<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel/events/core.c, branch v3.18.52</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>perf: Tighten (and fix) the grouping condition</title>
<updated>2017-05-08T05:44:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-23T10:19:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5a7b3b1ec16b6bfa57752d37292988e64fcdd172'/>
<id>5a7b3b1ec16b6bfa57752d37292988e64fcdd172</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c3c87e770458aa004bd7ed3f29945ff436fd6511 upstream.

The fix from 9fc81d87420d ("perf: Fix events installation during
moving group") was incomplete in that it failed to recognise that
creating a group with events for different CPUs is semantically
broken -- they cannot be co-scheduled.

Furthermore, it leads to real breakage where, when we create an event
for CPU Y and then migrate it to form a group on CPU X, the code gets
confused where the counter is programmed -- triggered in practice
as well by me via the perf fuzzer.

Fix this by tightening the rules for creating groups. Only allow
grouping of counters that can be co-scheduled in the same context.
This means for the same task and/or the same cpu.

Fixes: 9fc81d87420d ("perf: Fix events installation during moving group")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.090683288@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir &lt;amit.pundir@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c3c87e770458aa004bd7ed3f29945ff436fd6511 upstream.

The fix from 9fc81d87420d ("perf: Fix events installation during
moving group") was incomplete in that it failed to recognise that
creating a group with events for different CPUs is semantically
broken -- they cannot be co-scheduled.

Furthermore, it leads to real breakage where, when we create an event
for CPU Y and then migrate it to form a group on CPU X, the code gets
confused where the counter is programmed -- triggered in practice
as well by me via the perf fuzzer.

Fix this by tightening the rules for creating groups. Only allow
grouping of counters that can be co-scheduled in the same context.
This means for the same task and/or the same cpu.

Fixes: 9fc81d87420d ("perf: Fix events installation during moving group")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.090683288@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir &lt;amit.pundir@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Avoid horrible stack usage</title>
<updated>2017-04-30T03:49:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra (Intel)</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-16T11:47:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=803e3757c40366d673b7792f6ac07793825fafeb'/>
<id>803e3757c40366d673b7792f6ac07793825fafeb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 86038c5ea81b519a8a1fcfcd5e4599aab0cdd119 upstream.

Both Linus (most recent) and Steve (a while ago) reported that perf
related callbacks have massive stack bloat.

The problem is that software events need a pt_regs in order to
properly report the event location and unwind stack. And because we
could not assume one was present we allocated one on stack and filled
it with minimal bits required for operation.

Now, pt_regs is quite large, so this is undesirable. Furthermore it
turns out that most sites actually have a pt_regs pointer available,
making this even more onerous, as the stack space is pointless waste.

This patch addresses the problem by observing that software events
have well defined nesting semantics, therefore we can use static
per-cpu storage instead of on-stack.

Linus made the further observation that all but the scheduler callers
of perf_sw_event() have a pt_regs available, so we change the regular
perf_sw_event() to require a valid pt_regs (where it used to be
optional) and add perf_sw_event_sched() for the scheduler.

We have a scheduler specific call instead of a more generic _noregs()
like construct because we can assume non-recursion from the scheduler
and thereby simplify the code further (_noregs would have to put the
recursion context call inline in order to assertain which __perf_regs
element to use).

One last note on the implementation of perf_trace_buf_prepare(); we
allow .regs = NULL for those cases where we already have a pt_regs
pointer available and do not need another.

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Reported-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Javi Merino &lt;javi.merino@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Tom Zanussi &lt;tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Vaibhav Nagarnaik &lt;vnagarnaik@google.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141216115041.GW3337@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 86038c5ea81b519a8a1fcfcd5e4599aab0cdd119 upstream.

Both Linus (most recent) and Steve (a while ago) reported that perf
related callbacks have massive stack bloat.

The problem is that software events need a pt_regs in order to
properly report the event location and unwind stack. And because we
could not assume one was present we allocated one on stack and filled
it with minimal bits required for operation.

Now, pt_regs is quite large, so this is undesirable. Furthermore it
turns out that most sites actually have a pt_regs pointer available,
making this even more onerous, as the stack space is pointless waste.

This patch addresses the problem by observing that software events
have well defined nesting semantics, therefore we can use static
per-cpu storage instead of on-stack.

Linus made the further observation that all but the scheduler callers
of perf_sw_event() have a pt_regs available, so we change the regular
perf_sw_event() to require a valid pt_regs (where it used to be
optional) and add perf_sw_event_sched() for the scheduler.

We have a scheduler specific call instead of a more generic _noregs()
like construct because we can assume non-recursion from the scheduler
and thereby simplify the code further (_noregs would have to put the
recursion context call inline in order to assertain which __perf_regs
element to use).

One last note on the implementation of perf_trace_buf_prepare(); we
allow .regs = NULL for those cases where we already have a pt_regs
pointer available and do not need another.

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Reported-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Javi Merino &lt;javi.merino@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Tom Zanussi &lt;tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Vaibhav Nagarnaik &lt;vnagarnaik@google.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141216115041.GW3337@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Fix event inheritance on fork()</title>
<updated>2017-04-22T05:15:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-16T12:47:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=56f5f521cb3c9a90ea40bc6053eb3961d4bbbb0d'/>
<id>56f5f521cb3c9a90ea40bc6053eb3961d4bbbb0d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e7cc4865f0f31698ef2f7aac01a50e78968985b7 upstream.

While hunting for clues to a use-after-free, Oleg spotted that
perf_event_init_context() can loose an error value with the result
that fork() can succeed even though we did not fully inherit the perf
event context.

Spotted-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Cc: oleg@redhat.com
Fixes: 889ff0150661 ("perf/core: Split context's event group list into pinned and non-pinned lists")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170316125823.190342547@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e7cc4865f0f31698ef2f7aac01a50e78968985b7 upstream.

While hunting for clues to a use-after-free, Oleg spotted that
perf_event_init_context() can loose an error value with the result
that fork() can succeed even though we did not fully inherit the perf
event context.

Spotted-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Cc: oleg@redhat.com
Fixes: 889ff0150661 ("perf/core: Split context's event group list into pinned and non-pinned lists")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170316125823.190342547@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks</title>
<updated>2016-04-12T21:06:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jann@thejh.net</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-20T23:00:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b68c9b9a3f934851babe4862a19cedaeb20aa36b'/>
<id>b68c9b9a3f934851babe4862a19cedaeb20aa36b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 ]

By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.

To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.

The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g.  by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.

While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.

In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:

 /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
     should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
     directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
     this scenario:
     lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -&gt; /root/foobar
     drwx------ root root /root
     drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
     -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret

Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jann@thejh.net&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 ]

By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.

To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.

The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g.  by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.

While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.

In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:

 /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
     should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
     directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
     this scenario:
     lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -&gt; /root/foobar
     drwx------ root root /root
     drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
     -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret

Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jann@thejh.net&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Fix PERF_EVENT_IOC_PERIOD migration race</title>
<updated>2015-09-15T17:58:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-04T17:22:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a19bd3d535bcd02802b50d5cfd7b148fd183e9e7'/>
<id>a19bd3d535bcd02802b50d5cfd7b148fd183e9e7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c7999c6f3fed9e383d3131474588f282ae6d56b9 ]

I ran the perf fuzzer, which triggered some WARN()s which are due to
trying to stop/restart an event on the wrong CPU.

Use the normal IPI pattern to ensure we run the code on the correct CPU.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: bad7192b842c ("perf: Fix PERF_EVENT_IOC_PERIOD to force-reset the period")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c7999c6f3fed9e383d3131474588f282ae6d56b9 ]

I ran the perf fuzzer, which triggered some WARN()s which are due to
trying to stop/restart an event on the wrong CPU.

Use the normal IPI pattern to ensure we run the code on the correct CPU.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: bad7192b842c ("perf: Fix PERF_EVENT_IOC_PERIOD to force-reset the period")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Fix fasync handling on inherited events</title>
<updated>2015-09-15T17:57:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-11T08:32:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c08266ad1aa01aa974f1ac1c960b93f70a0c7915'/>
<id>c08266ad1aa01aa974f1ac1c960b93f70a0c7915</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fed66e2cdd4f127a43fd11b8d92a99bdd429528c ]

Vince reported that the fasync signal stuff doesn't work proper for
inherited events. So fix that.

Installing fasync allocates memory and sets filp-&gt;f_flags |= FASYNC,
which upon the demise of the file descriptor ensures the allocation is
freed and state is updated.

Now for perf, we can have the events stick around for a while after the
original FD is dead because of references from child events. So we
cannot copy the fasync pointer around. We can however consistently use
the parent's fasync, as that will be updated.

Reported-and-Tested-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho deMelo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: eranian@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1434011521.1495.71.camel@twins
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit fed66e2cdd4f127a43fd11b8d92a99bdd429528c ]

Vince reported that the fasync signal stuff doesn't work proper for
inherited events. So fix that.

Installing fasync allocates memory and sets filp-&gt;f_flags |= FASYNC,
which upon the demise of the file descriptor ensures the allocation is
freed and state is updated.

Now for perf, we can have the events stick around for a while after the
original FD is dead because of references from child events. So we
cannot copy the fasync pointer around. We can however consistently use
the parent's fasync, as that will be updated.

Reported-and-Tested-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho deMelo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: eranian@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1434011521.1495.71.camel@twins
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Fix ring_buffer_attach() RCU sync, again</title>
<updated>2015-07-13T12:50:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-30T20:04:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=eb1ea7225f048971e596f26dbda4f7089869b553'/>
<id>eb1ea7225f048971e596f26dbda4f7089869b553</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2f993cf093643b98477c421fa2b9a98dcc940323 ]

While looking for other users of get_state/cond_sync. I Found
ring_buffer_attach() and it looks obviously buggy?

Don't we need to ensure that we have "synchronize" _between_
list_del() and list_add() ?

IOW. Suppose that ring_buffer_attach() preempts right_after
get_state_synchronize_rcu() and gp completes before spin_lock().

In this case cond_synchronize_rcu() does nothing and we reuse
-&gt;rb_entry without waiting for gp in between?

It also moves the -&gt;rcu_pending check under "if (rb)", to make it
more readable imo.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: dave@stgolabs.net
Cc: der.herr@hofr.at
Cc: josh@joshtriplett.org
Cc: tj@kernel.org
Fixes: b69cf53640da ("perf: Fix a race between ring_buffer_detach() and ring_buffer_attach()")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150530200425.GA15748@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2f993cf093643b98477c421fa2b9a98dcc940323 ]

While looking for other users of get_state/cond_sync. I Found
ring_buffer_attach() and it looks obviously buggy?

Don't we need to ensure that we have "synchronize" _between_
list_del() and list_add() ?

IOW. Suppose that ring_buffer_attach() preempts right_after
get_state_synchronize_rcu() and gp completes before spin_lock().

In this case cond_synchronize_rcu() does nothing and we reuse
-&gt;rb_entry without waiting for gp in between?

It also moves the -&gt;rcu_pending check under "if (rb)", to make it
more readable imo.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: dave@stgolabs.net
Cc: der.herr@hofr.at
Cc: josh@joshtriplett.org
Cc: tj@kernel.org
Fixes: b69cf53640da ("perf: Fix a race between ring_buffer_detach() and ring_buffer_attach()")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150530200425.GA15748@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Fix irq_work 'tail' recursion</title>
<updated>2015-04-17T00:11:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-19T17:03:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f7d84d2b7c3e17b7004a1b4e71c3944bdf5d6cbb'/>
<id>f7d84d2b7c3e17b7004a1b4e71c3944bdf5d6cbb</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d525211f9d1be8b523ec7633f080f2116f5ea536 ]

Vince reported a watchdog lockup like:

	[&lt;ffffffff8115e114&gt;] perf_tp_event+0xc4/0x210
	[&lt;ffffffff810b4f8a&gt;] perf_trace_lock+0x12a/0x160
	[&lt;ffffffff810b7f10&gt;] lock_release+0x130/0x260
	[&lt;ffffffff816c7474&gt;] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x24/0x40
	[&lt;ffffffff8107bb4d&gt;] do_send_sig_info+0x5d/0x80
	[&lt;ffffffff811f69df&gt;] send_sigio_to_task+0x12f/0x1a0
	[&lt;ffffffff811f71ce&gt;] send_sigio+0xae/0x100
	[&lt;ffffffff811f72b7&gt;] kill_fasync+0x97/0xf0
	[&lt;ffffffff8115d0b4&gt;] perf_event_wakeup+0xd4/0xf0
	[&lt;ffffffff8115d103&gt;] perf_pending_event+0x33/0x60
	[&lt;ffffffff8114e3fc&gt;] irq_work_run_list+0x4c/0x80
	[&lt;ffffffff8114e448&gt;] irq_work_run+0x18/0x40
	[&lt;ffffffff810196af&gt;] smp_trace_irq_work_interrupt+0x3f/0xc0
	[&lt;ffffffff816c99bd&gt;] trace_irq_work_interrupt+0x6d/0x80

Which is caused by an irq_work generating new irq_work and therefore
not allowing forward progress.

This happens because processing the perf irq_work triggers another
perf event (tracepoint stuff) which in turn generates an irq_work ad
infinitum.

Avoid this by raising the recursion counter in the irq_work -- which
effectively disables all software events (including tracepoints) from
actually triggering again.

Reported-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Tested-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150219170311.GH21418@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d525211f9d1be8b523ec7633f080f2116f5ea536 ]

Vince reported a watchdog lockup like:

	[&lt;ffffffff8115e114&gt;] perf_tp_event+0xc4/0x210
	[&lt;ffffffff810b4f8a&gt;] perf_trace_lock+0x12a/0x160
	[&lt;ffffffff810b7f10&gt;] lock_release+0x130/0x260
	[&lt;ffffffff816c7474&gt;] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x24/0x40
	[&lt;ffffffff8107bb4d&gt;] do_send_sig_info+0x5d/0x80
	[&lt;ffffffff811f69df&gt;] send_sigio_to_task+0x12f/0x1a0
	[&lt;ffffffff811f71ce&gt;] send_sigio+0xae/0x100
	[&lt;ffffffff811f72b7&gt;] kill_fasync+0x97/0xf0
	[&lt;ffffffff8115d0b4&gt;] perf_event_wakeup+0xd4/0xf0
	[&lt;ffffffff8115d103&gt;] perf_pending_event+0x33/0x60
	[&lt;ffffffff8114e3fc&gt;] irq_work_run_list+0x4c/0x80
	[&lt;ffffffff8114e448&gt;] irq_work_run+0x18/0x40
	[&lt;ffffffff810196af&gt;] smp_trace_irq_work_interrupt+0x3f/0xc0
	[&lt;ffffffff816c99bd&gt;] trace_irq_work_interrupt+0x6d/0x80

Which is caused by an irq_work generating new irq_work and therefore
not allowing forward progress.

This happens because processing the perf irq_work triggers another
perf event (tracepoint stuff) which in turn generates an irq_work ad
infinitum.

Avoid this by raising the recursion counter in the irq_work -- which
effectively disables all software events (including tracepoints) from
actually triggering again.

Reported-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Tested-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150219170311.GH21418@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Fix events installation during moving group</title>
<updated>2015-01-16T14:59:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Olsa</name>
<email>jolsa@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-10T20:23:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=78a458e3617533fdd50c43d37538a2ba39165547'/>
<id>78a458e3617533fdd50c43d37538a2ba39165547</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9fc81d87420d0d3fd62d5e5529972c0ad9eab9cc upstream.

We allow PMU driver to change the cpu on which the event
should be installed to. This happened in patch:

  e2d37cd213dc ("perf: Allow the PMU driver to choose the CPU on which to install events")

This patch also forces all the group members to follow
the currently opened events cpu if the group happened
to be moved.

This and the change of event-&gt;cpu in perf_install_in_context()
function introduced in:

  0cda4c023132 ("perf: Introduce perf_pmu_migrate_context()")

forces group members to change their event-&gt;cpu,
if the currently-opened-event's PMU changed the cpu
and there is a group move.

Above behaviour causes problem for breakpoint events,
which uses event-&gt;cpu to touch cpu specific data for
breakpoints accounting. By changing event-&gt;cpu, some
breakpoints slots were wrongly accounted for given
cpu.

Vinces's perf fuzzer hit this issue and caused following
WARN on my setup:

   WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 20214 at arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c:119 arch_install_hw_breakpoint+0x142/0x150()
   Can't find any breakpoint slot
   [...]

This patch changes the group moving code to keep the event's
original cpu.

Reported-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vince@deater.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vince@deater.net&gt;
Cc: Yan, Zheng &lt;zheng.z.yan@intel.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1418243031-20367-3-git-send-email-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9fc81d87420d0d3fd62d5e5529972c0ad9eab9cc upstream.

We allow PMU driver to change the cpu on which the event
should be installed to. This happened in patch:

  e2d37cd213dc ("perf: Allow the PMU driver to choose the CPU on which to install events")

This patch also forces all the group members to follow
the currently opened events cpu if the group happened
to be moved.

This and the change of event-&gt;cpu in perf_install_in_context()
function introduced in:

  0cda4c023132 ("perf: Introduce perf_pmu_migrate_context()")

forces group members to change their event-&gt;cpu,
if the currently-opened-event's PMU changed the cpu
and there is a group move.

Above behaviour causes problem for breakpoint events,
which uses event-&gt;cpu to touch cpu specific data for
breakpoints accounting. By changing event-&gt;cpu, some
breakpoints slots were wrongly accounted for given
cpu.

Vinces's perf fuzzer hit this issue and caused following
WARN on my setup:

   WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 20214 at arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c:119 arch_install_hw_breakpoint+0x142/0x150()
   Can't find any breakpoint slot
   [...]

This patch changes the group moving code to keep the event's
original cpu.

Reported-by: Vince Weaver &lt;vince@deater.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;fweisbec@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vince@deater.net&gt;
Cc: Yan, Zheng &lt;zheng.z.yan@intel.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1418243031-20367-3-git-send-email-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Fix corruption of sibling list with hotplug</title>
<updated>2014-11-16T08:45:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-05T16:11:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=226424eee809251ec23bd4b09d8efba09c10fc3c'/>
<id>226424eee809251ec23bd4b09d8efba09c10fc3c</id>
<content type='text'>
When a CPU hotplugged out, we call perf_remove_from_context() (via
perf_event_exit_cpu()) to rip each CPU-bound event out of its PMU's cpu
context, but leave siblings grouped together. Freeing of these events is
left to the mercy of the usual refcounting.

When a CPU-bound event's refcount drops to zero we cross-call to
__perf_remove_from_context() to clean it up, detaching grouped siblings.

This works when the relevant CPU is online, but will fail if the CPU is
currently offline, and we won't detach the event from its siblings
before freeing the event, leaving the sibling list corrupt. If the
sibling list is later walked (e.g. because the CPU cam online again
before a remaining sibling's refcount drops to zero), we will walk the
now corrupted siblings list, potentially dereferencing garbage values.

Given that the events should never be scheduled again (as we removed
them from their context), we can simply detatch siblings when the CPU
goes down in the first place. If the CPU comes back online, the
redundant call to __perf_remove_from_context() is safe.

Reported-by: Drew Richardson &lt;drew.richardson@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: vincent.weaver@maine.edu
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1415203904-25308-2-git-send-email-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When a CPU hotplugged out, we call perf_remove_from_context() (via
perf_event_exit_cpu()) to rip each CPU-bound event out of its PMU's cpu
context, but leave siblings grouped together. Freeing of these events is
left to the mercy of the usual refcounting.

When a CPU-bound event's refcount drops to zero we cross-call to
__perf_remove_from_context() to clean it up, detaching grouped siblings.

This works when the relevant CPU is online, but will fail if the CPU is
currently offline, and we won't detach the event from its siblings
before freeing the event, leaving the sibling list corrupt. If the
sibling list is later walked (e.g. because the CPU cam online again
before a remaining sibling's refcount drops to zero), we will walk the
now corrupted siblings list, potentially dereferencing garbage values.

Given that the events should never be scheduled again (as we removed
them from their context), we can simply detatch siblings when the CPU
goes down in the first place. If the CPU comes back online, the
redundant call to __perf_remove_from_context() is safe.

Reported-by: Drew Richardson &lt;drew.richardson@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: vincent.weaver@maine.edu
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1415203904-25308-2-git-send-email-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
