linux-stable.git/kernel/futex.c, branch v4.1.35

futex: Acknowledge a new waiter in counter before plist

2016-07-11T03:07:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit fe1bce9e2107ba3a8faffe572483b6974201a0e6 ]

Otherwise an incoming waker on the dest hash bucket can miss
the waiter adding itself to the plist during the lockless
check optimization (small window but still the correct way
of doing this); similarly to the decrement counterpart.

Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra 
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1461208164-29150-1-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

futex: Handle unlock_pi race gracefully

2016-05-10T16:17:31+00:00

[ Upstream commit 89e9e66ba1b3bde9d8ea90566c2aee20697ad681 ]

If userspace calls UNLOCK_PI unconditionally without trying the TID -> 0
transition in user space first then the user space value might not have the
waiters bit set. This opens the following race:

CPU0	    	      	    CPU1
uval = get_user(futex)
			    lock(hb)
lock(hb)
			    futex |= FUTEX_WAITERS
			    ....
			    unlock(hb)

cmpxchg(futex, uval, newval)

So the cmpxchg fails and returns -EINVAL to user space, which is wrong because
the futex value is valid.

To handle this (yes, yet another) corner case gracefully, check for a flag
change and retry.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog and slightly reworked implementation ]

Fixes: ccf9e6a80d9e ("futex: Make unlock_pi more robust")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: Darren Hart 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1460723739-5195-1-git-send-email-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks

2016-04-12T02:07:35+00:00

[ Upstream commit caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 ]

By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.

To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.

The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g.  by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.

While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.

In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:

 /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
     should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
     directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
     this scenario:
     lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
     drwx------ root root /root
     drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
     -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret

Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: Casey Schaufler 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: James Morris 
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" 
Cc: Andy Shevchenko 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Willy Tarreau 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

futex: Drop refcount if requeue_pi() acquired the rtmutex

2016-02-01T16:53:47+00:00

[ Upstream commit fb75a4282d0d9a3c7c44d940582c2d226cf3acfb ]

If the proxy lock in the requeue loop acquires the rtmutex for a
waiter then it acquired also refcount on the pi_state related to the
futex, but the waiter side does not drop the reference count.

Add the missing free_pi_state() call.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Darren Hart 
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: Bhuvanesh_Surachari@mentor.com
Cc: Andy Lowe 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151219200607.178132067@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Merge tag 'v4.0-rc1' into locking/core, to refresh the tree before merging new changes

2015-02-24T07:41:07+00:00

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

locking/futex: Check PF_KTHREAD rather than !p->mm to filter out kthreads

2015-02-18T15:57:09+00:00

attach_to_pi_owner() checks p->mm to prevent attaching to kthreads and
this looks doubly wrong:

1. It should actually check PF_KTHREAD, kthread can do use_mm().

2. If this task is not kthread and it is actually the lock owner we can
   wrongly return -EPERM instead of -ESRCH or retry-if-EAGAIN.

   And note that this wrong EPERM is the likely case unless the exiting
   task is (auto)reaped quickly, we check ->mm before PF_EXITING.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Darren Hart 
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: Jerome Marchand 
Cc: Larry Woodman 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Mateusz Guzik 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150202140536.GA26406@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

all arches, signal: move restart_block to struct task_struct

2015-02-13T02:54:12+00:00

If an attacker can cause a controlled kernel stack overflow, overwriting
the restart block is a very juicy exploit target.  This is because the
restart_block is held in the same memory allocation as the kernel stack.

Moving the restart block to struct task_struct prevents this exploit by
making the restart_block harder to locate.

Note that there are other fields in thread_info that are also easy
targets, at least on some architectures.

It's also a decent simplification, since the restart code is more or less
identical on all architectures.

[james.hogan@imgtec.com: metag: align thread_info::supervisor_stack]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: David Miller 
Acked-by: Richard Weinberger 
Cc: Richard Henderson 
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky 
Cc: Matt Turner 
Cc: Vineet Gupta 
Cc: Russell King 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen 
Cc: Hans-Christian Egtvedt 
Cc: Steven Miao 
Cc: Mark Salter 
Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot 
Cc: Mikael Starvik 
Cc: Jesper Nilsson 
Cc: David Howells 
Cc: Richard Kuo 
Cc: "Luck, Tony" 
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven 
Cc: Michal Simek 
Cc: Ralf Baechle 
Cc: Jonas Bonn 
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" 
Cc: Helge Deller 
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt 
Cc: Paul Mackerras 
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman  (powerpc)
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman  (powerpc)
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky 
Cc: Heiko Carstens 
Cc: Chen Liqin 
Cc: Lennox Wu 
Cc: Chris Metcalf 
Cc: Guan Xuetao 
Cc: Chris Zankel 
Cc: Max Filippov 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Guenter Roeck 
Signed-off-by: James Hogan 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

futex: Fix argument handling in futex_lock_pi() calls

2015-01-19T11:05:32+00:00

This patch fixes two separate buglets in calls to futex_lock_pi():

  * Eliminate unused 'detect' argument
  * Change unused 'timeout' argument of FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI to NULL

The 'detect' argument of futex_lock_pi() seems never to have been
used (when it was included with the initial PI mutex implementation
in Linux 2.6.18, all checks against its value were disabled by
ANDing against 0 (i.e., if (detect... && 0)), and with
commit 778e9a9c3e7193ea9f434f382947155ffb59c755, any mention of
this argument in futex_lock_pi() went way altogether. Its presence
now serves only to confuse readers of the code, by giving the
impression that the futex() FUTEX_LOCK_PI operation actually does
use the 'val' argument. This patch removes the argument.

The futex_lock_pi() call that corresponds to FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI includes
'timeout' as one of its arguments. This misleads the reader into thinking
that the FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI operation does employ timeouts for some sensible
purpose; but it does not.  Indeed, it cannot, because the checks at the
start of sys_futex() exclude FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI from the set of operations
that do copy_from_user() on the timeout argument. So, in the
FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI futex_lock_pi() call it would be simplest to change
'timeout' to 'NULL'. This patch does that.

Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk 
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/54B96646.8010200@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner

futex: Fix a race condition between REQUEUE_PI and task death

2014-10-26T15:16:18+00:00

free_pi_state and exit_pi_state_list both clean up futex_pi_state's.
exit_pi_state_list takes the hb lock first, and most callers of
free_pi_state do too. requeue_pi doesn't, which means free_pi_state
can free the pi_state out from under exit_pi_state_list. For example:

task A                            |  task B
exit_pi_state_list                |
  pi_state =                      |
      curr->pi_state_list->next   |
                                  |  futex_requeue(requeue_pi=1)
                                  |    // pi_state is the same as
                                  |    // the one in task A
                                  |    free_pi_state(pi_state)
                                  |      list_del_init(&pi_state->list)
                                  |      kfree(pi_state)
  list_del_init(&pi_state->list)  |

Move the free_pi_state calls in requeue_pi to before it drops the hb
locks which it's already holding.

[ tglx: Removed a pointless free_pi_state() call and the hb->lock held
  	debugging. The latter comes via a seperate patch ]

Signed-off-by: Brian Silverman 
Cc: austin.linux@gmail.com
Cc: darren@dvhart.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1414282837-23092-1-git-send-email-bsilver16384@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner

futex: Mention key referencing differences between shared and private futexes

2014-10-26T15:16:18+00:00

Update our documentation as of fix 76835b0ebf8 (futex: Ensure
get_futex_key_refs() always implies a barrier). Explicitly
state that we don't do key referencing for private futexes.

Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: Matteo Franchin 
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Darren Hart 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Paul E. McKenney 
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1414121220.817.0.camel@linux-t7sj.site
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner