<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel/futex.c, branch v5.4.97</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>futex: Handle faults correctly for PI futexes</title>
<updated>2021-01-30T12:54:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-18T18:01:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ecd62d2e9ab405d9575c3aa8eb44e44e523a0d19'/>
<id>ecd62d2e9ab405d9575c3aa8eb44e44e523a0d19</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 34b1a1ce1458f50ef27c54e28eb9b1947012907a upstream

fixup_pi_state_owner() tries to ensure that the state of the rtmutex,
pi_state and the user space value related to the PI futex are consistent
before returning to user space. In case that the user space value update
faults and the fault cannot be resolved by faulting the page in via
fault_in_user_writeable() the function returns with -EFAULT and leaves
the rtmutex and pi_state owner state inconsistent.

A subsequent futex_unlock_pi() operates on the inconsistent pi_state and
releases the rtmutex despite not owning it which can corrupt the RB tree of
the rtmutex and cause a subsequent kernel stack use after free.

It was suggested to loop forever in fixup_pi_state_owner() if the fault
cannot be resolved, but that results in runaway tasks which is especially
undesired when the problem happens due to a programming error and not due
to malice.

As the user space value cannot be fixed up, the proper solution is to make
the rtmutex and the pi_state consistent so both have the same owner. This
leaves the user space value out of sync. Any subsequent operation on the
futex will fail because the 10th rule of PI futexes (pi_state owner and
user space value are consistent) has been violated.

As a consequence this removes the inept attempts of 'fixing' the situation
in case that the current task owns the rtmutex when returning with an
unresolvable fault by unlocking the rtmutex which left pi_state::owner and
rtmutex::owner out of sync in a different and only slightly less dangerous
way.

Fixes: 1b7558e457ed ("futexes: fix fault handling in futex_lock_pi")
Reported-by: gzobqq@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 34b1a1ce1458f50ef27c54e28eb9b1947012907a upstream

fixup_pi_state_owner() tries to ensure that the state of the rtmutex,
pi_state and the user space value related to the PI futex are consistent
before returning to user space. In case that the user space value update
faults and the fault cannot be resolved by faulting the page in via
fault_in_user_writeable() the function returns with -EFAULT and leaves
the rtmutex and pi_state owner state inconsistent.

A subsequent futex_unlock_pi() operates on the inconsistent pi_state and
releases the rtmutex despite not owning it which can corrupt the RB tree of
the rtmutex and cause a subsequent kernel stack use after free.

It was suggested to loop forever in fixup_pi_state_owner() if the fault
cannot be resolved, but that results in runaway tasks which is especially
undesired when the problem happens due to a programming error and not due
to malice.

As the user space value cannot be fixed up, the proper solution is to make
the rtmutex and the pi_state consistent so both have the same owner. This
leaves the user space value out of sync. Any subsequent operation on the
futex will fail because the 10th rule of PI futexes (pi_state owner and
user space value are consistent) has been violated.

As a consequence this removes the inept attempts of 'fixing' the situation
in case that the current task owns the rtmutex when returning with an
unresolvable fault by unlocking the rtmutex which left pi_state::owner and
rtmutex::owner out of sync in a different and only slightly less dangerous
way.

Fixes: 1b7558e457ed ("futexes: fix fault handling in futex_lock_pi")
Reported-by: gzobqq@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Simplify fixup_pi_state_owner()</title>
<updated>2021-01-30T12:54:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-19T15:26:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=55ea172ce3ebe276e734352eb1b236b3065496c3'/>
<id>55ea172ce3ebe276e734352eb1b236b3065496c3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f2dac39d93987f7de1e20b3988c8685523247ae2 upstream

Too many gotos already and an upcoming fix would make it even more
unreadable.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f2dac39d93987f7de1e20b3988c8685523247ae2 upstream

Too many gotos already and an upcoming fix would make it even more
unreadable.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Use pi_state_update_owner() in put_pi_state()</title>
<updated>2021-01-30T12:54:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-20T10:35:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a3155c362ca0a4677d0c886798bbeb5f0a9efe86'/>
<id>a3155c362ca0a4677d0c886798bbeb5f0a9efe86</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6ccc84f917d33312eb2846bd7b567639f585ad6d upstream

No point in open coding it. This way it gains the extra sanity checks.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6ccc84f917d33312eb2846bd7b567639f585ad6d upstream

No point in open coding it. This way it gains the extra sanity checks.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rtmutex: Remove unused argument from rt_mutex_proxy_unlock()</title>
<updated>2021-01-30T12:54:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-20T10:32:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ceb83cf9ed6764977c86a03fe187578def3b4e18'/>
<id>ceb83cf9ed6764977c86a03fe187578def3b4e18</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2156ac1934166d6deb6cd0f6ffc4c1076ec63697 upstream

Nothing uses the argument. Remove it as preparation to use
pi_state_update_owner().

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2156ac1934166d6deb6cd0f6ffc4c1076ec63697 upstream

Nothing uses the argument. Remove it as preparation to use
pi_state_update_owner().

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Provide and use pi_state_update_owner()</title>
<updated>2021-01-30T12:54:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-19T14:21:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=015b6a4c2564a9385401a6105e80a20c333e1d44'/>
<id>015b6a4c2564a9385401a6105e80a20c333e1d44</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c5cade200ab9a2a3be9e7f32a752c8d86b502ec7 upstream

Updating pi_state::owner is done at several places with the same
code. Provide a function for it and use that at the obvious places.

This is also a preparation for a bug fix to avoid yet another copy of the
same code or alternatively introducing a completely unpenetratable mess of
gotos.

Originally-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c5cade200ab9a2a3be9e7f32a752c8d86b502ec7 upstream

Updating pi_state::owner is done at several places with the same
code. Provide a function for it and use that at the obvious places.

This is also a preparation for a bug fix to avoid yet another copy of the
same code or alternatively introducing a completely unpenetratable mess of
gotos.

Originally-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Replace pointless printk in fixup_owner()</title>
<updated>2021-01-30T12:54:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-19T15:06:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=65aad57cac8db8dd0d1dcdd86bc8603039d937b7'/>
<id>65aad57cac8db8dd0d1dcdd86bc8603039d937b7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 04b79c55201f02ffd675e1231d731365e335c307 upstream

If that unexpected case of inconsistent arguments ever happens then the
futex state is left completely inconsistent and the printk is not really
helpful. Replace it with a warning and make the state consistent.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 04b79c55201f02ffd675e1231d731365e335c307 upstream

If that unexpected case of inconsistent arguments ever happens then the
futex state is left completely inconsistent and the printk is not really
helpful. Replace it with a warning and make the state consistent.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Ensure the correct return value from futex_lock_pi()</title>
<updated>2021-01-30T12:54:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-20T15:00:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0dae88a92596db9405fd4a341c1915cf7d8fbad4'/>
<id>0dae88a92596db9405fd4a341c1915cf7d8fbad4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 12bb3f7f1b03d5913b3f9d4236a488aa7774dfe9 upstream

In case that futex_lock_pi() was aborted by a signal or a timeout and the
task returned without acquiring the rtmutex, but is the designated owner of
the futex due to a concurrent futex_unlock_pi() fixup_owner() is invoked to
establish consistent state. In that case it invokes fixup_pi_state_owner()
which in turn tries to acquire the rtmutex again. If that succeeds then it
does not propagate this success to fixup_owner() and futex_lock_pi()
returns -EINTR or -ETIMEOUT despite having the futex locked.

Return success from fixup_pi_state_owner() in all cases where the current
task owns the rtmutex and therefore the futex and propagate it correctly
through fixup_owner(). Fixup the other callsite which does not expect a
positive return value.

Fixes: c1e2f0eaf015 ("futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 12bb3f7f1b03d5913b3f9d4236a488aa7774dfe9 upstream

In case that futex_lock_pi() was aborted by a signal or a timeout and the
task returned without acquiring the rtmutex, but is the designated owner of
the futex due to a concurrent futex_unlock_pi() fixup_owner() is invoked to
establish consistent state. In that case it invokes fixup_pi_state_owner()
which in turn tries to acquire the rtmutex again. If that succeeds then it
does not propagate this success to fixup_owner() and futex_lock_pi()
returns -EINTR or -ETIMEOUT despite having the futex locked.

Return success from fixup_pi_state_owner() in all cases where the current
task owns the rtmutex and therefore the futex and propagate it correctly
through fixup_owner(). Fixup the other callsite which does not expect a
positive return value.

Fixes: c1e2f0eaf015 ("futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Don't enable IRQs unconditionally in put_pi_state()</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-06T08:52:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2192d905df0d540f6f3240046bcb06c53bcf5016'/>
<id>2192d905df0d540f6f3240046bcb06c53bcf5016</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1e106aa3509b86738769775969822ffc1ec21bf4 upstream.

The exit_pi_state_list() function calls put_pi_state() with IRQs disabled
and is not expecting that IRQs will be enabled inside the function.

Use the _irqsave() variant so that IRQs are restored to the original state
instead of being enabled unconditionally.

Fixes: 153fbd1226fb ("futex: Fix more put_pi_state() vs. exit_pi_state_list() races")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201106085205.GA1159983@mwanda
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1e106aa3509b86738769775969822ffc1ec21bf4 upstream.

The exit_pi_state_list() function calls put_pi_state() with IRQs disabled
and is not expecting that IRQs will be enabled inside the function.

Use the _irqsave() variant so that IRQs are restored to the original state
instead of being enabled unconditionally.

Fixes: 153fbd1226fb ("futex: Fix more put_pi_state() vs. exit_pi_state_list() races")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201106085205.GA1159983@mwanda
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Handle transient "ownerless" rtmutex state correctly</title>
<updated>2020-11-10T11:37:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mike Galbraith</name>
<email>efault@gmx.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-04T15:12:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2716e78a6486814537df95a82efec4e9e4e081d9'/>
<id>2716e78a6486814537df95a82efec4e9e4e081d9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9f5d1c336a10c0d24e83e40b4c1b9539f7dba627 upstream.

Gratian managed to trigger the BUG_ON(!newowner) in fixup_pi_state_owner().
This is one possible chain of events leading to this:

Task Prio       Operation
T1   120	lock(F)
T2   120	lock(F)   -&gt; blocks (top waiter)
T3   50 (RT)	lock(F)   -&gt; boosts T1 and blocks (new top waiter)
XX   		timeout/  -&gt; wakes T2
		signal
T1   50		unlock(F) -&gt; wakes T3 (rtmutex-&gt;owner == NULL, waiter bit is set)
T2   120	cleanup   -&gt; try_to_take_mutex() fails because T3 is the top waiter
     			     and the lower priority T2 cannot steal the lock.
     			  -&gt; fixup_pi_state_owner() sees newowner == NULL -&gt; BUG_ON()

The comment states that this is invalid and rt_mutex_real_owner() must
return a non NULL owner when the trylock failed, but in case of a queued
and woken up waiter rt_mutex_real_owner() == NULL is a valid transient
state. The higher priority waiter has simply not yet managed to take over
the rtmutex.

The BUG_ON() is therefore wrong and this is just another retry condition in
fixup_pi_state_owner().

Drop the locks, so that T3 can make progress, and then try the fixup again.

Gratian provided a great analysis, traces and a reproducer. The analysis is
to the point, but it confused the hell out of that tglx dude who had to
page in all the futex horrors again. Condensed version is above.

[ tglx: Wrote comment and changelog ]

Fixes: c1e2f0eaf015 ("futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex")
Reported-by: Gratian Crisan &lt;gratian.crisan@ni.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87a6w6x7bb.fsf@ni.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87sg9pkvf7.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9f5d1c336a10c0d24e83e40b4c1b9539f7dba627 upstream.

Gratian managed to trigger the BUG_ON(!newowner) in fixup_pi_state_owner().
This is one possible chain of events leading to this:

Task Prio       Operation
T1   120	lock(F)
T2   120	lock(F)   -&gt; blocks (top waiter)
T3   50 (RT)	lock(F)   -&gt; boosts T1 and blocks (new top waiter)
XX   		timeout/  -&gt; wakes T2
		signal
T1   50		unlock(F) -&gt; wakes T3 (rtmutex-&gt;owner == NULL, waiter bit is set)
T2   120	cleanup   -&gt; try_to_take_mutex() fails because T3 is the top waiter
     			     and the lower priority T2 cannot steal the lock.
     			  -&gt; fixup_pi_state_owner() sees newowner == NULL -&gt; BUG_ON()

The comment states that this is invalid and rt_mutex_real_owner() must
return a non NULL owner when the trylock failed, but in case of a queued
and woken up waiter rt_mutex_real_owner() == NULL is a valid transient
state. The higher priority waiter has simply not yet managed to take over
the rtmutex.

The BUG_ON() is therefore wrong and this is just another retry condition in
fixup_pi_state_owner().

Drop the locks, so that T3 can make progress, and then try the fixup again.

Gratian provided a great analysis, traces and a reproducer. The analysis is
to the point, but it confused the hell out of that tglx dude who had to
page in all the futex horrors again. Condensed version is above.

[ tglx: Wrote comment and changelog ]

Fixes: c1e2f0eaf015 ("futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex")
Reported-by: Gratian Crisan &lt;gratian.crisan@ni.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87a6w6x7bb.fsf@ni.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87sg9pkvf7.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Fix incorrect should_fail_futex() handling</title>
<updated>2020-11-05T10:43:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mateusz Nosek</name>
<email>mateusznosek0@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-27T00:08:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2db7590371520735366639647352b44c0eeda11f'/>
<id>2db7590371520735366639647352b44c0eeda11f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 921c7ebd1337d1a46783d7e15a850e12aed2eaa0 ]

If should_futex_fail() returns true in futex_wake_pi(), then the 'ret'
variable is set to -EFAULT and then immediately overwritten. So the failure
injection is non-functional.

Fix it by actually leaving the function and returning -EFAULT.

The Fixes tag is kinda blury because the initial commit which introduced
failure injection was already sloppy, but the below mentioned commit broke
it completely.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Fixes: 6b4f4bc9cb22 ("locking/futex: Allow low-level atomic operations to return -EAGAIN")
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Nosek &lt;mateusznosek0@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200927000858.24219-1-mateusznosek0@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
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<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 921c7ebd1337d1a46783d7e15a850e12aed2eaa0 ]

If should_futex_fail() returns true in futex_wake_pi(), then the 'ret'
variable is set to -EFAULT and then immediately overwritten. So the failure
injection is non-functional.

Fix it by actually leaving the function and returning -EFAULT.

The Fixes tag is kinda blury because the initial commit which introduced
failure injection was already sloppy, but the below mentioned commit broke
it completely.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Fixes: 6b4f4bc9cb22 ("locking/futex: Allow low-level atomic operations to return -EAGAIN")
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Nosek &lt;mateusznosek0@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200927000858.24219-1-mateusznosek0@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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