6d323720d4c61bd714f5ae202c022 ]

Since commit 00cd5c37afd5 ("ptrace: permit ptracing of /sbin/init") we
can now trace init processes.  init is initially protected with
SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE which will prevent fatal signals such as SIGSTOP, but
there are a number of paths during tracing where SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE can
be implicitly cleared.

This can result in init becoming stoppable/killable after tracing.  For
example, running:

  while true; do kill -STOP 1; done &amp;
  strace -p 1

and then stopping strace and the kill loop will result in init being
left in state TASK_STOPPED.  Sending SIGCONT to init will resume it, but
init will now respond to future SIGSTOP signals rather than ignoring
them.

Make sure that when setting SIGNAL_STOP_CONTINUED/SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED
that we don't clear SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170104122017.25047-1-jamie.iles@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles &lt;jamie.iles@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2d39b3cd34e6d323720d4c61bd714f5ae202c022 ]

Since commit 00cd5c37afd5 ("ptrace: permit ptracing of /sbin/init") we
can now trace init processes.  init is initially protected with
SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE which will prevent fatal signals such as SIGSTOP, but
there are a number of paths during tracing where SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE can
be implicitly cleared.

This can result in init becoming stoppable/killable after tracing.  For
example, running:

  while true; do kill -STOP 1; done &amp;
  strace -p 1

and then stopping strace and the kill loop will result in init being
left in state TASK_STOPPED.  Sending SIGCONT to init will resume it, but
init will now respond to future SIGSTOP signals rather than ignoring
them.

Make sure that when setting SIGNAL_STOP_CONTINUED/SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED
that we don't clear SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170104122017.25047-1-jamie.iles@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles &lt;jamie.iles@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>signal: Only reschedule timers on signals timers have sent</title>
<updated>2017-06-29T07:12:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-13T09:31:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0ddaca0ac8afda72f061b926e1df3151b50e24b6'/>
<id>0ddaca0ac8afda72f061b926e1df3151b50e24b6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 57db7e4a2d92c2d3dfbca4ef8057849b2682436b upstream.

Thomas Gleixner  wrote:
&gt; The CRIU support added a 'feature' which allows a user space task to send
&gt; arbitrary (kernel) signals to itself. The changelog says:
&gt;
&gt;   The kernel prevents sending of siginfo with positive si_code, because
&gt;   these codes are reserved for kernel.  I think we can allow a task to
&gt;   send such a siginfo to itself.  This operation should not be dangerous.
&gt;
&gt; Quite contrary to that claim, it turns out that it is outright dangerous
&gt; for signals with info-&gt;si_code == SI_TIMER. The following code sequence in
&gt; a user space task allows to crash the kernel:
&gt;
&gt;    id = timer_create(CLOCK_XXX, ..... signo = SIGX);
&gt;    timer_set(id, ....);
&gt;    info-&gt;si_signo = SIGX;
&gt;    info-&gt;si_code = SI_TIMER:
&gt;    info-&gt;_sifields._timer._tid = id;
&gt;    info-&gt;_sifields._timer._sys_private = 2;
&gt;    rt_[tg]sigqueueinfo(..., SIGX, info);
&gt;    sigemptyset(&amp;sigset);
&gt;    sigaddset(&amp;sigset, SIGX);
&gt;    rt_sigtimedwait(sigset, info);
&gt;
&gt; For timers based on CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID, CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID this
&gt; results in a kernel crash because sigwait() dequeues the signal and the
&gt; dequeue code observes:
&gt;
&gt;   info-&gt;si_code == SI_TIMER &amp;&amp; info-&gt;_sifields._timer._sys_private != 0
&gt;
&gt; which triggers the following callchain:
&gt;
&gt;  do_schedule_next_timer() -&gt; posix_cpu_timer_schedule() -&gt; arm_timer()
&gt;
&gt; arm_timer() executes a list_add() on the timer, which is already armed via
&gt; the timer_set() syscall. That's a double list add which corrupts the posix
&gt; cpu timer list. As a consequence the kernel crashes on the next operation
&gt; touching the posix cpu timer list.
&gt;
&gt; Posix clocks which are internally implemented based on hrtimers are not
&gt; affected by this because hrtimer_start() can handle already armed timers
&gt; nicely, but it's a reliable way to trigger the WARN_ON() in
&gt; hrtimer_forward(), which complains about calling that function on an
&gt; already armed timer.

This problem has existed since the posix timer code was merged into
2.5.63. A few releases earlier in 2.5.60 ptrace gained the ability to
inject not just a signal (which linux has supported since 1.0) but the
full siginfo of a signal.

The core problem is that the code will reschedule in response to
signals getting dequeued not just for signals the timers sent but
for other signals that happen to a si_code of SI_TIMER.

Avoid this confusion by testing to see if the queued signal was
preallocated as all timer signals are preallocated, and so far
only the timer code preallocates signals.

Move the check for if a timer needs to be rescheduled up into
collect_signal where the preallocation check must be performed,
and pass the result back to dequeue_signal where the code reschedules
timers.   This makes it clear why the code cares about preallocated
timers.

Reported-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
History Tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
Reference: 66dd34ad31e5 ("signal: allow to send any siginfo to itself")
Reference: 1669ce53e2ff ("Add PTRACE_GETSIGINFO and PTRACE_SETSIGINFO")
Fixes: db8b50ba75f2 ("[PATCH] POSIX clocks &amp; timers")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 57db7e4a2d92c2d3dfbca4ef8057849b2682436b upstream.

Thomas Gleixner  wrote:
&gt; The CRIU support added a 'feature' which allows a user space task to send
&gt; arbitrary (kernel) signals to itself. The changelog says:
&gt;
&gt;   The kernel prevents sending of siginfo with positive si_code, because
&gt;   these codes are reserved for kernel.  I think we can allow a task to
&gt;   send such a siginfo to itself.  This operation should not be dangerous.
&gt;
&gt; Quite contrary to that claim, it turns out that it is outright dangerous
&gt; for signals with info-&gt;si_code == SI_TIMER. The following code sequence in
&gt; a user space task allows to crash the kernel:
&gt;
&gt;    id = timer_create(CLOCK_XXX, ..... signo = SIGX);
&gt;    timer_set(id, ....);
&gt;    info-&gt;si_signo = SIGX;
&gt;    info-&gt;si_code = SI_TIMER:
&gt;    info-&gt;_sifields._timer._tid = id;
&gt;    info-&gt;_sifields._timer._sys_private = 2;
&gt;    rt_[tg]sigqueueinfo(..., SIGX, info);
&gt;    sigemptyset(&amp;sigset);
&gt;    sigaddset(&amp;sigset, SIGX);
&gt;    rt_sigtimedwait(sigset, info);
&gt;
&gt; For timers based on CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID, CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID this
&gt; results in a kernel crash because sigwait() dequeues the signal and the
&gt; dequeue code observes:
&gt;
&gt;   info-&gt;si_code == SI_TIMER &amp;&amp; info-&gt;_sifields._timer._sys_private != 0
&gt;
&gt; which triggers the following callchain:
&gt;
&gt;  do_schedule_next_timer() -&gt; posix_cpu_timer_schedule() -&gt; arm_timer()
&gt;
&gt; arm_timer() executes a list_add() on the timer, which is already armed via
&gt; the timer_set() syscall. That's a double list add which corrupts the posix
&gt; cpu timer list. As a consequence the kernel crashes on the next operation
&gt; touching the posix cpu timer list.
&gt;
&gt; Posix clocks which are internally implemented based on hrtimers are not
&gt; affected by this because hrtimer_start() can handle already armed timers
&gt; nicely, but it's a reliable way to trigger the WARN_ON() in
&gt; hrtimer_forward(), which complains about calling that function on an
&gt; already armed timer.

This problem has existed since the posix timer code was merged into
2.5.63. A few releases earlier in 2.5.60 ptrace gained the ability to
inject not just a signal (which linux has supported since 1.0) but the
full siginfo of a signal.

The core problem is that the code will reschedule in response to
signals getting dequeued not just for signals the timers sent but
for other signals that happen to a si_code of SI_TIMER.

Avoid this confusion by testing to see if the queued signal was
preallocated as all timer signals are preallocated, and so far
only the timer code preallocates signals.

Move the check for if a timer needs to be rescheduled up into
collect_signal where the preallocation check must be performed,
and pass the result back to dequeue_signal where the code reschedules
timers.   This makes it clear why the code cares about preallocated
timers.

Reported-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
History Tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
Reference: 66dd34ad31e5 ("signal: allow to send any siginfo to itself")
Reference: 1669ce53e2ff ("Add PTRACE_GETSIGINFO and PTRACE_SETSIGINFO")
Fixes: db8b50ba75f2 ("[PATCH] POSIX clocks &amp; timers")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>signal: fix information leak in copy_siginfo_from_user32</title>
<updated>2015-08-27T17:25:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amanieu d'Antras</name>
<email>amanieu@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-06T22:46:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6f03dcb145cc383bdbef043039d13fc674c8062e'/>
<id>6f03dcb145cc383bdbef043039d13fc674c8062e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3c00cb5e68dc719f2fc73a33b1b230aadfcb1309 ]

This function can leak kernel stack data when the user siginfo_t has a
positive si_code value.  The top 16 bits of si_code descibe which fields
in the siginfo_t union are active, but they are treated inconsistently
between copy_siginfo_from_user32, copy_siginfo_to_user32 and
copy_siginfo_to_user.

copy_siginfo_from_user32 is called from rt_sigqueueinfo and
rt_tgsigqueueinfo in which the user has full control overthe top 16 bits
of si_code.

This fixes the following information leaks:
x86:   8 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to
       itself. This leak grows to 16 bytes if the process uses x32.
       (si_code = __SI_CHLD)
x86:   100 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to
       a 64-bit process. (si_code = -1)
sparc: 4 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to a
       64-bit process. (si_code = any)

parsic and s390 have similar bugs, but they are not vulnerable because
rt_[tg]sigqueueinfo have checks that prevent sending a positive si_code
to a different process.  These bugs are also fixed for consistency.

Signed-off-by: Amanieu d'Antras &lt;amanieu@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;rmk@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Ralf Baechle &lt;ralf@linux-mips.org&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Chris Metcalf &lt;cmetcalf@ezchip.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3c00cb5e68dc719f2fc73a33b1b230aadfcb1309 ]

This function can leak kernel stack data when the user siginfo_t has a
positive si_code value.  The top 16 bits of si_code descibe which fields
in the siginfo_t union are active, but they are treated inconsistently
between copy_siginfo_from_user32, copy_siginfo_to_user32 and
copy_siginfo_to_user.

copy_siginfo_from_user32 is called from rt_sigqueueinfo and
rt_tgsigqueueinfo in which the user has full control overthe top 16 bits
of si_code.

This fixes the following information leaks:
x86:   8 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to
       itself. This leak grows to 16 bytes if the process uses x32.
       (si_code = __SI_CHLD)
x86:   100 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to
       a 64-bit process. (si_code = -1)
sparc: 4 bytes leaked when sending a signal from a 32-bit process to a
       64-bit process. (si_code = any)

parsic and s390 have similar bugs, but they are not vulnerable because
rt_[tg]sigqueueinfo have checks that prevent sending a positive si_code
to a different process.  These bugs are also fixed for consistency.

Signed-off-by: Amanieu d'Antras &lt;amanieu@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;rmk@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Ralf Baechle &lt;ralf@linux-mips.org&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Chris Metcalf &lt;cmetcalf@ezchip.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>signal: fix information leak in copy_siginfo_to_user</title>
<updated>2015-08-27T17:25:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amanieu d'Antras</name>
<email>amanieu@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-06T22:46:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ad98e577ca49e4bc3c2d3afede2c5918dde55ba4'/>
<id>ad98e577ca49e4bc3c2d3afede2c5918dde55ba4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c08a75d950725cdd87c19232a5a3850c51520359 ]

commit 26135022f85105ad725cda103fa069e29e83bd16 upstream.

This function may copy the si_addr_lsb, si_lower and si_upper fields to
user mode when they haven't been initialized, which can leak kernel
stack data to user mode.

Just checking the value of si_code is insufficient because the same
si_code value is shared between multiple signals.  This is solved by
checking the value of si_signo in addition to si_code.

Signed-off-by: Amanieu d'Antras &lt;amanieu@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;rmk@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c08a75d950725cdd87c19232a5a3850c51520359 ]

commit 26135022f85105ad725cda103fa069e29e83bd16 upstream.

This function may copy the si_addr_lsb, si_lower and si_upper fields to
user mode when they haven't been initialized, which can leak kernel
stack data to user mode.

Just checking the value of si_code is insufficient because the same
si_code value is shared between multiple signals.  This is solved by
checking the value of si_signo in addition to si_code.

Signed-off-by: Amanieu d'Antras &lt;amanieu@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;rmk@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'signal-cleanup' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rw/misc</title>
<updated>2014-08-09T16:58:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-09T16:58:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=63b12bdb0d21aca527996fb2c547387bfd3e14b8'/>
<id>63b12bdb0d21aca527996fb2c547387bfd3e14b8</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull arch signal handling cleanup from Richard Weinberger:
 "This patch series moves all remaining archs to the get_signal(),
  signal_setup_done() and sigsp() functions.

  Currently these archs use open coded variants of the said functions.
  Further, unused parameters get removed from get_signal_to_deliver(),
  tracehook_signal_handler() and signal_delivered().

  At the end of the day we save around 500 lines of code."

* 'signal-cleanup' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rw/misc: (43 commits)
  powerpc: Use sigsp()
  openrisc: Use sigsp()
  mn10300: Use sigsp()
  mips: Use sigsp()
  microblaze: Use sigsp()
  metag: Use sigsp()
  m68k: Use sigsp()
  m32r: Use sigsp()
  hexagon: Use sigsp()
  frv: Use sigsp()
  cris: Use sigsp()
  c6x: Use sigsp()
  blackfin: Use sigsp()
  avr32: Use sigsp()
  arm64: Use sigsp()
  arc: Use sigsp()
  sas_ss_flags: Remove nested ternary if
  Rip out get_signal_to_deliver()
  Clean up signal_delivered()
  tracehook_signal_handler: Remove sig, info, ka and regs
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull arch signal handling cleanup from Richard Weinberger:
 "This patch series moves all remaining archs to the get_signal(),
  signal_setup_done() and sigsp() functions.

  Currently these archs use open coded variants of the said functions.
  Further, unused parameters get removed from get_signal_to_deliver(),
  tracehook_signal_handler() and signal_delivered().

  At the end of the day we save around 500 lines of code."

* 'signal-cleanup' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rw/misc: (43 commits)
  powerpc: Use sigsp()
  openrisc: Use sigsp()
  mn10300: Use sigsp()
  mips: Use sigsp()
  microblaze: Use sigsp()
  metag: Use sigsp()
  m68k: Use sigsp()
  m32r: Use sigsp()
  hexagon: Use sigsp()
  frv: Use sigsp()
  cris: Use sigsp()
  c6x: Use sigsp()
  blackfin: Use sigsp()
  avr32: Use sigsp()
  arm64: Use sigsp()
  arc: Use sigsp()
  sas_ss_flags: Remove nested ternary if
  Rip out get_signal_to_deliver()
  Clean up signal_delivered()
  tracehook_signal_handler: Remove sig, info, ka and regs
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Rip out get_signal_to_deliver()</title>
<updated>2014-08-06T11:03:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Weinberger</name>
<email>richard@nod.at</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-07T13:26:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=828b1f65d23cf8a68795739f6dd08fc8abd9ee64'/>
<id>828b1f65d23cf8a68795739f6dd08fc8abd9ee64</id>
<content type='text'>
Now we can turn get_signal() to the main function.

Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Now we can turn get_signal() to the main function.

Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Clean up signal_delivered()</title>
<updated>2014-08-06T11:03:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Weinberger</name>
<email>richard@nod.at</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-13T11:36:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=10b1c7ac8bfed429cf3dcb0225482c8dc1485d8e'/>
<id>10b1c7ac8bfed429cf3dcb0225482c8dc1485d8e</id>
<content type='text'>
 - Pass a ksignal struct to it
 - Remove unused regs parameter
 - Make it private as it's nowhere outside of kernel/signal.c is used

Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
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<pre>
 - Pass a ksignal struct to it
 - Remove unused regs parameter
 - Make it private as it's nowhere outside of kernel/signal.c is used

Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracehook_signal_handler: Remove sig, info, ka and regs</title>
<updated>2014-08-06T11:03:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Weinberger</name>
<email>richard@nod.at</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-07T13:37:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=df5601f9c3d831b4c478b004a1ed90a18643adbe'/>
<id>df5601f9c3d831b4c478b004a1ed90a18643adbe</id>
<content type='text'>
These parameters are nowhere used, so we can remove them.

Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
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<pre>
These parameters are nowhere used, so we can remove them.

Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>signal: Explain local_irq_save() call</title>
<updated>2014-07-09T16:14:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul E. McKenney</name>
<email>paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-05T15:18:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c41247e1d4864c863ee25e029dd53acdb2abc000'/>
<id>c41247e1d4864c863ee25e029dd53acdb2abc000</id>
<content type='text'>
The explicit local_irq_save() in __lock_task_sighand() is needed to avoid
a potential deadlock condition, as noted in a841796f11c90d53 (signal:
align __lock_task_sighand() irq disabling and RCU).  However, someone
reading the code might be forgiven for concluding that this separate
local_irq_save() was completely unnecessary.  This commit therefore adds
a comment referencing the shiny new block comment on rcu_read_unlock().

Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan &lt;laijs@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The explicit local_irq_save() in __lock_task_sighand() is needed to avoid
a potential deadlock condition, as noted in a841796f11c90d53 (signal:
align __lock_task_sighand() irq disabling and RCU).  However, someone
reading the code might be forgiven for concluding that this separate
local_irq_save() was completely unnecessary.  This commit therefore adds
a comment referencing the shiny new block comment on rcu_read_unlock().

Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan &lt;laijs@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>signals: introduce kernel_sigaction()</title>
<updated>2014-06-06T23:08:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-06T21:37:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b4e74264eb0b03f42097fa70a0766312156244a0'/>
<id>b4e74264eb0b03f42097fa70a0766312156244a0</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that allow_signal() is really trivial we can unify it with
disallow_signal().  Add the new helper, kernel_sigaction(), and
reimplement allow_signal/disallow_signal as a trivial wrappers.

This saves one EXPORT_SYMBOL() and the new helper can have more users.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Cc: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Now that allow_signal() is really trivial we can unify it with
disallow_signal().  Add the new helper, kernel_sigaction(), and
reimplement allow_signal/disallow_signal as a trivial wrappers.

This saves one EXPORT_SYMBOL() and the new helper can have more users.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Cc: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
