<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel/events/core.c, branch v6.18.50</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>perf: Reject exited events as group leaders</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:27:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kyle Zeng</name>
<email>kylebot@openai.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-06T20:56:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7a03413f31c196ab3894f988cdce0bb47b4fec42'/>
<id>7a03413f31c196ab3894f988cdce0bb47b4fec42</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fa091f46c3833fb22384f10eade2b4e1e1d0b278 ]

perf_event_remove_on_exec() sets remove-on-exec events to the EXIT state
and detaches their group relationships.  The event's file descriptor can
remain open, however, and perf_event_open() currently accepts that event
as a group leader because its early validation rejects only REVOKED and
DEAD events.

A new sibling can consequently be linked to the detached leader.  When
the leader is closed, perf_group_detach() observes that its
PERF_ATTACH_GROUP bit is already clear and skips the new sibling.  The
sibling then retains a group_leader pointer to the freed event.

Reject group leaders in the EXIT state.  Perform the check while holding
the shared context mutex so that an exec in the target task cannot detach
the leader between validation and group attachment.

[peterz: make the earlier test fully consistent]
Fixes: 037a3c43edfb ("perf/core: Detach event groups during remove_on_exec")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng &lt;kylebot@openai.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806205655.75722-1-kylebot@openai.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit fa091f46c3833fb22384f10eade2b4e1e1d0b278 ]

perf_event_remove_on_exec() sets remove-on-exec events to the EXIT state
and detaches their group relationships.  The event's file descriptor can
remain open, however, and perf_event_open() currently accepts that event
as a group leader because its early validation rejects only REVOKED and
DEAD events.

A new sibling can consequently be linked to the detached leader.  When
the leader is closed, perf_group_detach() observes that its
PERF_ATTACH_GROUP bit is already clear and skips the new sibling.  The
sibling then retains a group_leader pointer to the freed event.

Reject group leaders in the EXIT state.  Perform the check while holding
the shared context mutex so that an exec in the target task cannot detach
the leader between validation and group attachment.

[peterz: make the earlier test fully consistent]
Fixes: 037a3c43edfb ("perf/core: Detach event groups during remove_on_exec")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng &lt;kylebot@openai.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806205655.75722-1-kylebot@openai.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Fix group leader use-after-free after sibling detach</title>
<updated>2026-08-19T16:18:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Aditya Chillara</name>
<email>aditya.chillara@oss.qualcomm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-07T12:41:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a979a642402d0b1f856c7a729b4cb2d92de4cf2f'/>
<id>a979a642402d0b1f856c7a729b4cb2d92de4cf2f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 42c5ca1f0a288a52878bd72a5595b08261057438 upstream.

perf_group_detach() handles leader and sibling detach differently. When the
group leader is detached, all siblings are promoted to singleton events and
their group_leader pointer is reset to themselves. When a sibling is
detached, it is removed from the leader's sibling_list, but its
group_leader pointer is left pointing at the old leader.

That is harmless when the sibling is being closed and freed immediately, as
in the DETACH_DEAD path. It is not safe when the sibling is detached but
kept alive, such as during CPU hotplug with DETACH_GROUP. In that case the
sibling is removed from the context, while its file descriptor can still
keep it alive.

A typical failing sequence is:

  - A group contains leader L and sibling S.
  - CPU hot-unplug detaches S with DETACH_GROUP, removing it from
    L-&gt;sibling_list but leaving S-&gt;group_leader == L.
  - L is later closed and freed.
  - A PERF_IOC_FLAG_GROUP ioctl on S follows S-&gt;group_leader and
    dereferences the freed leader.

This was reproduced by running the perf event fuzzer, CPU hotplug, and a
stress workload concurrently:

  Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 006b6b6b6b6b6cdb
  CPU: 2 PID: 12489 Comm: perf_fuzzer 6.18.7 PREEMPT
  pc : perf_ioctl+0x34c/0xc68
  x20: ffffff89a3fa2c70 x8 : 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b
  Code: 943c4a0e 340047a0 f9404a94 f9411e88 (f940b908)
  Call trace:
  perf_ioctl+0x34c/0xc68 (P)
  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa0/0xf4
  invoke_syscall+0x58/0xe4
  el0_svc_common+0xa8/0xdc
  do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
  el0_svc+0x40/0xc0
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xdc
  el0t_64_sync+0x1c4/0x1c8

The fault happened in perf_ioctl(), where perf_event_for_each() follows
the stale group_leader pointer and perf_event_for_each_child() then
dereferences the freed leader's context.

Fix the use-after-free by promoting the detached sibling to a singleton.
Also fix __event_disable() cgroup accounting and event state change.

Fixes: 8a49542c0554 ("perf_events: Fix races in group composition")
Assisted-by: PatchWise:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Aditya Chillara &lt;aditya.chillara@oss.qualcomm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi &lt;dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807-fix-group-leader-uaf-v3-1-b0c2310c9a0d@oss.qualcomm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 42c5ca1f0a288a52878bd72a5595b08261057438 upstream.

perf_group_detach() handles leader and sibling detach differently. When the
group leader is detached, all siblings are promoted to singleton events and
their group_leader pointer is reset to themselves. When a sibling is
detached, it is removed from the leader's sibling_list, but its
group_leader pointer is left pointing at the old leader.

That is harmless when the sibling is being closed and freed immediately, as
in the DETACH_DEAD path. It is not safe when the sibling is detached but
kept alive, such as during CPU hotplug with DETACH_GROUP. In that case the
sibling is removed from the context, while its file descriptor can still
keep it alive.

A typical failing sequence is:

  - A group contains leader L and sibling S.
  - CPU hot-unplug detaches S with DETACH_GROUP, removing it from
    L-&gt;sibling_list but leaving S-&gt;group_leader == L.
  - L is later closed and freed.
  - A PERF_IOC_FLAG_GROUP ioctl on S follows S-&gt;group_leader and
    dereferences the freed leader.

This was reproduced by running the perf event fuzzer, CPU hotplug, and a
stress workload concurrently:

  Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 006b6b6b6b6b6cdb
  CPU: 2 PID: 12489 Comm: perf_fuzzer 6.18.7 PREEMPT
  pc : perf_ioctl+0x34c/0xc68
  x20: ffffff89a3fa2c70 x8 : 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b
  Code: 943c4a0e 340047a0 f9404a94 f9411e88 (f940b908)
  Call trace:
  perf_ioctl+0x34c/0xc68 (P)
  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa0/0xf4
  invoke_syscall+0x58/0xe4
  el0_svc_common+0xa8/0xdc
  do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
  el0_svc+0x40/0xc0
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xdc
  el0t_64_sync+0x1c4/0x1c8

The fault happened in perf_ioctl(), where perf_event_for_each() follows
the stale group_leader pointer and perf_event_for_each_child() then
dereferences the freed leader's context.

Fix the use-after-free by promoting the detached sibling to a singleton.
Also fix __event_disable() cgroup accounting and event state change.

Fixes: 8a49542c0554 ("perf_events: Fix races in group composition")
Assisted-by: PatchWise:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Aditya Chillara &lt;aditya.chillara@oss.qualcomm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi &lt;dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807-fix-group-leader-uaf-v3-1-b0c2310c9a0d@oss.qualcomm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/aux: Fix page UAF in map_range()</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:53:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lee Jia Jie</name>
<email>jiajie.lee@starlabs.sg</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-09T13:56:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c8b7e113f7b61eef2f017e6329c27c2331058c5a'/>
<id>c8b7e113f7b61eef2f017e6329c27c2331058c5a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5948aaf64f81f217a25dcc2bf6c0779bca19566c upstream.

map_range() reads rb-&gt;aux_pages[], rb-&gt;aux_nr_pages and rb-&gt;aux_pgoff via
perf_mmap_to_page() while holding only event-&gt;mmap_mutex. Those fields are
serialized by rb-&gt;aux_mutex, and mmap_mutex is per event.

Thus, two events sharing one rb via PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_OUTPUT can race
rb_alloc_aux() with map_range(), leading to a page-UAF scenario as follows:

  CPU 0                           CPU 1
  =====                           =====
  rb_alloc_aux()                  map_range()
  [1]: allocate rb-&gt;aux_pages[0]
  [2]: rb-&gt;aux_nr_pages++
                                  [3]: perf_mmap_to_page()
                                         returns rb-&gt;aux_pages[0]
                                  [4]: map it as VM_PFNMAP
  [5]: rb-&gt;aux_pgoff = 1

  munmap the page
  [6]: free rb-&gt;aux_pages[0]

Pages mapped as VM_PFNMAP have no refcount protection, so CPU 1 holds a
mapping to a freed physical frame.

Fix this by taking rb-&gt;aux_mutex across the page walk in map_range().

Fixes: b709eb872e19 ("perf: map pages in advance")
Signed-off-by: Lee Jia Jie &lt;jiajie.lee@starlabs.sg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5948aaf64f81f217a25dcc2bf6c0779bca19566c upstream.

map_range() reads rb-&gt;aux_pages[], rb-&gt;aux_nr_pages and rb-&gt;aux_pgoff via
perf_mmap_to_page() while holding only event-&gt;mmap_mutex. Those fields are
serialized by rb-&gt;aux_mutex, and mmap_mutex is per event.

Thus, two events sharing one rb via PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_OUTPUT can race
rb_alloc_aux() with map_range(), leading to a page-UAF scenario as follows:

  CPU 0                           CPU 1
  =====                           =====
  rb_alloc_aux()                  map_range()
  [1]: allocate rb-&gt;aux_pages[0]
  [2]: rb-&gt;aux_nr_pages++
                                  [3]: perf_mmap_to_page()
                                         returns rb-&gt;aux_pages[0]
                                  [4]: map it as VM_PFNMAP
  [5]: rb-&gt;aux_pgoff = 1

  munmap the page
  [6]: free rb-&gt;aux_pages[0]

Pages mapped as VM_PFNMAP have no refcount protection, so CPU 1 holds a
mapping to a freed physical frame.

Fix this by taking rb-&gt;aux_mutex across the page walk in map_range().

Fixes: b709eb872e19 ("perf: map pages in advance")
Signed-off-by: Lee Jia Jie &lt;jiajie.lee@starlabs.sg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Detach event groups during remove_on_exec</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:53:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Taeyang Lee</name>
<email>0wn@theori.io</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-14T14:22:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a2d5d3ee7b6e3953114726b1521e62123ab5b043'/>
<id>a2d5d3ee7b6e3953114726b1521e62123ab5b043</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 037a3c43edfb597665dd34457cd22b14692f2ba3 ]

perf_event_remove_on_exec() removes events by calling
perf_event_exit_event(). For top-level events, this removes the event from
the context with DETACH_EXIT only.

This can leave inconsistent group state when a removed event is a group
leader and the group contains siblings without remove_on_exec. If the group
was active, the surviving siblings can remain active and attached to the
removed leader's sibling list, but are no longer represented by a valid
group leader on the PMU context active lists.

A later close of the removed leader uses DETACH_GROUP and can promote the
still-active siblings from this stale group state. The next schedule-in can
then add an already-linked active_list entry again, corrupting the PMU
context active list.

With DEBUG_LIST enabled, this is caught as a list_add double-add in
merge_sched_in().

Fix this by detaching group relationships when remove_on_exec removes an
event. This preserves the existing task-exit and revoke behavior, while
ensuring surviving siblings are ungrouped before the removed event leaves
the context.

Fixes: 2e498d0a74e5 ("perf: Add support for event removal on exec")
Signed-off-by: Taeyang Lee &lt;0wn@theori.io&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ai65GgZcC0LAlWLG@Taeyangs-MacBook-Pro.local
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 037a3c43edfb597665dd34457cd22b14692f2ba3 ]

perf_event_remove_on_exec() removes events by calling
perf_event_exit_event(). For top-level events, this removes the event from
the context with DETACH_EXIT only.

This can leave inconsistent group state when a removed event is a group
leader and the group contains siblings without remove_on_exec. If the group
was active, the surviving siblings can remain active and attached to the
removed leader's sibling list, but are no longer represented by a valid
group leader on the PMU context active lists.

A later close of the removed leader uses DETACH_GROUP and can promote the
still-active siblings from this stale group state. The next schedule-in can
then add an already-linked active_list entry again, corrupting the PMU
context active list.

With DEBUG_LIST enabled, this is caught as a list_add double-add in
merge_sched_in().

Fix this by detaching group relationships when remove_on_exec removes an
event. This preserves the existing task-exit and revoke behavior, while
ensuring surviving siblings are ungrouped before the removed event leaves
the context.

Fixes: 2e498d0a74e5 ("perf: Add support for event removal on exec")
Signed-off-by: Taeyang Lee &lt;0wn@theori.io&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ai65GgZcC0LAlWLG@Taeyangs-MacBook-Pro.local
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Make sure to use pmu_ctx-&gt;pmu for groups</title>
<updated>2026-04-02T11:22:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-09T12:55:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=35f7914e54fe7f13654c22ee045b05e4b6d8062b'/>
<id>35f7914e54fe7f13654c22ee045b05e4b6d8062b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4b9ce671960627b2505b3f64742544ae9801df97 ]

Oliver reported that x86_pmu_del() ended up doing an out-of-bound memory access
when group_sched_in() fails and needs to roll back.

This *should* be handled by the transaction callbacks, but he found that when
the group leader is a software event, the transaction handlers of the wrong PMU
are used. Despite the move_group case in perf_event_open() and group_sched_in()
using pmu_ctx-&gt;pmu.

Turns out, inherit uses event-&gt;pmu to clone the events, effectively undoing the
move_group case for all inherited contexts. Fix this by also making inherit use
pmu_ctx-&gt;pmu, ensuring all inherited counters end up in the same pmu context.

Similarly, __perf_event_read() should use equally use pmu_ctx-&gt;pmu for the
group case.

Fixes: bd2756811766 ("perf: Rewrite core context handling")
Reported-by: Oliver Rosenberg &lt;olrose55@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers &lt;irogers@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260309133713.GB606826@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4b9ce671960627b2505b3f64742544ae9801df97 ]

Oliver reported that x86_pmu_del() ended up doing an out-of-bound memory access
when group_sched_in() fails and needs to roll back.

This *should* be handled by the transaction callbacks, but he found that when
the group leader is a software event, the transaction handlers of the wrong PMU
are used. Despite the move_group case in perf_event_open() and group_sched_in()
using pmu_ctx-&gt;pmu.

Turns out, inherit uses event-&gt;pmu to clone the events, effectively undoing the
move_group case for all inherited contexts. Fix this by also making inherit use
pmu_ctx-&gt;pmu, ensuring all inherited counters end up in the same pmu context.

Similarly, __perf_event_read() should use equally use pmu_ctx-&gt;pmu for the
group case.

Fixes: bd2756811766 ("perf: Rewrite core context handling")
Reported-by: Oliver Rosenberg &lt;olrose55@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers &lt;irogers@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260309133713.GB606826@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Fix __perf_event_overflow() vs perf_remove_from_context() race</title>
<updated>2026-03-12T11:09:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-24T12:29:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3f89b61dd504c5b6711de9759e053b082f9abf12'/>
<id>3f89b61dd504c5b6711de9759e053b082f9abf12</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c9bc1753b3cc41d0e01fbca7f035258b5f4db0ae ]

Make sure that __perf_event_overflow() runs with IRQs disabled for all
possible callchains. Specifically the software events can end up running
it with only preemption disabled.

This opens up a race vs perf_event_exit_event() and friends that will go
and free various things the overflow path expects to be present, like
the BPF program.

Fixes: 592903cdcbf6 ("perf_counter: add an event_list")
Reported-by: Simond Hu &lt;cmdhh1767@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Tested-by: Simond Hu &lt;cmdhh1767@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260224122909.GV1395416@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c9bc1753b3cc41d0e01fbca7f035258b5f4db0ae ]

Make sure that __perf_event_overflow() runs with IRQs disabled for all
possible callchains. Specifically the software events can end up running
it with only preemption disabled.

This opens up a race vs perf_event_exit_event() and friends that will go
and free various things the overflow path expects to be present, like
the BPF program.

Fixes: 592903cdcbf6 ("perf_counter: add an event_list")
Reported-by: Simond Hu &lt;cmdhh1767@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Tested-by: Simond Hu &lt;cmdhh1767@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260224122909.GV1395416@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Fix invalid wait context in ctx_sched_in()</title>
<updated>2026-03-12T11:09:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Namhyung Kim</name>
<email>namhyung@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-03T04:51:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c67ab059953e3b66cb17ddd6524c23f9e1f6526d'/>
<id>c67ab059953e3b66cb17ddd6524c23f9e1f6526d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 486ff5ad49bc50315bcaf6d45f04a33ef0a45ced ]

Lockdep found a bug in the event scheduling when a pinned event was
failed and wakes up the threads in the ring buffer like below.

It seems it should not grab a wait-queue lock under perf-context lock.
Let's do it with irq_work.

  [   39.913691] =============================
  [   39.914157] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
  [   39.914623] 6.15.0-next-20250530-next-2025053 #1 Not tainted
  [   39.915271] -----------------------------
  [   39.915731] repro/837 is trying to lock:
  [   39.916191] ffff88801acfabd8 (&amp;event-&gt;waitq){....}-{3:3}, at: __wake_up+0x26/0x60
  [   39.917182] other info that might help us debug this:
  [   39.917761] context-{5:5}
  [   39.918079] 4 locks held by repro/837:
  [   39.918530]  #0: ffffffff8725cd00 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __perf_event_task_sched_in+0xd1/0xbc0
  [   39.919612]  #1: ffff88806ca3c6f8 (&amp;cpuctx_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: __perf_event_task_sched_in+0x1a7/0xbc0
  [   39.920748]  #2: ffff88800d91fc18 (&amp;ctx-&gt;lock){....}-{2:2}, at: __perf_event_task_sched_in+0x1f9/0xbc0
  [   39.921819]  #3: ffffffff8725cd00 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: perf_event_wakeup+0x6c/0x470

Fixes: f4b07fd62d4d ("perf/core: Use POLLHUP for a pinned event in error")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/aD2w50VDvGIH95Pf@ly-workstation
Reported-by: "Lai, Yi" &lt;yi1.lai@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Tested-by: "Lai, Yi" &lt;yi1.lai@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250603045105.1731451-1-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 486ff5ad49bc50315bcaf6d45f04a33ef0a45ced ]

Lockdep found a bug in the event scheduling when a pinned event was
failed and wakes up the threads in the ring buffer like below.

It seems it should not grab a wait-queue lock under perf-context lock.
Let's do it with irq_work.

  [   39.913691] =============================
  [   39.914157] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
  [   39.914623] 6.15.0-next-20250530-next-2025053 #1 Not tainted
  [   39.915271] -----------------------------
  [   39.915731] repro/837 is trying to lock:
  [   39.916191] ffff88801acfabd8 (&amp;event-&gt;waitq){....}-{3:3}, at: __wake_up+0x26/0x60
  [   39.917182] other info that might help us debug this:
  [   39.917761] context-{5:5}
  [   39.918079] 4 locks held by repro/837:
  [   39.918530]  #0: ffffffff8725cd00 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __perf_event_task_sched_in+0xd1/0xbc0
  [   39.919612]  #1: ffff88806ca3c6f8 (&amp;cpuctx_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: __perf_event_task_sched_in+0x1a7/0xbc0
  [   39.920748]  #2: ffff88800d91fc18 (&amp;ctx-&gt;lock){....}-{2:2}, at: __perf_event_task_sched_in+0x1f9/0xbc0
  [   39.921819]  #3: ffffffff8725cd00 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: perf_event_wakeup+0x6c/0x470

Fixes: f4b07fd62d4d ("perf/core: Use POLLHUP for a pinned event in error")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/aD2w50VDvGIH95Pf@ly-workstation
Reported-by: "Lai, Yi" &lt;yi1.lai@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Tested-by: "Lai, Yi" &lt;yi1.lai@linux.intel.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250603045105.1731451-1-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Fix refcount bug and potential UAF in perf_mmap</title>
<updated>2026-03-12T11:09:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Haocheng Yu</name>
<email>yuhaocheng035@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-02T16:20:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c27dea9f50ed525facb62ef647dddc4722456e07'/>
<id>c27dea9f50ed525facb62ef647dddc4722456e07</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 77de62ad3de3967818c3dbe656b7336ebee461d2 upstream.

Syzkaller reported a refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free warning
in perf_mmap.

The issue is caused by a race condition between a failing mmap() setup
and a concurrent mmap() on a dependent event (e.g., using output
redirection).

In perf_mmap(), the ring_buffer (rb) is allocated and assigned to
event-&gt;rb with the mmap_mutex held. The mutex is then released to
perform map_range().

If map_range() fails, perf_mmap_close() is called to clean up.
However, since the mutex was dropped, another thread attaching to
this event (via inherited events or output redirection) can acquire
the mutex, observe the valid event-&gt;rb pointer, and attempt to
increment its reference count. If the cleanup path has already
dropped the reference count to zero, this results in a
use-after-free or refcount saturation warning.

Fix this by extending the scope of mmap_mutex to cover the
map_range() call. This ensures that the ring buffer initialization
and mapping (or cleanup on failure) happens atomically effectively,
preventing other threads from accessing a half-initialized or
dying ring buffer.

Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202602020208.m7KIjdzW-lkp@intel.com/
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Haocheng Yu &lt;yuhaocheng035@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260202162057.7237-1-yuhaocheng035@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 77de62ad3de3967818c3dbe656b7336ebee461d2 upstream.

Syzkaller reported a refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free warning
in perf_mmap.

The issue is caused by a race condition between a failing mmap() setup
and a concurrent mmap() on a dependent event (e.g., using output
redirection).

In perf_mmap(), the ring_buffer (rb) is allocated and assigned to
event-&gt;rb with the mmap_mutex held. The mutex is then released to
perform map_range().

If map_range() fails, perf_mmap_close() is called to clean up.
However, since the mutex was dropped, another thread attaching to
this event (via inherited events or output redirection) can acquire
the mutex, observe the valid event-&gt;rb pointer, and attempt to
increment its reference count. If the cleanup path has already
dropped the reference count to zero, this results in a
use-after-free or refcount saturation warning.

Fix this by extending the scope of mmap_mutex to cover the
map_range() call. This ensures that the ring buffer initialization
and mapping (or cleanup on failure) happens atomically effectively,
preventing other threads from accessing a half-initialized or
dying ring buffer.

Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202602020208.m7KIjdzW-lkp@intel.com/
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Haocheng Yu &lt;yuhaocheng035@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260202162057.7237-1-yuhaocheng035@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Fix slow perf_event_task_exit() with LBR callstacks</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:19:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Namhyung Kim</name>
<email>namhyung@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-12T16:51:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e1886b473131b82b4c17abd0d186f03f0d64e4d1'/>
<id>e1886b473131b82b4c17abd0d186f03f0d64e4d1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4960626f956d63dce57f099016c2ecbe637a8229 ]

I got a report that a task is stuck in perf_event_exit_task() waiting
for global_ctx_data_rwsem.  On large systems with lots threads, it'd
have performance issues when it grabs the lock to iterate all threads
in the system to allocate the context data.

And it'd block task exit path which is problematic especially under
memory pressure.

  perf_event_open
    perf_event_alloc
      attach_perf_ctx_data
        attach_global_ctx_data
          percpu_down_write (global_ctx_data_rwsem)
            for_each_process_thread
              alloc_task_ctx_data
                                               do_exit
                                                 perf_event_exit_task
                                                   percpu_down_read (global_ctx_data_rwsem)

It should not hold the global_ctx_data_rwsem on the exit path.  Let's
skip allocation for exiting tasks and free the data carefully.

Reported-by: Rosalie Fang &lt;rosaliefang@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260112165157.1919624-1-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4960626f956d63dce57f099016c2ecbe637a8229 ]

I got a report that a task is stuck in perf_event_exit_task() waiting
for global_ctx_data_rwsem.  On large systems with lots threads, it'd
have performance issues when it grabs the lock to iterate all threads
in the system to allocate the context data.

And it'd block task exit path which is problematic especially under
memory pressure.

  perf_event_open
    perf_event_alloc
      attach_perf_ctx_data
        attach_global_ctx_data
          percpu_down_write (global_ctx_data_rwsem)
            for_each_process_thread
              alloc_task_ctx_data
                                               do_exit
                                                 perf_event_exit_task
                                                   percpu_down_read (global_ctx_data_rwsem)

It should not hold the global_ctx_data_rwsem on the exit path.  Let's
skip allocation for exiting tasks and free the data carefully.

Reported-by: Rosalie Fang &lt;rosaliefang@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260112165157.1919624-1-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: sched: Fix perf crash with new is_user_task() helper</title>
<updated>2026-02-06T15:57:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-29T15:28:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a28fce0365e1cb9cb8c04c893b9334e5ca9d9f1c'/>
<id>a28fce0365e1cb9cb8c04c893b9334e5ca9d9f1c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 76ed27608f7dd235b727ebbb12163438c2fbb617 upstream.

In order to do a user space stacktrace the current task needs to be a user
task that has executed in user space. It use to be possible to test if a
task is a user task or not by simply checking the task_struct mm field. If
it was non NULL, it was a user task and if not it was a kernel task.

But things have changed over time, and some kernel tasks now have their
own mm field.

An idea was made to instead test PF_KTHREAD and two functions were used to
wrap this check in case it became more complex to test if a task was a
user task or not[1]. But this was rejected and the C code simply checked
the PF_KTHREAD directly.

It was later found that not all kernel threads set PF_KTHREAD. The io-uring
helpers instead set PF_USER_WORKER and this needed to be added as well.

But checking the flags is still not enough. There's a very small window
when a task exits that it frees its mm field and it is set back to NULL.
If perf were to trigger at this moment, the flags test would say its a
user space task but when perf would read the mm field it would crash with
at NULL pointer dereference.

Now there are flags that can be used to test if a task is exiting, but
they are set in areas that perf may still want to profile the user space
task (to see where it exited). The only real test is to check both the
flags and the mm field.

Instead of making this modification in every location, create a new
is_user_task() helper function that does all the tests needed to know if
it is safe to read the user space memory or not.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250425204120.639530125@goodmis.org/

Fixes: 90942f9fac05 ("perf: Use current-&gt;flags &amp; PF_KTHREAD|PF_USER_WORKER instead of current-&gt;mm == NULL")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0d877e6f-41a7-4724-875d-0b0a27b8a545@roeck-us.net/
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260129102821.46484722@gandalf.local.home
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 76ed27608f7dd235b727ebbb12163438c2fbb617 upstream.

In order to do a user space stacktrace the current task needs to be a user
task that has executed in user space. It use to be possible to test if a
task is a user task or not by simply checking the task_struct mm field. If
it was non NULL, it was a user task and if not it was a kernel task.

But things have changed over time, and some kernel tasks now have their
own mm field.

An idea was made to instead test PF_KTHREAD and two functions were used to
wrap this check in case it became more complex to test if a task was a
user task or not[1]. But this was rejected and the C code simply checked
the PF_KTHREAD directly.

It was later found that not all kernel threads set PF_KTHREAD. The io-uring
helpers instead set PF_USER_WORKER and this needed to be added as well.

But checking the flags is still not enough. There's a very small window
when a task exits that it frees its mm field and it is set back to NULL.
If perf were to trigger at this moment, the flags test would say its a
user space task but when perf would read the mm field it would crash with
at NULL pointer dereference.

Now there are flags that can be used to test if a task is exiting, but
they are set in areas that perf may still want to profile the user space
task (to see where it exited). The only real test is to check both the
flags and the mm field.

Instead of making this modification in every location, create a new
is_user_task() helper function that does all the tests needed to know if
it is safe to read the user space memory or not.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250425204120.639530125@goodmis.org/

Fixes: 90942f9fac05 ("perf: Use current-&gt;flags &amp; PF_KTHREAD|PF_USER_WORKER instead of current-&gt;mm == NULL")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0d877e6f-41a7-4724-875d-0b0a27b8a545@roeck-us.net/
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260129102821.46484722@gandalf.local.home
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
