linux-stable.git/kernel/fork.c, branch v3.2.20

mm/fork: fix overflow in vma length when copying mmap on clone

2012-06-10T13:41:44+00:00

commit 7edc8b0ac16cbaed7cb4ea4c6b95ce98d2997e84 upstream.

The vma length in dup_mmap is calculated and stored in a unsigned int,
which is insufficient and hence overflows for very large maps (beyond
16TB). The following program demonstrates this:

#include 
#include 
#include 

#define GIG 1024 * 1024 * 1024L
#define EXTENT 16393

int main(void)
{
        int i, r;
        void *m;
        char buf[1024];

        for (i = 0; i < EXTENT; i++) {
                m = mmap(NULL, (size_t) 1 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024L,
                         PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0);

                if (m == (void *)-1)
                        printf("MMAP Failed: %d\n", m);
                else
                        printf("%d : MMAP returned %p\n", i, m);

                r = fork();

                if (r == 0) {
                        printf("%d: successed\n", i);
                        return 0;
                } else if (r < 0)
                        printf("FORK Failed: %d\n", r);
                else if (r > 0)
                        wait(NULL);
        }
        return 0;
}

Increase the storage size of the result to unsigned long, which is
sufficient for storing the difference between addresses.

Signed-off-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar 
Cc: Tejun Heo 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Jens Axboe 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

namespaces, pid_ns: fix leakage on fork() failure

2012-05-20T21:56:32+00:00

commit 5e2bf0142231194d36fdc9596b36a261ed2b9fe7 upstream.

Fork() failure post namespace creation for a child cloned with
CLONE_NEWPID leaks pid_namespace/mnt_cache due to proc being mounted
during creation, but not unmounted during cleanup.  Call
pid_ns_release_proc() during cleanup.

Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith 
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov 
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov 
Cc: Louis Rilling 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

epoll: introduce POLLFREE to flush ->signalfd_wqh before kfree()

2012-03-01T00:31:23+00:00

commit d80e731ecab420ddcb79ee9d0ac427acbc187b4b upstream.

This patch is intentionally incomplete to simplify the review.
It ignores ep_unregister_pollwait() which plays with the same wqh.
See the next change.

epoll assumes that the EPOLL_CTL_ADD'ed file controls everything
f_op->poll() needs. In particular it assumes that the wait queue
can't go away until eventpoll_release(). This is not true in case
of signalfd, the task which does EPOLL_CTL_ADD uses its ->sighand
which is not connected to the file.

This patch adds the special event, POLLFREE, currently only for
epoll. It expects that init_poll_funcptr()'ed hook should do the
necessary cleanup. Perhaps it should be defined as EPOLLFREE in
eventpoll.

__cleanup_sighand() is changed to do wake_up_poll(POLLFREE) if
->signalfd_wqh is not empty, we add the new signalfd_cleanup()
helper.

ep_poll_callback(POLLFREE) simply does list_del_init(task_list).
This make this poll entry inconsistent, but we don't care. If you
share epoll fd which contains our sigfd with another process you
should blame yourself. signalfd is "really special". I simply do
not know how we can define the "right" semantics if it used with
epoll.

The main problem is, epoll calls signalfd_poll() once to establish
the connection with the wait queue, after that signalfd_poll(NULL)
returns the different/inconsistent results depending on who does
EPOLL_CTL_MOD/signalfd_read/etc. IOW: apart from sigmask, signalfd
has nothing to do with the file, it works with the current thread.

In short: this patch is the hack which tries to fix the symptoms.
It also assumes that nobody can take tasklist_lock under epoll
locks, this seems to be true.

Note:

	- we do not have wake_up_all_poll() but wake_up_poll()
	  is fine, poll/epoll doesn't use WQ_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE.

	- signalfd_cleanup() uses POLLHUP along with POLLFREE,
	  we need a couple of simple changes in eventpoll.c to
	  make sure it can't be "lost".

Reported-by: Maxime Bizon 
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

writeback: remove vm_dirties and task->dirties

2011-11-17T12:49:06+00:00

They are not used any more.

Signed-off-by: Wu Fengguang

Merge branch 'writeback-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wfg/linux

2011-11-07T03:02:23+00:00

* 'writeback-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wfg/linux:
  writeback: Add a 'reason' to wb_writeback_work
  writeback: send work item to queue_io, move_expired_inodes
  writeback: trace event balance_dirty_pages
  writeback: trace event bdi_dirty_ratelimit
  writeback: fix ppc compile warnings on do_div(long long, unsigned long)
  writeback: per-bdi background threshold
  writeback: dirty position control - bdi reserve area
  writeback: control dirty pause time
  writeback: limit max dirty pause time
  writeback: IO-less balance_dirty_pages()
  writeback: per task dirty rate limit
  writeback: stabilize bdi->dirty_ratelimit
  writeback: dirty rate control
  writeback: add bg_threshold parameter to __bdi_update_bandwidth()
  writeback: dirty position control
  writeback: account per-bdi accumulated dirtied pages

oom: remove oom_disable_count

2011-11-01T00:30:45+00:00

This removes mm->oom_disable_count entirely since it's unnecessary and
currently buggy.  The counter was intended to be per-process but it's
currently decremented in the exit path for each thread that exits, causing
it to underflow.

The count was originally intended to prevent oom killing threads that
share memory with threads that cannot be killed since it doesn't lead to
future memory freeing.  The counter could be fixed to represent all
threads sharing the same mm, but it's better to remove the count since:

 - it is possible that the OOM_DISABLE thread sharing memory with the
   victim is waiting on that thread to exit and will actually cause
   future memory freeing, and

 - there is no guarantee that a thread is disabled from oom killing just
   because another thread sharing its mm is oom disabled.

Signed-off-by: David Rientjes 
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Ying Han 
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

writeback: per task dirty rate limit

2011-10-03T13:08:57+00:00

Add two fields to task_struct.

1) account dirtied pages in the individual tasks, for accuracy
2) per-task balance_dirty_pages() call intervals, for flexibility

The balance_dirty_pages() call interval (ie. nr_dirtied_pause) will
scale near-sqrt to the safety gap between dirty pages and threshold.

The main problem of per-task nr_dirtied is, if 1k+ tasks start dirtying
pages at exactly the same time, each task will be assigned a large
initial nr_dirtied_pause, so that the dirty threshold will be exceeded
long before each task reached its nr_dirtied_pause and hence call
balance_dirty_pages().

The solution is to watch for the number of pages dirtied on each CPU in
between the calls into balance_dirty_pages(). If it exceeds ratelimit_pages
(3% dirty threshold), force call balance_dirty_pages() for a chance to
set bdi->dirty_exceeded. In normal situations, this safeguarding
condition is not expected to trigger at all.

On the sqrt in dirty_poll_interval():

It will serve as an initial guess when dirty pages are still in the
freerun area.

When dirty pages are floating inside the dirty control scope [freerun,
limit], a followup patch will use some refined dirty poll interval to
get the desired pause time.

   thresh-dirty (MB)    sqrt
		   1      16
		   2      22
		   4      32
		   8      45
		  16      64
		  32      90
		  64     128
		 128     181
		 256     256
		 512     362
		1024     512

The above table means, given 1MB (or 1GB) gap and the dd tasks polling
balance_dirty_pages() on every 16 (or 512) pages, the dirty limit won't
be exceeded as long as there are less than 16 (or 512) concurrent dd's.

So sqrt naturally leads to less overheads and more safe concurrent tasks
for large memory servers, which have large (thresh-freerun) gaps.

peter: keep the per-CPU ratelimit for safeguarding the 1k+ tasks case

CC: Peter Zijlstra 
Reviewed-by: Andrea Righi 
Signed-off-by: Wu Fengguang

move RLIMIT_NPROC check from set_user() to do_execve_common()

2011-08-11T18:24:42+00:00

The patch http://lkml.org/lkml/2003/7/13/226 introduced an RLIMIT_NPROC
check in set_user() to check for NPROC exceeding via setuid() and
similar functions.

Before the check there was a possibility to greatly exceed the allowed
number of processes by an unprivileged user if the program relied on
rlimit only.  But the check created new security threat: many poorly
written programs simply don't check setuid() return code and believe it
cannot fail if executed with root privileges.  So, the check is removed
in this patch because of too often privilege escalations related to
buggy programs.

The NPROC can still be enforced in the common code flow of daemons
spawning user processes.  Most of daemons do fork()+setuid()+execve().
The check introduced in execve() (1) enforces the same limit as in
setuid() and (2) doesn't create similar security issues.

Neil Brown suggested to track what specific process has exceeded the
limit by setting PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED process flag.  With the change only
this process would fail on execve(), and other processes' execve()
behaviour is not changed.

Solar Designer suggested to re-check whether NPROC limit is still
exceeded at the moment of execve().  If the process was sleeping for
days between set*uid() and execve(), and the NPROC counter step down
under the limit, the defered execve() failure because NPROC limit was
exceeded days ago would be unexpected.  If the limit is not exceeded
anymore, we clear the flag on successful calls to execve() and fork().

The flag is also cleared on successful calls to set_user() as the limit
was exceeded for the previous user, not the current one.

Similar check was introduced in -ow patches (without the process flag).

v3 - clear PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED on successful calls to set_user().

Reviewed-by: James Morris 
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov 
Acked-by: NeilBrown 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

kernel/fork.c: fix a few coding style issues

2011-07-26T23:49:44+00:00

Signed-off-by: Daniel Rebelo de Oliveira 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

cpusets: randomize node rotor used in cpuset_mem_spread_node()

2011-07-26T23:49:43+00:00

[ This patch has already been accepted as commit 0ac0c0d0f837 but later
  reverted (commit 35926ff5fba8) because it itroduced arch specific
  __node_random which was defined only for x86 code so it broke other
  archs.  This is a followup without any arch specific code.  Other than
  that there are no functional changes.]

Some workloads that create a large number of small files tend to assign
too many pages to node 0 (multi-node systems).  Part of the reason is
that the rotor (in cpuset_mem_spread_node()) used to assign nodes starts
at node 0 for newly created tasks.

This patch changes the rotor to be initialized to a random node number
of the cpuset.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix layout]
[Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com: Define stub numa_random() for !NUMA configuration]
[mhocko@suse.cz: Make it arch independent]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix CONFIG_NUMA=y, MAX_NUMNODES>1 build]
Signed-off-by: Jack Steiner 
Signed-off-by: Lee Schermerhorn 
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko 
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro 
Cc: Christoph Lameter 
Cc: Pekka Enberg 
Cc: Paul Menage 
Cc: Jack Steiner 
Cc: Robin Holt 
Cc: David Rientjes 
Cc: Christoph Lameter 
Cc: David Rientjes 
Cc: Jack Steiner 
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro 
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Paul Menage 
Cc: Pekka Enberg 
Cc: Robin Holt 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds