linux-stable.git/kernel/events/core.c, branch v4.1.45

perf/core: Fix group {cpu,task} validation

2017-10-04T01:36:35+00:00

[ Upstream commit 64aee2a965cf2954a038b5522f11d2cd2f0f8f3e ]

Regardless of which events form a group, it does not make sense for the
events to target different tasks and/or CPUs, as this leaves the group
inconsistent and impossible to schedule. The core perf code assumes that
these are consistent across (successfully intialised) groups.

Core perf code only verifies this when moving SW events into a HW
context. Thus, we can violate this requirement for pure SW groups and
pure HW groups, unless the relevant PMU driver happens to perform this
verification itself. These mismatched groups subsequently wreak havoc
elsewhere.

For example, we handle watchpoints as SW events, and reserve watchpoint
HW on a per-CPU basis at pmu::event_init() time to ensure that any event
that is initialised is guaranteed to have a slot at pmu::add() time.
However, the core code only checks the group leader's cpu filter (via
event_filter_match()), and can thus install follower events onto CPUs
violating thier (mismatched) CPU filters, potentially installing them
into a CPU without sufficient reserved slots.

This can be triggered with the below test case, resulting in warnings
from arch backends.

  #define _GNU_SOURCE
  #include 
  #include 
  #include 
  #include 
  #include 
  #include 
  #include 

  static int perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, pid_t pid, int cpu,
			   int group_fd, unsigned long flags)
  {
	return syscall(__NR_perf_event_open, attr, pid, cpu, group_fd, flags);
  }

  char watched_char;

  struct perf_event_attr wp_attr = {
	.type = PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT,
	.bp_type = HW_BREAKPOINT_RW,
	.bp_addr = (unsigned long)&watched_char,
	.bp_len = 1,
	.size = sizeof(wp_attr),
  };

  int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  {
	int leader, ret;
	cpu_set_t cpus;

	/*
	 * Force use of CPU0 to ensure our CPU0-bound events get scheduled.
	 */
	CPU_ZERO(&cpus);
	CPU_SET(0, &cpus);
	ret = sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(cpus), &cpus);
	if (ret) {
		printf("Unable to set cpu affinity\n");
		return 1;
	}

	/* open leader event, bound to this task, CPU0 only */
	leader = perf_event_open(&wp_attr, 0, 0, -1, 0);
	if (leader < 0) {
		printf("Couldn't open leader: %d\n", leader);
		return 1;
	}

	/*
	 * Open a follower event that is bound to the same task, but a
	 * different CPU. This means that the group should never be possible to
	 * schedule.
	 */
	ret = perf_event_open(&wp_attr, 0, 1, leader, 0);
	if (ret < 0) {
		printf("Couldn't open mismatched follower: %d\n", ret);
		return 1;
	} else {
		printf("Opened leader/follower with mismastched CPUs\n");
	}

	/*
	 * Open as many independent events as we can, all bound to the same
	 * task, CPU0 only.
	 */
	do {
		ret = perf_event_open(&wp_attr, 0, 0, -1, 0);
	} while (ret >= 0);

	/*
	 * Force enable/disble all events to trigger the erronoeous
	 * installation of the follower event.
	 */
	printf("Opened all events. Toggling..\n");
	for (;;) {
		prctl(PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
		prctl(PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
	}

	return 0;
  }

Fix this by validating this requirement regardless of whether we're
moving events.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Alexander Shishkin 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Zhou Chengming 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498142498-15758-1-git-send-email-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Revert "perf/core: Drop kernel samples even though :u is specified"

2017-09-10T20:35:44+00:00

[ Upstream commit 6a8a75f3235724c5941a33e287b2f98966ad14c5 ]

This reverts commit cc1582c231ea041fbc68861dfaf957eaf902b829.

This commit introduced a regression that broke rr-project, which uses sampling
events to receive a signal on overflow (but does not care about the contents
of the sample). These signals are critical to the correct operation of rr.

There's been some back and forth about how to fix it - but to not keep
applications in limbo queue up a revert.

Reported-by: Kyle Huey 
Acked-by: Kyle Huey 
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Jin Yao 
Cc: Vince Weaver 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Will Deacon 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Alexander Shishkin 
Cc: Stephane Eranian 
Cc: Namhyung Kim 
Cc: Jiri Olsa 
Cc: 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170628105600.GC5981@leverpostej
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

perf/core: Drop kernel samples even though :u is specified

2017-06-26T02:02:19+00:00

[ Upstream commit cc1582c231ea041fbc68861dfaf957eaf902b829 ]

When doing sampling, for example:

  perf record -e cycles:u ...

On workloads that do a lot of kernel entry/exits we see kernel
samples, even though :u is specified. This is due to skid existing.

This might be a security issue because it can leak kernel addresses even
though kernel sampling support is disabled.

The patch drops the kernel samples if exclude_kernel is specified.

For example, test on Haswell desktop:

  perf record -e cycles:u 
  perf report --stdio

Before patch applied:

    99.77%  mgen     mgen              [.] buf_read
     0.20%  mgen     mgen              [.] rand_buf_init
     0.01%  mgen     [kernel.vmlinux]  [k] apic_timer_interrupt
     0.00%  mgen     mgen              [.] last_free_elem
     0.00%  mgen     libc-2.23.so      [.] __random_r
     0.00%  mgen     libc-2.23.so      [.] _int_malloc
     0.00%  mgen     mgen              [.] rand_array_init
     0.00%  mgen     [kernel.vmlinux]  [k] page_fault
     0.00%  mgen     libc-2.23.so      [.] __random
     0.00%  mgen     libc-2.23.so      [.] __strcasestr
     0.00%  mgen     ld-2.23.so        [.] strcmp
     0.00%  mgen     ld-2.23.so        [.] _dl_start
     0.00%  mgen     libc-2.23.so      [.] sched_setaffinity@@GLIBC_2.3.4
     0.00%  mgen     ld-2.23.so        [.] _start

We can see kernel symbols apic_timer_interrupt and page_fault.

After patch applied:

    99.79%  mgen     mgen           [.] buf_read
     0.19%  mgen     mgen           [.] rand_buf_init
     0.00%  mgen     libc-2.23.so   [.] __random_r
     0.00%  mgen     mgen           [.] rand_array_init
     0.00%  mgen     mgen           [.] last_free_elem
     0.00%  mgen     libc-2.23.so   [.] vfprintf
     0.00%  mgen     libc-2.23.so   [.] rand
     0.00%  mgen     libc-2.23.so   [.] __random
     0.00%  mgen     libc-2.23.so   [.] _int_malloc
     0.00%  mgen     libc-2.23.so   [.] _IO_doallocbuf
     0.00%  mgen     ld-2.23.so     [.] do_lookup_x
     0.00%  mgen     ld-2.23.so     [.] open_verify.constprop.7
     0.00%  mgen     ld-2.23.so     [.] _dl_important_hwcaps
     0.00%  mgen     libc-2.23.so   [.] sched_setaffinity@@GLIBC_2.3.4
     0.00%  mgen     ld-2.23.so     [.] _start

There are only userspace symbols.

Signed-off-by: Jin Yao 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: 
Cc: Alexander Shishkin 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Jiri Olsa 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Namhyung Kim 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Stephane Eranian 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Vince Weaver 
Cc: acme@kernel.org
Cc: jolsa@kernel.org
Cc: kan.liang@intel.com
Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Cc: yao.jin@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1495706947-3744-1-git-send-email-yao.jin@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

perf/core: Fix event inheritance on fork()

2017-05-17T19:07:02+00:00

[ Upstream commit e7cc4865f0f31698ef2f7aac01a50e78968985b7 ]

While hunting for clues to a use-after-free, Oleg spotted that
perf_event_init_context() can loose an error value with the result
that fork() can succeed even though we did not fully inherit the perf
event context.

Spotted-by: Oleg Nesterov 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Alexander Shishkin 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov 
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker 
Cc: Jiri Olsa 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Stephane Eranian 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Vince Weaver 
Cc: oleg@redhat.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 889ff0150661 ("perf/core: Split context's event group list into pinned and non-pinned lists")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170316125823.190342547@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

perf/core: Fix the perf_cpu_time_max_percent check

2017-03-06T22:31:15+00:00

Use "proc_dointvec_minmax" instead of "proc_dointvec" to check the input
value from user-space.

If not, we can set a big value and some vars will overflow like
"sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate" which will cause a lot of unexpected
problems.

Signed-off-by: Tan Xiaojun 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: 
Cc: 
Cc: Alexander Shishkin 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Jiri Olsa 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Stephane Eranian 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Vince Weaver 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1487829879-56237-1-git-send-email-tanxiaojun@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

perf/core: Make sysctl_perf_cpu_time_max_percent conform to documentation

2017-03-06T22:31:15+00:00

Markus reported that 0 should also disable the throttling we per
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt.

Reported-by: Markus Trippelsdorf 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Alexander Shishkin 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Jiri Olsa 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Stephane Eranian 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Vince Weaver 
Fixes: 91a612eea9a3 ("perf/core: Fix dynamic interrupt throttle")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Tan Xiaojun 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

perf/core: Fix implicitly enable dynamic interrupt throttle

2017-03-06T22:31:15+00:00

This patch fixes an issue which was introduced by commit:

  91a612eea9a3 ("perf/core: Fix dynamic interrupt throttle")

... which commit unconditionally sets the perf_sample_allowed_ns value
to !0. But that could trigger a bug in the following corner case:

The user can disable the dynamic interrupt throttle mechanism by setting
perf_cpu_time_max_percent to 0. Then they change perf_event_max_sample_rate.
For this case, the mechanism will be enabled implicitly, because
perf_sample_allowed_ns becomes !0 - which is not what we want.

This patch only updates perf_sample_allowed_ns when the dynamic
interrupt throttle mechanism is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Kan Liang 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Alexander Shishkin 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Jiri Olsa 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Stephane Eranian 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Vince Weaver 
Cc: acme@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462260366-3160-1-git-send-email-kan.liang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Tan Xiaojun 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

perf/core: Fix dynamic interrupt throttle

2017-03-06T22:31:14+00:00

There were two problems with the dynamic interrupt throttle mechanism,
both triggered by the same action.

When you (or perf_fuzzer) write a huge value into
/proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_sample_rate the computed
perf_sample_allowed_ns becomes 0. This effectively disables the whole
dynamic throttle.

This is fixed by ensuring update_perf_cpu_limits() never sets the
value to 0. However, we allow disabling of the dynamic throttle by
writing 100 to /proc/sys/kernel/perf_cpu_time_max_percent. This will
generate a warning in dmesg.

The second problem is that by setting the max_sample_rate to a huge
number, the adaptive process can take a few tries, since it halfs the
limit each time. Change that to directly compute a new value based on
the observed duration.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Alexander Shishkin 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Borislav Petkov 
Cc: Brian Gerst 
Cc: David Ahern 
Cc: Denys Vlasenko 
Cc: H. Peter Anvin 
Cc: Jiri Olsa 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Namhyung Kim 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Stephane Eranian 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: Vince Weaver 
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Tan Xiaojun 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

perf/core: Fix PERF_RECORD_MMAP2 prot/flags for anonymous memory

2017-03-06T22:31:12+00:00

[ Upstream commit 0b3589be9b98994ce3d5aeca52445d1f5627c4ba ]

Andres reported that MMAP2 records for anonymous memory always have
their protection field 0.

Turns out, someone daft put the prot/flags generation code in the file
branch, leaving them unset for anonymous memory.

Reported-by: Andres Freund 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: Alexander Shishkin 
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 
Cc: Don Zickus 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Stephane Eranian 
Cc: Stephane Eranian 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: acme@kernel.org
Cc: anton@ozlabs.org
Cc: namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.16+
Fixes: f972eb63b100 ("perf: Pass protection and flags bits through mmap2 interface")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170126221508.GF6536@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks

2016-04-12T02:07:35+00:00

[ Upstream commit caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 ]

By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.

To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.

The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g.  by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.

While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.

In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:

 /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
     should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
     directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
     this scenario:
     lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
     drwx------ root root /root
     drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
     -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret

Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Cc: Casey Schaufler 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: James Morris 
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" 
Cc: Andy Shevchenko 
Cc: Andy Lutomirski 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Cc: Willy Tarreau 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin