linux-stable.git/kernel/futex.c, branch v4.1.23

ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks

2016-04-12T02:07:35+00:00

[ Upstream commit caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 ]

By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.

To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.

The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g.  by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.

While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.

In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:

 /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
     should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
     directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
     this scenario:
     lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
     drwx------ root root /root
     drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
     -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret

Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: Casey Schaufler 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: James Morris 
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" 
Cc: Andy Shevchenko 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Willy Tarreau 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

futex: Drop refcount if requeue_pi() acquired the rtmutex

2016-02-01T16:53:47+00:00

[ Upstream commit fb75a4282d0d9a3c7c44d940582c2d226cf3acfb ]

If the proxy lock in the requeue loop acquires the rtmutex for a
waiter then it acquired also refcount on the pi_state related to the
futex, but the waiter side does not drop the reference count.

Add the missing free_pi_state() call.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Darren Hart 
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: Bhuvanesh_Surachari@mentor.com
Cc: Andy Lowe 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151219200607.178132067@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Merge tag 'v4.0-rc1' into locking/core, to refresh the tree before merging new changes

2015-02-24T07:41:07+00:00

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

locking/futex: Check PF_KTHREAD rather than !p->mm to filter out kthreads

2015-02-18T15:57:09+00:00

attach_to_pi_owner() checks p->mm to prevent attaching to kthreads and
this looks doubly wrong:

1. It should actually check PF_KTHREAD, kthread can do use_mm().

2. If this task is not kthread and it is actually the lock owner we can
   wrongly return -EPERM instead of -ESRCH or retry-if-EAGAIN.

   And note that this wrong EPERM is the likely case unless the exiting
   task is (auto)reaped quickly, we check ->mm before PF_EXITING.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Darren Hart 
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: Jerome Marchand 
Cc: Larry Woodman 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Mateusz Guzik 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150202140536.GA26406@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

all arches, signal: move restart_block to struct task_struct

2015-02-13T02:54:12+00:00

If an attacker can cause a controlled kernel stack overflow, overwriting
the restart block is a very juicy exploit target.  This is because the
restart_block is held in the same memory allocation as the kernel stack.

Moving the restart block to struct task_struct prevents this exploit by
making the restart_block harder to locate.

Note that there are other fields in thread_info that are also easy
targets, at least on some architectures.

It's also a decent simplification, since the restart code is more or less
identical on all architectures.

[james.hogan@imgtec.com: metag: align thread_info::supervisor_stack]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: David Miller 
Acked-by: Richard Weinberger 
Cc: Richard Henderson 
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky 
Cc: Matt Turner 
Cc: Vineet Gupta 
Cc: Russell King 
Cc: Catalin Marinas 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen 
Cc: Hans-Christian Egtvedt 
Cc: Steven Miao 
Cc: Mark Salter 
Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot 
Cc: Mikael Starvik 
Cc: Jesper Nilsson 
Cc: David Howells 
Cc: Richard Kuo 
Cc: "Luck, Tony" 
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven 
Cc: Michal Simek 
Cc: Ralf Baechle 
Cc: Jonas Bonn 
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" 
Cc: Helge Deller 
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt 
Cc: Paul Mackerras 
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman  (powerpc)
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman  (powerpc)
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky 
Cc: Heiko Carstens 
Cc: Chen Liqin 
Cc: Lennox Wu 
Cc: Chris Metcalf 
Cc: Guan Xuetao 
Cc: Chris Zankel 
Cc: Max Filippov 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Guenter Roeck 
Signed-off-by: James Hogan 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

futex: Fix argument handling in futex_lock_pi() calls

2015-01-19T11:05:32+00:00

This patch fixes two separate buglets in calls to futex_lock_pi():

  * Eliminate unused 'detect' argument
  * Change unused 'timeout' argument of FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI to NULL

The 'detect' argument of futex_lock_pi() seems never to have been
used (when it was included with the initial PI mutex implementation
in Linux 2.6.18, all checks against its value were disabled by
ANDing against 0 (i.e., if (detect... && 0)), and with
commit 778e9a9c3e7193ea9f434f382947155ffb59c755, any mention of
this argument in futex_lock_pi() went way altogether. Its presence
now serves only to confuse readers of the code, by giving the
impression that the futex() FUTEX_LOCK_PI operation actually does
use the 'val' argument. This patch removes the argument.

The futex_lock_pi() call that corresponds to FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI includes
'timeout' as one of its arguments. This misleads the reader into thinking
that the FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI operation does employ timeouts for some sensible
purpose; but it does not.  Indeed, it cannot, because the checks at the
start of sys_futex() exclude FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI from the set of operations
that do copy_from_user() on the timeout argument. So, in the
FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI futex_lock_pi() call it would be simplest to change
'timeout' to 'NULL'. This patch does that.

Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk 
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/54B96646.8010200@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner

futex: Fix a race condition between REQUEUE_PI and task death

2014-10-26T15:16:18+00:00

free_pi_state and exit_pi_state_list both clean up futex_pi_state's.
exit_pi_state_list takes the hb lock first, and most callers of
free_pi_state do too. requeue_pi doesn't, which means free_pi_state
can free the pi_state out from under exit_pi_state_list. For example:

task A                            |  task B
exit_pi_state_list                |
  pi_state =                      |
      curr->pi_state_list->next   |
                                  |  futex_requeue(requeue_pi=1)
                                  |    // pi_state is the same as
                                  |    // the one in task A
                                  |    free_pi_state(pi_state)
                                  |      list_del_init(&pi_state->list)
                                  |      kfree(pi_state)
  list_del_init(&pi_state->list)  |

Move the free_pi_state calls in requeue_pi to before it drops the hb
locks which it's already holding.

[ tglx: Removed a pointless free_pi_state() call and the hb->lock held
  	debugging. The latter comes via a seperate patch ]

Signed-off-by: Brian Silverman 
Cc: austin.linux@gmail.com
Cc: darren@dvhart.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1414282837-23092-1-git-send-email-bsilver16384@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner

futex: Mention key referencing differences between shared and private futexes

2014-10-26T15:16:18+00:00

Update our documentation as of fix 76835b0ebf8 (futex: Ensure
get_futex_key_refs() always implies a barrier). Explicitly
state that we don't do key referencing for private futexes.

Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: Matteo Franchin 
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Darren Hart 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Paul E. McKenney 
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1414121220.817.0.camel@linux-t7sj.site
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner

futex: Ensure get_futex_key_refs() always implies a barrier

2014-10-18T16:28:51+00:00

Commit b0c29f79ecea (futexes: Avoid taking the hb->lock if there's
nothing to wake up) changes the futex code to avoid taking a lock when
there are no waiters. This code has been subsequently fixed in commit
11d4616bd07f (futex: revert back to the explicit waiter counting code).
Both the original commit and the fix-up rely on get_futex_key_refs() to
always imply a barrier.

However, for private futexes, none of the cases in the switch statement
of get_futex_key_refs() would be hit and the function completes without
a memory barrier as required before checking the "waiters" in
futex_wake() -> hb_waiters_pending(). The consequence is a race with a
thread waiting on a futex on another CPU, allowing the waker thread to
read "waiters == 0" while the waiter thread to have read "futex_val ==
locked" (in kernel).

Without this fix, the problem (user space deadlocks) can be seen with
Android bionic's mutex implementation on an arm64 multi-cluster system.

Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas 
Reported-by: Matteo Franchin 
Fixes: b0c29f79ecea (futexes: Avoid taking the hb->lock if there's nothing to wake up)
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso 
Tested-by: Mike Galbraith 
Cc: 
Cc: Darren Hart 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Paul E. McKenney 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

futex: Unlock hb->lock in futex_wait_requeue_pi() error path

2014-09-12T20:04:36+00:00

futex_wait_requeue_pi() calls futex_wait_setup(). If
futex_wait_setup() succeeds it returns with hb->lock held and
preemption disabled. Now the sanity check after this does:

        if (match_futex(&q.key, &key2)) {
	   	ret = -EINVAL;
		goto out_put_keys;
	}

which releases the keys but does not release hb->lock.

So we happily return to user space with hb->lock held and therefor
preemption disabled.

Unlock hb->lock before taking the exit route.

Reported-by: Dave "Trinity" Jones 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart 
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.10.1409112318500.4178@nanos
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner