<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel/fork.c, branch v3.18.136</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>fork: record start_time late</title>
<updated>2019-01-13T09:07:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Herrmann</name>
<email>dh.herrmann@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-08T12:58:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0b2758fb10d9557899b614e76a6d60d299baadf5'/>
<id>0b2758fb10d9557899b614e76a6d60d299baadf5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7b55851367136b1efd84d98fea81ba57a98304cf upstream.

This changes the fork(2) syscall to record the process start_time after
initializing the basic task structure but still before making the new
process visible to user-space.

Technically, we could record the start_time anytime during fork(2).  But
this might lead to scenarios where a start_time is recorded long before
a process becomes visible to user-space.  For instance, with
userfaultfd(2) and TLS, user-space can delay the execution of fork(2)
for an indefinite amount of time (and will, if this causes network
access, or similar).

By recording the start_time late, it much closer reflects the point in
time where the process becomes live and can be observed by other
processes.

Lastly, this makes it much harder for user-space to predict and control
the start_time they get assigned.  Previously, user-space could fork a
process and stall it in copy_thread_tls() before its pid is allocated,
but after its start_time is recorded.  This can be misused to later-on
cycle through PIDs and resume the stalled fork(2) yielding a process
that has the same pid and start_time as a process that existed before.
This can be used to circumvent security systems that identify processes
by their pid+start_time combination.

Even though user-space was always aware that start_time recording is
flaky (but several projects are known to still rely on start_time-based
identification), changing the start_time to be recorded late will help
mitigate existing attacks and make it much harder for user-space to
control the start_time a process gets assigned.

Reported-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tom Gundersen &lt;teg@jklm.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann &lt;dh.herrmann@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7b55851367136b1efd84d98fea81ba57a98304cf upstream.

This changes the fork(2) syscall to record the process start_time after
initializing the basic task structure but still before making the new
process visible to user-space.

Technically, we could record the start_time anytime during fork(2).  But
this might lead to scenarios where a start_time is recorded long before
a process becomes visible to user-space.  For instance, with
userfaultfd(2) and TLS, user-space can delay the execution of fork(2)
for an indefinite amount of time (and will, if this causes network
access, or similar).

By recording the start_time late, it much closer reflects the point in
time where the process becomes live and can be observed by other
processes.

Lastly, this makes it much harder for user-space to predict and control
the start_time they get assigned.  Previously, user-space could fork a
process and stall it in copy_thread_tls() before its pid is allocated,
but after its start_time is recorded.  This can be misused to later-on
cycle through PIDs and resume the stalled fork(2) yielding a process
that has the same pid and start_time as a process that existed before.
This can be used to circumvent security systems that identify processes
by their pid+start_time combination.

Even though user-space was always aware that start_time recording is
flaky (but several projects are known to still rely on start_time-based
identification), changing the start_time to be recorded late will help
mitigate existing attacks and make it much harder for user-space to
control the start_time a process gets assigned.

Reported-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tom Gundersen &lt;teg@jklm.no&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann &lt;dh.herrmann@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kthread: Fix use-after-free if kthread fork fails</title>
<updated>2018-09-26T06:33:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vegard Nossum</name>
<email>vegard.nossum@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-09T07:39:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3fb2459d90e34356f47fd6810f1ee1e1ed21b446'/>
<id>3fb2459d90e34356f47fd6810f1ee1e1ed21b446</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4d6501dce079c1eb6bf0b1d8f528a5e81770109e upstream.

If a kthread forks (e.g. usermodehelper since commit 1da5c46fa965) but
fails in copy_process() between calling dup_task_struct() and setting
p-&gt;set_child_tid, then the value of p-&gt;set_child_tid will be inherited
from the parent and get prematurely freed by free_kthread_struct().

    kthread()
     - worker_thread()
        - process_one_work()
        |  - call_usermodehelper_exec_work()
        |     - kernel_thread()
        |        - _do_fork()
        |           - copy_process()
        |              - dup_task_struct()
        |                 - arch_dup_task_struct()
        |                    - tsk-&gt;set_child_tid = current-&gt;set_child_tid // implied
        |              - ...
        |              - goto bad_fork_*
        |              - ...
        |              - free_task(tsk)
        |                 - free_kthread_struct(tsk)
        |                    - kfree(tsk-&gt;set_child_tid)
        - ...
        - schedule()
           - __schedule()
              - wq_worker_sleeping()
                 - kthread_data(task)-&gt;flags // UAF

The problem started showing up with commit 1da5c46fa965 since it reused
-&gt;set_child_tid for the kthread worker data.

A better long-term solution might be to get rid of the -&gt;set_child_tid
abuse. The comment in set_kthread_struct() also looks slightly wrong.

Debugged-by: Jamie Iles &lt;jamie.iles@oracle.com&gt;
Fixes: 1da5c46fa965 ("kthread: Make struct kthread kmalloc'ed")
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jamie Iles &lt;jamie.iles@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170509073959.17858-1-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir &lt;amit.pundir@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4d6501dce079c1eb6bf0b1d8f528a5e81770109e upstream.

If a kthread forks (e.g. usermodehelper since commit 1da5c46fa965) but
fails in copy_process() between calling dup_task_struct() and setting
p-&gt;set_child_tid, then the value of p-&gt;set_child_tid will be inherited
from the parent and get prematurely freed by free_kthread_struct().

    kthread()
     - worker_thread()
        - process_one_work()
        |  - call_usermodehelper_exec_work()
        |     - kernel_thread()
        |        - _do_fork()
        |           - copy_process()
        |              - dup_task_struct()
        |                 - arch_dup_task_struct()
        |                    - tsk-&gt;set_child_tid = current-&gt;set_child_tid // implied
        |              - ...
        |              - goto bad_fork_*
        |              - ...
        |              - free_task(tsk)
        |                 - free_kthread_struct(tsk)
        |                    - kfree(tsk-&gt;set_child_tid)
        - ...
        - schedule()
           - __schedule()
              - wq_worker_sleeping()
                 - kthread_data(task)-&gt;flags // UAF

The problem started showing up with commit 1da5c46fa965 since it reused
-&gt;set_child_tid for the kthread worker data.

A better long-term solution might be to get rid of the -&gt;set_child_tid
abuse. The comment in set_kthread_struct() also looks slightly wrong.

Debugged-by: Jamie Iles &lt;jamie.iles@oracle.com&gt;
Fixes: 1da5c46fa965 ("kthread: Make struct kthread kmalloc'ed")
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jamie Iles &lt;jamie.iles@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170509073959.17858-1-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir &lt;amit.pundir@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fork: don't copy inconsistent signal handler state to child</title>
<updated>2018-09-26T06:33:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-22T05:00:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5d1346a118342d26e3b9ae03ee7f3b1bbf734b42'/>
<id>5d1346a118342d26e3b9ae03ee7f3b1bbf734b42</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 06e62a46bbba20aa5286102016a04214bb446141 ]

Before this change, if a multithreaded process forks while one of its
threads is changing a signal handler using sigaction(), the memcpy() in
copy_sighand() can race with the struct assignment in do_sigaction().  It
isn't clear whether this can cause corruption of the userspace signal
handler pointer, but it definitely can cause inconsistency between
different fields of struct sigaction.

Take the appropriate spinlock to avoid this.

I have tested that this patch prevents inconsistency between sa_sigaction
and sa_flags, which is possible before this patch.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180702145108.73189-1-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 06e62a46bbba20aa5286102016a04214bb446141 ]

Before this change, if a multithreaded process forks while one of its
threads is changing a signal handler using sigaction(), the memcpy() in
copy_sighand() can race with the struct assignment in do_sigaction().  It
isn't clear whether this can cause corruption of the userspace signal
handler pointer, but it definitely can cause inconsistency between
different fields of struct sigaction.

Take the appropriate spinlock to avoid this.

I have tested that this patch prevents inconsistency between sa_sigaction
and sa_flags, which is possible before this patch.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180702145108.73189-1-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canary's random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit platforms</title>
<updated>2017-06-14T10:54:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Micay</name>
<email>danielmicay@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-04T13:32:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=74d7dce0243947af84f1c0b70afb709b02f922ad'/>
<id>74d7dce0243947af84f1c0b70afb709b02f922ad</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5ea30e4e58040cfd6434c2f33dc3ea76e2c15b05 upstream.

The stack canary is an 'unsigned long' and should be fully initialized to
random data rather than only 32 bits of random data.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay &lt;danielmicay@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Arjan van Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170504133209.3053-1-danielmicay@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5ea30e4e58040cfd6434c2f33dc3ea76e2c15b05 upstream.

The stack canary is an 'unsigned long' and should be fully initialized to
random data rather than only 32 bits of random data.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay &lt;danielmicay@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Arjan van Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170504133209.3053-1-danielmicay@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canary's random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit platforms"</title>
<updated>2017-06-07T10:01:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-27T10:09:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2bc281ebacf969770597fad415547016f0457b53'/>
<id>2bc281ebacf969770597fad415547016f0457b53</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit 609a3e81550b0b4ea87197b0f59455a7bcff975a which is
commit 5ea30e4e58040cfd6434c2f33dc3ea76e2c15b05 upstream.

It shouldn't have been backported to 3.18, as we do not have
get_random_long() in that kernel tree.

Reported-by: Philip Müller &lt;philm@manjaro.org&gt;
Cc: Daniel Micay &lt;danielmicay@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Arjan van Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This reverts commit 609a3e81550b0b4ea87197b0f59455a7bcff975a which is
commit 5ea30e4e58040cfd6434c2f33dc3ea76e2c15b05 upstream.

It shouldn't have been backported to 3.18, as we do not have
get_random_long() in that kernel tree.

Reported-by: Philip Müller &lt;philm@manjaro.org&gt;
Cc: Daniel Micay &lt;danielmicay@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Arjan van Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canary's random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit platforms</title>
<updated>2017-05-25T12:18:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Micay</name>
<email>danielmicay@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-04T13:32:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=609a3e81550b0b4ea87197b0f59455a7bcff975a'/>
<id>609a3e81550b0b4ea87197b0f59455a7bcff975a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5ea30e4e58040cfd6434c2f33dc3ea76e2c15b05 upstream.

The stack canary is an 'unsigned long' and should be fully initialized to
random data rather than only 32 bits of random data.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay &lt;danielmicay@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Arjan van Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170504133209.3053-1-danielmicay@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5ea30e4e58040cfd6434c2f33dc3ea76e2c15b05 upstream.

The stack canary is an 'unsigned long' and should be fully initialized to
random data rather than only 32 bits of random data.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay &lt;danielmicay@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Arjan van Ven &lt;arjan@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170504133209.3053-1-danielmicay@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>unshare: Unsharing a thread does not require unsharing a vm</title>
<updated>2015-10-07T14:03:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-10T22:35:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e12419a52e738fb967e2c721ae5bf7df47e7840b'/>
<id>e12419a52e738fb967e2c721ae5bf7df47e7840b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 12c641ab8270f787dfcce08b5f20ce8b65008096 ]

In the logic in the initial commit of unshare made creating a new
thread group for a process, contingent upon creating a new memory
address space for that process.  That is wrong.  Two separate
processes in different thread groups can share a memory address space
and clone allows creation of such proceses.

This is significant because it was observed that mm_users &gt; 1 does not
mean that a process is multi-threaded, as reading /proc/PID/maps
temporarily increments mm_users, which allows other processes to
(accidentally) interfere with unshare() calls.

Correct the check in check_unshare_flags() to test for
!thread_group_empty() for CLONE_THREAD, CLONE_SIGHAND, and CLONE_VM.
For sighand-&gt;count &gt; 1 for CLONE_SIGHAND and CLONE_VM.
For !current_is_single_threaded instead of mm_users &gt; 1 for CLONE_VM.

By using the correct checks in unshare this removes the possibility of
an accidental denial of service attack.

Additionally using the correct checks in unshare ensures that only an
explicit unshare(CLONE_VM) can possibly trigger the slow path of
current_is_single_threaded().  As an explict unshare(CLONE_VM) is
pointless it is not expected there are many applications that make
that call.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b2e0d98705e60e45bbb3c0032c48824ad7ae0704 userns: Implement unshare of the user namespace
Reported-by: Ricky Zhou &lt;rickyz@chromium.org&gt;
Reported-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 12c641ab8270f787dfcce08b5f20ce8b65008096 ]

In the logic in the initial commit of unshare made creating a new
thread group for a process, contingent upon creating a new memory
address space for that process.  That is wrong.  Two separate
processes in different thread groups can share a memory address space
and clone allows creation of such proceses.

This is significant because it was observed that mm_users &gt; 1 does not
mean that a process is multi-threaded, as reading /proc/PID/maps
temporarily increments mm_users, which allows other processes to
(accidentally) interfere with unshare() calls.

Correct the check in check_unshare_flags() to test for
!thread_group_empty() for CLONE_THREAD, CLONE_SIGHAND, and CLONE_VM.
For sighand-&gt;count &gt; 1 for CLONE_SIGHAND and CLONE_VM.
For !current_is_single_threaded instead of mm_users &gt; 1 for CLONE_VM.

By using the correct checks in unshare this removes the possibility of
an accidental denial of service attack.

Additionally using the correct checks in unshare ensures that only an
explicit unshare(CLONE_VM) can possibly trigger the slow path of
current_is_single_threaded().  As an explict unshare(CLONE_VM) is
pointless it is not expected there are many applications that make
that call.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b2e0d98705e60e45bbb3c0032c48824ad7ae0704 userns: Implement unshare of the user namespace
Reported-by: Ricky Zhou &lt;rickyz@chromium.org&gt;
Reported-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2014-10-13T14:23:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-13T14:23:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=faafcba3b5e15999cf75d5c5a513ac8e47e2545f'/>
<id>faafcba3b5e15999cf75d5c5a513ac8e47e2545f</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull scheduler updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "The main changes in this cycle were:

   - Optimized support for Intel "Cluster-on-Die" (CoD) topologies (Dave
     Hansen)

   - Various sched/idle refinements for better idle handling (Nicolas
     Pitre, Daniel Lezcano, Chuansheng Liu, Vincent Guittot)

   - sched/numa updates and optimizations (Rik van Riel)

   - sysbench speedup (Vincent Guittot)

   - capacity calculation cleanups/refactoring (Vincent Guittot)

   - Various cleanups to thread group iteration (Oleg Nesterov)

   - Double-rq-lock removal optimization and various refactorings
     (Kirill Tkhai)

   - various sched/deadline fixes

  ... and lots of other changes"

* 'sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (72 commits)
  sched/dl: Use dl_bw_of() under rcu_read_lock_sched()
  sched/fair: Delete resched_cpu() from idle_balance()
  sched, time: Fix build error with 64 bit cputime_t on 32 bit systems
  sched: Improve sysbench performance by fixing spurious active migration
  sched/x86: Fix up typo in topology detection
  x86, sched: Add new topology for multi-NUMA-node CPUs
  sched/rt: Use resched_curr() in task_tick_rt()
  sched: Use rq-&gt;rd in sched_setaffinity() under RCU read lock
  sched: cleanup: Rename 'out_unlock' to 'out_free_new_mask'
  sched: Use dl_bw_of() under RCU read lock
  sched/fair: Remove duplicate code from can_migrate_task()
  sched, mips, ia64: Remove __ARCH_WANT_UNLOCKED_CTXSW
  sched: print_rq(): Don't use tasklist_lock
  sched: normalize_rt_tasks(): Don't use _irqsave for tasklist_lock, use task_rq_lock()
  sched: Fix the task-group check in tg_has_rt_tasks()
  sched/fair: Leverage the idle state info when choosing the "idlest" cpu
  sched: Let the scheduler see CPU idle states
  sched/deadline: Fix inter- exclusive cpusets migrations
  sched/deadline: Clear dl_entity params when setscheduling to different class
  sched/numa: Kill the wrong/dead TASK_DEAD check in task_numa_fault()
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull scheduler updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "The main changes in this cycle were:

   - Optimized support for Intel "Cluster-on-Die" (CoD) topologies (Dave
     Hansen)

   - Various sched/idle refinements for better idle handling (Nicolas
     Pitre, Daniel Lezcano, Chuansheng Liu, Vincent Guittot)

   - sched/numa updates and optimizations (Rik van Riel)

   - sysbench speedup (Vincent Guittot)

   - capacity calculation cleanups/refactoring (Vincent Guittot)

   - Various cleanups to thread group iteration (Oleg Nesterov)

   - Double-rq-lock removal optimization and various refactorings
     (Kirill Tkhai)

   - various sched/deadline fixes

  ... and lots of other changes"

* 'sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (72 commits)
  sched/dl: Use dl_bw_of() under rcu_read_lock_sched()
  sched/fair: Delete resched_cpu() from idle_balance()
  sched, time: Fix build error with 64 bit cputime_t on 32 bit systems
  sched: Improve sysbench performance by fixing spurious active migration
  sched/x86: Fix up typo in topology detection
  x86, sched: Add new topology for multi-NUMA-node CPUs
  sched/rt: Use resched_curr() in task_tick_rt()
  sched: Use rq-&gt;rd in sched_setaffinity() under RCU read lock
  sched: cleanup: Rename 'out_unlock' to 'out_free_new_mask'
  sched: Use dl_bw_of() under RCU read lock
  sched/fair: Remove duplicate code from can_migrate_task()
  sched, mips, ia64: Remove __ARCH_WANT_UNLOCKED_CTXSW
  sched: print_rq(): Don't use tasklist_lock
  sched: normalize_rt_tasks(): Don't use _irqsave for tasklist_lock, use task_rq_lock()
  sched: Fix the task-group check in tg_has_rt_tasks()
  sched/fair: Leverage the idle state info when choosing the "idlest" cpu
  sched: Let the scheduler see CPU idle states
  sched/deadline: Fix inter- exclusive cpusets migrations
  sched/deadline: Clear dl_entity params when setscheduling to different class
  sched/numa: Kill the wrong/dead TASK_DEAD check in task_numa_fault()
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: use VM_BUG_ON_MM where possible</title>
<updated>2014-10-10T02:25:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sasha Levin</name>
<email>sasha.levin@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-09T22:28:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=96dad67ff244e797c4bc3e4f7f0fdaa0cfdf0a7d'/>
<id>96dad67ff244e797c4bc3e4f7f0fdaa0cfdf0a7d</id>
<content type='text'>
Dump the contents of the relevant struct_mm when we hit the bug condition.

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Dump the contents of the relevant struct_mm when we hit the bug condition.

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: fix perf bug in fork()</title>
<updated>2014-10-02T23:28:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-02T23:17:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6c72e3501d0d62fc064d3680e5234f3463ec5a86'/>
<id>6c72e3501d0d62fc064d3680e5234f3463ec5a86</id>
<content type='text'>
Oleg noticed that a cleanup by Sylvain actually uncovered a bug; by
calling perf_event_free_task() when failing sched_fork() we will not yet
have done the memset() on -&gt;perf_event_ctxp[] and will therefore try and
'free' the inherited contexts, which are still in use by the parent
process.  This is bad..

Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Sylvain 'ythier' Hitier &lt;sylvain.hitier@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Oleg noticed that a cleanup by Sylvain actually uncovered a bug; by
calling perf_event_free_task() when failing sched_fork() we will not yet
have done the memset() on -&gt;perf_event_ctxp[] and will therefore try and
'free' the inherited contexts, which are still in use by the parent
process.  This is bad..

Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Sylvain 'ythier' Hitier &lt;sylvain.hitier@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
