linux-stable.git/kernel/kexec_core.c, branch v5.4.285

kexec: fix a memory leak in crash_shrink_memory()

2023-07-27T06:37:10+00:00

[ Upstream commit 1cba6c4309f03de570202c46f03df3f73a0d4c82 ]

Patch series "kexec: enable kexec_crash_size to support two crash kernel
regions".

When crashkernel=X fails to reserve region under 4G, it will fall back to
reserve region above 4G and a region of the default size will also be
reserved under 4G.  Unfortunately, /sys/kernel/kexec_crash_size only
supports one crash kernel region now, the user cannot sense the low memory
reserved by reading /sys/kernel/kexec_crash_size.  Also, low memory cannot
be freed by writing this file.

For example:
resource_size(crashk_res) = 512M
resource_size(crashk_low_res) = 256M

The result of 'cat /sys/kernel/kexec_crash_size' is 512M, but it should be
768M.  When we execute 'echo 0 > /sys/kernel/kexec_crash_size', the size
of crashk_res becomes 0 and resource_size(crashk_low_res) is still 256 MB,
which is incorrect.

Since crashk_res manages the memory with high address and crashk_low_res
manages the memory with low address, crashk_low_res is shrunken only when
all crashk_res is shrunken.  And because when there is only one crash
kernel region, crashk_res is always used.  Therefore, if all crashk_res is
shrunken and crashk_low_res still exists, swap them.

This patch (of 6):

If the value of parameter 'new_size' is in the semi-open and semi-closed
interval (crashk_res.end - KEXEC_CRASH_MEM_ALIGN + 1, crashk_res.end], the
calculation result of ram_res is:

	ram_res->start = crashk_res.end + 1
	ram_res->end   = crashk_res.end

The operation of insert_resource() fails, and ram_res is not added to
iomem_resource.  As a result, the memory of the control block ram_res is
leaked.

In fact, on all architectures, the start address and size of crashk_res
are already aligned by KEXEC_CRASH_MEM_ALIGN.  Therefore, we do not need
to round up crashk_res.start again.  Instead, we should round up
'new_size' in advance.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230527123439.772-1-thunder.leizhen@huawei.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230527123439.772-2-thunder.leizhen@huawei.com
Fixes: 6480e5a09237 ("kdump: add missing RAM resource in crash_shrink_memory()")
Fixes: 06a7f711246b ("kexec: premit reduction of the reserved memory size")
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei 
Acked-by: Baoquan He 
Cc: Cong Wang 
Cc: Eric W. Biederman 
Cc: Michael Holzheu 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

kernel: kexec: remove the lock operation of system_transition_mutex

2021-02-03T22:25:56+00:00

commit 56c91a18432b631ca18438841fd1831ef756cabf upstream.

Function kernel_kexec() is called with lock system_transition_mutex
held in reboot system call. While inside kernel_kexec(), it will
acquire system_transition_mutex agin. This will lead to dead lock.

The dead lock should be easily triggered, it hasn't caused any
failure report just because the feature 'kexec jump' is almost not
used by anyone as far as I know. An inquiry can be made about who
is using 'kexec jump' and where it's used. Before that, let's simply
remove the lock operation inside CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP ifdeffery scope.

Fixes: 55f2503c3b69 ("PM / reboot: Eliminate race between reboot and suspend")
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He 
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter 
Reviewed-by: Pingfan Liu 
Cc: 4.19+  # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kexec: bail out upon SIGKILL when allocating memory.

2019-09-26T00:51:40+00:00

syzbot found that a thread can stall for minutes inside kexec_load() after
that thread was killed by SIGKILL [1].  It turned out that the reproducer
was trying to allocate 2408MB of memory using kimage_alloc_page() from
kimage_load_normal_segment().  Let's check for SIGKILL before doing memory
allocation.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a0e3436829698d5824231251fad9d8e998f94f5e

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/993c9185-d324-2640-d061-bed2dd18b1f7@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa 
Reported-by: syzbot 
Cc: Eric Biederman 
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 230

2019-06-19T15:09:06+00:00

Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):

  this source code is licensed under the gnu general public license
  version 2 see the file copying for more details

  this source code is licensed under general public license version 2
  see

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 52 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt 
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal 
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras 
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190602204653.449021192@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

power/suspend: Add function to disable secondaries for suspend

2019-05-03T17:42:41+00:00

This adds a function to disable secondary CPUs for suspend that are
not necessarily non-zero / non-boot CPUs. Platforms will be able to
use this to suspend using non-zero CPUs.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Rafael J . Wysocki 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190411033448.20842-3-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

mm: convert totalram_pages and totalhigh_pages variables to atomic

2018-12-28T20:11:47+00:00

totalram_pages and totalhigh_pages are made static inline function.

Main motivation was that managed_page_count_lock handling was complicating
things.  It was discussed in length here,
https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/995739/#1181785 So it seemes
better to remove the lock and convert variables to atomic, with preventing
poteintial store-to-read tearing as a bonus.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1542090790-21750-4-git-send-email-arunks@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Arun KS 
Suggested-by: Michal Hocko 
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka 
Reviewed-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov 
Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka 
Cc: David Hildenbrand 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: reference totalram_pages and managed_pages once per function

2018-12-28T20:11:47+00:00

Patch series "mm: convert totalram_pages, totalhigh_pages and managed
pages to atomic", v5.

This series converts totalram_pages, totalhigh_pages and
zone->managed_pages to atomic variables.

totalram_pages, zone->managed_pages and totalhigh_pages updates are
protected by managed_page_count_lock, but readers never care about it.
Convert these variables to atomic to avoid readers potentially seeing a
store tear.

Main motivation was that managed_page_count_lock handling was complicating
things.  It was discussed in length here,
https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/995739/#1181785 It seemes better
to remove the lock and convert variables to atomic.  With the change,
preventing poteintial store-to-read tearing comes as a bonus.

This patch (of 4):

This is in preparation to a later patch which converts totalram_pages and
zone->managed_pages to atomic variables.  Please note that re-reading the
value might lead to a different value and as such it could lead to
unexpected behavior.  There are no known bugs as a result of the current
code but it is better to prevent from them in principle.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1542090790-21750-2-git-send-email-arunks@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Arun KS 
Reviewed-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov 
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand 
Acked-by: Michal Hocko 
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka 
Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

kexec: Allocate decrypted control pages for kdump if SME is enabled

2018-10-06T10:01:51+00:00

When SME is enabled in the first kernel, it needs to allocate decrypted
pages for kdump because when the kdump kernel boots, these pages need to
be accessed decrypted in the initial boot stage, before SME is enabled.

 [ bp: clean up text. ]

Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang 
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov 
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky 
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de
Cc: mingo@redhat.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com
Cc: bhelgaas@google.com
Cc: baiyaowei@cmss.chinamobile.com
Cc: tiwai@suse.de
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com
Cc: dyoung@redhat.com
Cc: bhe@redhat.com
Cc: jroedel@suse.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180930031033.22110-3-lijiang@redhat.com

kexec: yield to scheduler when loading kimage segments

2018-06-14T22:55:24+00:00

Without yielding while loading kimage segments, a large initrd will
block all other work on the CPU performing the load until it is
completed.  For example loading an initrd of 200MB on a low power single
core system will lock up the system for a few seconds.

To increase system responsiveness to other tasks at that time, call
cond_resched() in both the crash kernel and normal kernel segment
loading loops.

I did run into a practical problem.  Hardware watchdogs on embedded
systems can have short timers on the order of seconds.  If the system is
locked up for a few seconds with only a single core available, the
watchdog may not be pet in a timely fashion.  If this happens, the
hardware watchdog will fire and reset the system.

This really only becomes a problem when you are working with a single
core, a decently sized initrd, and have a constrained hardware watchdog.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1528738546-3328-1-git-send-email-jmf@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jarrett Farnitano 
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME

2017-07-18T09:38:04+00:00

Provide support so that kexec can be used to boot a kernel when SME is
enabled.

Support is needed to allocate pages for kexec without encryption.  This
is needed in order to be able to reboot in the kernel in the same manner
as originally booted.

Additionally, when shutting down all of the CPUs we need to be sure to
flush the caches and then halt. This is needed when booting from a state
where SME was not active into a state where SME is active (or vice-versa).
Without these steps, it is possible for cache lines to exist for the same
physical location but tagged both with and without the encryption bit. This
can cause random memory corruption when caches are flushed depending on
which cacheline is written last.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky 
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: 
Cc: Alexander Potapenko 
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Arnd Bergmann 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Brijesh Singh 
Cc: Dave Young 
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov 
Cc: Jonathan Corbet 
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 
Cc: Larry Woodman 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Matt Fleming 
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin 
Cc: Paolo Bonzini 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Radim Krčmář 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani 
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b95ff075db3e7cd545313f2fb609a49619a09625.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar