linux-stable.git/kernel/module/main.c, branch v6.12.91

module: Fix freeing of charp module parameters when CONFIG_SYSFS=n

2026-05-23T11:04:21+00:00

[ Upstream commit deffe1edba626d474fef38007c03646ca5876a0e ]

When setting a charp module parameter, the param_set_charp() function
allocates memory to store a copy of the input value. Later, when the module
is potentially unloaded, the destroy_params() function is called to free
this allocated memory.

However, destroy_params() is available only when CONFIG_SYSFS=y, otherwise
only a dummy variant is present. In the unlikely case that the kernel is
configured with CONFIG_MODULES=y and CONFIG_SYSFS=n, this results in
a memory leak of charp values when a module is unloaded.

Fix this issue by making destroy_params() always available when
CONFIG_MODULES=y. Rename the function to module_destroy_params() to clarify
that it is intended for use by the module loader.

Fixes: e180a6b7759a ("param: fix charp parameters set via sysfs")
Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu 
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

module: Fix kernel panic when a symbol st_shndx is out of bounds

2026-04-02T11:09:27+00:00

[ Upstream commit f9d69d5e7bde2295eb7488a56f094ac8f5383b92 ]

The module loader doesn't check for bounds of the ELF section index in
simplify_symbols():

       for (i = 1; i < symsec->sh_size / sizeof(Elf_Sym); i++) {
		const char *name = info->strtab + sym[i].st_name;

		switch (sym[i].st_shndx) {
		case SHN_COMMON:

		[...]

		default:
			/* Divert to percpu allocation if a percpu var. */
			if (sym[i].st_shndx == info->index.pcpu)
				secbase = (unsigned long)mod_percpu(mod);
			else
  /** HERE --> **/		secbase = info->sechdrs[sym[i].st_shndx].sh_addr;
			sym[i].st_value += secbase;
			break;
		}
	}

A symbol with an out-of-bounds st_shndx value, for example 0xffff
(known as SHN_XINDEX or SHN_HIRESERVE), may cause a kernel panic:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ...
  RIP: 0010:simplify_symbols+0x2b2/0x480
  ...
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

This can happen when module ELF is legitimately using SHN_XINDEX or
when it is corrupted.

Add a bounds check in simplify_symbols() to validate that st_shndx is
within the valid range before using it.

This issue was discovered due to a bug in llvm-objcopy, see relevant
discussion for details [1].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-modules/20251224005752.201911-1-ihor.solodrai@linux.dev/

Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai 
Reviewed-by: Daniel Gomez 
Reviewed-by: Petr Pavlu 
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

module: Prevent silent truncation of module name in delete_module(2)

2025-08-20T16:30:46+00:00

[ Upstream commit a6323bd4e611567913e23df5b58f2d4e4da06789 ]

Passing a module name longer than MODULE_NAME_LEN to the delete_module
syscall results in its silent truncation. This really isn't much of
a problem in practice, but it could theoretically lead to the removal of an
incorrect module. It is more sensible to return ENAMETOOLONG or ENOENT in
such a case.

Update the syscall to return ENOENT, as documented in the delete_module(2)
man page to mean "No module by that name exists." This is appropriate
because a module with a name longer than MODULE_NAME_LEN cannot be loaded
in the first place.

Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu 
Reviewed-by: Daniel Gomez 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250630143535.267745-2-petr.pavlu@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gomez 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

audit,module: restore audit logging in load failure case

2025-08-15T10:13:31+00:00

[ Upstream commit ae1ae11fb277f1335d6bcd4935ba0ea985af3c32 ]

The move of the module sanity check to earlier skipped the audit logging
call in the case of failure and to a place where the previously used
context is unavailable.

Add an audit logging call for the module loading failure case and get
the module name when possible.

Link: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-52839
Fixes: 02da2cbab452 ("module: move check_modinfo() early to early_mod_check()")
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs 
Reviewed-by: Petr Pavlu 
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

module: Don't fail module loading when setting ro_after_init section RO failed

2025-02-08T08:57:58+00:00

[ Upstream commit 110b1e070f1d50f5217bd2c758db094998bb7b77 ]

Once module init has succeded it is too late to cancel loading.
If setting ro_after_init data section to read-only fails, all we
can do is to inform the user through a warning.

Reported-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230915082126.4187913-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com/
Fixes: d1909c022173 ("module: Don't ignore errors from set_memory_XX()")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy 
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d6c81f38da76092de8aacc8c93c4c65cb0fe48b8.1733427536.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Merge tag 'pull-stable-struct_fd' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

2024-09-23T16:35:36+00:00

Pull 'struct fd' updates from Al Viro:
 "Just the 'struct fd' layout change, with conversion to accessor
  helpers"

* tag 'pull-stable-struct_fd' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  add struct fd constructors, get rid of __to_fd()
  struct fd: representation change
  introduce fd_file(), convert all accessors to it.

introduce fd_file(), convert all accessors to it.

2024-08-13T02:00:43+00:00

	For any changes of struct fd representation we need to
turn existing accesses to fields into calls of wrappers.
Accesses to struct fd::flags are very few (3 in linux/file.h,
1 in net/socket.c, 3 in fs/overlayfs/file.c and 3 more in
explicit initializers).
	Those can be dealt with in the commit converting to
new layout; accesses to struct fd::file are too many for that.
	This commit converts (almost) all of f.file to
fd_file(f).  It's not entirely mechanical ('file' is used as
a member name more than just in struct fd) and it does not
even attempt to distinguish the uses in pointer context from
those in boolean context; the latter will be eventually turned
into a separate helper (fd_empty()).

	NOTE: mass conversion to fd_empty(), tempting as it
might be, is a bad idea; better do that piecewise in commit
that convert from fdget...() to CLASS(...).

[conflicts in fs/fhandle.c, kernel/bpf/syscall.c, mm/memcontrol.c
caught by git; fs/stat.c one got caught by git grep]
[fs/xattr.c conflict]

Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro

module: make waiting for a concurrent module loader interruptible

2024-08-09T15:33:28+00:00

The recursive aes-arm-bs module load situation reported by Russell King
is getting fixed in the crypto layer, but this in the meantime fixes the
"recursive load hangs forever" by just making the waiting for the first
module load be interruptible.

This should now match the old behavior before commit 9b9879fc0327
("modules: catch concurrent module loads, treat them as idempotent"),
which used the different "wait for module to be ready" code in
module_patient_check_exists().

End result: a recursive module load will still block, but now a signal
will interrupt it and fail the second module load, at which point the
first module will successfully complete loading.

Fixes: 9b9879fc0327 ("modules: catch concurrent module loads, treat them as idempotent")
Cc: Russell King 
Cc: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

module: warn about excessively long module waits

2024-08-08T19:29:40+00:00

Russell King reported that the arm cbc(aes) crypto module hangs when
loaded, and Herbert Xu bisected it to commit 9b9879fc0327 ("modules:
catch concurrent module loads, treat them as idempotent"), and noted:

 "So what's happening here is that the first modprobe tries to load a
  fallback CBC implementation, in doing so it triggers a load of the
  exact same module due to module aliases.

  IOW we're loading aes-arm-bs which provides cbc(aes). However, this
  needs a fallback of cbc(aes) to operate, which is made out of the
  generic cbc module + any implementation of aes, or ecb(aes). The
  latter happens to also be provided by aes-arm-cb so that's why it
  tries to load the same module again"

So loading the aes-arm-bs module ends up wanting to recursively load
itself, and the recursive load then ends up waiting for the original
module load to complete.

This is a regression, in that it used to be that we just tried to load
the module multiple times, and then as we went on to install it the
second time we would instead just error out because the module name
already existed.

That is actually also exactly what the original "catch concurrent loads"
patch did in commit 9828ed3f695a ("module: error out early on concurrent
load of the same module file"), but it turns out that it ends up being
racy, in that erroring out before the module has been fully initialized
will cause failures in dependent module loading.

See commit ac2263b588df (which was the revert of that "error out early")
commit for details about why erroring out before the module has been
initialized is actually fundamentally racy.

Now, for the actual recursive module load (as opposed to just
concurrently loading the same module twice), the race is not an issue.

At the same time it's hard for the kernel to see that this is recursion,
because the module load is always done from a usermode helper, so the
recursion is not some simple callchain within the kernel.

End result: this is not the real fix, but this at least adds a warning
for the situation (admittedly much too late for all the debugging pain
that Russell and Herbert went through) and if we can come to a
resolution on how to detect the recursion properly, this re-organizes
the code to make that easier.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZrFHLqvFqhzykuYw@shell.armlinux.org.uk/
Reported-by: Russell King 
Debugged-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

module, bpf: Store BTF base pointer in struct module

2024-06-21T21:45:07+00:00

...as this will allow split BTF modules with a base BTF
representation (rather than the full vmlinux BTF at time of
BTF encoding) to resolve their references to kernel types in a
way that is more resilient to small changes in kernel types.

This will allow modules that are not built every time the kernel
is to provide more resilient BTF, rather than have it invalidated
every time BTF ids for core kernel types change.

Fields are ordered to avoid holes in struct module.

Signed-off-by: Alan Maguire 
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko 
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain 
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240620091733.1967885-3-alan.maguire@oracle.com