linux-stable.git/kernel/ptrace.c, branch v4.14.166

ptrace: Fix ->ptracer_cred handling for PTRACE_TRACEME

2019-07-10T07:54:38+00:00

commit 6994eefb0053799d2e07cd140df6c2ea106c41ee upstream.

Fix two issues:

When called for PTRACE_TRACEME, ptrace_link() would obtain an RCU
reference to the parent's objective credentials, then give that pointer
to get_cred().  However, the object lifetime rules for things like
struct cred do not permit unconditionally turning an RCU reference into
a stable reference.

PTRACE_TRACEME records the parent's credentials as if the parent was
acting as the subject, but that's not the case.  If a malicious
unprivileged child uses PTRACE_TRACEME and the parent is privileged, and
at a later point, the parent process becomes attacker-controlled
(because it drops privileges and calls execve()), the attacker ends up
with control over two processes with a privileged ptrace relationship,
which can be abused to ptrace a suid binary and obtain root privileges.

Fix both of these by always recording the credentials of the process
that is requesting the creation of the ptrace relationship:
current_cred() can't change under us, and current is the proper subject
for access control.

This change is theoretically userspace-visible, but I am not aware of
any code that it will actually break.

Fixes: 64b875f7ac8a ("ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ptrace: restore smp_rmb() in __ptrace_may_access()

2019-06-19T06:20:55+00:00

commit f6581f5b55141a95657ef5742cf6a6bfa20a109f upstream.

Restore the read memory barrier in __ptrace_may_access() that was deleted
a couple years ago. Also add comments on this barrier and the one it pairs
with to explain why they're there (as far as I understand).

Fixes: bfedb589252c ("mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

signal/ptrace: Don't leak unitialized kernel memory with PTRACE_PEEK_SIGINFO

2019-06-19T06:20:54+00:00

[ Upstream commit f6e2aa91a46d2bc79fce9b93a988dbe7655c90c0 ]

Recently syzbot in conjunction with KMSAN reported that
ptrace_peek_siginfo can copy an uninitialized siginfo to userspace.
Inspecting ptrace_peek_siginfo confirms this.

The problem is that off when initialized from args.off can be
initialized to a negaive value.  At which point the "if (off >= 0)"
test to see if off became negative fails because off started off
negative.

Prevent the core problem by adding a variable found that is only true
if a siginfo is found and copied to a temporary in preparation for
being copied to userspace.

Prevent args.off from being truncated when being assigned to off by
testing that off is <= the maximum possible value of off.  Convert off
to an unsigned long so that we should not have to truncate args.off,
we have well defined overflow behavior so if we add another check we
won't risk fighting undefined compiler behavior, and so that we have a
type whose maximum value is easy to test for.

Cc: Andrei Vagin 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+0d602a1b0d8c95bdf299@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 84c751bd4aeb ("ptrace: add ability to retrieve signals without removing from a queue (v4)")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ptrace: take into account saved_sigmask in PTRACE{GET,SET}SIGMASK

2019-05-04T07:15:22+00:00

[ Upstream commit fcfc2aa0185f4a731d05a21e9f359968fdfd02e7 ]

There are a few system calls (pselect, ppoll, etc) which replace a task
sigmask while they are running in a kernel-space

When a task calls one of these syscalls, the kernel saves a current
sigmask in task->saved_sigmask and sets a syscall sigmask.

On syscall-exit-stop, ptrace traps a task before restoring the
saved_sigmask, so PTRACE_GETSIGMASK returns the syscall sigmask and
PTRACE_SETSIGMASK does nothing, because its sigmask is replaced by
saved_sigmask, when the task returns to user-space.

This patch fixes this problem.  PTRACE_GETSIGMASK returns saved_sigmask
if it's set.  PTRACE_SETSIGMASK drops the TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK flag.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181120060616.6043-1-avagin@gmail.com
Fixes: 29000caecbe8 ("ptrace: add ability to get/set signal-blocked mask")
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin 
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin (Microsoft)

ptrace: Remove unused ptrace_may_access_sched() and MODE_IBRS

2018-12-05T18:41:21+00:00

commit 46f7ecb1e7359f183f5bbd1e08b90e10e52164f9 upstream

The IBPB control code in x86 removed the usage. Remove the functionality
which was introduced for this.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Jiri Kosina 
Cc: Tom Lendacky 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli 
Cc: David Woodhouse 
Cc: Tim Chen 
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc: Dave Hansen 
Cc: Casey Schaufler 
Cc: Asit Mallick 
Cc: Arjan van de Ven 
Cc: Jon Masters 
Cc: Waiman Long 
Cc: Greg KH 
Cc: Dave Stewart 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.559149393@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

x86/speculation: Apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak

2018-12-05T18:41:18+00:00

commit dbfe2953f63c640463c630746cd5d9de8b2f63ae upstream

Currently, IBPB is only issued in cases when switching into a non-dumpable
process, the rationale being to protect such 'important and security
sensitive' processess (such as GPG) from data leaking into a different
userspace process via spectre v2.

This is however completely insufficient to provide proper userspace-to-userpace
spectrev2 protection, as any process can poison branch buffers before being
scheduled out, and the newly scheduled process immediately becomes spectrev2
victim.

In order to minimize the performance impact (for usecases that do require
spectrev2 protection), issue the barrier only in cases when switching between
processess where the victim can't be ptraced by the potential attacker (as in
such cases, the attacker doesn't have to bother with branch buffers at all).

[ tglx: Split up PTRACE_MODE_NOACCESS_CHK into PTRACE_MODE_SCHED and
  PTRACE_MODE_IBPB to be able to do ptrace() context tracking reasonably
  fine-grained ]

Fixes: 18bf3c3ea8 ("x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch")
Originally-by: Tim Chen 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli 
Cc:  "WoodhouseDavid" 
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc:  "SchauflerCasey" 
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251437340.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

signal: Remove kernel interal si_code magic

2017-07-24T19:30:28+00:00

struct siginfo is a union and the kernel since 2.4 has been hiding a union
tag in the high 16bits of si_code using the values:
__SI_KILL
__SI_TIMER
__SI_POLL
__SI_FAULT
__SI_CHLD
__SI_RT
__SI_MESGQ
__SI_SYS

While this looks plausible on the surface, in practice this situation has
not worked well.

- Injected positive signals are not copied to user space properly
  unless they have these magic high bits set.

- Injected positive signals are not reported properly by signalfd
  unless they have these magic high bits set.

- These kernel internal values leaked to userspace via ptrace_peek_siginfo

- It was possible to inject these kernel internal values and cause the
  the kernel to misbehave.

- Kernel developers got confused and expected these kernel internal values
  in userspace in kernel self tests.

- Kernel developers got confused and set si_code to __SI_FAULT which
  is SI_USER in userspace which causes userspace to think an ordinary user
  sent the signal and that it was not kernel generated.

- The values make it impossible to reorganize the code to transform
  siginfo_copy_to_user into a plain copy_to_user.  As si_code must
  be massaged before being passed to userspace.

So remove these kernel internal si codes and make the kernel code simpler
and more maintainable.

To replace these kernel internal magic si_codes introduce the helper
function siginfo_layout, that takes a signal number and an si_code and
computes which union member of siginfo is being used.  Have
siginfo_layout return an enumeration so that gcc will have enough
information to warn if a switch statement does not handle all of union
members.

A couple of architectures have a messed up ABI that defines signal
specific duplications of SI_USER which causes more special cases in
siginfo_layout than I would like.  The good news is only problem
architectures pay the cost.

Update all of the code that used the previous magic __SI_ values to
use the new SIL_ values and to call siginfo_layout to get those
values.  Escept where not all of the cases are handled remove the
defaults in the switch statements so that if a new case is missed in
the future the lack will show up at compile time.

Modify the code that copies siginfo si_code to userspace to just copy
the value and not cast si_code to a short first.  The high bits are no
longer used to hold a magic union member.

Fixup the siginfo header files to stop including the __SI_ values in
their constants and for the headers that were missing it to properly
update the number of si_codes for each signal type.

The fixes to copy_siginfo_from_user32 implementations has the
interesting property that several of them perviously should never have
worked as the __SI_ values they depended up where kernel internal.
With that dependency gone those implementations should work much
better.

The idea of not passing the __SI_ values out to userspace and then
not reinserting them has been tested with criu and criu worked without
changes.

Ref: 2.4.0-test1
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"

ptrace: Properly initialize ptracer_cred on fork

2017-05-23T12:40:44+00:00

When I introduced ptracer_cred I failed to consider the weirdness of
fork where the task_struct copies the old value by default.  This
winds up leaving ptracer_cred set even when a process forks and
the child process does not wind up being ptraced.

Because ptracer_cred is not set on non-ptraced processes whose
parents were ptraced this has broken the ability of the enlightenment
window manager to start setuid children.

Fix this by properly initializing ptracer_cred in ptrace_init_task

This must be done with a little bit of care to preserve the current value
of ptracer_cred when ptrace carries through fork.  Re-reading the
ptracer_cred from the ptracing process at this point is inconsistent
with how PT_PTRACE_CAP has been maintained all of these years.

Tested-by: Takashi Iwai 
Fixes: 64b875f7ac8a ("ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"

ptrace: fix PTRACE_LISTEN race corrupting task->state

2017-04-08T07:47:48+00:00

In PT_SEIZED + LISTEN mode STOP/CONT signals cause a wakeup against
__TASK_TRACED.  If this races with the ptrace_unfreeze_traced at the end
of a PTRACE_LISTEN, this can wake the task /after/ the check against
__TASK_TRACED, but before the reset of state to TASK_TRACED.  This
causes it to instead clobber TASK_WAKING, allowing a subsequent wakeup
against TRACED while the task is still on the rq wake_list, corrupting
it.

Oleg said:
 "The kernel can crash or this can lead to other hard-to-debug problems.
  In short, "task->state = TASK_TRACED" in ptrace_unfreeze_traced()
  assumes that nobody else can wake it up, but PTRACE_LISTEN breaks the
  contract. Obviusly it is very wrong to manipulate task->state if this
  task is already running, or WAKING, or it sleeps again"

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Fixes: 9899d11f ("ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/xm26y3vfhmkp.fsf_-_@bsegall-linux.mtv.corp.google.com
Signed-off-by: Ben Segall 
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to

2017-03-02T07:42:35+00:00

We are going to split  out of , which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.

Create a trivial placeholder  file that just
maps to  to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.

Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Mike Galbraith 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar