linux-stable.git/kernel/events/core.c, branch v5.4.97 Linux kernel stable tree exec: Transform exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore 2021-01-09T12:44:55+00:00 Eric W. Biederman ebiederm@xmission.com 2020-12-03T20:12:00+00:00 117433236ae296d9770442960ddf57459177e90e [ Upstream commit f7cfd871ae0c5008d94b6f66834e7845caa93c15 ] Recently syzbot reported[0] that there is a deadlock amongst the users of exec_update_mutex. The problematic lock ordering found by lockdep was: perf_event_open (exec_update_mutex -> ovl_i_mutex) chown (ovl_i_mutex -> sb_writes) sendfile (sb_writes -> p->lock) by reading from a proc file and writing to overlayfs proc_pid_syscall (p->lock -> exec_update_mutex) While looking at possible solutions it occured to me that all of the users and possible users involved only wanted to state of the given process to remain the same. They are all readers. The only writer is exec. There is no reason for readers to block on each other. So fix this deadlock by transforming exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore named exec_update_lock that only exec takes for writing. Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Christopher Yeoh <cyeoh@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Fixes: eea9673250db ("exec: Add exec_update_mutex to replace cred_guard_mutex") [0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/00000000000063640c05ade8e3de@google.com Reported-by: syzbot+db9cdf3dd1f64252c6ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87ft4mbqen.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit f7cfd871ae0c5008d94b6f66834e7845caa93c15 ]

Recently syzbot reported[0] that there is a deadlock amongst the users
of exec_update_mutex.  The problematic lock ordering found by lockdep
was:

   perf_event_open  (exec_update_mutex -> ovl_i_mutex)
   chown            (ovl_i_mutex       -> sb_writes)
   sendfile         (sb_writes         -> p->lock)
     by reading from a proc file and writing to overlayfs
   proc_pid_syscall (p->lock           -> exec_update_mutex)

While looking at possible solutions it occured to me that all of the
users and possible users involved only wanted to state of the given
process to remain the same.  They are all readers.  The only writer is
exec.

There is no reason for readers to block on each other.  So fix
this deadlock by transforming exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore
named exec_update_lock that only exec takes for writing.

Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Christopher Yeoh <cyeoh@au1.ibm.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Fixes: eea9673250db ("exec: Add exec_update_mutex to replace cred_guard_mutex")
[0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/00000000000063640c05ade8e3de@google.com
Reported-by: syzbot+db9cdf3dd1f64252c6ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87ft4mbqen.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
perf: Break deadlock involving exec_update_mutex 2021-01-09T12:44:54+00:00 peterz@infradead.org peterz@infradead.org 2020-08-28T12:37:20+00:00 71b8355ba667028557a88253096d6991a11abfba [ Upstream commit 78af4dc949daaa37b3fcd5f348f373085b4e858f ] Syzbot reported a lock inversion involving perf. The sore point being perf holding exec_update_mutex() for a very long time, specifically across a whole bunch of filesystem ops in pmu::event_init() (uprobes) and anon_inode_getfile(). This then inverts against procfs code trying to take exec_update_mutex. Move the permission checks later, such that we need to hold the mutex over less code. Reported-by: syzbot+db9cdf3dd1f64252c6ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 78af4dc949daaa37b3fcd5f348f373085b4e858f ]

Syzbot reported a lock inversion involving perf. The sore point being
perf holding exec_update_mutex() for a very long time, specifically
across a whole bunch of filesystem ops in pmu::event_init() (uprobes)
and anon_inode_getfile().

This then inverts against procfs code trying to take
exec_update_mutex.

Move the permission checks later, such that we need to hold the mutex
over less code.

Reported-by: syzbot+db9cdf3dd1f64252c6ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
perf/core: Fix race in the perf_mmap_close() function 2020-11-18T18:20:33+00:00 Jiri Olsa jolsa@redhat.com 2020-09-16T11:53:11+00:00 c5cf5c7b585c7f48195892e44b76237010c0747a commit f91072ed1b7283b13ca57fcfbece5a3b92726143 upstream. There's a possible race in perf_mmap_close() when checking ring buffer's mmap_count refcount value. The problem is that the mmap_count check is not atomic because we call atomic_dec() and atomic_read() separately. perf_mmap_close: ... atomic_dec(&rb->mmap_count); ... if (atomic_read(&rb->mmap_count)) goto out_put; <ring buffer detach> free_uid out_put: ring_buffer_put(rb); /* could be last */ The race can happen when we have two (or more) events sharing same ring buffer and they go through atomic_dec() and then they both see 0 as refcount value later in atomic_read(). Then both will go on and execute code which is meant to be run just once. The code that detaches ring buffer is probably fine to be executed more than once, but the problem is in calling free_uid(), which will later on demonstrate in related crashes and refcount warnings, like: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. ... RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x6d/0xf ... Call Trace: prepare_creds+0x190/0x1e0 copy_creds+0x35/0x172 copy_process+0x471/0x1a80 _do_fork+0x83/0x3a0 __do_sys_wait4+0x83/0x90 __do_sys_clone+0x85/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Using atomic decrease and check instead of separated calls. Tested-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Acked-by: Wade Mealing <wmealing@redhat.com> Fixes: 9bb5d40cd93c ("perf: Fix mmap() accounting hole"); Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916115311.GE2301783@krava [sudip: used ring_buffer] Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit f91072ed1b7283b13ca57fcfbece5a3b92726143 upstream.

There's a possible race in perf_mmap_close() when checking ring buffer's
mmap_count refcount value. The problem is that the mmap_count check is
not atomic because we call atomic_dec() and atomic_read() separately.

  perf_mmap_close:
  ...
   atomic_dec(&rb->mmap_count);
   ...
   if (atomic_read(&rb->mmap_count))
      goto out_put;

   <ring buffer detach>
   free_uid

out_put:
  ring_buffer_put(rb); /* could be last */

The race can happen when we have two (or more) events sharing same ring
buffer and they go through atomic_dec() and then they both see 0 as refcount
value later in atomic_read(). Then both will go on and execute code which
is meant to be run just once.

The code that detaches ring buffer is probably fine to be executed more
than once, but the problem is in calling free_uid(), which will later on
demonstrate in related crashes and refcount warnings, like:

  refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
  ...
  RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x6d/0xf
  ...
  Call Trace:
  prepare_creds+0x190/0x1e0
  copy_creds+0x35/0x172
  copy_process+0x471/0x1a80
  _do_fork+0x83/0x3a0
  __do_sys_wait4+0x83/0x90
  __do_sys_clone+0x85/0xa0
  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Using atomic decrease and check instead of separated calls.

Tested-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Wade Mealing <wmealing@redhat.com>
Fixes: 9bb5d40cd93c ("perf: Fix mmap() accounting hole");
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916115311.GE2301783@krava
[sudip: used ring_buffer]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
perf/core: Fix a memory leak in perf_event_parse_addr_filter() 2020-11-10T11:37:34+00:00 kiyin(尹亮) kiyin@tencent.com 2020-11-04T05:23:22+00:00 b7f7474b392194530d1ec07203c8668e81b7fdb9 commit 7bdb157cdebbf95a1cd94ed2e01b338714075d00 upstream. As shown through runtime testing, the "filename" allocation is not always freed in perf_event_parse_addr_filter(). There are three possible ways that this could happen: - It could be allocated twice on subsequent iterations through the loop, - or leaked on the success path, - or on the failure path. Clean up the code flow to make it obvious that 'filename' is always freed in the reallocation path and in the two return paths as well. We rely on the fact that kfree(NULL) is NOP and filename is initialized with NULL. This fixes the leak. No other side effects expected. [ Dan Carpenter: cleaned up the code flow & added a changelog. ] [ Ingo Molnar: updated the changelog some more. ] Fixes: 375637bc5249 ("perf/core: Introduce address range filtering") Signed-off-by: "kiyin(尹亮)" <kiyin@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: "Srivatsa S. Bhat" <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Cc: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@amazon.com> -- kernel/events/core.c | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 7bdb157cdebbf95a1cd94ed2e01b338714075d00 upstream.

As shown through runtime testing, the "filename" allocation is not
always freed in perf_event_parse_addr_filter().

There are three possible ways that this could happen:

 - It could be allocated twice on subsequent iterations through the loop,
 - or leaked on the success path,
 - or on the failure path.

Clean up the code flow to make it obvious that 'filename' is always
freed in the reallocation path and in the two return paths as well.

We rely on the fact that kfree(NULL) is NOP and filename is initialized
with NULL.

This fixes the leak. No other side effects expected.

[ Dan Carpenter: cleaned up the code flow & added a changelog. ]
[ Ingo Molnar: updated the changelog some more. ]

Fixes: 375637bc5249 ("perf/core: Introduce address range filtering")
Signed-off-by: "kiyin(尹亮)" <kiyin@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: "Srivatsa S. Bhat" <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu>
Cc: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@amazon.com>
--
 kernel/events/core.c |   12 +++++-------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
perf: Fix task_function_call() error handling 2020-10-14T08:33:05+00:00 Kajol Jain kjain@linux.ibm.com 2020-08-27T06:47:32+00:00 760c7a948bea9881598c528a4779aaa7f142d91b [ Upstream commit 6d6b8b9f4fceab7266ca03d194f60ec72bd4b654 ] The error handling introduced by commit: 2ed6edd33a21 ("perf: Add cond_resched() to task_function_call()") looses any return value from smp_call_function_single() that is not {0, -EINVAL}. This is a problem because it will return -EXNIO when the target CPU is offline. Worse, in that case it'll turn into an infinite loop. Fixes: 2ed6edd33a21 ("perf: Add cond_resched() to task_function_call()") Reported-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Barret Rhoden <brho@google.com> Tested-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200827064732.20860-1-kjain@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 6d6b8b9f4fceab7266ca03d194f60ec72bd4b654 ]

The error handling introduced by commit:

  2ed6edd33a21 ("perf: Add cond_resched() to task_function_call()")

looses any return value from smp_call_function_single() that is not
{0, -EINVAL}. This is a problem because it will return -EXNIO when the
target CPU is offline. Worse, in that case it'll turn into an infinite
loop.

Fixes: 2ed6edd33a21 ("perf: Add cond_resched() to task_function_call()")
Reported-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Barret Rhoden <brho@google.com>
Tested-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200827064732.20860-1-kjain@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
perf: Use new infrastructure to fix deadlocks in execve 2020-10-01T11:17:48+00:00 Bernd Edlinger bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de 2020-03-20T20:27:55+00:00 a48cf1c921a7072324b5ce245ccddffec4c970dd [ Upstream commit 6914303824bb572278568330d72fc1f8f9814e67 ] This changes perf_event_set_clock to use the new exec_update_mutex instead of cred_guard_mutex. This should be safe, as the credentials are only used for reading. Signed-off-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 6914303824bb572278568330d72fc1f8f9814e67 ]

This changes perf_event_set_clock to use the new exec_update_mutex
instead of cred_guard_mutex.

This should be safe, as the credentials are only used for reading.

Signed-off-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
perf/core: Fix endless multiplex timer 2020-08-11T13:33:32+00:00 Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org 2020-03-05T12:38:51+00:00 68a2350376b137f98f41a4f153c416282a16531e commit 90c91dfb86d0ff545bd329d3ddd72c147e2ae198 upstream. Kan and Andi reported that we fail to kill rotation when the flexible events go empty, but the context does not. XXX moar Fixes: fd7d55172d1e ("perf/cgroups: Don't rotate events for cgroups unnecessarily") Reported-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Reported-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200305123851.GX2596@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 90c91dfb86d0ff545bd329d3ddd72c147e2ae198 upstream.

Kan and Andi reported that we fail to kill rotation when the flexible
events go empty, but the context does not. XXX moar

Fixes: fd7d55172d1e ("perf/cgroups: Don't rotate events for cgroups unnecessarily")
Reported-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200305123851.GX2596@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
perf: Add cond_resched() to task_function_call() 2020-06-17T14:40:36+00:00 Barret Rhoden brho@google.com 2020-04-14T22:29:20+00:00 e81b05e535e8f4f636b81bdb8a4533cd42d869c8 commit 2ed6edd33a214bca02bd2b45e3fc3038a059436b upstream. Under rare circumstances, task_function_call() can repeatedly fail and cause a soft lockup. There is a slight race where the process is no longer running on the cpu we targeted by the time remote_function() runs. The code will simply try again. If we are very unlucky, this will continue to fail, until a watchdog fires. This can happen in a heavily loaded, multi-core virtual machine. Reported-by: syzbot+bb4935a5c09b5ff79940@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Barret Rhoden <brho@google.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200414222920.121401-1-brho@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 2ed6edd33a214bca02bd2b45e3fc3038a059436b upstream.

Under rare circumstances, task_function_call() can repeatedly fail and
cause a soft lockup.

There is a slight race where the process is no longer running on the cpu
we targeted by the time remote_function() runs.  The code will simply
try again.  If we are very unlucky, this will continue to fail, until a
watchdog fires.  This can happen in a heavily loaded, multi-core virtual
machine.

Reported-by: syzbot+bb4935a5c09b5ff79940@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Barret Rhoden <brho@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200414222920.121401-1-brho@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
perf/core: fix parent pid/tid in task exit events 2020-05-02T06:48:52+00:00 Ian Rogers irogers@google.com 2020-04-17T18:28:42+00:00 9578a8c157b4bd5f04fe8a087e29d616b2f70c80 commit f3bed55e850926614b9898fe982f66d2541a36a5 upstream. Current logic yields the child task as the parent. Before: $ perf record bash -c "perf list > /dev/null" $ perf script -D |grep 'FORK\|EXIT' 4387036190981094 0x5a70 [0x30]: PERF_RECORD_FORK(10472:10472):(10470:10470) 4387036606207580 0xf050 [0x30]: PERF_RECORD_EXIT(10472:10472):(10472:10472) 4387036607103839 0x17150 [0x30]: PERF_RECORD_EXIT(10470:10470):(10470:10470) ^ Note the repeated values here -------------------/ After: 383281514043 0x9d8 [0x30]: PERF_RECORD_FORK(2268:2268):(2266:2266) 383442003996 0x2180 [0x30]: PERF_RECORD_EXIT(2268:2268):(2266:2266) 383451297778 0xb70 [0x30]: PERF_RECORD_EXIT(2266:2266):(2265:2265) Fixes: 94d5d1b2d891 ("perf_counter: Report the cloning task as parent on perf_counter_fork()") Reported-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200417182842.12522-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit f3bed55e850926614b9898fe982f66d2541a36a5 upstream.

Current logic yields the child task as the parent.

Before:
$ perf record bash -c "perf list > /dev/null"
$ perf script -D |grep 'FORK\|EXIT'
4387036190981094 0x5a70 [0x30]: PERF_RECORD_FORK(10472:10472):(10470:10470)
4387036606207580 0xf050 [0x30]: PERF_RECORD_EXIT(10472:10472):(10472:10472)
4387036607103839 0x17150 [0x30]: PERF_RECORD_EXIT(10470:10470):(10470:10470)
                                                   ^
  Note the repeated values here -------------------/

After:
383281514043 0x9d8 [0x30]: PERF_RECORD_FORK(2268:2268):(2266:2266)
383442003996 0x2180 [0x30]: PERF_RECORD_EXIT(2268:2268):(2266:2266)
383451297778 0xb70 [0x30]: PERF_RECORD_EXIT(2266:2266):(2265:2265)

Fixes: 94d5d1b2d891 ("perf_counter: Report the cloning task as parent on perf_counter_fork()")
Reported-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200417182842.12522-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
perf/core: Disable page faults when getting phys address 2020-04-29T14:33:02+00:00 Jiri Olsa jolsa@kernel.org 2020-04-07T14:14:27+00:00 16c370534d6c483978e18ef7ca02ae7b22d480f4 [ Upstream commit d3296fb372bf7497b0e5d0478c4e7a677ec6f6e9 ] We hit following warning when running tests on kernel compiled with CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y: WARNING: CPU: 19 PID: 4472 at mm/gup.c:2381 __get_user_pages_fast+0x1a4/0x200 CPU: 19 PID: 4472 Comm: dummy Not tainted 5.6.0-rc6+ #3 RIP: 0010:__get_user_pages_fast+0x1a4/0x200 ... Call Trace: perf_prepare_sample+0xff1/0x1d90 perf_event_output_forward+0xe8/0x210 __perf_event_overflow+0x11a/0x310 __intel_pmu_pebs_event+0x657/0x850 intel_pmu_drain_pebs_nhm+0x7de/0x11d0 handle_pmi_common+0x1b2/0x650 intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x17b/0x370 perf_event_nmi_handler+0x40/0x60 nmi_handle+0x192/0x590 default_do_nmi+0x6d/0x150 do_nmi+0x2f9/0x3c0 nmi+0x8e/0xd7 While __get_user_pages_fast() is IRQ-safe, it calls access_ok(), which warns on: WARN_ON_ONCE(!in_task() && !pagefault_disabled()) Peter suggested disabling page faults around __get_user_pages_fast(), which gets rid of the warning in access_ok() call. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200407141427.3184722-1-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit d3296fb372bf7497b0e5d0478c4e7a677ec6f6e9 ]

We hit following warning when running tests on kernel
compiled with CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y:

 WARNING: CPU: 19 PID: 4472 at mm/gup.c:2381 __get_user_pages_fast+0x1a4/0x200
 CPU: 19 PID: 4472 Comm: dummy Not tainted 5.6.0-rc6+ #3
 RIP: 0010:__get_user_pages_fast+0x1a4/0x200
 ...
 Call Trace:
  perf_prepare_sample+0xff1/0x1d90
  perf_event_output_forward+0xe8/0x210
  __perf_event_overflow+0x11a/0x310
  __intel_pmu_pebs_event+0x657/0x850
  intel_pmu_drain_pebs_nhm+0x7de/0x11d0
  handle_pmi_common+0x1b2/0x650
  intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x17b/0x370
  perf_event_nmi_handler+0x40/0x60
  nmi_handle+0x192/0x590
  default_do_nmi+0x6d/0x150
  do_nmi+0x2f9/0x3c0
  nmi+0x8e/0xd7

While __get_user_pages_fast() is IRQ-safe, it calls access_ok(),
which warns on:

  WARN_ON_ONCE(!in_task() && !pagefault_disabled())

Peter suggested disabling page faults around __get_user_pages_fast(),
which gets rid of the warning in access_ok() call.

Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200407141427.3184722-1-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>