linux-stable.git/kernel/futex, branch v7.2.1

futex: Fix might_sleep() warning in futex_pivot_pending()

2026-08-27T12:35:27+00:00

[ Upstream commit d8aa5dd97944a72d4a9e3cc79bb80fcac7d6e829 ]

A younger me put a WARN in might_sleep() to warn about nested sleep loops. This
younger me also build a wait-loop variant that can deal with it. This wait-loop
variant doesn't have all the fancy wrappers, since it isn't used much. It also
lacks wait-bit support.

Add the wait-bit support and use it to fix the nested wait issue.

Fixes: 8e7ff730dd96 ("futex: Fix race in futex_pivot_pending() during private hash resize")
Reported-by: syzbot+350a93852ac854927f45@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260820074927.GH1246887@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=350a93852ac854927f45
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

futex: Fix race on the initial mm->futex.phash.ref allocation

2026-08-27T12:35:22+00:00

commit bde0238083647381d4747355c5a19115a3422b96 upstream.

futex_hash_allocate() allocates mm->futex.phash.ref without any locking.
Commit d9b05321e21e ("futex: Move futex_hash_free() back to __mmput()")
moved the allocation here and assumed that the process has just a single
thread at this point.

Commit ee9dce44362b ("futex: Drop CLONE_THREAD requirement for private
default hash alloc") widened need_futex_hash_allocate_default() to cover
any CLONE_VM clone, but left out vfork because the parent is suspended and
cannot race.

That no longer holds once vfork is nested. If a vfork child calls vfork
again and is then killed with SIGKILL, the parent is released from its
vfork wait and runs concurrently with the grandchild in the same mm.
Neither of them went through futex_hash_allocate_default().

When both call prctl(PR_FUTEX_HASH, PR_FUTEX_HASH_SET_SLOTS) at the same
time, each one sees mm->futex.phash.ref as NULL and stores its own percpu
counter. Only the last store survives. The counter stored first is no
longer reachable from the mm, so the references on it are not seen by
__futex_ref_atomic_end(). A private hash that still has references is then
considered dead and freed, and a task that still holds one of its buckets
writes into freed memory in futex_q_lock().

Store the counter once with cmpxchg() and let the loser free_percpu() its
own. The initial reference has to be taken before the store, otherwise
another task can install a private hash while the counter is still 0.

Fixes: d9b05321e21e ("futex: Move futex_hash_free() back to __mmput()")
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ansrpP4ImE1MaBY9@v4bel
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex: Avoid private hash use-after-free on final put

2026-08-27T12:35:22+00:00

commit 1c7efabfbaf796f11000a46094a69955a01ec6cc upstream.

futex_private_hash_put() drops the reference to fph before evaluating
fph->mm for wake_up_var(). futex_ref_put() enables preemption again before
returning. If that put drops the final reference and the task is preempted,
another task can pivot to the replacement hash and free the old hash after
an RCU grace period. The first task then reads fph->mm from the freed
allocation when it resumes.

KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free in futex_private_hash_put(), with the
read at offset 24 in a freed kmalloc-512 allocation. The allocation and
free stacks point to futex_hash_allocate() and the RCU free path,
respectively.

Load the mm pointer while the fph reference is still held and pass the
saved value to wake_up_var(). wake_up_var() uses the pointer as a waitqueue
key and does not dereference the mm through it.

Fixes: bd54df5ea7ca ("futex: Allow to resize the private local hash")
Signed-off-by: Felix Hoffmann 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260731155024.1150011-1-f3lix.dev@gmx.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex/pi: Plug private futex exec() race

2026-08-27T12:35:22+00:00

commit c5f0bc9fd1cec4a00400cc727fcde03e0fde17cc upstream.

The check for private futexes whether the waiter's mm, which is stored in
the futex_key and copied into the pi_state, is the same as the owner's mm
is not sufficient for exec(). exec() has a gap where the mm check fails to
give the correct answer:

  exec()
  ...
    exec_release_mm()
      futex_exec_release()
        tsk::futex::exit_state = EXITING;
        cleanup_robust_list();
1)      tsk::futex::exit_state = OK;
    ...
    old_mm = tsk::mm;
2)  tsk::mm = ->mm;

Between #1 and #2 the check for the mm is wrong as that mm is about to be
swapped out and eventually freed.

Plug this gap by:

  1) Setting tsk::futex::exit_state to FUTEX_STATE_DEAD in
     futex_exec_release()

  2) Setting tsk::futex::exit_state to FUTEX_STATE_OK after
     the mm has been switched.

From a futex point of view the task is dead after it finished the robust
list cleanup up to the point where it sets the state to OK again.

Fixes: 80367ad01d93 ("futex: Add basic infrastructure for local task local hash")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Kyle Zeng 
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex: Sanitize and document task_struct::futex::state transitions

2026-08-27T12:35:22+00:00

commit f9ece060cc43eae8a1f148737d193ba0d07b8f88 upstream.

The futex state is used to prevent a waiter from attaching to the lock
owner while the owner runs the futex cleanup in exit() or exec().

Only the state transition from FUTEX_STATE_OK to FUTEX_STATE_EXITING must
be done with the task's pi_lock held, the transition away from
FUTEX_STATE_EXITING has no serialization requirements on the writer side,
but it's completely non obvious why. It's magically protected by
exit_pi_state(), which operates under tsk::pi_lock, as that's the state
which has to be correct when the waiter observes the new state.

OTOH, taking the pi_lock in futex_cleanup_end() is not a performance issue
because at that point the lock should be uncontended in the vast majority
of cases.

Aside of that the handling of FUTEX_STATE_EXITING in attach_to_pi_owner()
and handle_exit_race() is confusing at best.

Protect the store in futex_cleanup_end() with tsk::pi_lock, handle
FUTEX_STATE_EXITING in attach_to_pi_owner() explicitly and document how
this is supposed to work.

Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Kyle Zeng 
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex/pi: Reject cross-mm private futex owners

2026-08-27T12:35:21+00:00

commit 59b3732f95dda1fbd2234514d35f4fb6b5bb6d85 upstream.

A private futex key borrows the waiter's mm without taking an mm_users
reference. Nevertheless, attach_to_pi_owner() currently accepts an owner
from a different address space and copies the private key into the owner's
PI state.

When that owner exits, exit_pi_state_list() uses the saved key to find the
hash bucket and acquires a reference to the waiter's private hash. If the
last user of the waiter's mm exits concurrently, futex_hash_free() frees
the hash while the owner still uses its bucket and reference.

Prevent this by validating in attach_to_pi_owner() that, for private
futexes, the owner mm and waiter mm are the same. Perform the check with
the owner's pi_lock held and after validating owner::futex::state to
serialize against a concurrent PI-state exit cleanup.

[ tglx: Amended comment ]

Fixes: 80367ad01d93 ("futex: Add basic infrastructure for local task local hash")
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra 
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex: Fix race in futex_pivot_pending() during private hash resize

2026-08-07T15:46:30+00:00

A task performing a custom private hash resize can remain blocked in
uninterruptible sleep indefinitely.  The hung-task detector reports:

  INFO: task futex-resizer:314 blocked for more than 10 seconds.
  task:futex-resizer state:D stack:14824 pid:314 tgid:312 ppid:311

  Call Trace:
   __schedule+0x521/0xf30
   schedule+0x22/0xa0
   futex_hash_allocate+0x3db/0x490
   __do_sys_prctl+0x6f5/0xbd0
   do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x530
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

  Kernel panic - not syncing: hung_task: blocked tasks

futex_pivot_pending() allows the resize request to continue when
either no replacement hash is pending (hash_new == NULL) or the current
hash reference count has reached zero.

After the final-reference wake, another futex task can complete the
pivot between the two observations:

  T1                                  T2

  futex_hash_allocate()
    wait_var_event(mm, ...)
      futex_pivot_pending(mm)
        hash_new != NULL
                                      futex_hash()
                                        futex_ref_get(old) -> false
                                        futex_pivot_hash(mm)
                                          hash_new = NULL
                                          __futex_pivot_hash(mm, new)
                                            rcu_assign_pointer(hash, new)
        fph = rcu_dereference(hash) /* new */
        futex_ref_is_dead(fph) -> false
      schedule()

The pivot changes the state from hash_new != NULL with a dead current
hash to hash_new == NULL with a live current hash.  Because
futex_pivot_pending() reads hash_new and hash without serialization,
the resize task can observe hash_new in the pre-pivot state and hash in
the post-pivot state, causing futex_pivot_pending() to return false even
though the pivot has completed.  The task then goes to sleep after the
wakeup has already been consumed.

Serialize state reads in futex_pivot_pending() using futex_mm_phash::lock.
This guarantees that futex_pivot_pending() observes hash_new and hash
atomically, eliminating the race condition.

Fixes: bd54df5ea7ca ("futex: Allow to resize the private local hash")
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra 
Signed-off-by: Yao Kai 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260804125530.3933754-1-yaokai34@huawei.com

futex: Prevent robust futex exit race some more

2026-08-02T07:57:35+00:00

A robust futex unlock stores 0 over the whole futex value - wiping
FUTEX_WAITERS - and wakes a single waiter. That wakeup is a one-shot
notification: the protocol relies on its recipient to either acquire the
futex (and eventually unlock while aware of the remaining contention) or
re-arm FUTEX_WAITERS before sleeping again.  If the woken waiter is killed
before it can do either, the kernel must jump in and wake the next task
down the line.

This is a known complication of the futex protocol with a previous
partial fix in commit ca16d5bee598 ("futex: Prevent robust futex exit
race"). Unfortunately, that fix is insufficient.

If a third task re-acquired the futex through the uncontended fast
path in the meantime, the notification is lost: robust exit processing
sees that it is owned by another task and does nothing, while the new
owner sees no FUTEX_WAITERS when it unlocks and wakes nobody.
The remaining waiters sleep forever behind a free futex:

  A owns the futex, B and C sleep in FUTEX_WAIT
                                        uval == A | FUTEX_WAITERS
  A robust unlock: store 0, FUTEX_WAKE(1) wakes B
                                        uval == 0
  D fast path acquire: cmpxchg(0 -> D)
                                        uval == D, no FUTEX_WAITERS
  B killed before acting on the wakeup
  B exit walk, pending op: owner D != B -> no action
  D unlock: no FUTEX_WAITERS -> no wake
                                        C sleeps forever

This is clearly a shortcoming in the implementation, which fails to keep
the FUTEX_WAITERS bit consistent.

Work around this by augmenting the robust list exit processing to also
perform the extra wakeup if the futex word is owned by another thread but
FUTEX_WAITERS is not set.

This does not fix the problem of a non-contended take over/release and free
sequence, which has been discussed for years and has been addressed by
commit 3ca9595d9fb6 ("futex: Add support for unlocking robust futexes") and
subsequent changes, but failed to take the problem described above into
account.

A more complete solution which is based on the in kernel unlock of
contended robust futexes has been discussed in the context of this change
and should show up in mainline sooner than later.

[ tglx: Amend change log slightly and fixup coding style ]

Fixes: ca16d5bee598 ("futex: Prevent robust futex exit race")
Signed-off-by: Keno Fischer 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Assisted-by: ClaudeCode:claude-fable-5 tla+
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260730194705.38981-1-keno@juliacomputing.com

futex/requeue: Revert "Prevent NULL pointer dereference in remove_waiter() on self-deadlock""

2026-07-02T20:14:08+00:00

The commit cited below should not have been merged. It attemted to fix an
existing problem ansd thereby introduced new problems by keeping the
pi_state in state Q_REQUEUE_PI_IN_PROGRESS and leaking it.

Based on the commit description the intention was to handle the case
when task_blocks_on_rt_mutex() returns -EDEADLK and the following
remove_waiter() dereferences the NULL pointer in waiter->task.

That is already handled by Davidlohr in commit 40a25d59e85b3
("locking/rtmutex: Skip remove_waiter() when waiter is not enqueued") and
requires no further acting.

Revert the commit breaking the "waiter == owner" case again.

Fixes: 74e144274af39 ("futex/requeue: Prevent NULL pointer dereference in remove_waiter() on self-deadlock")
Reported-by: Michael Bommarito 
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260701131150.0Ijhq4Dw@linutronix.de
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260629020049.2082397-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com

Merge tag 'locking-core-2026-06-14' of gitolite.kernel.org:pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2026-06-15T08:51:14+00:00

Pull locking updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "Futex updates:

   - Optimize futex hash bucket access patterns (Peter Zijlstra)

   - Large series to address the robust futex unlock race for real, by
     Thomas Gleixner:

      "The robust futex unlock mechanism is racy in respect to the
       clearing of the robust_list_head::list_op_pending pointer because
       unlock and clearing the pointer are not atomic.

       The race window is between the unlock and clearing the pending op
       pointer. If the task is forced to exit in this window, exit will
       access a potentially invalid pending op pointer when cleaning up
       the robust list.

       That happens if another task manages to unmap the object
       containing the lock before the cleanup, which results in an UAF.

       In the worst case this UAF can lead to memory corruption when
       unrelated content has been mapped to the same address by the time
       the access happens.

       User space can't solve this problem without help from the kernel.
       This series provides the kernel side infrastructure to help it
       along:

        1) Combined unlock, pointer clearing, wake-up for the
           contended case

        2) VDSO based unlock and pointer clearing helpers with a
           fix-up function in the kernel when user space was interrupted
           within the critical section.

      ... with help by André Almeida:

        - Add a note about robust list race condition (André Almeida)
        - Add self-tests for robust release operations (André Almeida)

  Context analysis updates:

   - Implement context analysis for 'struct rt_mutex'. (Bart Van Assche)
   - Bump required Clang version to 23 (Marco Elver)

  Guard infrastructure updates:

   - Series to remove NULL check from unconditional guards (Dmitry
     Ilvokhin)

  Lockdep updates:

   - Restore self-test migrate_disable() and sched_rt_mutex state on
     PREEMPT_RT (Karl Mehltretter)

  Membarriers updates:

   - Use per-CPU mutexes for targeted commands (Aniket Gattani)
   - Modernize membarrier_global_expedited with cleanup guards (Aniket
     Gattani)
   - Add rseq stress test for CFS throttle interactions (Aniket Gattani)

  percpu-rwsems updates:

   - Extract __percpu_up_read() to optimize inlining overhead (Dmitry
     Ilvokhin)

  Seqlocks updates:

   - Allow UBSAN_ALIGNMENT to fail optimizing (Heiko Carstens)

  Lock tracing:

   - Add contended_release tracepoint to sleepable locks such as
     mutexes, percpu-rwsems, rtmutexes, rwsems and semaphores (Dmitry
     Ilvokhin)

  MAINTAINERS updates:

   - MAINTAINERS: Add RUST [SYNC] entry (Boqun Feng)

  Misc updates and fixes by Randy Dunlap, YE WEI-HONG, Fabricio Parra,
  Dmitry Ilvokhin and Peter Zijlstra"

* tag 'locking-core-2026-06-14' of gitolite.kernel.org:pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (36 commits)
  locking: Add contended_release tracepoint to sleepable locks
  locking/percpu-rwsem: Extract __percpu_up_read()
  tracing/lock: Remove unnecessary linux/sched.h include
  futex: Optimize futex hash bucket access patterns
  rust: sync: completion: Mark inline complete_all and wait_for_completion
  MAINTAINERS: Add RUST [SYNC] entry
  cleanup: Specify nonnull argument index
  selftests: futex: Add tests for robust release operations
  Documentation: futex: Add a note about robust list race condition
  x86/vdso: Implement __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock()
  x86/vdso: Prepare for robust futex unlock support
  futex: Provide infrastructure to plug the non contended robust futex unlock race
  futex: Add robust futex unlock IP range
  futex: Add support for unlocking robust futexes
  futex: Cleanup UAPI defines
  x86: Select ARCH_MEMORY_ORDER_TSO
  uaccess: Provide unsafe_atomic_store_release_user()
  futex: Provide UABI defines for robust list entry modifiers
  futex: Move futex related mm_struct data into a struct
  futex: Make futex_mm_init() void
  ...